Abstract

Almost all political, economic, financial, and population migration indicators of Nepal have been showing pessimistic trends, reflecting an increasingly sensitive status due to the electoral delimitation, an oversized mixed electoral system, and a hugely overburdened governing structure fuelled by a lack of good governance. In fact, “electoral delimitation” and “electoral system” are directly associated with the “governing structure,” and the other remaining factor, such as “lack of good governance,” is, to a significant extent, a by-product of political instability sourced by this giant “mixed electoral system.” Furthermore, provided the availability of a couple of my prior research publications regarding the aspects of governing structural reform and electoral interventions, this research is entirely focused on electoral delimitation. It has studied the currently implemented electoral constituency delimitation and identified various issues or gerrymandering due to the derogative scaling of its only available and based statistical tools called the weightage system. Due to not only the ill scaling but also the rigidity of the weightage system toward addressing the status of all available diversities or deviations, the only available modern electoral delimitation called “Weightage Electoral Delimitation System” has been failing to address the entities of equality, equity, and inclusion at the determinant, distributional, and representational levels. Significant amounts of spatial gerrymandering have been noticed in most of the Terai districts—most particularly Sarlahi, Mahottari, Saptari, Morang, Dhanusha, Dang, Banke, Kailali, and Kanchanpur, etc.—along with numerical gerrymandering. The maximum electoral constituencies, almost 49% of total seats from both the FPTP and PR electoral systems (135 MPs out of a total of 275 MPs and 269 MLAs out of 550 MLAs), have been provided to Terai alone, disregarding almost 80% of the geography of Nepal—Hilly & Himalaya regions, and their population. Thus, the research has introduced “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance & Flexibility (CSoBaF)” to form the “Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation System (CECD System),” guided by the “Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation (CPoD),” in order to address the available diversities and deviations with the spirit of political core values to prevent the existence of any potential gerrymandering. For the validation of the constituency delimitation, the Validity Status Determination System (VSDS) has been added with its own statistical formulations that categorize four validation clusters with a two-dimensional validation system both less than 100% down to 1% and from more than 100% up to 199% to deal with and validate multi-determinant parameters effectively, efficiently, and inclusively. Anyway, the CECD System with CSoBaF has maximum flexibility to address, inclusively, all the statuses of the potentially available deviations or diversities from 0% - 1200% addible and 0% - 97.25% deductible on its average value (μ or $\overline{\alpha }$ ), comprehensively covering all the potential clusters from Minimum Normal Deviation to Maximum Normal, Maximum Normal to Minimum Exceptional Deviation, and from Minimum Exceptional to Extreme Exceptional Deviation with its own Average, Addible, and Deductible Statistics Methods. After the establishment of CSoBaF, the research has delimited the overall constituency of Nepal. The remarkable aspect of CECD System is also about its measurability. It makes the equality, equity and inclusion as the measurable criteria. It has equally and inclusively distributed the FCAs among the districts as per their parameters and determinants on a case-by-case basis. Anyway, the best part is that it has allocated only one (1) FCA for only twenty-one (21) districts with all validity status, unlike the thirty-five (35) delimited districts (almost half the number of districts) of the currently delimited and implemented constituency delimitation. In addition, the current status of the spatial gerrymandering mostly seen in the Terai region has been justifiably addressed and the numerical gerrymandering has been settled with CECD, and an inclusive figure of 44% and its equivalent 121 MPs (64 from FPTP and 57 from PR) has been determined against the currently implemented 49.09% (135 MPs). Anyway, Absolute Non-discriminatory Operational Mechanism; its own new statistical tools with a new validation system; universally & locally applicable constituency delimitation; neither urban nor rural but all-oriented inclusive electoral constituency delimitation; assurance of “LUAs < SPA < FCA Concept”; cost-effective, rational & pragmatic and more inclusive constituencies; appropriate to address all the weaknesses and loopholes of the only available modern weightage system-led constituency delimitation; etc., are major conclusive features of the Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation System (CECD System). And, the “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance & Flexibility (CSoBaF)”, “Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation (CPoD)”, “Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation System (CECD System)”, and “Validity Status Determination System (VSDS)” have been established as innovations and important achievements of this research.

Keywords

Theory of Statistics, Electoral-Delimitation, Fair Electoral Delimitation Theory, Election-System, Electoral Theory of Consensus & Majoritarianism, Growth-Maximizing Economic Theories, Forced & COMPULSIVE Migration Theories, Governing Structural Reformation and Good Governance

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1. Introduction

What typical course of direction and condition the particular country takes, obviously, depends on how the form of its governance and corresponding political representation has been set and established within its governing structure. The political representation of the country depends on what and how its electoral system and electoral constituencies are designed. Similarly, in order to ensure the effectively operational governing system and governance structure, political representation, electoral system and elected government, and policy and program, etc., good governance or its respective honest decisional, operational, and implementational execution is the only mandatory tool. In the case and context of an electoral constituency boundary, if everything remains the same and intact, we need to assess how the electoral boundaries have been delineated and how representation is distributed across the country in order to acknowledge how the electoral constituency delimitation and corresponding distribution and allocation of representation have been made countrywide. Before doing so, we need to see the structural provision and the number and size of governing structures as directed by the constitution. Upon the existence of any infeasibility in the existing constitution in terms of the size and form of the governing structure, we have no option other than to go for a constitutional amendment. And definitely, with an infeasible constitutional provision, if we or any Constituency Delimitation Commission conducts electoral delimitation, there is for sure the existence of discrepancies or mismatches or overburdened electoral constituencies with lots of gerrymandering. In the case of Nepal too, we have some constitutional provisions regarding an oversized governing structure, an overloaded mixed electoral system with the mandatory existence of FPTP & PR and their separate electoral quotas of 165 & 110 for MPs and 330 & 220 for MLAs, 7 state governments, 7 assemblies with the Federal Union Government and Federal Assemblies, along with 753 local governments, etc.; these are the constitutional provisions we need to review in order to maintain their feasibility and sustainability.

Furthermore, having a total of 761 governments (1 federal, 7 state, 753 local units) and, as reported, oversized governments, along with the 275-member Federal Assembly, 550-member State Assembly, and 59-member National Assembly, raises striking questions about its upper government structure; on the other hand, having a total of 37,012 political posts (*Appendix for source) across all three government structures also raises questions about its size and unhealthy and expensive operating costs.

(Thapa, 2026a)

In spite of, and along with, the availability of all these discrepancies, the oversized electoral constituency delimitation has been executed, but with gerrymandering and the mal-proportionate distribution of electoral constituencies by the Constituency Delimitation Commission of Nepal in the year 2017. One thing is that it has been constitutionally arranged as oversized, and the other thing is that even this oversized number of constituencies has also been gerrymandered or ill-distributed among various geographies. Leaving all these constitutionally provisional issues aside to the possibility of a constitutional course of future amendment, let us only focus on the aspects of electoral delimitation as the research paper itself is all about. However, to identify vivid impacts of this huge, over-expensive electoral delimitation guided by its overloaded mixed electoral system, and the over-structured mixed electoral system sourced by its oversized governance structure, this research is going to evaluate the overall aspects of the country, especially its political, economic, judicial, populational, administrative, etc., facets. This process is going to provide a valid ground for further research on the reformation of electoral constituency delimitation, the electoral system, and governing structure.

Anyway, now to talk about electoral constituency especially the current trend of constituency, it was delimited by the Constituency Delimitation Commission in the year 2017, and it has been in execution for 20 years up to 2037. The commission had delimited Nepalese electoral areas by enforcing a “weightage system” and the major parameters had been focused only on 2 parameters, population and geography, though other parameters such as remoteness, administrative boundaries, cultural and social traits, transportation proximity, economic viability, aboriginal and ethnic identity, etc., were and are also constitutionally provisioned {Article 286 (5), (6)—Constitution of Nepal 2015, 2015}. The given weightage for these 2 parameters had been set to a 90:10 ratio, 90 for population and 10 for geography, which is completely contradicted by the provision of Article 286 (5). The article says, “While determining election constituencies pursuant to this Article, the Election Constituency Delimitation Commission shall so determine the constituencies, having regard to population and geography as the basis of representation, and as to ensure that the ratio between the geography, population and number of members of such election constituencies is equal, so far as practicable”. In fact, the implemented weightage system has made the electoral constituency delimitation almost population-based or entirely population dominant. It had not given rational and pragmatic weightage to geography, distribution of population, and other parameters. The other remaining parameters are only used to determine the directional or spatial dimension of the composition of each electoral area. Anyway, the following are the commission recommended district-wise numbers of electoral constituencies (Table 1).

Table 1. Specific conceptual framework.

Source: Delimitation Commission Report of early September 2017 (Constituency Delimitation Commission of Nepal, 2017).

