An Analysis of National and International Factors Influencing Jordan’s Reform Implementation ()
1. Introduction
The implementation of the political reforms in the Middle East started to grow, when nationalistic movements came into existence demanding liberation and Arab Unity (i.e., for an Arab unified state) and many parties in the area were formed. The emerging power of U.S.S.R. after World War I gave further impact for political reforms. The struggle between the two opposing camps, Western Camp and Eastern Camp, created a big impact on the area, where at a later date the Eastern Camp disintegrated and a new World Order came to existence.
As a result, the United States of America became the most powerful country in the world, and it resorted to the ideology of implementing democracy to apply its various policies within all countries including non-obedient regimes to its policies.
On the other hand, at the local level, political reforms in the state of Jordan had been undergone through various and important stages. The Emirate of Trans-Jordan became in 1946 the Kingdom of Jordan with a constitutional monarchy, and as from 1921 till today the state of Jordan amended its electoral laws more than six times in order to accommodate new emerging situations in the area (Balawi, 2001: p. 1).
This article will address to what extent was the Middle East in general and the state of Jordan in particular successful in implementing political and economic reforms, where the article introduces and discusses a historical review, conceptual analysis and policies review within the Jordanian case. It uses the method of qualitative content analysis and also the analysis of quantitative data as well. The utilized deductive approach was implemented to formulate the analytical categories presented in the corresponding sections.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: International factors that affected political reforms in Jordan are discussed in Section 2 through a historical review. Local factors that affected reforms in Jordan as a conceptual analysis are discussed in Section 3. Policies with regards to economic reforms and their corresponding social effects are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions and future work are presented in Section 5.
2. International Factors
This section consists of three main parts. The first is the rise of the Communist regime in Russia, the second is its disintegration in 1989, and the third is the rise of nationalistic movements.
2.1. The Rise and Establishment of the Communist Regime
For hundreds of years, Russia was ruled by Czars, who had a complete power over the Russian system and life. In the year 1917, a massive revolution drove the Czar from power. The Bolsheviks, later called Communists, seized the government (i.e., Communist dictatorship) and Russia became the first Communist nation. Under this policy, the Soviet Union expected to spread Communism through economic, political and technological means.
The rise of Communism had shaped much of the history since the early 1900s, where many considered Communism at that time as the greatest threat to world peace, while others looked on it as the world’s greatest hope (Backtash, 1980: p. 10). The Communists called for government ownership instead of private ownership of factories, machines and other basic means of production. They also called for government planning of economic activity and for strict rule by the Communist party (Backtash, 1980: p. 35).
The Communist methods of gaining and holding power ranged from violent revolution to propaganda and education. In a Communist country, the power was always in the hands of the “Communist Executive Party”; no other party was allowed. The communist party was highly centralized, and the top leadership was the only decision maker. However, the “Communist doctrine seemed to be losing its importance, especially for young people. There was an increasing interest in safe and comfortable living, and less revolutionary activity” (Backtash, 1980: p. 60).
The Communist party lost many members due especially to the Soviet policy and Cold War, where “The Cold War was a struggle between the communists and non-communist powers. The main weapons of this war included propaganda, economics, political and technological power” (Backtash, 1980: p. 75).
The Soviet Union was able to win some of the Third World powers to its side. The strategy of domination which was adopted by the Communists was through economic, military and other means at a time when Western countries had ended their support. Egypt was one of the examples out of many; when the World Bank turned down to fund the construction of the High Dam. Consequently, the Russians stepped in and started granting loans to Third World powers for around five billion Roubles, where 70% of these granted loans were used for economic and technical fields in accordance with the agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the corresponding Third World powers (Backtash, 1980: p. 90). This policy had a significant effect especially in the process of developing the industry, which would help those countries to improve their economies and it would decrease their reliance on the western countries.
The United States, as the world most powerful democratic country, took the role of defending non-communist nations that were threatened by the Communist takeover. Containment of Communism became the major goal of the United States post war policy (Backtash, 1980: p. 112).
2.2. The American Dominance and Disintegration of the Soviet
Union
With regards to Communism, it had failed where N. Chomsky argues “… Yes, it’s true, socialism has lost because Russia has failed. … Okay, then in what sense did socialism fail? meaning, it’s true that the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe called themselves ‘socialist’—but they also called themselves ‘democratic’. The question here is, were they socialist? Well, you can argue about what socialism is, but there are some ideas that are so closely related to it, like workers’ control over production, elimination of wage labour, things like that. Did those countries have any of those things? They weren’t even a thought there. In fact, just as the moves towards democracy in Russia were instantly destroyed, the Bolshevik takeover was a coup and that was perfectly well understood at the time” (Chomsky, 2002: p. 145).
In addition to what N. Chomsky has said, several Arab communist thinkers and writers like I. Mahfouz, B. Yasin, B. Galoumi, S. Abu Shakra, I. Kafaji and N. Nimer agreed and attributed the downfall of the Soviet Union to various factors. For example, I. Mahfouz attributed the failure of socialism in the U.S.S.R. to a number of factors among these (Backtash, 1980: p. 13):
- The rise of communism in an underdeveloped agricultural community.
- The negative position of the West towards socialistic ideology in the U.S.S.R.
- Failure of the communist labour union in Europe to achieve its objectives.
- The early struggle between Lenin and Trotsky.
- The absence of qualified leadership to promote socialistic ideas in the U.S.S.R.
- The establishment of an autocratic regime in U.S.S.R. that deprived their citizens from freedom.
In addition, B. Yasin who is another Arab communist thinker agreed with I. Mahfouz that the Communist party leadership created a new upper class possessing the power and riches (Backtash, 1980: p. 27). Also, B. Galoumi, another Arab communist intellectual, attributed the U.S.S.R. disintegration to the failure of the communist leadership to create a psychological, cultural and moral rules that are necessary to implement and create the technical and scientific atmosphere needed for human initiative. The communist leadership was unable to understand the occurring changes in the world, and the inability to continue the project of the “Soviet Model” which contained within itself the seeds of bankruptcy, and even their visualization of socialism was not clear (Backtash, 1980: p. 43).
