<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE article  PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v3.0 20080202//EN" "http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/3.0/journalpublishing3.dtd"><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="3.0" xml:lang="en" article-type="research article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">JMF</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Journal of Mathematical Finance</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2162-2434</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Scientific Research Publishing</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.4236/jmf.2013.33038</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">JMF-35896</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="Discipline-v2"><subject>Business&amp;Economics</subject><subject> Physics&amp;Mathematics</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>
 
 
  Dynamics of Entrepreneurship under Regime Switching
 
</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>ha</surname><given-names>Sun</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"><sup>1</sup></xref><xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor1"><sup>*</sup></xref></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Jinqiang</surname><given-names>Yang</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"><sup>1</sup></xref><xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor1"><sup>*</sup></xref></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Minghui</surname><given-names>Li</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"><sup>1</sup></xref><xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor1"><sup>*</sup></xref></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><addr-line>School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China; Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology, Shanghai, China</addr-line></aff><author-notes><corresp id="cor1">* E-mail:<email>shasha1989123@hotmail.com(HS)</email>;<email>yang.jinqiang@mail.sufe.edu.cn(JY)</email>;<email>liminghui02@gmail.com(ML)</email>;</corresp></author-notes><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>08</day><month>08</month><year>2013</year></pub-date><volume>03</volume><issue>03</issue><fpage>374</fpage><lpage>382</lpage><history><date date-type="received"><day>May</day>	<month>30,</month>	<year>2013</year></date><date date-type="rev-recd"><day>July</day>	<month>6,</month>	<year>2013</year>	</date><date date-type="accepted"><day>July</day>	<month>18,</month>	<year>2013</year></date></history><permissions><copyright-statement>&#169; Copyright  2014 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. </copyright-statement><copyright-year>2014</copyright-year><license><license-p>This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</license-p></license></permissions><abstract><p>
 
 
   We propose a tractable model of entrepreneur dynamics where the investment conditions are stochastic. Applying the approach of stochastic control and optimization, we solve the dynamics of the entrepreneur’s optimal investment, consumption and portfolio allocation under regime switching. We find that the interactions of precautionary savings and liquidation boundary advance/postpone motives generate rich implications for entrepreneur dynamics. Facing the threat of financial crisis, entrepreneurs build cash reserves and bring forward liquidation option exercise to mitigate downside risk. During the bad times, entrepreneurs value financial slack and postpone liquidation boundary to maintain the business and wait for the good state to come.  
    
 
</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>Regime Switching; Entrepreneurial Finance; &lt;i&gt;q&lt;/i&gt; Theory of Investment; Liquidity Constraints; Precautionary Saving</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><body><sec id="s1"><title>1. Introduction</title><p>The ability of regime-switching models to capture the cyclical features of real macroeconomic variables as proposed by Hamilton [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref1">1</xref>] is widely accepted. Since then, there has been growing interest in applications of regime-switching models into a wide class of financial and economic problems (see Honda [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref2">2</xref>], Guo, Miao, Morellec [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref3">3</xref>] among others). It’s reasonable to believe that firm policy can be affected by regime shifts, since booms and recessions can have significant impact on the profitability or riskiness of both real and financial investment and the willingness to consume. Recent empirical studies show that firms’ financing and investment behaviors change dramatically during the 2008 financial crisis (see Campello, Graham and Harvey [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref4">4</xref>], Ivashina and Scharfstein [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref5">5</xref>]). However, little theoretical research has been done on the relation between regime switching and the dynamics of entrepreneur’s optimal consumption, investment and portfolio allocation. In this paper, we try to focus on the following interesting questions: How should entrepreneurs choose optimal consumption, investment, portfolio allocation and liquidation boundary when facing the threat of financial crisis in the future? How should entrepreneurs behave during a financial crisis?