With this weightage system, the Commission had delimited the constituencies in a mal-proportionate manner. Geographically huge areas comprising almost 35 districts of the Hilly and Himalayan regions had received only a single electoral constituency each district. In contrast, the highly populated but geographically small Terai region, constituting almost 23% of the territory, had alone received 78 constituencies out of a total of 165 constituencies for FPTP. Including 51.45% of PR seats, it had received 135 MPs out of 275 MPs. On average, geographically, the Terai had received 49.09% of MPs. Furthermore, almost all of these seats are centered in the highly populated cities of Terai.

In this way, the notion of “non-decreasing of at least 2 constituencies for each district” in the previous Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 (Article 154.A.8) and the earlier Constitution of Nepal 1990 (Article 105.2) has been completely ignored. The fair delimitation principle of “impartiality” has been totally undermined, and “distribution of population” has been entirely ignored by only leveraging the “concentration of people” (Paudyal, 2017). In an attempt to make delimitation as “equal representation”, the commission disregarded “equitable representation”, without which democracy cannot be inclusive. This is obviously no exception in the current context of inclusive democracy in the Nepalese Federal Democratic Republican State (Article 4).

Thus, the recent report and recommendation of delimitation, indeed, raise the following questions.

• What is inclusion in federalism, and what is the role of inclusion in delimiting the boundaries of electoral constituencies?

• Who are the outreached, ignored, deprived, and discriminated populations or geographies? Is it urban, Terai, or rural areas of rural hilly and Himalayan districts?

• Then, what about the utterance of inclusion in the inclusive democracy of the Federal Democratic Republic State of Nepal?

• And what about the future and sustainability of the delimitation?

Thus, the Constituency Delimitation Commission of Nepal (2017) had even boycotted the basic guiding principle of inclusion by setting a derogatory “weightage system” of “90/10” for population and geographic area (Constituency Delimitation Commission of Nepal, 2017), which in itself is completely against the spirit of “inclusive democracy” of the federal democratic republic of Nepal on the one hand, and on the other, as the population and geographic area are two different parameters that require both parameters to be dealt with systematically, the simple “weightage system” cannot allocate rational electoral constituencies accurately, definably, and justifiably, remaining under the spirit of democracy.

In addition, the following are snapshots of the limitations, problem analysis, major issues to address, and key solutional clue of the weightage system.

1.1. Limitation of Weightage System Electoral Constituency Delimitation

• The Weightage System Electoral Constituency Delimitation cannot delimit the exceptional cases correctly as it only focuses on one parameter. Even if there is a constitutional provision for the availability of a certain minimum deviation in order to incorporate its specificity, such as “equitable representation”, “distribution of population”, and “size & difficulties of geography”, that is not enough. It only addresses one parameter, population, and the acceptability of deviation is very minimal. It does not address exceptional cases and the availability of deviations and diversities. It is more about equal representational delimitation and it remains silent when there are exceptional cases requiring inclusive and equitable representational delimitation. Typically, the Nepalese delimitation procedure does not address these deviations and diversities. However, the constitution has arranged the provision of having at least one constituency in each district. Yet, this is not enough to address the exceptional cases.

• Apart from the exceptional, it also remains silent when there are other normal deviations as well. In reality, in almost all cases, the actual real constituencies are surely normal deviations. The question is how you justify when there is no mechanism in the weightage system for adjusting these normal to exceptional deviations or diversities.

• It only discusses deviation or diversities of a certain minimum scale of the first parameter, but it does not state what it should be in terms of the second parameter.

• The maximum number of constituencies are allocated to cities of the Terai and centers. very few are allocated to the Hilly and Himalaya regions.

• If the parameter of one determinant is designed or remains higher, the second remains undermined. Similarly, if the second determinant is designed or remains larger, the first determinant remains affected. In both cases, the total electoral constituency delimitation of the country is entirely affected. Even if it is put somewhere around the equilibrium point, it cannot appropriately address the availability of normal and exceptional deviations. It is exactly the big question that the weightage system does not have any answer for, and it is its limitation or problem.

• To be more specific, if electoral constituency delimitation ignores geographic area in the name of a weightage system only emphasising population, it means that it is limiting the rights and future of people of the rural area where the government has to invest most of its capital for physical infrastructural development with some small investment for day-to-day operational services for rural people. To add a little bit to it, the people of rural villages—though smaller in population size and extremely large in geographic area—are actually suffering significantly from poverty, exclusion, deprivation, unemployment, and lack of basic access in comparison to the urban population. Moreover, in the primitive condition of unavailability of even basic infrastructure and facilities in rural areas of Nepal, the government must essentially allocate majority portion of its development budget for rational rural development. It is one of the biggest questions whether and how much budget the government of Nepal has been allocating for its rural governance and development. However, if constituency delimitation is ignoring population in the name of geographic area, then it is limiting the rights and future of the people in urban areas, where the government has to invest more for the day-to-day operational facilities of urban life, with some average scale (in terms of its investment in daily operational facilities) of infrastructural development. So, in both cases, the unnecessary weightage principle or system for delimitation turns out to be imperfect delimitation that has an adverse impact on both sides: the people of the center as well as the periphery.

1.2. Problem Analysis

• The number and distribution of electoral constituencies are not entirely unjust.

• Existence of Gerrymandering.

• Inequality in state power sharing and political representation.

• Lack of public perception of balanced and equitable development.

• Almost all of the available modern delimitations follow the weightage system. It is mostly based on the weightage given to various primary and secondary determinants. Thus, there is always a chance of questions arising regarding the ratio set for various determinants. It also raises curiosity about how it addresses the specific increment of one determinant with others. Thus, it appears more manipulative, as it alters the ratio rather than incorporating and automating with the actual naturally available ratio of determinants through the natural automation system called AODS (Automatic Objective Determination System). This is what, actually, the CPoD (Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation) guided delimitation named CECD (Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation) discusses further ahead in this research.

1.3. Major Issues to Address

• Highly populated but geographically very small cities and surroundings such as Kathmandu, Biratnagar, Pokhara, Birgunj, Butwal, etc.

• Rarely populated but extremely large districts such as Manag, Mustang, Dolpa, etc.,

• And how you address these issues to ensure inclusivity, equality, and equitability at the constituency delimitation level is the major issue to address.

1.4. Key Solutional Clue

• The new dynamic “Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation” led by the “Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation” and its own all-in-one statistical operating mechanism called “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility” with its “Validity Status Determination System (VSDS)” is the solution which is established throughout this research.

1.5. What Is the Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation?

• The Comprehensive Principle or Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation (CPoD) means a pervasive, broad, holistic, integrated, universal, cosmological, macrocosmic, extensive, or microcosmic principle (or basis, source, truth, fact, rule, set of beliefs, proposition) that serves as the foundation for a system or system of belief or behavior, or chain of reasoning for setting the clear boundary or limitation or meaning for the elimination of ambiguity and further clarification of specific terminology, idea, field, discipline, stream, and faculty. It believes in having and developing its own continuously developing, well-developed system of thought based on evidence-informed, vision and value-guided world and humanitarian welfare, prosperity, and futuristic movement with its own sophisticated and well-equipped system, model, tool, methodology, operating mechanism, organization, and governance to at least address the overall context/situation/issue/problem/aspect/welfare/prosperity more perfectly, scientifically, theoretically, and as well as pragmatically that of other available traditional or existing principles are unaware of. It trusts in the existence of the Real World, which is so vivid and diverse, and, thus, develops a consent and instrument for studying and addressing each individual status/case/issue/situation/context/possibility or welfare individually as per the guidance of broader systematic categorization of rational and pragmatic local/national/global/universal paradigm and its respective Super-Smart Comprehensive Master system/policy/plan/resource/program/project/campaign.

• Thus, from the electoral constituency delimitation perspective, CPoD is only the means through which delimitation can be as exactly done as per the spirit and objectives of the constitution, as well as humanitarian and pure political core values (Democratic or Republican), with more qualitative and quantitative results. Unlike traditional Weightage System Delimitation, it can address each and every corner/edge/periphery/rural and Centre (Urban/City) and its population on an essence and necessity basis. Thus, it can deal with its very Average to Normal Flexibility Case/deviation/diversity up to Exceptional Cases/deviation/diversity at once. Hence, it has global essence along with individual national significance (Thapa, 2017a).

• Positive-Bosomism, Humanism, and Stato-Dynamism & Progressivism are the major traits of the Comprehensive Principle. It believes in core political values, where there is no space for any kind or form of discrimination. Everywhere, there is only positive and pure democracy or publico-cracy or people’s political governance system with positive and benevolent justice, facilities, rights, and benefits with rational responsibilities. It has eternal trust in natural human rights (life, liberty & pursuit of happiness, and social, political, economic and employment, legal, etc.), human diversity, individuality, equality, prosperity, integrity, solidarity, fraternity, humanism, peace, and development. It also believes in the human identity principle, such as individualism on the one hand, and on the other, it correlates individualism, self-dependency, and independency in the context of specific relations, family, society, nation, global and cosmological perspective. It trusts heading towards prosperity through unity, integrity, and the harmonic principle of awareness, progressivism and stato-dynamism, and respective comprehensive movements. It has a strong belief in the principle of political ethics. It trusts the concept that the “world” is our only “home” and the “people” dwelling here are the “family members”, the “kinship” is the one and only single “sole motto”, and global and universal “friendship, fraternity, production, productivity, employability, and services”, etc. are the means of “tool”, “humanism” and “humanity” are its single “ideology”, and “empowerment”, “self-dependency”, “independency”, “cooperation”, “collaboration”, “coordination”, “partnership”, “unification”, “integrity”, “togetherness”, “transparency” and “accountability” etc. are the means of instruments, and “human prosperity” and “peace” are its ultimate “goal and vision”.