Another Arab communist scholar, S. Abu Shakra, attributed the causes of the disintegration of the Soviet Model to the existence of struggle between the top members of the party (Backtash, 1980: p. 67). In addition, I. Khafaj said that the external forces represented by the capitalistic powers played an important role in the disintegration (Backtash, 1980: p. 76), while N. Nimer said that the absence of materialistic incentives decreased the productivity; the U.S.S.R. depended on moral incentives which had short effects (Backtash, 1980: p. 80).
The United States of America adopted the implementation of the rule of democracy as a tool among other tools and factors to affect the existence of the U.S.S.R. The United States supported nationalistic movements that existed in the Communist countries within the Soviet Union influence. The two outstanding forces that defied the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe were the Czechoslovakian reforms under Alexander Dubcek, and the Poland’s uprising against the new laws enacted by the Communist party that were rejected by the labour Union uprising that was led by L. Walesa who played a key role in Polish politics and its independence from Russia. The Establishment of an independent state in Poland was one of the initial steps towards the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. Communist doctrine seemed to be losing its importance, especially for young people; there was an increasing interest in safe and comfortable living and less revolutionary activity (Backtash, 1980: p. 95).
The United States’ policy to affect regimes was as N. Chomsky said “one of the interesting features of the 1980s is that to a large extent the United States had to carry its foreign interventions through the medium of mercenary states. There is a whole net of U.S. mercenary states, Israel is the major one, but it also includes South Africa, South Korea, the states that are involved in the world of anti-communist league, and the various military groups that united the Western hemisphere and Saudi Arabia to fund it” (Chomsky, 2002: p. 4).
In the next sub-section, we will discuss and elaborate how the foreign intervention affected the rise of nationalistic movements in the Middle East.
2.3. The Rise of Nationalistic Movements
Between and after the two World Wars, several nationalistic movements in Europe and in the Middle East were born. In Eastern Europe, nationalistic groups sought to create smaller states out of the huge Austro-Hungarian state, and the Ottoman and Russian empires. The origin of nationalistic movements in Europe goes back to the 1800s. During the late 1800s, Otto Bismarck, who was the Prime Minister of Prussia, united Germany through brief wars where the corresponding Germany’s efforts to increase its power helped to cause World War I (Hitti, 1993: p. 90). Indeed, later on during the 1930s, the Nazis revived the sentiments of the Germans on nationalistic grounds (Hitti, 1993: p. 95). On the other hand, Italy also began a long period as a divided country governed by foreign rulers, and the unification was based on nationalistic grounds where the architect for this unification was Garibaldi (Hitti, 1993: p. 100).
Middle East was not an exception; the outcome of the First World War and the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was that Arab Crescent was divided into states on ethnic and nationalistic grounds among France and Britain on mandatory status according to the League of Nations’ resolution. The Arab Crescent fell under occupation by the foreign powers of France and Britain replacing the previous rule. As a result of this occupation, nationalistic movements emerged. The author A. Antonious says “Arab nationalism started from a wide-base thesis that all Arab speaking peoples were one nation,” and continued to say “it began as a purely intellectual movement with pioneers mostly Syrian intellectuals, more specifically Christian Lebanese, educated at the American University of Beirut, and were operating in Egypt” (Madi, 1959: p. 43; Antonious, 1938: p. 75).
As nationalism struggled against foreign powers, political democracy contended with the native feudalism. The system centred on chiefs who held power by virtue of descent and the accumulation of the existing property. As these chiefs acquired wealth, their office became hereditary too (Antonious, 1938: p. 79), and as P. Hitti says “if the First World War served the Arab components of the Ottoman Empire and set them on the way to full or semi nationhood, the Second World War combined with the threat of political Zionism, which was viewed by Arabs everywhere as an intrusive movement, contributed to bringing those parts closer together” (Hitti, 1993: p. 300).
The major aim of the Arab nationalistic movement was to liberate all Arab countries from the foreign rule and to unite all Arab countries in one state. With this regard, P. Hitti states that (Hitti, 1993: p. 302):
“These two objectives namely the Liberation and Unification of the Arab countries into one state were the objectives of the Arab Nationalistic movement. Secret national societies, associations such as Al-Montada, Young Arabs, Al-Ahd and the Decentralization Party were formed, and most of those who participated in these societies joined the revolution of the Sharif Al-Husein Ben Ali on June 9, 1916 that started from Saudi Arabia against the Ottoman rule. The aim was to liberate Greater Syria, and establishing our Arab States.”
At earlier dates, Iraq had even begun to pursue a hostile course against the British mandate. The rebellion of 1920, which started among the tribes on the lower Euphrates and in the holy cities of Al-Najaf and Karbala, led the British to substitute indirect rule for direct rule. Around 1920, it became apparent to the nationalists that these uprisings which took place in most of the Arab countries under the French and British rules were crushed.
“The establishment of an Arab unified state received a hard blow by two stated imperialistic countries. As a result, the nationalistic movements were liquidated as in the Arab Crescent of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in (1925-1927) and in North Africa in (1920-1930). In view of these depressing circumstances, a new generation of young well-educated Arab nationalists revived the idea of the ‘Arab Nationalism’ and called for independence and Arab unity.” (Hindi, 1963)
For the new pioneers of Nationalism, nationalization became a “universal idea that should fulfil the demands of life to its people and aims to liberate their people from their external and internal grievances, and elevate their conditions from being underdeveloped states…to development and sovereignty” (Rustum, 1970: p. 65). This new frontier was led by many parties in the Arab countries. To name a few out of many such Arab Nationalistic movements, Al-Ba’th Party, Socialist Party, Social National Syrian Party, and many others.
Considering the Democratization thesis, this was not new to the American foreign policy; Democratization was a “justification” to encounter political opponents across the globe who typically invoked that same right to freedom and self-determination in favour of their cause (Neep, 2003: p. 74). Democratization was an adopted American policy, and was used in an instrumental fashion; a tactic in a wider strategy to achieve specific set of political objectives rather than for the sake of democracy itself. This approach “stoked the fires of public frustration and fed the overwhelming anti-American sentiment that has been sweeping over the Middle East region since the mid-1990s” (Neep, 2003: p. 75). For example, we had noticed that the American influence in the Middle East had reached its peak by utilizing the policy of democratization by force through the use of wars that were based on false pretences. Democracy cannot be imposed or installed top-down but rather bottom-up; the push and intervention for a political reform system, within which genuine participation through real parties is possible, must begin at the level of grassroots. It is essential for any country’s democratic structure that—within the public sphere—political participation is granted to all citizens, where the principle of human rights is applied by granting effective political rights.