</p><p>To address these questions, we propose a quantitative model to study the dynamics of entrepreneur’s optimal consumption, investment and portfolio allocation when the dynamics of decision variables are subject to discrete regime shifts at random times. Our model builds on the dynamic framework of entrepreneur’s optimal policies (see Wang, Wang and Yang [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref6">6</xref>], henceforth WWY) by adding stochastic investment conditions. We have shown that when the entrepreneur faces uncertain macro conditions, it is optimal for them to hoard cash for precautionary reasons. In addition, the entrepreneur may choose the optimal liquidation boundary to eliminate the risk associated with regime switching. The analysis shows that precautionary savings and liquidation boundary advance/ postpone can have significant value and generate rich implications for entrepreneur dynamics.</p><p>The analysis in the present paper relates to two different strands of literature. First, it relates to the entrepreneurship literature. Hurst, Lusardi [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref7">7</xref>] used empirical methods to show that liquidity constraint induces the entrepreneur to initiate small-sized business. Herranz, Krasa and Villamil [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref8">8</xref>] studied the entrepreneur’s behavior from the aspect of law, and found that the more riskaverse the entrepreneur, the more likely he executes liquidation option. Chen, Miao and Wang [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref9">9</xref>] developed a dynamic incomplete-market model of entrepreneurial firms building on Leland [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref10">10</xref>] and presented the implications of nondiversifiable risks on entrepreneurial finance. Hall and Woodward [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref11">11</xref>] studied the risk facing venture capital-backed entrepreneurial firms. Wang, Wang and Yang [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref6">6</xref>] proposed an incomplete-market q-theoretic model to study entrepreneurial dynamics, and found that precautionary motive, borrowing constraints, and capital illiquidity lead to underinvestment, conservative debt use, under-consumption, and less risky portfolio allocation. However, all these models assume that investment conditions are time-invariant.</p><p>Second, the present paper relates to a series of recent papers on regime switching. Driffill, Kenc, Sola [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref12">12</xref>] modeled the underlying asset return dynamic as a regime switching process to value a perpetual American call option. Honda [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref2">2</xref>] defined an unobservable regime variable in the economy as a continuous-time Markov chain and studied dynamic optimal consumption and portfolio choice in which the mean return of a risky asset shifts between regimes. Guo, Miao, Morellec [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref3">3</xref>] proposed a real option model in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times, and the results showed investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q under this policy. Chen [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref13">13</xref>] built a dynamic capital structure model and demonstrated how business cycle variations in expected growth rates, economic uncertainty, and risk premia influence firm’s financing policies. One of our main contributions is the extensions of regime switching settings to the study of entrepreneurial dynamics, which includes entrepreneur’s optimal consumption, investment and portfolio allocation decisions.</p><p>The paper that is most closely related to the present analysis is Bolton, Chen and Wang [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref14">14</xref>] (henceforth BCW). The authors analyzed dynamic corporate financial management for a financially constrained risk-neutral firm under stochastic financing conditions. They found that firms have precautionary cash hoarding and market timing motives to mitigate macroeconomic risk. One essential difference between the two papers is that we examine the dynamics of entrepreneurship while they focus on financially constrained public firms. Another important point of departure is that we assume stochastic investment conditions, whereas they consider stochastic financing conditions. Finally, we use nonexpected recursive utility function to separate risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). However, they consider risk-neutral pricing.</p><p>The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of entrepreneur dynamics under regime switching. Section 3 derives the model solution. Section 4 presents parameter choices and quantitative results. Section 5 concludes.</p></sec><sec id="s2"><title>2. The Model</title><p>In this section, we propose our quantitative model to study the dynamics of entrepreneurship under regime switching. Our model is built on WWY [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref6">6</xref>] by adding stochastic investment conditions. In particular, we assume the economy has two aggregate states, <img src="5-1490190\8275f86a-7c4a-4820-b572-f82f927325a4.jpg" />(boom and recession). The state <img src="5-1490190\b9717767-1aa8-4334-887e-1e8d428c79b3.jpg" /> follows a continuous-time Markov chain alternating between state G and B and the transition intensity follows a Poisson law. Let <img src="5-1490190\090ba2a8-7d6e-454c-a5fc-f130124ac958.jpg" /> denote the transition intensity from state <img src="5-1490190\1fc0373a-72f0-4cbf-93f8-338ef9cbf618.jpg" /> to state<img src="5-1490190\4229106c-b734-4f31-ae87-848cf8c08785.jpg" />. Then the probability of the economy switching from state G to state B within a small period <img src="5-1490190\e39194cc-d052-468b-a2a4-915529b8c808.jpg" /> is approximately equal to<img src="5-1490190\3beb2fcb-b7fe-497b-8f9e-78a8b546c51c.jpg" />, while the probability of switching from state B to G is approximately<img src="5-1490190\d84397bf-6bab-4eb4-8ff5-4e5017326f1c.jpg" />. In our model, parameters related to investment conditions, i.e. <img src="5-1490190\48df5526-a3c5-46d7-942a-fecfcddd1797.jpg" />and<img src="5-1490190\25e17887-bcae-46fe-b47a-557323e78c05.jpg" />, and liquidation value <img src="5-1490190\4283b7d9-e207-483a-84ad-de0197dbcf43.jpg" /> take different values when the process <img src="5-1490190\8ed96b8d-242e-4c05-985f-b4f0a96b88af.jpg" /> is in different states.