• Comprehensive Principle is such a systematically integrated principle or system that advocates for multiple available ideologies at once. It advocates for comprehensive capitalism in both context of capital and social-capital building, empowerment and partnership in course of providing comprehensive suppliance of pure public welfare services and development projects in order to step or achieve supreme prosperity. Because it has the optimum dynamism to incorporate with both private and social capitalism for maximum performance and deliverable growth. Similarly, it refers for the Comprehensive Socialism in social context, and Comprehensive Individualism in context of individual. Similarly, it recommends “Localism” in place of local, “Nationalism” in the terms of the nation, “globalism” in the context of the world, and “universalism” in the setting of the Universe. What proportions of these ideologies, the Comprehensive Principle carries? it depends on its (Comprehensive) own principal parameters based on the status of the specificity of the country. In addition, it carries foundational trust on having its own Comprehensive Economy, Comprehensive Tax policy & System, Comprehensive Health & Education Policies and System, Comprehensive Foreign Policy & Diplomacy, and other policies and systems etc. along with its own essentially additional and innovative stato-dinamic and progressive core values and quality systems strategically directed towards the “Supreme Prosperity”. Therefore, “Comprehensive Principle” which is identified and taken as the English equivalent word for Nepalese “Brihatarwad” [“बृहतरवाद”]} is substantially much more than available existing ideologies. In fact, the Comprehensive Principle is “Brihatarwad” [“बृहतरवाद”] and “Brihatarwad” [“बृहतरवाद”] is its ideology.

• The comprehensive principle has a faith in PGLCMS (Political Governance Life Cycle Management System). Thus, it believes in public supremacy and sovereignty. It innately holds foundational belief in the public welfare state, multi-party system, regular & updated election and electoral system, executive-legislatives-judiciary governance system, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, good governance, meritocracy, development and prosperity etc. Therefore, it is an ideology, thought, or model that can recognize, justify, unify, and mobilize each and every individual from each and every edge (rural area) and centre (capital, urban, city, etc.) irrespective of the race, colour, and class for the prosperity of each and every individual from each and every edge and centre without any form of discrimination, deprivation, domination, exploitation, or isolation. There is only, and only, the prosperity of local, national, global, and universal sectors through the prosperity of “ALL”.

Thus, it has become crystal clear that the weightage system delimitation has several drawbacks and has also been criticized by several scholars for not being inclusive, equal, and equitable at the same time (Paudyal, 2017). Thus, it raises the question—what is inclusive, equal, and equitable delimitation, then? It is exactly what this research paper is going to explore throughout this research effort. Anyway, with this finding, the “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility (CSoBaF)”, “Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation (CPoD)”, “Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation System (CECD System)”, and “Validity Status Determination System (VSDS)” are going to be established as innovations and important achievements of this research.

2. Literature Review

The term electoral delimitation is composed of two words—Electoral and Delimitation. “Electoral” stands for election and it means the political process of selecting people’s representatives for various political roles of the government, where the people choose their favourite representatives based on their size or majority of votes. It is the soul of the modern political system that ensures people’s regular, fresh, and updated political representation via formal and regular selection of various people’s political representatives for the formation of the government and governing structure to effectively operate people’s benevolent and according multi-faceted development, administration, and welfare activities. Whereas, the diction “Delimitation”, however, is derived from the English verb “delimit”, which itself is composed of the assimilation of two words “De” + “Limit” that means to limit any vague terminology, idea, field, discipline, stream, and faculty so that it can be clear enough to at least eliminate ambiguity of specific terminology, idea, field, discipline, stream, and faculty. In this way, from a very generalist point of view, delimitation is a systematic process of eliminating ambiguity and extending its according further clarification of any specific terminology, idea, field, discipline, stream, and faculty by setting a clear boundary or limitation. Thus, electoral delimitation is the process of drawing the boundaries of electoral areas or districts for electoral management and modern political practice. An electoral area or district or arena is an electoral unit where multiple available political parties compete with each other to represent the voters’ population by winning a seat for political representation of citizens.

In delimitation science, especially political delimitation, electoral delimitation is the process of drawing or redrawing the boundaries of electoral areas or districts for electoral management and democratic political practices.

(Thapa, 2026a)

Various determining parameters are set for the delimitation of electoral areas. These are mostly directed by the constitutional provisions of the respective countries. However, the most important parameters are population, geography, remoteness, administrative boundaries, cultural and social traits, transportation proximity, economic viability, aboriginal and ethnic identity, etc. The standard directive principles for electoral delimitation are impartiality, equality, representativeness, non-discrimination, and transparency. However, various variations can be seen regarding these directive principles at the implementation level of various countries as per their political orientation and constitutional provisions. Similarly, there are also two types of electoral delimitation—traditional electoral delimitation and modern electoral delimitation. Traditional delimitation is such an electoral delimitation where knowledge of delimitation was either limited or non-existent. Almost all traditional delimitations, even up to the colonial period, are supposed to be traditional electoral delimitation. In contrast, modern delimitation is such a delimitation where knowledge of delimitation was developed and implemented according to its principles and criteria to ensure a fair election system and modern political values. Almost all contemporary modern delimitation systems utilize a weight-based system called the weightage system. It relies on employing only one predetermined weight to various determinants in all available contexts and statuses.

Anyway, as far as the delimitation of the electoral area of Nepal is concerned, it does not have a history longer than that of its democracy. The first delimitation was introduced in 1951 AD, alongside the establishment of democracy in the country. However, it had to wait until the People’s Democratic Movement of 1990 to get the first version of systematic modern electoral delimitation fueled by its weightage system. All electoral delimitations carried out prior to 1990 were largely traditional electoral delimitation.

Anyway, the first electoral delimitation was introduced with the introduction of democracy in Nepal in the year 1951 AD. As per the Interim Constitution of Nepal 1951, the election commission {Article 69 (2)}, election tribunal, and delimitation of constituency were clearly provisioned and introduced in the Nepalese political streams for the very first time, though there was no clear-cut provision for having a separate delimitation commission. No parameters were constitutionally mentioned as the basis for the delimitation, though reports such as the Administrative Restructuring Committee 1953 and the Administrative Restructuring Committee 1957 played an important role in engineering 109 electoral districts or areas for the House of Representatives.

Similarly, with the first elected democratic government and its promulgated constitution of Nepal 1959, the clear-cut constitutional provision of the delimitation commission {Article 22 (3)} was established for the very first time along with the election commission, election tribunal, and unquestionability of delimitation in the court. Some basic determinants or indicators such as administrative district boundaries, population density, transport facilities, geographical features, and community and human diversity, etc., were taken as parameters. The constitution did not say much about the size and structure of these commissions.

The electoral districts shall be delimited by a Delimitation Commission appointed by His Majesty in His discretion, in such manner that each shall contain, as nearly as may be practicable, an equal number of electors, account, however, being taken of boundaries of administrative districts, the density or sparsity of population, transport facilities, physical features, and the community or diversity of the inhabitants. {Article 22 (3)—The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (1959)}

As the constitution was very short-lived, the provision of the then constitution’s delimitation had never been implemented due to the coup of King Mahendra and the promulgation of the Panchayat Constitution of Nepal in 1962. There was no constitutional provision for a Delimitation Commission during the period of direct rule by King Mahendra, and the delimitation of that time was still, for sure, traditional.

Similarly, with the restoration of long-lost democracy in 1990 through the people’s democracy movement and the establishment of the Constitution of Nepal 1990, the Election Constituency Delimitation Commission (Article 105) was established with the identification of certain parameters such as administrative district boundaries, more than 2 seats or electoral units in each district, geographical features, population density, transportation services, and communal homogeneity or heterogeneity of the local residents, along with a more powerful Election Commission (Article 103) and a separate Election Court (Article 106) for election disputes. The weightage system was used as a statistical tool for electoral delimitation, but which specific weightages were used for particular determinants was not clearly published. However, the best part of it was the assurance of balanced political participation for its MPs, and a minimum of 2 electoral (Legislative) quotas were set for each district. The weaknesses were the existence of some notable gerrymandering or malapportioned electoral constituencies. Anyway, there were 205 electoral areas for the House of Representatives (Constituency Delimitation Commission of Nepal, 1990), and 60 electoral seats were allocated for the National Assembly.

After determining the number of seats in the House of Representatives for each district pursuant to Article 45, the Election Constituency Delimitation Commission shall delimit the constituencies in districts having more than one seat (meaning 2 MP seats).