However, the policy of the U.S. in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf area where democratic governments did not exist, was that the U.S. was willing to sacrifice its promotion of democracy in exchange for security promised to regimes that would maintain the production of petroleum and provide a buffer against the expansion of the Soviet influence before it was disintegrated. The way of war does not solve the problem of implementing democracy in nations by force; economic incentives could be offered to countries that are successful in implementing political reforms, and sanctions would be imposed to reprove those countries that refuse to open up the avenues of political partnership (Neep, 2003: p. 82).
Yet, the War on Terror was launched by the United States in response to the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. by Al-Qaeda terrorist organization on September 11, 2001. The campaign which was led by the United States and its allies had the goal of ending international terrorism by stopping terrorist groups and ending alleged state sponsorship of terrorism. Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia, states that “War on Terrorism has largely been dominated by the use of special forces, intelligence, police work, diplomacy and propaganda” (Wikipedia, 2006: p. 1). The Wikipedia continues to say that the American administration “considers the Iraq War as part of the war on terrorism, even though several reasons that the U.S. originally was presenting for invading Iraq have since been discredited” (Wikipedia, 2006: p. 1). As a result of that, launching The War on Terror by the U.S. and its allies created political instability in the Middle East due to the fact that Al-Qaeda was originally an Arab Islamic fundamentalist organization.
The thesis of democratization and the “War on Terror” led by the U.S. had created negative sentiments among great number of peoples in the Islamic and Arab worlds. For example, free election to the Palestinian parliament resulted in Hamas coming to power; a group which is considered by America as terrorist. Again, great numbers of Arabs felt in particular that the launched war on Iraq was not justified and especially that Weapons of Mass Destruction were not found at all in that country.
To conclude, the impact of external factors was reflected in the creation of new Arab states that were under the Ottoman rule for at least four centuries. The divided states came under foreign rule again namely under the French and British mandates. During that mandate rule, nationalistic movements took place. The objective of the nationalistic movements was the liberation from foreign rule and the unification of all Arab countries. The struggle to achieve these two objectives failed. A Palestinian scholar, S. Al-Qasim who lived in Israel, said on a televised Al-Jazeera interview on 20th February 2006 that “Arab nationalistic and communistic movements did not achieve their objectives because both ideas were imported from the West.” He added that “such ideologies should have been rooted in the Arab culture, especially since that the Arab world embodies many ethnic and religious groups and sects.” Also, M. Madi states that “Communism failed because its ideology is far from the Arab way of life and culture. They advocated freedom, calls for freedom, standing against imperialistic movements and spreading of justice” (Madi, 1959: p. 110). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only world superpower.
3. Local Factors
In this section, the internal factors that affected the political reforms in Jordan will be presented and discussed. The analysed factors include the constitutional reforms that were implemented, political events that took place, and the important role of the media.
3.1. Constitution and Election Laws
The state of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy in which the King selects a prime minister to govern for him. The King also chooses the corresponding members of the Cabinet. The National Assembly—Jordan’s legislative branch—consists of two Houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate was composed of one hundred and ten members who were elected through the secret ballot. It is important here to recognize the parliamentary structure with regards to the lobbying nature, and the fairness in the number of members within the Lower House who are legitimately authorized to suggest laws. The question here is how these structural attributes influence the legislative process and the decision making. The number of members was always subject to change depending on internal and external affecting factors, and usually the most important factor was to ensure that the resulting political decisions were always onto the government’s side. All men and women over 18 years of age have the right to vote and run for election. The information that will be presented here was adopted from the Jordanian National Assembly’s library archives.
Since the year of its establishment in 1921, the state of Jordan had six election laws and twenty-eight amendments until the year 2010. The last one was the election law No. (22/1986) which was amended five times in the years 1988, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001. Important milestones of these amendments were as follows:
1) The election law No. (22/1986) included in its regulations the West Bank as part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan whereas this law allocated nine seats for the Palestinian camps on the condition that the candidate does not belong to any illegitimate political organization.
2) On 30-07-1987 the administrative engagement with the West Bank was disengaged. Therefore, the election law was amended in terms of constituencies and the number of the members. By virtue of amendments in 1988 and 1989, the number of seats in the House of Representatives became 80 distributed over 20 constituencies, while the corresponding seats of the Palestinian camps were abolished.
3) In 1989, the decision not to engage illegitimate parties and political organizations was frozen which expanded the margin of democracy and pluralism and the contribution to political life. On the basis of a mixed election system, the elections of the years 1989-1993 took place.
4) In 1993, and after the dissolution of the House of Representatives, the government of Abdulsalam Al-Majali issued the provisional law No. (15/1993) based on the article No. (94/1) of the constitution whereby the election system was amended from the Open List to the system of One-Man One-Vote system which gave the constituent one vote regardless of the number of seats allocated for his constituency.
5) In 1997, the second government of Abdulsalam Al-Majali issued the provisional law No. (24/1997). The reason for the amendment was to limit the number of seats for the new governorates of Madaba, Jerash and Aqaba.
6) In 2001, the government of Ali Abu Al-Ragheb issued the provisional election law No. (34/2001) which was approved by the new King at that time.
7) The age of the constituent: the election law approved the age of the constituent at 18 instead of 19 which was in the old law.
8) The body supervising the election: the judicial authority had become a participant in supervising the election process, whereas in the past supervision of the election was conducted by a committee formed from government employees and assigned by the administrative governor.
9) Places of voting and sorting: sorting is performed in the same voting centres, whereas in the past it used to be transferred to the centre of the constituency.
10) The constituent is allowed to vote at any of the voting centres in the constituency, whereas voting was only allowed in the place and centre where his name was listed.
11) Voting crimes: punishments were amended in the law based on two main issues of alleged illiteracy and buying votes due to their significant effects on the integrity of the elections.