</p><p>Stochastic investment conditions and production technology. The entrepreneur employs only capital and cash as the factor of production. We denote <img src="5-1490190\a8a2b893-0845-4e13-aefa-9e892f42a592.jpg" /> as the gross investment and <img src="5-1490190\88791ddd-aac3-4e15-88a5-ac45d79c5782.jpg" /> as capital stock. As is standard in capital accumulation models, the change of capital stock <img src="5-1490190\02f2c93a-b7fb-4da6-bf69-6e522043c023.jpg" /> evolves according to</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105992"><label>(1.1)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\84163d66-3a32-43ef-bf6b-a64305a2fe60.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\eaf6ebc9-adbb-4211-9f73-3d4b043c7412.jpg" /> is the rate of depreciation.</p><p>We assume the cumulative productivity shock <img src="5-1490190\e1eff82f-cc18-4fc3-8182-54c74b4a1dc4.jpg" /> follows arithmetic Brownian motion process. Thus, the firm’s productivity shock <img src="5-1490190\7c7c3e07-f398-483e-90fb-929abfa1d173.jpg" /> over the period <img src="5-1490190\bad69ea1-e4b1-491f-b8c5-895b5699a057.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105993"><label>(1.2)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\df79a109-bec1-4a90-b074-8a3d5b3da625.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\b7f99099-6634-4f90-9498-d9d807ef439b.jpg" /> is a standard Brownian motion, <img src="5-1490190\7660c015-f536-4548-adbf-a04875592ce1.jpg" />is the mean of the productivity shock in state<img src="5-1490190\00ddbf10-1879-43c6-acb9-d182224a8169.jpg" />, and <img src="5-1490190\06c51c00-bd4a-4409-928c-212b7045624a.jpg" /> is the volatility of the productivity shock in both states.</p><p>The firm’s operating revenue over period <img src="5-1490190\7115ed25-c1de-42c4-8f17-9f1bcc1b4b26.jpg" /> is given by<img src="5-1490190\23d28297-7d41-4767-87d4-d6b0611c8b74.jpg" />. After investment <img src="5-1490190\c0c40ba4-6a38-4af2-968b-997be69a3da5.jpg" /> and adjustment cost<img src="5-1490190\c11342c9-c7da-492e-939e-20bebe11672e.jpg" />, the firm’s operating profit <img src="5-1490190\2d2805be-7808-4845-92bd-c30b603e9f6f.jpg" /> over the same period is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105994"><label>(1.3)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\292f77b0-689d-4c54-95e4-0f80ff762587.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where the price of the investment good is set to unity and <img src="5-1490190\260d91e3-cf2e-4a78-a4c4-195845da3176.jpg" /> is the adjustment cost.</p><p>Following Hayashi [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref15">15</xref>], we assume that the firm’s adjustment cost <img src="5-1490190\6ca4632e-6dc9-43b0-9eff-80d5bc206f67.jpg" /> is homogeneous of degree one in <img src="5-1490190\8218370c-4d0e-47ac-9143-75693d67e8a0.jpg" /> and<img src="5-1490190\5ef49f8c-1fc5-4173-9a42-538ec814c86c.jpg" />. And adjustment cost <img src="5-1490190\bb507d30-cadf-4bc0-a95f-fccf6c8a1060.jpg" /> is written in the following homogeneous form</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105995"><label>(1.4)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\e4ad3667-d312-4d2c-b777-448c5f2d4ef7.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\2486326f-f946-40f6-9f06-fac00d5cc609.jpg" /> is the firm’s investment-capital ratio and <img src="5-1490190\132fce6b-e4c4-41ac-ad6e-f34fd4c272c4.jpg" /> is an increasing and convex function. To make the analysis simple and tractable ( see WWY [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref6">6</xref>], BCW [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref14">14</xref>] for example), we assume that</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105996"><label>(1.5)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\4358ab4e-a357-400c-863e-e21d3c02b92c.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where the parameter <img src="5-1490190\523638ff-93a0-4e8a-b863-a3bc1ec87aa3.jpg" /> measures the degree of the adjustment cost. The higher<img src="5-1490190\174b7d63-3a29-4a62-b70d-45b6fdec653d.jpg" />, the more adjustment cost occurs.</p><p>Finally, the entrepreneur can liquidate its assets at any moment. The flexibility of liquidation option makes the entrepreneur optimally manage his downside business risk. Liquidation gives a terminal value<img src="5-1490190\f10e8e9a-da37-42d2-af64-3484f77c51b5.jpg" />, where <img src="5-1490190\21a829a2-9cb8-475a-b8d1-cdf67fba485e.jpg" /> depends on the state<img src="5-1490190\c9149639-fe5b-4374-872b-e62c7222c5ff.jpg" />. A higher <img src="5-1490190\2d3d533f-a00a-4e2d-b763-6924779b8d50.jpg" /> implies a higher liquidation value. Obviously, we have<img src="5-1490190\0914e66d-bc1f-4f06-b85a-c9b6a88c16ca.jpg" />, which makes liquidation in the good state much more attractive than in the bad state. Let <img src="5-1490190\820d52b3-b845-465a-b50b-c531f12471e4.jpg" /> denote the entrepreneur’s optimally chosen liquidation time.</p><p>Financial investment opportunities. In our model, the entrepreneur has financial investment opportunities to partially hedge his business risk. The entrepreneur allocates his liquid financial wealth between a risk-free asset which pays a constant rate of interest <img src="5-1490190\eed71e60-d641-4be6-bd1d-cecbdce13ad1.jpg" /> and the risky market portfolio (Merton [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref16">16</xref>]). The incremental return <img src="5-1490190\4f10efaf-30a7-44c1-86c7-4db8749cbf60.jpg" /> of the market portfolio over time period dt evolves as follows,</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105997"><label>(1.6)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\ef3354de-73c8-4490-91d4-d5f17482de77.