{Article 105 (2)—Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990)}

After the King Gyanendra Coup and the people’s democracy movement, and the establishment of the fully democratic interim constitution in 2007, a more dynamic version of the Election Commission (Article 128) and the Constituency Delimitation Commission (Article 154 A) were formed with the primary aim of achieving the federal democratic Constitution of Nepal via the Constituent Assembly. The election system was constitutionally set as a Mixed Electoral System for both FPTP and PR electoral systems with the ratio of 40:60. The parameters for electoral delimitation were constitutionally provisioned as equality of population, geographical features, special attention to the existing administrative district boundaries, population density, transportation facilities, and the communal and cultural characteristics of the people living in such districts.

While delimiting the electoral constituencies pursuant to Clause (6), on the basis of equality of population, geographical convenience, and special characteristics, attention shall be paid to the boundary of each administrative district, geographical conditions, population density, transportation facilities, and the communal and cultural characteristics of the people living in such districts. {Article 154. A. 7—The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007)}

Most of the above-mentioned parameters were mainly used for the determination of location, direction, assimilation, and formation of a specific electoral area. Those had nothing to do with the determination of the electoral number. The only determinants for the specific numbers of electoral areas for a specific electoral district, zone, or region were mainly based on population and geography. As far as the electoral delimitation of the Constituent Assembly is concerned, the Constituency Delimitation Commission delimited 601 seats for the Constituent Assembly, with 240 for direct election (Constituency Delimitation Commission of Nepal, 2007), 335 for proportionate election, and 26 nominations, and the ratios of them were 40:56:4, respectively. The weightage system had been used as a statistical tool for the electoral delimitation, but what specific weightages were being used for which particular determinants was not clearly published. However, the assurance of balanced political participation for its MPs and a minimum of 2 electoral (Legislative) quotas for each district, etc., were its good aspects. The existence of some notable Gerrymandering or mal-proportioned electoral constituencies was definitely its weakness. Some traces of Gerrymandering (constitutional boundaries intentionally drawn for the benefit of one ruling or non-ruling political party at the expense of another) can be easily observed by seeing the figure of the then electoral delimitation. The maximum number of electoral areas was set for the highly populated Terai districts, the district of the capital city, and districts with metropolitan areas for the advantage of certain political parties. Whereas, the delimited electoral areas of Hilly and Himalayan districts were comparatively very minimal, which in fact contradicted the delimitation articles of the constitution 154. A.7, 154. A.8, 63.3.

As far as the current trend of the implemented electoral system—as per the Constitution of Nepal 2015—is concerned, the mixed electoral system has been constitutionally provisioned for the Federal Legislature and Provincial Assemblies. The Federal Parliament consists of two houses named the House of Representatives and the National Assembly. The House of Representatives consists of 275 MPs, with 165 MPs directly elected based on the FPTP electoral system from 165 electoral constituencies, and 110 MPs elected from the proportional representation electoral system. Thus, there are 165 delimited electoral areas for MPs from the FPTP stream and 110 PR delimited seats, considering the overall country as one electoral area. The upper house consists of 59 members, where 56 members are elected from an electoral college comprising members of the Provincial Assembly and chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of Village Councils and Mayors and Deputy Mayors of Municipal Councils, and 3 members, including at least one woman, are nominated by the President on the recommendation of the Government of Nepal {Article 86 (2b), 86 (3)—Constitution of Nepal, 2015}. As per the constitution, there are 7 states, 7 State Assemblies, and 7 governments. There is a constitutional provision for having a total of 550 MLAs. Out of 550, almost 330 seats are allocated for direct FPTP election and 220 for the PR election system for all 7 states.

The electoral parameters such as geography and population have been taken as primary parameters, whereas there are also other secondary parameters such as population density, geographic specificity, administrative and transportation convenience, and community and cultural aspects as per Article 286. (5), (6). The clearly published weightage system of 90:10 has been used for its primary parameters of population & geographies. The question might arise: is the weightage ratio of 90:10 rational as per the constitutional provision of Article 286 (5)?

(5) The Constituency Delimitation Commission, while delimiting the constituencies in accordance with this Article, shall, based on population and geography, maintain, as far as practicable, the equal ratio or proportionality between geography, population, and the number of members.

(Article 286 (5)—The Constitution of Nepal 2015, 2015)

Similarly, it remains silent regarding the question of how the delimitation procedure weighted its other secondary parameters. Anyway, for the moment, we can say that the commission utilized the secondary parameters only for the spatial, directional, and areal composition of each electoral constituency, but not to determine the numerical dimension of the electoral constituencies.

And, whatever model the Constituency Delimitation Commission of Nepal has implemented in the name of this proportion of weightage system has not only made it a population-dominated delimitation but has also accordingly transferred it to a completely imperfect, biased, and un-inclusive distribution of electoral boundaries. It has provided the maximum electoral areas for the Terai region, even undermining the other 80% of geographies named the Hilly and Himalayan regions.

People have interpreted CDC’s report from various angles. If you make population the main basis, you will reach one conclusion. If you take geography into account, you will present a different picture. As a student of geography, I would say the report is unfair to our hill and mountain regions.

(Paudyal, 2017)

To be a little more specific, the Delimitation Commission has provided a total of almost 135 MPs (78—FPTP and 57—PR) for the Terai region out of 275 seats. That means almost 51.45% from the Proportionate Representation System and 49.09% on average for both FPTP & PR systems. Similarly, around 51.45% from the PR system and an average of 49% (269 seats) for both PR and FPTP systems of a total of 550 MLAs have been delimited for Terai districts. In contrast, the proportionate area of the Terai is only around 20% of the total area of Nepal. Approximately 80% of the geography of Nepal, most specifically the Hilly and Himalayan electoral districts, has been totally under-represented (Thapa, 2026b). The administrative district boundaries have been completely ignored, and the previous concept of “at least not less than 2 electoral areas for each district irrespective of population size” in earlier electoral practices has been entirely disregarded and replaced with the concept of “at least not less than 1 electoral area” for each district. In the course of making electoral delimitation “equal representation”, the concept of “equitable representation” has been undermined. Geographically very large 35 districts of Hilly and Himalayan regions have received only a single electoral constituency for each district due to gerrymandering or biased, unequal, and inequitable or non-inclusive distribution of electoral delimitation.

This electoral delimitation, in fact, overlooks the principle of “equitable representation”, without which political system representation cannot be truly inclusive. However, the baseline for electoral boundaries should vary according to the specific characteristics of population distribution and geographic context, in order to align with “equitable representation”. Therefore, constitutional provisions across various jurisdictions permit a range of acceptable deviations from the population baseline, varying from 0% to as high as 61.9% in current practice worldwide. For instance, constitutional tolerance limits vary across jurisdictions: approximately 15% in Armenia, Germany, and the Czech Republic; between 15% and 24% in Germany under certain conditions; around 30% in Singapore; and up to 61.9% in Canada (ACE, 2012). These limits are designed to balance equitable representation with considerations such as population distribution, geographic size, and challenges. However, the appropriateness, suitability, and representative fairness of these deviation thresholds remain subjects of ongoing study and debate. In fact, the permissible percentage of deviation is generally determined by the distribution and concentration of the population. Thus, allowable deviations may range widely, potentially from 0% to 90%, depending on contextual factors. Accordingly, how such deviations are calibrated in relation to alternative determinants—primarily geography, along with other secondary considerations—through additive and deductive statistical principles remains a key area of concern. However, in the context of electoral delimitation in Nepal, this dimension of permissible exceptional deviation does not appear to have been adequately understood or applied. Consequently, under the rubric of “equal representation”, the principle of “equitable representation” is significantly undermined. To talk about adjustment of “equitable representation” through weightage system seems almost impossible due to its single-dimensional operating nature. Whereas, quite a bit of criticism has also been expressed regarding the delimitation report of the Constituency Delimitation Commission for being completely Terai-oriented. They have blamed it for ignoring the basic principles of impartiality, transparency, non-discrimination, representativeness, and equality in the course of basing only on population. The principle of “impartiality” has been completely ignored, and “distribution of population” has been entirely dominated by only prioritizing the “number of people”.

That means the authority that determines electoral constituencies must first be impartial. This is where we failed. The officials inducted into CDC were biased towards the political parties that nominated them. The second mistake they made was that they focused only on the number of people, not their distribution. As a result, hills and mountains lost seats. Most hill districts lost one seat each.

(Paudyal, 2017)

The concepts of “geography encompasses both the place and people”, “inextricable relationship between a man and geography”, “the very nature of population is to increase but not the geography” and “the availability of multiple forms of geography or natures and the scope it provides for a human journey of development” have been rejected.

You cannot limit a person to a fixed geography. However, this aspect of geography was overlooked while demarcating electoral constituencies.

(Paudyal, 2017)

In fact, we can imagine a person with geography but not without geography or nature. Similarly, we can’t limit a person to a fixed geography. A person can be local and at the same time by-local or multi-local, but he can never be without local. The density of it might be different from other locals and can be decreased or increased in the course of time. However, all types of necessary social, political, and governing structures are naturally the most inevitable part of it. Thus, there have been provisions for having electoral districts, or provincial or state-level electoral areas, with constitutionally defined specific electoral quotas.