12) The constituencies: The Council of Ministers agreed on the system of dividing the constituencies and the seats allocated for each one of them according to the law No. (43/2001). The system stipulated on increasing the number of seats at the House of Representatives from 80 to 104 and the number of constituencies from 20 to 45.
13) The law of One-Man One-Vote raised a vast debate, as it led to a state of negative refusal of this law which was shown by the boycott of most of the political forces in the Jordanian society, in addition to the professional unions and some of the political symbols that demanded the necessity to renovate the route of the institutional democratic method which is based on pluralism and allows for a greater margin of political participation and more contribution in the decision making. This called for the creation of a modern and democratic election law that seeks to meet national needs aiming at activating the roles of national, social and political forces and achieving more freedom, justice and equality. In this regards, one can note that it is rather the institutional barriers which have the effects on the political representation.
Therefore, not adopting a stable election law has always been one of the aspects of political retardation and democratic regression. Also, there has always been the need for creating a democratic law that aims at spelling out a real representation of the Jordanian people in order for the House of Representatives to be competent and practice its role in auditing, questioning and controlling. Any deviation from these principles is considered as a deviation from democracy and a weakening of the role of constitutional institutions, which is an offense against political participation on the basis of pluralism, the circulation of power, and the anti-corruption process which has always been of high interest to the nation.
In a related and closely connected issue, and in order to shed much more light on the Jordanian constitution, some related outstanding articles are presented as follows (Jordan Constitution, 1952 (rev. 2011)):
Article 6
1) All Jordanians are equal before the law and there shall be no discrimination between them in rights and duties even if they differ in race, language or religion.
2) The state shall secure work and education within its capabilities and ensure assurance and equal opportunities for all Jordanians.
Article 15
1) The state shall safeguard the freedom of promoting religious and doctrinal rituals according to the customs practiced in the Kingdom unless this is in breach of the general order or against manners.
2) Journalism and the press are free within the limits of the law.
3) It is not permitted to suspend newspapers nor to void their privileges unless according to the law.
4) In the case of announcing martial law or a state of emergency, the law is allowed to impose limited control upon newspapers, publishing, writings and media in matters that are linked to public security and issues of national defence.
5) The law shall organize the method of control over newspapers’ resources.
Article 16
1) Jordanians have the right to assemble within the limits of the law.
2) Jordanians have the right to establish societies and political parties provided that it has a legitimate purpose and peaceful means and has rules that do not violate the Regulations of the constitution.
3) The law shall organize the method of establishing societies and political parties and controlling its resources.
Article 25 The Legislative Authority shall be entrusted to the Parliament and the King, whereas the Parliament shall be composed of the Houses of Senate and Deputies.
Article 26 The Executive Authority shall be entrusted with the King who shall assume it by means of his ministers according to the regulations of the law.
Article 27 The Legal Authority is undertaken by the courts in their different kinds and degrees and all rulings shall be issued according to the law in the name of the King.
For the twenty-eight amendments on the script of the constitution, M. Horani (Horani, 2006: p. 19) stated that the power of the executive government was increased and the role of both the legislative and judicial authorities was weakened. This gave the executive government more power and overruled the authority of the legislative and legal branches. Thus, it became obvious that the executive branch of the government possessed the upper hand and power, due to the introduced amendments to the constitution, which helped avoid the checks and balances within the government’s performance.
In addition, M. Horani recommended that five of the amended texts of the constitution should be reinstated as follows (Middle East Briefing:2):
1) The Upper House should not be dissolved in order to safeguard its independence and to maintain continuity of legislation.
2) Any executive government that dissolves the parliament should resign, and a new one should conduct the new elections.
3) Restrictions on the government’s issuing of temporary laws.
We can notice that the structure of the parliamentary institution, which was caused by the corresponding election laws, created controlling strategies for the political, legal and economic decisions, which led to ineffective political outcomes. Moreover, the number of MPs was always subject to change depending on internal and external factors, where the purpose was always to ensure the actual realization of the pre-intended political decisions.
3.2. Local and Regional Political Events
Navigating the treacherous shoals of the Iraq conflict with a steady hand, the state of Jordan appears to have emerged unscathed from the turbulent events that had resulted. The Kingdom of Jordan adjusted its rhetoric to fit the public mood while backing the U.S. policy in Iraq.
With a small economy that is particularly vulnerable to regional crises, its precarious demographic realities and limited public participation in government, there could have been otherwise been continuing economic hardships despite a steady growth in GNP. The suspension of the parliament for two years that lasted until July 2003, restrictions on a handful of basic freedoms and anger from the ongoing regional developments have caused discontent, along with the prevention of public sentiments from being expressed through the established political and media channels. For example, angry public demonstrations against the U.S.-led war on Iraq in March and April 2003 had to be monitored closely. To deal with this situation, King Abdullah II announced parliamentary elections which had previously been suspended, and this step was a strong pledge to institute domestic reforms.
In addition to what was previously stated, events in the southern town of Ma’an in November 2002 underscored the danger of failing to address the absence of trust between local authorities and the state in general, because most of the circumstances in Ma’an were not unique, where such an event stood a fair chance of being replicated elsewhere in the Kingdom. Another issue was the unsettling situation eastward in Iraq. Both crises, shown graphically on television screens and in the media, together with mounting economic difficulties that had in the past triggered outbursts of fury, were likely to do so again. The absence of institutionalized channels to express and address these situations could shake the government at any point in time.
There was no indication that Jordanian policies were about to become unstuck. The Jordanian political elite was asking itself of how to manage the next crises peacefully because of the fact that the bond between the State and individuals remained fragile, and discontent continued to bubble directly beneath the surface. Some expected that democratic reforms would threaten stability as long as regional crises remain unresolved, sparking unrest among a population that nurtures a close affinity with its Arab brethren in surrounding nations. Others argued that opening up the political system is the only way to ensure Jordan’s security in the long run and that the regime must improve trust between citizens and the authority before frustrations rise to undermine the state. Arguing that any reform with regards to the democratization process has to be a tightly managed process, lest passions and interests could be unleashed that could spin out of control and take the Kingdom on an unpredictable and dangerous path (International Crises Group, 2003: p. 2, 19).