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\aac21bf7-13aa-4458-be78-cc581076e139.jpg" /> is the mean of the market portfolio return in state <img src="5-1490190\3e6d7dc4-0c99-48bf-8e17-8f99b1c41f98.jpg" /> and <img src="5-1490190\ccc5ddcc-6f92-454f-9e63-72485d76f2a0.jpg" /> is the volatility of the market portfolio return in both states, and B is a standard Brownian motion. The correlation coefficient <img src="5-1490190\d3d08cb8-4f27-4610-805c-bbfe0774ade3.jpg" /> between <img src="5-1490190\c4b50645-7731-4b00-a272-4a8f32561750.jpg" /> and <img src="5-1490190\815cc96a-c8a4-45a9-a7b6-e2c5cd77be8c.jpg" /> is less than 1, which implies there exists nondiversifiable risk and the entrepreneur can’t completely hedge his business risk. Let <img src="5-1490190\a0b1e36c-f885-4c37-acb0-8abe7b8999da.jpg" /> denote the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio in state<img src="5-1490190\b4ad0bb4-127d-477c-a3d4-ecff37b69750.jpg" />, which is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105998"><label>(1.7)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\d53d970b-60b8-4c3d-be5d-c5152a22a355.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>We denote <img src="5-1490190\6b5d7485-179e-487a-8c66-44de29a1e1b6.jpg" /> and <img src="5-1490190\7ad3f843-143f-4f60-ade3-0141e7abe138.jpg" /> as the agent’s financial wealth and the amount invested in the risky asset respectively. Given the entrepreneur’s operating profit, investment, consumption and portfolio allocation, we can write the dynamics of liquid financial wealth <img src="5-1490190\c3805e36-c8a4-4669-840a-0fb266bc3541.jpg" /> as follows:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula105999"><label>(1.8)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\825a6be3-6953-42e8-8b28-47404269d942.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where the firm term is the return on risk-free asset, the second and third terms are the return on market portfolio, the fourth term <img src="5-1490190\7e25ad5f-697f-451f-ac91-8b7dca5cabce.jpg" /> is the entrepreneur’s consumption, and the last term <img src="5-1490190\717f6716-a64c-467b-937f-b11cf34f564c.jpg" /> is the firm’s cash flows from operations.</p><p>We assume the entrepreneur can use capital <img src="5-1490190\02c63141-61af-4e90-9c5d-cffb345a904d.jpg" /> as collateral to borrow and the borrowing is risk-free. Thus, the liquidation value of capital <img src="5-1490190\5e7ee871-0e70-4c4e-ba68-c73f5e89c018.jpg" /> must be greater than outstanding liability. So the following Equation holds,</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106000"><label>(1.9)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\5ea4f930-13c2-4148-a177-e6aa428b6296.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>The Entrepreneur’s Objective. The entrepreneur maximizes his utility defined as,</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106001"><label>(1.10)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\5a16037c-edbb-4ffa-a596-444613c7f8a9.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\1cd6094e-411e-4016-8bca-fd9cc1c215cc.jpg" /> for Epstein-Zin non-expected homothetic recursive utility (Duffie and Epstein [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref17">17</xref>]) is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106002"><label>(1.11)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\10284020-328a-45e2-a2ba-cb68b2a03091.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106003"><label>(1.12)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\e914c8c9-ca94-4fcc-a48d-fb5ec056d397.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>In the above utility function, the parameter <img src="5-1490190\ab111111-415c-4a5a-81d4-a02dd1bb4580.jpg" /> is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), and the parameter <img src="5-1490190\31e97094-0fda-4e54-b8bb-049cbeeef8dc.jpg" /> is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The parameter <img src="5-1490190\93ea7092-4899-4f50-b8d4-b7d0e4377a92.jpg" /> is the agent’s subjective discount rate. To maximize his utility, the entrepreneur chooses investment, consumption and portfolio allocation subject to the collateralized borrowing limit (1.9). And the agent optimally chooses the liquidation time<img src="5-1490190\3887b226-db64-4897-b80e-1301d717be7d.jpg" />.</p></sec><sec id="s3"><title>3. Model Solution</title><p>The entrepreneurial value depends on both its capital stock <img src="5-1490190\023d933f-1d22-4659-8786-37542f8a9261.jpg" /> and its cash holdings<img src="5-1490190\ef5c2d54-7ee9-4ad8-b133-805b27d72e75.jpg" />. Thus, let <img src="5-1490190\d017c68c-b3d1-48d3-9bdb-c992986340a3.jpg" /> denote the value function in state<img src="5-1490190\fac18052-0543-4e7b-a43b-f8daefc5be32.jpg" />. It satisfies the following system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Equations:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106004"><label>(1.13)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\14261f4a-271c-4a25-8466-21d18d2c5a98.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>The first term on the right side of the HJB Equation (1.13) represents the one-period utility. The second term represents the effect of capital stock changes on entrepreneurial value. The third and fourth terms represent the effect of the expected change in cashing holdings <img src="5-1490190\355aabb2-359f-4698-9776-e36f53b62060.jpg" /> and volatility of <img src="5-1490190\aa7e9e24-356c-400b-a5ff-a1282313be2d.jpg" /> on entrepreneurial value and the last term is the expected change of entrepreneurial value when the state changes form <img src="5-1490190\c086ef58-8f5c-4485-a99c-afff157baa7f.jpg" /> to<img src="5-1490190\c2f7bd88-4b30-4dba-b6a9-526dc2b78319.jpg" />.