In addition, this ratio of the weightage system, according to many critics, is making the whole delimitation entirely population-dominated delimitation. However, we could make it more farsighted and inclusive. Anyway, there are many models of delimitation within the weightage system. But no one can define the precise best single model of delimitation for delimiting boundaries, as Handley concluded in his research paper “Challenging the Norms and Standards of Election Administration: Boundary Delimitation” in the year 2007 by saying “There is no single best model for delimiting constituency boundaries” (Handley, 2007).

He concludes his research findings by stating that there is no well-defined, precise, best single model for delimiting the boundaries. However, it is very important to establish precise rules for the process that are flexible for both mature and transitional democracies.

(Dampegama et al., 2019)

Almost all available contemporary modern delimitation systems employ this weight-based weightage system that assigns only one predetermined weight to various determinants of multiple contexts and statuses. This inevitably raises questions about the rationale underlying such weight assignment and how changes in one determinant should be reconciled with changes in others. Rather than allowing the relationships among determinants to emerge from their naturally occurring proportions, the reliance on only one predetermined ratio for overall available statuses may therefore raise questions about the delimitation process. This is what, actually, the CPoD (Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation) raises and proposes—the natural automation system called AODS (Automatic Objective Determination System)—to address these discrepancies for appropriate electoral constituency delimitation (Thapa, 2017a).

Thus, it is clear that there is no as such availability of a perfect and precise model of delimitation, that has not only signaled for the maximum chances of occurrence of delimitation discrepancies but also equally further indirectly paved the way for the scope of innovative efforts for further development of the delimitation system and model. In this situation, there is scope and need for research for the identification of a further new model of delimitation.

Therefore, this research study has the urgency of scope and strong rationale for conducting further research efforts to coin a more innovative version of electoral delimitation that has maximum flexibility for addressing “equitable representation” along with “equal representation” from highly populated centres and their surroundings to rarely populated peripheral geographies.

3. Methodology, Theoretical Framework, and Data

Coming up to the Methodology, it is clear that the constituency delimitation of Nepal has a lot of drawbacks due to its currently implemented weightage system of 90:10. Upon the availability of these issues, the research raises the capital question—what is its solution? This is exactly what this research is trying to explore. To do so, the research first attempts to utilize the methodology to identify the key factors of the weightage system behind these issues, and then tries to seek the solution while remaining within the same weightage system; and, if needed, it further engages in the potential innovation of a new and innovative delimitation system called “Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation (CECD)” backed by the “Comprehensive Principle of Delimitation (CPoD)”. In doing so, it utilizes various theories such as—Handley’s Theory of Electoral Delimitation, Weightage System Theory of Electoral Delimitation, Theory of Statistics, Theory of Equality, Equity, and Inclusion in Electoral Delimitation, Gerrymandering, Structuralist Theory of Governing Structure, Consensus & Majoritarian Theory of Powell, Structuralism and Textualistic Theory of Constitution and Intentionalism, Forced Migration Theory & Compulsive Migration Theory, Ratio Theory, Normative Theory, etc. Thus, the research implements these theories not only to identify the factors behind the issues but also utilizes them for further innovation of a new and more dynamic delimitation system (Figure 1). However, this research, being very aware of the privileged length and word limits, is fundamentally employing parameters established by the theories to identify the factors behind the electoral constituency delimitation issues and propose the Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation Model as a rational solution rather than completely going through one-to-one detailed, theoretical, empirics-based statistical procedures in exactly the same way as the specific theorists had once gone through in the course of founding their respective theories. In fact, the “Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation (CECD)” is backed by its own innovative “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility for Inclusion, Equality, and Equitable Distribution and Representation”. In this sense, “Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation (CECD)”, “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility for Inclusion, Equality, and Equitable Distribution and Representation”, and “Validity Status Determination System (VSDS)” are the innovations of this research. Anyway, below is the theoretical framework, and further down below to it is the conceptual framework that eases the key task of the theoretical framework in or-der to achieve the goal of this research paper (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Theoretical framework.

3.1. Conceptual Framework

The statistical tool to make CECD as per the spirit of the comprehensive principle is Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility. It statistically ensures the Absolute Non-Discriminatory Operating Mechanism (ANDOM) and the Automatic Objective Determination System (AODS). To acknowledge specifically how the comprehensive statistical operating mechanism operates at the determinant or variable level, the following conceptual framework has been designed to address all forms of deviations or diversities, from normal deviation or diversity to exceptional and then up to extreme exceptional deviations or diversities. The conceptual framework very explicitly expresses how it incorporates the available deviations or diversities to ensure the overall electoral delimitation is more inclusive, equal, and equitable in terms of political representation and form of governance (Table 2).

Table 2. Specific conceptual framework.

The deviations, it includes, range from normal deviation to exceptional deviation. Within normal, there are further minimum normal and maximum normal deviations. The exceptional deviation includes minimum exceptional to maximum (extreme) exceptional deviations. In fact, the proposed Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation has broader flexibility that includes a very dynamic mechanism of statistics encompassing tools from Average Statistics to Broader Deviational Tools. The following are the scale-based specific deviational and average tools used by this Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation.

3.1.1. Average Flexibility Case, Principle, and Tool

It is such a tool and principle that only considers or deals with the average value. In most general cases, the flexibility within it is almost none. For instance, as mentioned earlier above (Table 1), the population of 176755 and the geographic area of 830.5 KM² (considering the total area based on the Local Units) are the average population and geographic area for an electoral area to be an average electoral constituency. Anyway, the total population of Nepal and the geographic area covered by local units are 29164578 and 137032.6 KM² respectively.

3.1.2. Normal Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

The Normal Flexibility Tool and Principle is such a principle or tool that considers and deals with the issue that does have normal flexibility. It has a conscience and belief that the majority of the world is filled with normal deviation and diversity. It opines that the deviation is part of nature and reality, thus needing a system for its good governance. It mainly emphasizes the term majority when it comes to addressing deviation; thus, it mostly considers, talks, emphasizes, and justifies the majority status for sure normal deviation. It believes in addressing majority deviational cases with its own principle and according tool of majority inclusion. It believes that the real world is deviated than the average narrative information we have been taught for. Thus, it trusts in the inclusion of this normal diversity and deviation for the creation of a better world. Anyway, the Normal Flexibility Principle considers the deviation from 0% - 100% as addible and from 0% - 44.35% as deductible in its determinants. In other words, up to 100% addible means that one of any determinants is 200% the size of its own average guided value, because a 100% addible value is an added or additional value of 100% on the average base value, which is always 100%, and the accumulation of them tends to 200%. Similarly, 44.35% deductible means any one of the indicators is 44.35% less than the average value, which means 100% - 44.35% (Average Value - Deductible Value) definitely tends to express that the position of a particular determinant is a percentage status of 55.65%. Hence, accumulating these two statements of 100% addible and 44.35% deductible means if any one determinant has 100% addible, then 44.35% becomes the deductible for the other second determinant, which means 55.65% will be the minimum optimum value on the second determinant to become a constituency. Anyway, upon consideration of its scale of flexibility and balance principle, it is further divided into two categories.

1. Minimum Normal Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

2. Maximum Normal Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

1. Minimum Normal Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

The Minimum Normal Flexibility Principle and Tool is believed to consider, cover, and justify the deviations and diversity that the Average Flexibility Principle generally does not address. It regards diversity as normal but a majority in existence. Therefore, it emphasizes majority inclusion. Thus, it has more flexibility in comparison to the rigidity of the Average Flexibility Principle. Therefore, it covers deviations or diversity from 0% up to 25% for addible values and 0% - 25% for deductible values on the average value. Thus, the tolerable limit of it is from 0% - 25% for the minimum normal addible and from 0% - 25% as the minimum normal deductible limit. This means, in the case of the optimum addible value of 25% on the average value, the maximum deductible value will be 25% deductible (25%) in the average value. In other words, in the case of up to 25% addible in one determinant, it provides the other determinant with the flexibility of 25% deductible, which means a minimum of 75% (100% - 25%) for another determinant to be a constituency.

2. Maximum Normal Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

The Maximum Normal Flexibility Principle and Tool is believed to consider, cover, and justify the deviations and diversity only from above the diversity tolerance limit of the Minimum Normal Flexibility Principle up to 100% for addible and 44.35% for deductible values. Thus, its tolerable limit is from 25% - 100% for the maximum normal addible and from 25% - 44.35% for the maximum normal deductible limit. That means, in the case of the optimum value of 100%, the maximum deductible value will be 44.35%, which is derived from the deductible value of the minimum normal deductible (25%) by adding 19.35%. In other words, in the case of up to 100% addible in one determinant, it provides the other determinant the flexibility of 44.35% deductible, which means a minimum of 55.65% (100% - 44.35%) for another determinant to be a constituency.