Jordanians have begun to chart a careful middle course that was reflected in the recommendations of the Jordan’s first reform committee in December 2002, the June 2003 establishment of the National Centre for Human Rights, and the report on Ma’an issued by the Centre for Strategic Studies at The University of Jordan in September 2003. These recommendations should have been expanded, received unequivocal regime encouragement, and would themselves would have given rise to new measures. The previously mentioned committee (Middle East Briefing: 19) concluded that:
“Bolstering the reform process, reform is most widely called for in several areas. Many of those interviewed by ICG emphasized the importance of making the electoral process more reflective of the country’s demographic makeup and/or improving the representation of national political parties. Independent international election observers would go a long way toward enhancing the credibility of future elections. An equally important measure would be expanding media freedoms by revising the 1999 press and publications law; especially as it concerns government licensing and censorship practices, restrictions on who may practice journalism, prohibitive minimum capital requirements for newspapers and limitations on funding for research centres. Jordanians also suggested the establishment of a constitutional court as a practical step to lend greater credibility to the legislative process.”
Furthermore, the committee added:
“Strengthening civic institutions and popular participation in political life must extend to civic institutions, including political parties. As a critical first step, the government should loosen controls over its internal functioning and financing. Ultimately, it should strengthen civil society, promote independent voices and allow for genuine and constructive opposition. In addition to that, it should address the issue raised by the violence in Ma’an. The government took some modest steps towards improving relations between the authorities and the population and delivering economic services. It should go further by modernizing and standardizing law enforcement nationwide including adopting a fresh approach to citizen—police relations, and developing essential infrastructure in Ma’an and towns suffering from similar economic conditions by expanding technical training for young people and embarking on serious efforts to increase private sector investment.”
Indeed, one could criticize what was called the “improvements” as a shallow one and the aim was just to show in front of the international community that authorities are undertaking reforms at the political, economic or social levels. As a matter of fact, life quality was continuously deteriorating such as deteriorations within education and health insurance, and there was no serious supervision of many continuous private sector chaotic overpricing activities. Another example, there had been no real major improvements with regards to women’s rights and equality and what was done only resembled shy policies just to show in front of the corresponding international community (Al-Rabadi & Al-Rabadi, 2016, 2017, 2018).
With regards to reforms in Jordan, and in the wider MENA region in general, one can state that the aimed reforms became theoretical more than practical and real implementations (Bani Salameh, 2018; Zakharov & Issaev, 2022; Farag & AbuDalu, 2022; Vollmann et al., 2020). These reforms were intended as a reaction to the public tensions at the internal level, and one of the main reasons for these existing public tensions was caused by the US war on terror which created internal political instability.
3.3. Media and Freedom of Speech
The objective behind media and freedom of journalism as defined by Hamilton is “to establish a noble fundament in order to guarantee to ourselves, our descendants and our neighbours what nature has given us as a right, which is the right to expose the oppressing authority and oppose it by means of spoken and written words which is the right and truth.” In contrast to that, we were witnessing in Jordan several laws for media and publishing that were presented before the House of Representatives, and had put high constraints on the publishing of facts before the public keeping what was really published in the dark. This shows that no real reforms have been done as mentioned above. These corresponding laws came at a time when Jordan was launching a new era of controlling freedoms and more limitations on democracy; what we were seeing had proven that there were numerous attempts that aimed at maintaining and protecting the old mechanisms.
The most suitable description of freedoms in Jordan is favouritism; the rights that are given to the public today, under the ruling that is enjoying full authority, could be withdrawn from them tomorrow.
Since the lifting of the martial law in Jordan in 1989, the regime maintained a relatively good reputation in the field of human rights in dealing with the national circumstances although the martial law style of handling some issues was still considered such as “arrest without defined accusations.” Furthermore, the press managed to exceed the traditional red lines from time to time, and during recent years created a mechanism to criticize the government and sometimes reaching the levels of high ranking officials who in the past were never approached. This became especially with the emergence of the independent publishers and press enjoying the independence from government ownership. The privately owned newspapers began on a full scale by alienating the historic red lines as far as possible from the press.
In attempts to seek close assistance from the constitution, the independent daily and weekly newspapers tried to build a firm base during the last few years that is based on excluding the royal family from any criticism, while any other individual or group remained subject to numerous investigations and criticisms. Aside from the previously mentioned facts, there was an intellectual liberal school that demanded the lifting of constraints imposed on the press and other freedoms based on the fact that such measures will not only give people their rights, but will also contribute in the economic development process and will accelerate the political reform process.
In a related direction, and as previously mentioned, the duties of the Upper House were to check decisions taken by the Parliament. The following specific Articles of the Jordanian Constitution will shed light on these duties and how they affect press reforms:
Article 91
The prime minister submits drafts of laws to the Parliament. The Parliament has the right to approve these laws, reject them or amend them. Then they will be sent to the Upper House. In order for any law to become valid, it should have the approval of both Houses.
Article 92
If one of the Houses rejects any proposed law twice, then the two Houses will meet under the chairmanship of the Upper House. A two thirds majority vote by the members of the two Houses are needed for the law to be passed.
Therefore, many of the proposed laws for press reforms were rejected based on the above mentioned Articles 91 and 92 where several members of the Houses, who are fully controlled by the government’s political tools, managed to stop legislative laws that could have been very useful to support press freedoms. It is to be noted that lobbying for the corresponding laws requires a hard work to collect the required number of MPs to agree on the proposed law; the number of the required members may affect the legislative process, and here we mean lobbying for the introduction of a law that gives more freedom of speech and fewer restrictions on media and press.
The swinging freedom of the press (up and down) was always dependent on the political scene—locally and regionally—accompanied by steady state control over the media depending on the local and international circumstances.
4. Economic and Social Factors
Jordan, as with several other countries, was at the threshold of realizing the dynamic opportunities that were presented by economic openness and global integration (i.e., globalization). Currently, the population of Jordan is around eleven million with numerous unrealized and untapped potentials. At its core, the society of Jordan is built on openness, dialogue and respect for life; a society where education, equality and a sense of purpose are not only attainable but essential elements of what it means to be a citizen. The following sub-sections will address the World Bank (WB) monetary policies with regards to Jordan and the consequences of their implementation.