</p><p>Next, we solve the first-order conditions (FOC) with respect to consumption<img src="5-1490190\0d8ae6f0-83d3-4642-b284-e05ca36cd4ff.jpg" />, investment <img src="5-1490190\c6e0eccc-8893-4d9d-8d35-ca904f585aec.jpg" /> and portfolio choice <img src="5-1490190\c148153e-366a-4b9c-980c-ca63e3a4f173.jpg" /> respectively. The FOC with respect to consumption <img src="5-1490190\06f054f0-7f6d-4f51-bdae-79e295889add.jpg" /> is</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106005"><label>(1.14)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\7f7d0092-5233-4b66-906c-59ce20582a28.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>which shows the marginal utility of consumption <img src="5-1490190\32829ede-295c-445c-bf8c-35b66134bf99.jpg" /> is equal to the marginal utility of wealth <img src="5-1490190\21600bd7-5e88-4e4f-8fcc-784620d5ac82.jpg" /> at optimality.</p><p>The FOC with respect to investment <img src="5-1490190\539afd8c-dbba-4d84-89c6-0661f4c51727.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106006"><label>(1.15)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\868838bd-ac6c-4bd3-866b-0b0db97482e7.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>which implies the entrepreneur’s marginal cost of investing <img src="5-1490190\05e1e8f6-2d62-45aa-bfed-c3a97bb110de.jpg" /> is equal to the marginal benefit of adding a unit of capital <img src="5-1490190\61d66304-797c-4789-abd3-1721da958e01.jpg" /> in state<img src="5-1490190\2759e477-6b8c-4aea-9a1e-8e78f43f931e.jpg" />.</p><p>The FOC with respect to portfolio choice <img src="5-1490190\de22f7f6-ac3f-448b-8fcc-b7fb3ffc7f5d.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106007"><label>(1.16)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\f46e556a-045c-4a30-95b8-464ef658faae.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>which states that the optimal amount investing in market portfolio is equal to the mean-variance demand (the first term on the right side) plus the hedging demand (the second term).</p><p>Then, we conjecture that the value function <img src="5-1490190\4149d679-f636-4573-984f-251f0ad59894.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106008"><label>(1.17)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\02b94458-b7f2-4df6-9049-ff9675ecac24.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\65ebe71c-1165-4f7f-876b-1335bbbf6ad0.jpg" /> is given in appendix B and <img src="5-1490190\b5800827-0fe8-4d90-9449-01d3345f3f4a.jpg" /> is the entrepreneur’s certainty equaivalent (CE) wealth.</p><p>Using the homogeneity property, we can write scaled CE wealth as <img src="5-1490190\44fb5c05-337a-42f9-9b4c-2b9affe70b76.jpg" /> in each state. We substitute the FOCs with respect to<img src="5-1490190\0377c884-bfeb-4055-88cd-3ee0a8e32be7.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\90a62e57-f786-4511-9d63-fe88badfc869.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\fa04b130-6095-4ed8-99b3-19f8397ec48a.jpg" />, the value function form and the scaled CE wealth into the HJB Equation (1.13), and then get the systems of ordinary differential Equations (ODE) for scaled CE wealth<img src="5-1490190\f71b51ed-176d-4b7e-8f1a-06593ac12f6b.jpg" />. The results are summarized in the following theorem.</p><p>Theorem 1 The scaled CE wealth <img src="5-1490190\1b40802b-7aa9-4c28-b831-71458de80763.jpg" /> solves the following system of ODEs,</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106009"><label>(1.18)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\f8d4e12d-8238-4c76-9302-46dd24ac6a1b.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106010"><label>(1.19)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\0f0b0ea7-9b85-4bb8-968b-19e9bf4bf960.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\5ce9cf13-a5b9-4961-9d69-337861b4a698.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106011"><label>(1.20)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\efcf249f-1276-4a5d-9664-357aa3878fd7.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>and <img src="5-1490190\cb315af9-1144-4073-9799-e9368a0b8953.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106012"><label>(1.21)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\53d81ac8-481e-4e44-a7f8-3ddd61accdef.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>Intuitively, <img src="5-1490190\1c52533a-d517-4356-9729-4b473252c333.jpg" />can be referred to as the idiosyncratic component of the total volatility of the productivity shock and <img src="5-1490190\8430dd84-5913-4d57-8342-1d3894cfde3f.jpg" /> is the effective risk aversion (see WWY [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref6">6</xref>]).</p><p>Next, we specify the boundary conditions. When <img src="5-1490190\92d80746-82f9-454b-8a6a-5bfa1ae99525.jpg" /> approaches infinity, <img src="5-1490190\fc6a60e8-a298-47d4-b278-2d8cedab1c1e.jpg" />approaches the first-best solution given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106013"><label>(1.22)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\92968340-99d5-4928-8d92-664e6b142ba0.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\df251ae2-a22a-45d2-9c86-247c9d27bdb8.jpg" /> is calculated in the appendix B.</p><p>At the endogenous liquidation boundary, we have the following value matching and smooth pasting conditions for<img src="5-1490190\9bf36208-2291-4ae7-b883-52478286ecfe.jpg" />,</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106014"><label>(1.23)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\554c6d0e-b3c4-4ced-9b68-421c0d8f3500.