3.1.3. Exceptional (Maximum and Minimum) Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity and Respective Principle & Tool

The Exceptional Flexibility Principle and tool is such a tool and principle that does not only believe that the universe of mathematics or any other fields is so diverse, vivid, and unique, with full deviations, that the Average Principle with the Normal Flexibility Principle, as they are also limited by certain limitations, also fails to address extreme addible or deductible values most probably from 100% - 1200% addible and 66.35% - 97.25% deductible values. In this situation of inability of the Average Flexibility and even Normal Flexibility Principles, the Exceptional Flexibility Principle and its corresponding tool will come into effective operational enforcement in order to address the principle of balance among the actual availability of exceptionally diverse parameters of the determinants. From 100% - 1200% is addible diversity and deviation; whereas, the deductible diversity and deviation it covers is from 66.35% - 97.25%. Therefore, it believes in equitable inclusion or representation. Anyway, based on the scale of flexibility and the balance principle, it can be further divided into the following 2 categories:

1. Minimum Exceptional Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

2. Maximum Exceptional Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

1) Minimum Exceptional Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and Respective Principle & Tool

The Minimum Exceptional Flexibility Principle and Tool is believed to consider, cover, and justify the deviations and diversity only above the diversity tolerance limit of the Maximum Normal Flexibility Principle, up to 200% for addible and 66.35% for deductible values. Thus, its tolerable limit is from 100% - 200% for the minimum exceptional addible, and from 44.35% - 66.35% for the minimum exceptional deductible limit. This means that, in the case of an optimum value of 200%, the maximum deductible value will be 66.35%, which is derived from the deductible value of the maximum normal deductible (44.35%) by adding 22%. In other words, in the case of up to 200% addible in one determinant, the other determinant is provided the flexibility of 66.35% deductible, meaning a minimum of 33.65% (100% - 66.35%) for another determinant to be a constituency.

2) Maximum (Extreme) Exceptional Flexibility Case of Deviation or Diversity, and the Respective Principle & Tool

The Maximum (Extreme) Exceptional Flexibility Principle and Tool trust to consider, cover, and justify the deviations and diversity just above the diversity tolerance limit of the Minimum Exceptional Flexibility Principle up to 1200% for addible and 97.25% for deductible values. Thus, the tolerable limit is from 200% - 1200% for maximum exceptional addible, and from 66.35% - 97.25% for the maximum exceptional deductible limit. That means, in the case of the optimum value of 1200%, the maximum deductible value will be 97.25%, which is derived from the deductible value of Minimum Exceptional Deductible (66.35%) by adding 30.90%. In other words, in the case of up to 1200% addible in one determinant, it provides the other determinant the flexibility of 97.25% deductible, which means a minimum of 2.75% (100% - 97.25%) for another determinant to be a constituency. Anyway, the upper deductible limit of 97.25% and the upper addible limit of 1200 are subject to change as per the specificity of each country.

3.2. Statistical Operational Mechanism of Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation

Anyway, the Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation System (CECD System) has its own operational statistical methodology, ranging from the very basic Average Mean Method (for all average scenarios) up to Addible and Deductible Methods (for all Flexible Statistics Operational Mechanisms for the management of deviational and diversity aspects in Comprehensive Delimitation), as follows below:

1. Average Mean Method,

2. Deductible Method, and

3. Addible Method.

3.2.1. Average Mean Method

The Average Mean Method is the statistical method of using the statistical mechanism of average mean to cover all the average scenarios. It is also the foundational base for the further derivation of Addible and Deductible Statistics Operational Mechanism. Anyway, the following below is the derivation of the key statistical formula for the calculation of electoral delimitation.

Total No. of MPs in the House of Representatives = 165

Total Number of Constituency Electoral Areas (n) = 165

Total Area of Nepal (A’) = 147,181 km²

Total Area by Local Units of Nepal (A) = 137032.59 KM²

Total Population (P) = 29,164,578

Average Population for each constituency (μ) = $\frac{\sum \text{P}}{\text{n}}$

= 29164578/165

= 176755

Average Geographic Area for each constituency ($\overline{\text{α}}$) = $\frac{\sum \text{A}}{\text{n}}$

= 137032.59/165

= 830.5 KM²

3.2.2. Deductible Method

The Deductible Method is the major, dominant, and dynamic method; the Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation enforces it to address all the deviations, diversities, and flexibilities of available actual determinants. It is, in fact, a new statistical operational mechanism with the strength of dynamism to address deviations ranging from normal to exceptional and extremely exceptional status. This is also exactly part of one of the statistical operational innovations and research achievements that this research presents. The Deductible Method is the method of identifying the deductible value by determining and utilizing the size of the additional large value and converting it to the accordingly deductible value, and then identifying the minimum determinant size needed for a constituency in that particular deviational or diversity case. The following is the derivation of the key statistical formulas for the calculation of electoral delimitation using the Deductible Method.

District Total Area = (A₁)

District Total Population = (P₁)

Deductible (D) = 0% - 97.25%

(In case of less than average condition)

Addible (A_d) = 0 - 1200%

(In case of the availability of a population or geography larger than the average)

Nearest achieved deductible (d₁) = 25% - 66.35%

(Note: The upper deductible limit of 97.25% is subject to change depending on the specificity of the country)

Upper but not fully achieved deductible (d₂) = 44.35% - 97.25%

Nearest achieved Addible (A_d1) = 25% - 200%

Upper but not fully achieved Addible (A_d2) = 100% - 1200%

Remaining Addible Number after d1 (R_a) = A_d − A_d1

Deductible (D) = d₁ + {(A_d − A_d1)/(A_d2 − A_d1)} * (d₂ − d₁)

Or,

$={\text{d}}_1+\frac{\left({\text{A}}_{\text{d}}-{\text{A}}_{\text{d1}}\right)}{\left({\text{A}}_{\text{d2}}-{\text{A}}_{\text{d1}}\right)}\times \left({\text{d}}_2-{\text{d}}_1\right)$

Valid % for Population or Geography (V) in Deductible Method = 100% - D%

Valid Population or Geography to be a Constituency = $\overline{\alpha }$ * V% or μ * V%

Total Number of Constituencies in the District (n₁) = A₁/($\overline{\alpha }$ * V%) or P₁/(μ * V%)

$=\frac{{\text{A}}_1}{\left(\overline{\alpha }\times \text{V}\%\right)}\text{or}\frac{\text{P}1}{\left(\overline{\mu }\times \text{V}\%\right)}$

3.2.3. Addible Method

The Addible Method is another important method of Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation after its Deductible and Average Method. It is also used to address all the deviations, diversities, and flexibility of available actual determinants. The Addible Method is the method of identifying the addible value by determining and utilizing the size of the value less than the average determinant and converting it to the corresponding addible value, then identifying the minimum determinant size needed to be a constituency in that particular deviational or diversity case by adding it to the average value of 100%. The only difference between the Addible Method and the Deductible Method is that the Addible Method is used especially in the prior condition where the value and weight of the lesser determinant are much less than the higher additional figured determinant. The following is the derivation of the key statistical formulas for the calculation of electoral delimitation using the Addible Method.

District Total Area = (A₁)

District Total Population = (P₁)

Deductible (D) = 0 - 97.25%

(In case of less than average condition)

Addible (A_d) = 0 - 1200%

(In case of the availability of a population or geography bigger than the average)

Nearest achieved deductible (d₁) = 25% - 66.35%

(Note: the upper deductible limit of 97.25% is subject to change according to the specificity of the country)

Upper but not fully achieved deductible (d₂) = 44.35% - 97.25%

Nearest achieved Addible (A_d1) = 25% - 200%

Upper but not fully achieved Addible (A_d2) = 100% - 1200%

Remaining Deductible Number after A_d1 (R_d) = D – d₁

Addible (A_d) = A_d1 + {(D – d₁)/(d₂ – d₁)} * (A_d2 – A_d1)

=${\text{A}}_{d1}+\frac{\left(\text{D}-\text{d}1\right)}{\left(\text{d}2-\text{d}1\right)}\times \left({\text{A}}_{\text{d}2}-{\text{A}}_{\text{d1}}\right)$

Valid % for Population or Geography (V) in Addible Method = (100 + A_d)%

Valid Population or Geography to be a Constituency = $\overline{\alpha }$ * V% or μ * V%Total Number of Constituencies in the District (n₁) = A₁/($\overline{\alpha }$ * V%) or P₁/(μ * V%)

$=\frac{{\text{A}}_{\text{1}}}{\left(\overline{\alpha }\times \text{V}\%\right)}\text{or}\frac{\text{P}1}{\left(\overline{\mu }\times \text{V}\%\right)}$

3.3. Validity Status Determination System

In the electoral delimitation process, validation is an important step that ensures the electoral delimitation is a combination of consistency, deliverability, inclusivity, equality & equitability, and respective representativeness. It is, in fact, the process of building a perfect and complete electoral delimitation and justifying its delimitation justifiably after its formulation. The validity status is based on percentage, as the Ad and D themselves are also based on percentage. Anyway, the Validity Status Percentage (%) is the available actual higher load-carrying addible or deductible percentage (%) status of any higher weightage determinant with respect to Addible and Deductible Statistic derived valid percentage (%). Here, the percentage (%) of addible and deductible status percentage (%) are derived from the determinant with respect to the average determinant (μ or $\overline{\alpha }$ ). Thus, the derivation of the key statistic formula for the calculation of Validity Status of Electoral Constituency delimitation is as follows below.