4.1. Economy before WB Program Implementation
Jordan’s aspiration had always been focused on benefiting from the opportunities of economic openness and global integration (i.e., globalization) to become an active contributor to the global economy. The challenges in realizing this vision always existed effectively due to the need to adapt to a continuously changing set of global economic indicators. Jordan had positioned itself to thrive, not just survive, in this dynamically changing era of globalization.
Traditional economics models for developing nations, which focused on regional economies that depended on foreign aid, allowed Jordan to reach unprecedented growth levels in the early and mid 1980s, but they were no longer relevant in the new economic model. This harsh reality became apparent during the severe economic crises that gripped the country in the late 1980s where its fallout is still influential to this day. The rapid decline in oil prices and the eight-year Iraq-Iran war triggered several crises that harshly gripped the region; while the dependence of Jordan on foreign aid had served Jordan very well in the early booming years, this had a direct and devastating effect during the subsequent recession.
The corresponding related World Bank report stated that “before the crises, the Jordanian economy relied heavily on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member nations, as well as the Iraqi market, to satisfy its production capacity. This arrangement negated the need to search for new markets and hindered industrial competitiveness and creativity in the process. At the time, capital investment in the Jordanian economy was driven by the public sector, and fuelled by foreign aid. For example, the United States had provided Jordan with economic assistance totalling more than 2 billion dollars since 1952, yet this significantly marginalized the private sector’s role in the development process. Labour found readily available jobs in GCC markets, removing any added burden on the local economy to create sufficient employment opportunities” (Rashwani, 2003: p. 5).
The downturn experienced by the regional economy adversely affected the demand for Jordanian product and labour, and significantly reduced the inflow of GCC foreign aid to the country. A severe macroeconomic imbalance resulted and trickled down to citizens as the inflation rate rose, unemployment hit record high, foreign debt mounted, fiscal deficit widened, and the trade deficit worsened, where all in turn depleting Jordan’s foreign reserves. The drastic impact of the crises prompted the country to evaluate its economic approach in order to seek an economic solution that would highlight the benefits of adopting the liberal economic model and would help Jordan to steer its way out of economic crises by establishing a free market. With the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the country executed a series of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs in 1989. As an example, Table 1 shows numerically the objectives of the Structural Adjustment Program from 1992 to 1998 (relative to the net national GNP).
Table 1. Objectives of the structural adjustment program (1992-1998). (Relative to the Net National GNP).
Category |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
Real GNP Growth |
11.3 |
6 |
5.5 |
5.8 |
6 |
6.2 |
6.5 |
Inflation |
5.3 |
5 |
4.5 |
4.5 |
4.5 |
4.5 |
4.5 |
Consumption |
105 |
99.9 |
97.8 |
95.6 |
93.3 |
91.6 |
88.9 |
Investment |
25.7 |
23.2 |
22.3 |
22.5 |
22.8 |
23 |
23.5 |
General Balance
(Internal Income) |
35.3 |
32.2 |
31.7 |
31.8 |
31.2 |
31 |
31 |
Foreign Aids |
7 |
5.4 |
4.9 |
4.1 |
3.1 |
2.5 |
2 |
General Public Expenses |
39.3 |
38.6 |
36.9 |
36.2 |
34.6 |
33.8 |
33.5 |
Deficit (Without Aids) |
4 |
6.4 |
5.2 |
4.4 |
3.4 |
2.8 |
2.5 |
Currency Growth and Supply |
7.4 |
8.6 |
10.2 |
10.6 |
10.7 |
11 |
11.3 |
Expenses and Trade Balance (Deficit) |
44.2 |
36.5 |
33.8 |
31.3 |
29.3 |
27.7 |
26.2 |
Exports |
25.5 |
26.2 |
26.9 |
28 |
28.4 |
28.8 |
29.1 |
Imports |
69.7 |
62.7 |
60.7 |
59.3 |
57.7 |
56.5 |
55.4 |
Current Account (Deficit) |
15.5 |
10.4 |
7.2 |
6 |
2.9 |
0.7 |
1.7 |
Labor Transfers
(Net Annual Change) |
83.5 |
6.4 |
5.3 |
5.9 |
8.6 |
5.1 |
7.4 |
Tourism (Net Annual Change) |
220 |
60.7 |
11.1 |
15.5 |
15.2 |
15 |
14.1 |
These programs were aimed at enhancing the corresponding economic growth and reducing macroeconomic imbalance, and therefore “the strategy focused on the integration of the private sector into the industrial policymaking framework, export expansion through increased competitiveness, and facilitation of private sector driven growth, which ensured that Jordan’s legal and regulatory policies matched requirements for global economic participation” (Rashwani, 2003). Thus, the state of Jordan began programs to minimize government intervention in the economy in order to make its way for influential positively-intervening market forces.
4.2. Central Bank—Related Reforms
Reforms are policies interventions which are used to alter issues. However, the sustainability of reforms depends on factors such as democracy as a power to carry out decisions, awareness of civil society and the poverty alleviation; these factors are interrelated to ensure positively the sustainability of reforms. The effectiveness of reforms can be measured in one way by the actual realization of the pre-planned goals and outcomes.
Starting with fiscal and monetary reforms, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), which is the monetary authority of Jordan, shifted from a hard line policy towards a more indirect softer approach. Banking laws were amended and tightened the fiscal with a more transparent tax system and more efficient collection methods. In addition to the national privatization program, creating additional private sector investment opportunities such as the Aqaba Railway and Jordan Telecommunications Company was initiated to prepare the Jordanian economy for the upcoming demands of the 21st century.
Major policy changes in the areas of trade and investment were made to ensure the creation of a lucrative and friendly environment for both local and foreign investors. New laws were introduced to provide Jordanians and non-Jordanians alike with increased investment incentives. In addition, labour codes were amended to favour workers while industrial protection and requirements for import license-based considerations were completely abolished. An investment promotion law was enacted, which included incentives such as income and social service tax exemptions, and the exemption of imported capital goods from customs duties and fees. The main objectives of the ongoing reform program were to increase private investment in infrastructure, raise enterprise efficiency and competitiveness, develop the local capital market, consolidate public finances, and attract foreign investment, technology and expertise.