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106015"><label>(1.24)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\721f084b-6fa7-48f7-a85e-6790cff2b499.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>Finally, the optimal scaled consumption<img src="5-1490190\79e46818-8198-46ae-a5b4-4b26f907c05d.jpg" />, investment<img src="5-1490190\d7a2fb3f-0fd2-4d6c-becd-3d16f6157022.jpg" />, and market portfolio allocationcapital ratio <img src="5-1490190\dffd979a-33de-4661-8e53-e57bdef10005.jpg" /> are given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106016"><label>(1.25)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\1863fde5-d0a2-44ea-9e0e-8a3a3b21670d.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106017"><label>(1.26)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\1dfdc0a8-dc85-4d29-98e4-bea9c60fd9e3.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106018"><label>(1.27)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\87ae48ce-1128-4779-bb55-fa1e783fbe91.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\2dbc1077-280f-4aa4-a498-1b9528d83f16.jpg" /> is the marginal value of cash in state<img src="5-1490190\d9a70fc6-91c1-4a42-ba70-b5f931089ee7.jpg" />.</p></sec><sec id="s4"><title>4. Quantitative Results</title><p>In this section, we illustrate the quantitative results for given parameter choices of the model. First, we specify our choice of parameters. In state G, the expected productivity is set to be <img src="5-1490190\786676b8-2ad2-40e9-856d-a178fb602d4e.jpg" /> (Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref18">18</xref>]), while in state B <img src="5-1490190\26684583-cb1e-4ce1-b6c4-41c4c85aad66.jpg" /> is set to be 18% to reflect the worse investment condition in the bad state. Similarly, the mean return of market portfolio is set as <img src="5-1490190\bd35278e-5908-4aec-baf9-50fb5b65cc70.jpg" /> and<img src="5-1490190\fc546f2c-faad-4e13-9d65-0d711b8e4ab2.jpg" />. We choose the liquidation parameter <img src="5-1490190\728074b5-c517-46b2-aeec-d9c5a79c6081.jpg" /> in state G in line with estimates provided by Hennessy and Whited [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref19">19</xref>]. In the bad state, the capital liquidation value is set to <img src="5-1490190\64d294d9-ef4e-49ac-ba17-bf493328b83f.jpg" /> to reflect the severe lack of liquidity during a financial crisis. The transition intensity out of state G is set at<img src="5-1490190\fc2959e3-8b9d-42b8-a62c-33655b2991a4.jpg" />, which implies an average duration of 10 years for good times. The transition intensity out of state B is<img src="5-1490190\bcf7e67c-42a1-4d54-9d89-a9868e9671e5.jpg" />, with an implied average length of a financial crisis being 2 years. This reasonable setting is borrowed from BCW [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref14">14</xref>].</p><p>The other parameters remain the same in the two states, and we set the parameters by widely-used numbers (see WWY [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref6">6</xref>]). The risk-free interest rate is<img src="5-1490190\4ae12d7a-335e-488c-bc01-42eef88ebe1a.jpg" />. The subjective discount rate is set to equal to the risk-free rate,<img src="5-1490190\e26985b1-af55-4231-97ed-9f584fbe1968.jpg" />. We obtain the adjustment cost parameter <img src="5-1490190\beff2107-4ff4-4790-ae5a-50a7a2f89238.jpg" /> and the rate of depreciation for capital stock <img src="5-1490190\681ead31-f8f0-4b13-923d-bd8836cfc262.jpg" /> The volatility of productivity shocks <img src="5-1490190\2a83ae6d-139b-4c26-9c22-846b42fe86dc.jpg" /> is <img src="5-1490190\1e9ab8c5-edd3-46b2-a589-78566b8dde17.jpg" /> (Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.35896-ref18">18</xref>]) and the volatility of return on market portfolio <img src="5-1490190\a89cf624-e25d-43fa-a8bc-927dc7f11dd6.jpg" /> is<img src="5-1490190\b711098c-8737-4438-8980-8e9aaa7ff7ce.jpg" />. We consider widely used values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, <img src="5-1490190\b07d116e-b57c-481f-827b-9a1aab4377b4.jpg" />and we set the EIS to be<img src="5-1490190\30cef6a5-4034-4ce1-bfa8-a6a4aff62c5c.jpg" />.</p><sec id="s4_1"><title>4.1. Entrepreneur Welfare and Optimal Liquidation Boundary</title><p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig1">Figure 1</xref> plots entrepreneur’s CE wealth<img src="5-1490190\93c05454-8314-4d90-a13a-c7b9f511de7a.jpg" />, average <img src="5-1490190\0c635313-5909-4621-abbc-39ea2d7dfb1d.jpg" /> and net marginal value of cash <img src="5-1490190\311b1050-3221-4465-8e3c-0a0434b76fb9.jpg" /> and marginal value of capital <img src="5-1490190\a9be80b7-b3e8-41f2-8792-0d90230fe413.jpg" /> in both states. For all panels, we graph both the transitory two states and the benchmarks in two states with transitory intensity equaling to zero. Since<img src="5-1490190\67fa3a21-3468-4462-a16c-4281d4b1c246.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\2fbc31ab-f3c2-48dc-ac49-91d5dc969319.jpg" />and <img src="5-1490190\9ae91100-d030-4ef2-acfb-db8005e78a5e.jpg" /> conveys the same information and <img src="5-1490190\5704bd31-1397-4f57-a36b-cd38507cc474.jpg" /> is easier to read, we discuss<img src="5-1490190\054ad6bd-aa91-46cb-b840-9eb6862c5e66.jpg" />. As expected, average q in state G is higher than in state B. More remarkable is the fact that the difference between the average q in the two states is so large especially for lower levels of cash holdings. However, this phenomenon is not that obvious in the benchmarks. This difference in average q is due to differences in investment conditions.