Total Federal Constituency Area for the FCA Unit = A₂

Total Population of that particular FCA Unit = P₂

Average Population for the FCA Unit = μ

Average Area for an FC = $\overline{\alpha }$

Addible (always in %) = A_d

Deductible (Always in %) = D

The Validity Status % = $\frac{\frac{{\text{A}}_2}{}}{100+{\text{A}}_{\text{d}}\text{or}100-\text{D}}\text{or,}\frac{\frac{{\text{P}}_2}{\text{μ}}}{100+{\text{A}}_{\text{d}}\text{or}100-\text{D}}$

Thus, the Validity Status % = $\frac{\frac{{\text{A}}_2}{}}{100+{\text{A}}_{\text{d}}\text{or}100-\text{D}}\text{or,}\frac{\frac{{\text{P}}_2}{\text{μ}}}{100+{\text{A}}_{\text{d}}\text{or}100-\text{D}}$

where 100 + Ad is taken, if we have Addible value. Whereas 100 − D is utilized

when there is a Deductible value. Similarly, $\frac{{\text{A}}_2}{}$ is utilized when the value or weightage of the available actual area of the particular constituency unit is higher. Whereas $\frac{{\text{P}}_2}{\text{μ}}$ is utilized when the value or weightage of the available actual population of the particular constituency unit is higher than the other determinant.

In addition, the validity status is composed of four categories named “Absolute Valid”, “Valid”, “Medium Valid”, and “Lower Valid”. Certain percentages are given in interval form for these four categories. These percentages are the acceptable deviations on any one determinant for cluster specificity of the above-mentioned conceptual framework. The validity status is, thus, based on these minimum normal addible and deductible, maximum normal addible and deductible, minimum exceptional addible and deductible, maximum exceptional addible and deductible, and average determinants value. The percentages of the below validity status are, in fact, the acceptable percentages on the percentage of a lower determinant mentioned in these broader clusters. And, in the context of average determinants value, both of the determinants can be lower, or it can be higher, or any one of the determinants can be lower or higher. The validation status the research follows is also the same as below. These are all the parameters of primary determinants we are talking about. But for the parameters of other secondary determinants, as they are strictly associated with the spatial and directional dimension of delimitation that might result in gerrymandering or mala-proportioned electoral delimitation, they should strictly follow the parameters of non-gerrymandering, equal and equitable representational electoral delimitation, and the below flexible parameters of validity status are not for them (Table 3). Anyway, this overall system of validation is, in fact, the Validity Status Determination System (VSDS).

Table 3. Validation chart.

In addition, to show how the validity status is represented, let us take an example from Area 1 of Rupandehi District in the empirical analysis section below. The validity details for the delimited constituency show “V-M(i)EAdD:AM⇒AdM”. Here, “V” stands for “Valid”, “M(i)EAdD” stands for “Minimum Exceptional Addible Deductible”, which means it is valid from the Minimum Exceptional Addible Deductible cluster. “AM⇒AdM” stands for First “Average Method” to Final “Addible Method”. The First “Average Method” is utilized during the numerical determination of the constituency for the district at the beginning procedure of the CECD, and then the “Addible Method” is finally utilized during the spatial, directional, locational, or unit-wise final formation of the constituency delimitation. In this way, the validation details not only indicate the specific validity status but also show how the delimitation was carried out using specific methods in its specific track of delimitation. Thus, it is a track-driven validation system. In this case, the validity status percentage is 70.18%, and it lies within the “Valid” validation cluster’s interval of 82.25% - 60.5%; thus, it is “Valid” from the “Valid Cluster”, which means “nicely valid”.

Validity Status Determination System-Specific Operating Rule

Except for the rule mentioned for the district-wise numeral determination of FCA through the Average Statistics Operation rule, both the remaining Addible as well as Deductible Statistics Operational Rules are operative as per the conditions and manner mentioned below in the Rules of Statistics Operational Mechanism. However, for the final actual derivation of the unit-based FCA of the Average Method derived constituencies, these are operative according to the higher value or the higher weightage-carrying determinant with its Deductible Statistics Method. In contrast, for a negatively higher value or negatively higher weightage-carrying status, the validation status system is operational as per the Addible Statistics Method. This means that even if both determinants are positively higher than the average value of determinants ($\mu$ or $\overline{\alpha }$ , the VSDS is operative as per the Deductible Method condition. Whereas, if both determinants are negatively higher (that is, smaller) than the average value of determinants ($\mu$ or $\overline{\alpha }$ , the VSDS is operative as per the Addible Method condition.

3.4. Rules of Statistics: Operational Mechanism of Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation

The Statistics Operational Mechanism of Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation consists of all Average Mean, Addible, and Deductible Statistical Operations for more dynamic, inclusive, equitable, and equal electoral constituency delimitation. Thus, the question may arise as to what particular statistics operational method it uses under what particular conditions. For its easy grasp, the research has developed its own operating rules as mentioned below.

1. Average Statistics Operational Rule - The Average Mean Method is generally in operation if both of the determinants are either higher or lower. That means both determinants should be higher under higher conditions and should be lower under lower conditions for the Average Method of Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation to be operative. It is utilized only for the numerical determination of constituencies at the district level at the initial phase. However, after numerical determination and for the spatial determination or one-to-one constituency delimitation, it uses only the two Addible and Deductible Methods.

2. Deductible Statistics Operational Rule - The Deductible Statistics Method is generally in operation if either one determinant or the weightage of the determinant is higher and the other one is less than the average determinants μ and $$ \stackrel{-}{\alpha }$$. The dominant statistics operational method in Comprehensive Delimitation, which the research uses, is certainly the Deductible Statistics Method.

3. Addible Statistics Operational Rule - The Addible Statistics Operational Method is generally in effect if any one of the determinants is negatively higher than the other positive one. In other words, if the figure or weightage of the negative of any determinant is higher than the positive one, the only operational option for the Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation is the Addible Statistics Operational Method.

3.5. Operational Roadmap, Specifically, for the Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation

The Operational Roadmap is essential when it comes to delimitation-related research. It will keep the delimitation research efforts on track and in the right direction. The following is the roadmap of the Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation.

1. Identification of the current issues and drawbacks of electoral constituency delimitation backed by only one available existing weightage system. Then, on the basis of their discrepancies and problems, the research proposes a new model of Electoral Constituency Delimitation called Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation (CECD), which has a Comprehensive Delimitation Mechanism to address the current issues effectively and efficiently in order to formulate a more dynamic, transparent, inclusive, equal, and equitable constituency delimitation.

2. Delimiting the total number of overall countrywide and district-wise constituencies—From the constitutional provision, the research draws the total electoral areas. It further continues by determining the Average Population (μ) and Average Geographical Area ($\overline{\alpha }$ ) based on the available total electoral constituencies, total countrywide population, and the total geographical area covered by Local Units. Furthermore, it identifies and delineates the number of district constituencies utilizing the average population (μ) and the total geographical area covered by Local Units ($\overline{\alpha }$ ). For the determination of the number of constituencies, two primary determinants are considered; whereas, for spatial and directional determination of constituencies, it considers other secondary determinants such as administrative and transportation proximity, district and international borders, communal and cultural characteristics, etc.

3. Drawing Actual One-to-One Electoral Constituency Delimitation within the district—After determining the number of district-wise constituencies, the research further proceeds to actual constituency delimitation based on each corresponding district’s allocated number of constituencies. Here, the focus of electoral constituency delimitation is also on spatial and directional dimensions. Thus, it considers all of the parameters of both primary and secondary determinants. In fact, it is the primary stage of electoral delimitation where actual electoral delimitation is drawn. Furthermore, it is the same step where Gerrymandering mostly occurs. Therefore, the delimiter should be very attentive here.

4. Establishment of the “Validity Status” for the Justification of the drawn Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation—After determining and delimiting the constituency, it further goes ahead for its corresponding validity status.