4.3. Society Transformation
The factors of poverty, democratic reversion and the limited success of the reforms among other factors are interrelated. For example, liberalizing and improving market conditions were leading to some macroeconomic improvements while contributing little to poverty alleviation (Rashwani, 2003). This was to certain extent negative for sustainable microeconomic growth and the corresponding political stability in Jordan.
On the other hand, the positive impact and achievement of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs were clearly reflected in the macro economy of Jordan. The WB Jordan development policy review in 2002 concluded that “The figures show that real economic growth was 4.2% in November 2001 as compared with a 13.4% drop in 1989, inflation fell from a 25.6% annual rate in 1989 to 1.8% in 2001, the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP narrowed to 6.9% in 2001 from a staggering 20.6% in 1989, and external debt also witnessed a sharp decline falling to 75.2% of GDP at the end of 2001 in comparison with a high of 190% in 1990” (World Bank, 2002).
The negative impact of the Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs participated within the micro economy in increasing the poverty in a direct way. During the application of the program, if we take poverty per individual, the figure shows that “individuals who are on the poverty line were 3% and zero under the poverty line in 1986 and 19881, then in 1992 the individuals who are under the poverty line were 24% and zero on the poverty line2, and in 1994 and 1993 individuals who are on poverty line were 19.8% while the individuals under the poverty line were 8.7%3.”
Given the above, one can argue that while liberalizing and improving market conditions were leading to macroeconomic successes, they were contributing little to social development as it was shown before, which was ultimately critical for sustainable growth and political stability. The government launched a second reform program in the late 1990s that focused on areas that directly affected social development, namely public sector reform, improvements in educational system, an open market policy, legislative and judicial overhauls, and a modern legal infrastructure.
The monetary and fiscal policies that have been adopted have helped to create a dynamic and responsive society equipped with the requisite tools for competing in the expanding global economy. Fuelling this reform program was from the sector of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) which has become a source of wealth where knowledge and information can now be used as tools to drive significant economic and social reforms.
The country established the REACH initiative (Regulatory framework, Enabling environment (infrastructure), Advancement programs, Capital and finance, and Human resources development). Launched in 1999, REACH became a plan of action to bolster Jordan’s Information Technology (IT) sector and maximize its ability to compete in local, regional and global markets. The ICT became a tool to enable Jordan to move ahead in developing its business, government and citizens (Speech of King Abdullah II to the Parliament, 2004).
4.4. The ICT-Based Government Modernization
For public sector reforms, the country introduced an e-government program in January 2001. For Jordan, e-government meant a new definition of government that of a first rate service provider for its citizens. The program had hired world-class systems’ integrators to assist in the transition and in training e-government project managers who would lead change in the heart of public institutions.
With almost one-third of Jordanian citizens in learning institutions, the educational reform was aimed at “leveraging knowledge and allowing the mind to reach its full potential” (Speech of King Abdullah II to the Parliament, 2004). The society needed “a complete revolution in the educational system to ensure that what takes place in the classroom, on campus, and in society is a process of learning and creative thinking and not simply one of rote instruction” (Speech of King Abdullah II to the Parliament, 2004). Education in all its forms and at all levels, must promote the importance of entrepreneurship and competition, and it must also be dynamic enough to adapt to a rapidly changing world to facilitate these requirements.
To support reform, Jordan’s networking strategy had set a target of connecting all of the public learning institutions to the important Broad-Band Network system, bringing global resources into classrooms and allowing the student to interact with the world (Speech of King Abdullah II to the Parliament, 2004). Furthermore, by adopting a policy to build global partnerships, active institutional relationships and to allow for free trade and international engagements, important steps were taken such as securing an association agreement with the European Union, gaining membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, and establishing free trade areas with the European, Middle Eastern and U.S. markets. The trade agreement, which was signed on 24th October 2000, in addition to other treaties was “intended to shift Jordan’s economy from one of dependence on foreign aid to one of self-reliance” (Speech of King Abdullah II to the Parliament, 2004).
At the same time, legislative, regulatory, judicial and other reform efforts have been undertaken to create the necessary environment to allow Jordan’s businesses and citizens to utilize such international agreements and effectively compete in the new knowledge-based global economy; Jordan was not able to tackle all of the reform areas that needed to be addressed while remaining within the government’s budget. As a result, the country adopted a creative and ambitious program named the Social and Economic Transformation Program (SETP) in November 2001, where “the SETP is funded by external donor grants and by partial utilization of privatization proceeds. It calls for the adoption of a performance-based growth budget and further strengthening the role of the private sector” (Fact sheet, Jordan at Glance, 2004; Rashwani, 2003: p. 13).
4.5. The Economy after WB Program Implementation
According to the cultural transformation, the country was acting to enable Jordanians to explore all of the opportunities that the world presented. The majority of people were driven by greater awareness equipped with knowledge and tried not to allow for traditional limitations.
The state of Jordan had created an environment conducive to competition in a free market by offering international investors a unique strategic position, stable political environment, and a qualified and modernized world-class infrastructure and means of communications. On the other hand, as previously stated, and despite the implementation of the objectives of economic privatization and globalization, it has been noticed that poverty rates in Jordan had been substantially increased within the short to medium term, especially since the implementation of the WB-influenced Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs. As an example, Table 2 illustrates the actual performance of the Jordanian economic indicators that were previously targeted by the Structural Adjustment Program from 1992 to 1998.
Table 2. Actual performance of the jordanian economic indicators previously targeted by the structural adjustment program (1992-1998).