</p><p>In state G, the optimal liquidation boundary <img src="5-1490190\e9865b56-c435-4d68-b9e7-55097e457466.jpg" /> <img src="5-1490190\3b465dd3-903c-4654-892b-7958e5b80438.jpg" />. At this point, the firm hasn’t reached the boundary compared with the benchmark. Further running the business would help the entrepreneur earn more profit. However, doing so would mean taking the risk that the state of nature switches to the bad state when the investment condition is much worse. The entrepreneur makes the trades off and optimally exercises the liquidation option by liquidating when <img src="5-1490190\bd9fddf2-6867-491a-865c-b2e5ea53245d.jpg" /> hits the lower barrier<img src="5-1490190\d1a54a63-28e3-4e38-851e-ddae0bf63164.jpg" />. However, the optimal liquidation boundary <img src="5-1490190\5758a0ff-6c2e-42ca-b99c-ac9f0f255b9a.jpg" /> <img src="5-1490190\112fc5d1-ae38-4dff-a701-157d90d4d41c.jpg" /> in state B is lower than the benchmark, which implies that the firm struggles to maintain the business and waits for the possible arrival of good state.</p><p>Panel C of <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig1">Figure 1</xref> underscores the significant impact of stochastic investment conditions on the marginal value of cash. The entrepreneur with low cash holdings values cash more in the bad state. In our model, the marginal value of cash in state B reaches<img src="5-1490190\4ec5f6b4-8680-4be2-b8ec-3b098b855181.jpg" />, almost double <img src="5-1490190\79b3e50c-98cf-4ddf-9d10-62c291e4996d.jpg" /> in the good state, when<img src="5-1490190\c9a7b1bc-ca43-4e2d-8075-051f98733a8d.jpg" />. When<img src="5-1490190\9d2effae-f2bd-4787-a868-7d430927dbb4.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\08a50058-6381-40c5-8a76-9f0b863c6854.jpg" />in four scenarios all approaches to<img src="5-1490190\9353ec10-bac8-4065-9b11-2daf39d670a9.jpg" />.</p><p>Comparing the transitory case with the benchmark case, <img src="5-1490190\f07f8ce7-6f6c-4394-8de9-cc4f37650066.jpg" />displays different dynamics. In good state, for an entrepreneur with sufficient financial slack, <img src="5-1490190\322f1822-b759-4fc0-ba3e-c70b62fa801e.jpg" />is higher than the benchmark, since wealth can mitigate the additional risk associated with regime switching. For an entrepreneur with low financial slack, <img src="5-1490190\4367fb2b-3c97-4940-be64-f75cafd53d34.jpg" />is lower than the benchmark.</p><p>However, in the bad state, the entrepreneur values his cash more than in the benchmark, no matter his financial slack is sufficient or not. Intuitively, the entrepreneur may value wealth less, aware of the possibility of the state of nature switching to the good state. It is incorrect, because the entrepreneur needs more cash to maintain the business and postpone the liquidation option exercise.</p><p>Panel D plots marginal value of capital<img src="5-1490190\056cfdee-0f79-4bb3-bc71-708951dc04c9.jpg" />, which is also referred to as the marginal<img src="5-1490190\a1a499d6-b28a-468a-946c-e2505066618d.jpg" />. The entrepreneur with medium cash holdings values capital more in the bad state and the one with extreme low (near the liquidation boundary) and high cash holdings values capital more in the good state. When<img src="5-1490190\fac1d6dc-d22f-4df6-8c36-12852614ad4c.jpg" />, the marginal <img src="5-1490190\816b9dcb-8cbe-4ac2-b6b2-409fa9495448.jpg" /> approaches to average <img src="5-1490190\6aa408d7-f258-4c11-bcc7-ee5bc37667d7.jpg" /> shown in Panel B.</p></sec><sec id="s4_2"><title>4.2. Optimal Investment</title><p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig2">Figure 2</xref> plots investment-capital ratio <img src="5-1490190\93ef0b85-121b-4817-92f0-8b61e1034c82.jpg" /> and investment-liquidity sensitivity<img src="5-1490190\aca7ff8c-93f5-400a-9b30-cc24fa4936b5.jpg" />. The investment in the good state is higher than in the bad state for a give <img src="5-1490190\9391ed47-1fef-4b59-bf96-45ac2c1071fa.jpg" /> and the difference is especially large when <img src="5-1490190\893983ee-135b-4653-b1ef-2ba6bd3d9ccc.jpg" /> is low. The entrepreneur’s precautionary motive is stronger in bad times, so that we should expect to see the firm hoarding more cash. This is reflected in the lower levels of investment. From Panel A of <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig2">Figure 2</xref>, it can be seen that the firm engages in large asset sales and divestment up to 12% and 18% of its capital in the good and bad states respectively for cash hoarding purpose.</p><p>Compared to the benchmark, investment in the good state is lower for the entrepreneur with sufficient financial slack. Aware of the threat of switching to the bad state, the entrepreneur cuts investment and hoards cash for precautionary purpose. However, the entrepreneur</p><p>reduces disinvestment and even boosts investment to the level higher than the benchmark near the liquidation boundary. When <img src="5-1490190\246fe3a8-1f63-4e44-af9f-6c4534e6e3db.jpg" /> is near the liquidation boundary, the cash hoarding motive is dominated by the early liquidation option exercise motive, thus leading to the investment boost. In the bad state, the investment is higher than the benchmark since the possible arrival of the good state. Similarly, the investment in state B in lower than the benchmark when <img src="5-1490190\7df32732-1a0b-41dc-aaf5-4ee588982971.jpg" /> is sufficiently low. Having the possibility of the state of nature switching to the good state in mind, the entrepreneur cuts investment to maintain the business and wait for the good state to come.</p><p>Panel B of <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig2">Figure 2</xref> shows the significant impact of regime switching on investment sensitivity in both states. Obviously, <img src="5-1490190\399b64f1-e9c3-4967-b387-9c46f56fb0cf.jpg" />reaches down to −2.5 when<img src="5-1490190\92c84288-cf94-4356-b988-232819029572.jpg" />. As the firm approaches the liquidation boundary<img src="5-1490190\6eeefe6d-08cb-46dd-a5a8-d207e3d8e5e9.jpg" />, it may choose to accelerate investment aggressively (and thus reduce under-investment) to take advantage of the higher investment conditions. In state B, <img src="5-1490190\32dfa242-0acc-4377-ab25-55f3b93d5721.jpg" />also reaches negative value near the liquidation boundary, which reveals the convexity character brought by the liquidation option.