3.6. Equality, Equity, Inclusion, Malapportionment, or Gerrymandering as the Measurable Criteria

The CPoD has its own specific theoretical and conceptual framework that makes equality, equity, and inclusion as the measurable criteria. For instance, the measurable scaling that is equal to Average Area or Population per Constituency ($\overline{\alpha }$ or μ) is “Absolute Equal” in terms of constituency delimitation, and such a kind of delimitation is “Absolute Equal Delimitation”. Whereas, the scaling that is equal to up to ± 25% addible or deductible value on the $\overline{\alpha }$ or μ refers to “Substitutional Equal Delimitation”, and it is derived using both addible and deductible methods. Similarly, from “25% - 44.35%” deductible value on $\overline{\alpha }$ or μ is “Minimum Equitable Value”, which is derived utilizing the “Addible Method” considering the addible interval from “25% - 100%”. This delimitation is called “Minimum Equitable Delimitation”. Again, from “44.35% - 66.35%” deductible value on $\overline{\alpha }$ or μ is “Medium Equitable Value”, which is derived using the “Addible Method” considering the addible interval of “100% - 200%” addible. This delimitation is called “Medium Equitable Delimitation”. Similarly, from “66.35% - 97.25%” deductible value on $\overline{\alpha }$ or μ tends to “Maximum or Extreme Equitable Value”, which is derived using the Addible Method considering the addible interval of Addible Method “200% - 1200%”. This delimitation is called “Maximum or Extreme Equitable Delimitation”. In the same way, from the perspective of statistical operating methodology, even if the very nature of the Deductible Method apparently does not look equitable as it identifies the ratio of deductible value, which outwardly seems to be comparatively smaller in ratio than its already available given higher ratio or values, it is in fact equitable. Because by nature—provided the availability of a higher value and utilizing it, the small value is to be identified—thus the available higher values of the upcoming identified counter small value always remain many times higher in ratio to keep the spirit of equity. No matter what method we use, whether we use the addible method utilizing the given small values or the deductible method with higher value, the measurable essence of equity is always achieved.

Anyway, with the integrated values and corresponding tools of both equal and equitable delimitation, the value of inclusion or overall inclusive delimitation is achieved. Moreover, the CPoD, with its sophisticated statistics, makes it possible to measure the malapportionment or gerrymandering of both of its numerical or spatial dimension. In fact, the base parameters of CPoD play a major role in identifying the status of gerrymandering or malapportionment, as malapportionment and gerrymandering are assessed by comparison with the measurable parameters of CPoD.

3.7. Data

Anyway, the study is descriptive in nature and is based on secondary data. Thus, the utilized data are for sure quantitative and descriptive in nature, and are gathered and organized from various government wings such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Local Affairs, Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal Rastra Bank, Office of Company Registrar, Department of Industry, Nepal Chamber of Commerce, various professional associations, Election Commission, Constituency Delimitation Commission, Local Body Restructuring Commission, scholarly academic journals, journal articles, newspapers, and reports of international organizations like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNDP, European Union, FATP, as well as national parliament subject committees. These data are not only collected on an individual basis but also arranged in a synthetic format so that we can have overall figurative statistics to overview the trend and status of these 9 years of implemented federalism in Nepal. In the course of doing so, the research develops various tables, charts, ratio and percentage trends, and statistical tools and diagrams in order to identify and analyze the status of the currently implemented constituency delimitation and its sustainability on the one hand; and, on the other, it also develops a new Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation System (CECD System) and redraws or delimits the constituency boundary as per it to ensure that the overall constituency delimitation is inclusive, equal, and equitable with sustainability. Thus, it is also following the normative model based on its concrete foundation of logic, theory, and optimization with fully informed and rational agents and its optimizing deliverables of its ideal benchmark.

4. Empirical Findings and Discussion

The paper has gone through assessing various indicators of Nepal based on the same parameters of all the theories, as mentioned earlier above in the theoretical framework, and has arrived at the following findings and brief analysis (Table 4).

Table 4. Findings and their brief analysis according to various disciplines and corresponding theories & their parameters.

From the above findings, it has become clear that the weightage system has plenty of issues because it does not have the flexibility to address all the availabilities of diversities and deviations in an inclusive manner. Even if we set the weightage somewhere at the very equilibrium point—though there are no as such equilibrium points, because the equilibrium point for one cluster cannot be the equilibrium point for another cluster, and another cluster’s centre point cannot be the balanced central point for further another cluster, and so on endlessly—it possibly addresses the available general average cluster, but what about all other available normal and exceptional diversity clusters’ deviations? After all, the real-time actual availabilities of determinant status are definitely in the multiple forms of varieties of clusters, deviations, and diversities. In addition, the truth is that almost all of the actual availabilities of determinants come under normal diversity or deviation, and the few remaining leftovers come under exceptional diversity or deviations. The weightage system gives a centre point or ratio among the available determinants, but there are so many centre points in real fields if the delimitation needs to be flawless, with perfection, inclusivity, equality, and equitability. Simply increasing and decreasing the ratio of the available determinants of the weightage system is not a solution. If you increase the weightage of the first determinant, it will make the delimitation more first determinant-oriented; similarly, if we increase the second determinant, it will make the delimitation second determinant-oriented. How do you set and address these multiple increasing and decreasing tendencies, and in what fashion to address all the available multiple diversities? This is the big question to which the weightage system does not have any answer, and it is its limitation. The answer to this is the “Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation”, which has its own all-in-one statistical operating mechanism called “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility” to address all of these available diversities or deviations, encompassing from “average to minimum normal”, “minimum normal to maximum normal”, “maximum normal to minimum exceptional”, and from “minimum exceptional to extreme exceptional cases” on a case-by-case basis with an inclusive and justiciable tendency. Much of these things have already been mentioned above in the methodology section about the “Comprehensive Constituency Delimitation” and “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility”, by the way.

In addition, to discuss the overall constituency delimitation procedure from a dimensional point of view, it has two dimensions—Numeral Dimension and Spatial Dimension. The Numeral Dimension of constituency delimitation is a preliminary delimitation process for determining the number as per the available total countrywide constituencies. Whereas, the Spatial Dimension of Constituency Delimitation is an actual “One to One” constituency delimitation after the execution of the Numeral Dimension and with its successful deliverables of allocation of justiciable number of constituencies for the provincial, regional, zonal, and administrative districts. Generally, in the Numeral Dimension, the two primary key determinants, geography and population, have been utilized to identify and allocate the number of constituencies. Whereas, during the spatial dimensional execution, the delimitation has also focused on other secondary determinants such as geographical conditions, administrative and transportation proximity, and the communal and cultural characteristics of the people living in such districts, etc., along with its primary determinants. Anyway, these two dimensions, along with Post-Electoral Constituency Delimitation Assessment (PECDA) and Electoral Constituency Impact Assessment (ECIA), are not only to allocate and structure electoral constituency but also provide feedback for the improvement of constituency delimitation and delimitation-related constitutional amendment through developing and proposing the delimitation (pre and post, and impact) reviews and model for the effective Electoral Constituency Delimitation Life Cycle Management (ECDLCM). Anyway, in the context of delimiting the electoral constituency with comprehensive electoral constituency delimitation, the Numeral Dimension and its activity of determining the number of constituencies with “Comprehensive Statistics of Balance and Flexibility for Equality, Equity and Inclusion (CSoBaFfEEaI)” as per administrative districts are significantly important. Thus, let us now move towards the preliminary but vital stage of comprehensive delimitation and its empirically specific findings as directed by the operational roadmap mentioned earlier by the methodology. As per the roadmap, the research has delimited the district-wise number of constituencies utilizing the comprehensive electoral delimitation methods—Average Method, Addible Method, and Deductible Method. Therefore, these methods are very important; all of them have been automatically operative during the Comprehensive Electoral Delimitation in order to achieve delimitation with the pure political qualities of equality, equity, and inclusion at the same time, which is not possible through the currently available trend of electoral constituency delimitation backed by a sole weightage system statistics tool. Hence, the CSoBaFfEEaI is new for academic disciplines and as well as constituency delimitation, and has potentially significant scope for multiple disciplines. However, the following are the empirical findings (Table 5), especially of the Numeral Dimension of Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation (CECD).

Table 5. Empirical findings of the numerical dimension of Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation (CECD) of Nepal.

Average Population (μ) = 176755; Average Geographic Area ($\overline{\text{α}}$) = 830.5; Note: If the delimited values reached ≥ 0.5, it has been taken as 1 electoral constituency unit.

Source: National Statistics Office (2023), Ministry of Federal Affairs & Local Development of Nepal (2017), Election Commission of Nepal (2026).

Based on the above-identified district-wise number of constituencies, the research has further delimited the actual delimitation, taking into account all the primary (Population and Geography) and secondary parameters (better connectivity, specific cultural and administrative features, public convenience, national security interest, etc.) in line with the spirit of the constitution and international standard practices. In addition to the Federal Constituencies, the research has developed further delimitation of State Constituencies with the concept of 1.5 of FC. The 1.5 concept has been considered in order to align with the size, strength, and feasibility of a small country like Nepal. However, the concept of 2 times bigger HoR for SCA is ideal and pragmatic for larger countries. Whereas, for the small country Nepal, the 1.5 times approach has been proposed and utilized for SCA, along with growing voices and feedback from numerous scholars from multiple walks of life in the country, for reviewing the number of states, MPs, MLAs, the electoral system, and the overall size of the governing structure. Anyway, to implement this concept of 1.5 in the real governing structure scenario, the Nepalese government needs to go through a constitutional amendment procedure, and this research, as policy feedback research, has it as one of its important objectives. However, the following are the one-to-one constituency delimitations of both FCA and SCA with their validity index (Table 6).

Table 6. One-to-one Comprehensive Electoral Constituency Delimitation (CECD) overview of Nepal.