Category |
1992 |
1993 |
1994 |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
Real GNP Growth |
17.8 |
5.6 |
6.1 |
6.3 |
3 |
2 |
1.6 |
GNP Decline (1985 = 100) |
- |
- |
- |
- |
2.3 |
3.7 |
3 |
Inflation (1995 = 100) |
3.9 |
3.3 |
3.6 |
2.4 |
6.5 |
2.9 |
3.1 |
Consumption |
98.5 |
94 |
89.7 |
87.8 |
94.6 |
96.4 |
97.6 |
Investment |
34.6 |
36.9 |
34.2 |
34.1 |
31.8 |
26.7 |
23.5 |
General Balance
(Internal Returns) |
33.5 |
31.3 |
31.2 |
31.8 |
30.4 |
28.2 |
28.9 |
Foreign Aids |
3.9 |
4.3 |
4.2 |
3.7 |
4.7 |
4.5 |
3.9 |
Overall General Expenses |
38.6 |
43.2 |
37.7 |
37.3 |
38.5 |
35.9 |
38.8 |
Deficit (Without Aids) |
5.1 |
11.9 |
6.5 |
5.5 |
8.1 |
7.7 |
9.9 |
Currency Growth |
12.8 |
6.9 |
8 |
6.6 |
0.3 |
7.8 |
8.1 |
Expenses and Trade Balance (Deficit) |
45.2 |
46.2 |
37.4 |
34.8 |
42.5 |
37.2 |
32.2 |
Exports |
18.1 |
18.1 |
18.9 |
22 |
22.1 |
21.6 |
20.2 |
Imports |
63.4 |
64.4 |
56.4 |
56.8 |
64.6 |
58.8 |
52.4 |
Current Account |
-16.3 |
-11.4 |
-6.7 |
-3.9 |
-3.3 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
Labor Transfers
(Net Annual Change) |
94.4 |
29.5 |
4.8 |
14 |
28.5 |
0.8 |
-8.2 |
Tourism
(Net Annual Change) |
216.2 |
98.3 |
-13.2 |
25.6 |
55.9 |
3.8 |
11.8 |
Internal Savings |
- |
- |
- |
- |
5.4 |
3.6 |
2.4 |
National Savings |
- |
- |
- |
- |
3 |
2.6 |
2.3 |
One can note, by comparing the 1998 aimed objectives from Table 1 with the 1998 actual performance indicators from Table 2, that a notable overall decline occurred in some important economic indicators such as within real GNP growth, internal returns (revenues), currency growth, deficit without aid, and exports. This obvious decline resulted as previously mentioned, and despite of the application of the privatization and globalization objectives and the macroeconomic improvement of the current account by comparing Table 1 and Table 2 through the implementation of WB restructuring policies, in the fact that the microeconomic situation has been changing negatively as evidenced by the notable rise of the corresponding poverty rates in Jordan (Rashwani, 2003) which had substantially increased. Macroeconomic improvement and liberalizing the market could lead to the rise in GDP and to the drop in national unemployment. However, in the case of Jordan, this was not the case; at the microeconomic level there was an uneven wealth distribution, asset price inflation, creative destruction, drops in purchasing power and structural unemployment, where all of these factors—among others—explain how the microeconomic well-being was degraded despite the improvement at the macroeconomic level (UNDP, 2014; Rashwani, 2003).
5. Conclusion and Future Work
The purpose of this article is to address major factors that affected sustainable reforms in Jordan during the period spanning from its establishment until the first decade of the rule of the new King Abdullah Iben Al-Hussein. Political reforms in the general MENA region were affected by various global factors which are presented, and important local factors that affected political reforms in Jordan are also introduced. The investigated period mentioned above (spanning from Jordan’s establishment until the first decade of the rule of the new King) is important since it had significant long-range effects on the following years.
Side by side with the spread of Communist ideas, at the end of the World War I and its outcome with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Arab Fertile Crescent was divided into many small states based on French and British interests. Because of this new situation on the ground, nationalist movements emerged demanding liberation and unity. New nationalist parties were formed and were able to transfer some of the states in the area to become independent. This trend did not survive due to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. which resulted in leaving the United States as the world’s superpower. The cold war ended in 1989, and a new world order came into existence, where the United States played the important role (directly or indirectly) within the causes for the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.
The U.S. has always been interested in the Middle East especially for its oil. The main objective of the American policy was always to maintain stability in this area (their support to the family regimes in the Arabian Peninsula) where this policy was honoured by the United States which found in these states as N. Chomsky says “regional police force, and they perform their duties with accuracy and at the same time they deprive others and their people from their rights.”
The occurrence of several double standards, that were used by the United States, resulted in Islamic fundamentalist ideas coming into existence, where the war on Iraq was another excuse for these fundamentalist fractions to fight back. They started to resist the American policy which led to the catastrophic September Eleven attacks on the United States. The war on terror came into existence in order to fight this trend, which is still ongoing.
With regards to the internal factors that affected political reforms in Jordan and its constitutional amendments, the comments on these amendments indicate that Jordan was able to introduce many constitutional amendments in order to adapt to the emerging political, economic, educational, social, media, and local disrupting events that frequently occurred in Jordan. These were dealt with constitutional amendments in order to overcome such problems facing the government at the time. It is imperative that the parliamentary process in Jordan acts in accordance with the constitution with few restrictions on the powers granted by the constitution to the King. However, the various mentioned reforms were not highly effective towards achieving the intended objectives; even in some cases legislative obstacles have been applied to restrict freedoms of speech such as within press reforms.
The aspiration of Jordan’s system had focused on benefiting from the opportunities of economic openness and global integration to become an active contributor in the global economy and society. The challenges in realizing this vision existed in effectively being able to adapt to a continuously changing set of global economic indicators. Accordingly, one had noticed that reforms’ amendments took place in banking, laws, fiscal laws tightening, and higher levels of cooperation with the World Bank recommendations. Yet, while implementing the objectives of economic privatization and globalization, it has been noticed that poverty rates had been substantially increased within short to medium runs, especially since the implementation of the World Bank-influenced Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs in Jordan.
Future work will include items such as further analytical investigations of the presented external and internal factors for their long ripple effects on the following years within the reforms’ process that took place in Jordan since the year 2010 for the various political, economic and social aspects.
Acknowledgements
This research was performed during sabbatical leave in 2024-2025 that was granted to Prof. Anas N. Al-Rabadi from The University of Jordan.
NOTES
1Jordan: Strategy Adjustment and Growth, W.B. report 1994.
2M. Baker, Measure Poverty, U.N. report 1996.
3Jordan: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Poverty Assessment Report, W.B. report 1994.