</p></sec><sec id="s4_3"><title>4.3. Optimal Portfolio Allocation and Consumption</title><p>Panel A of <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig3">Figure 3</xref> plots the demand for the market portfolio <img src="5-1490190\79dab5e7-f6c6-4b9f-912c-edd8ebd2b588.jpg" /> and Panel B plots the consumption<img src="5-1490190\ae129d95-8f44-4805-bf7a-4eb3b27aedee.jpg" />. It’s easy to find that the graphs of Panel A and B are very similar.</p><p>As expected, the portfolio allocation in the good state is higher than the portfolio allocation in the bad state and so does consumption. Similar to the investment, the entrepreneur chooses to accelerate consumption and financial investment when the firm approaches the liquidation boundary. Strikingly, <img src="5-1490190\f7601979-19ab-4655-b149-b4becfac8fdc.jpg" />and <img src="5-1490190\b7ac08a4-13c8-4891-a36a-25682d5b526f.jpg" /> decrease as w increases near the liquidation boundary, which is counterintuitive.</p><p>In fact, the entrepreneur needs to burn cash to bring forward the liquidation option exercise. In the bad state, the difference between <img src="5-1490190\bf955c06-7247-4436-a21d-6cd08c1f3806.jpg" /> and the benchmark when w is large is significantly larger than that when w is near the liquidation boundary. Intuitively, the entrepreneur needs to hoard cash to postpone the liquidation option exercise.</p><p>Apparently, the impact of regime switching on portfolio allocation and consumption is different. Comparing Panel A and Panel B in <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig3">Figure 3</xref>, one can find that portfolio allocation <img src="5-1490190\8151672c-a591-429d-8c5a-56afb9d97035.jpg" /> in the transitory case is so close to the one in the benchmark case, except for the part near the liquidation boundary. However, the consumption experiences a large jump in both states between the transitory case and the benchmark case. Intuitively, it implies that the precautionary cash hoarding motive is mainly captured by consumption rather than portfolio allocation.</p></sec></sec><sec id="s5"><title>5. Conclusions</title><p>We propose a quantitative model to study the dynamics of entrepreneur’s optimal consumption, investment and portfolio allocation when the dynamics of decision variables are subject to discrete regime shifts at random times. Our model builds on the dynamic framework of entrepreneur’s optimal policies by adding stochastic investment conditions.</p><p>We have shown that when the entrepreneur faces uncertain macro conditions, it is optimal for them to hoard cash for precautionary reasons. In addition, the entrepreneur may choose the optimal liquidation boundary to eliminate the risk associated with regime switching. The analysis shows that precautionary savings and liquidation boundary advance/postpone can have significant value and generate rich implications for entrepreneur dynamics.</p><p>During favorable macroeconomic conditions, the cash hoarding motive is reflected in the lower investment,</p><p>consumption and portfolio allocation for the entrepreneur with sufficient cash holdings. Interestingly, we find that the need to burn cash to bring forward liquidation option exercise dominates the cash hoarding motive, thus making the boost of investment, consumption and portfolio allocation when the firm is near the liquidation boundary.</p><p>During a financial crisis, the entrepreneur cuts investment, delays consumption, lowers portfolio allocations and sometimes engages in asset sales. This is especially true when the entrepreneur enters the crisis with low cash reserves. These predictions are consistent with the stylized facts about firm behaviour during the recent financial crisis. In prospect of the possible arrival of the good state, the investment, consumption and portfolio allocation is higher than the benchmark for the entrepreneur with sufficient wealth. As the firm is near the liquidation boundary, the entrepreneur brings investment, consumption and portfolio allocation back to the benchmark to maintain the business and wait for the good state to come.</p></sec><sec id="s6"><title>6. Acknowledgements</title><p>The authors acknowledge financial support from Natural Science Foundation of China (# 71202007), Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (# 13ZS050), “Chen Guang” Project of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission and Shanghai Education Development Foundation (# 12CG44) and Innovation Research Fund of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (# CXJJ-2013-317 and # CXJJ-2013-312)</p></sec><sec id="s7"><title>REFERENCES</title></sec><sec id="s8"><title>Appendix A. Details for Theorem 1</title><p>We conjecture that the value function is given by Equation (1.17). Using homogeneity property of<img src="5-1490190\c48c4810-7771-4b32-a473-716cf7b7db03.jpg" />, we can obtain Equation(1.25), (1.26) and (1.27) for<img src="5-1490190\e7b0e784-17f5-4175-afd5-42d4e8cb8484.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\39c4a7ef-f171-44b7-bd6a-b72338832b7f.jpg" />and <img src="5-1490190\b0ac80e4-fee1-4f83-a346-032546c0aa2b.jpg" /> respectively. Substituting these results into Equation (1.13), we obtain the system of ODEs, i.e. Equations (1.18) and (1.19).</p><p>We consider the lower liquidation boundary<img src="5-1490190\d3d0c5df-3b96-4789-84d7-6ba5f835432b.jpg" />. When<img src="5-1490190\6b55f036-0128-4010-8ccc-49ca6d045ee8.jpg" />, the entrepreneur liquidates the firm. Using the value-matching condition at<img src="5-1490190\64b5d4fd-f807-4a8b-bbdd-13084b3eb099.jpg" />, we have</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106019"><label>(1.1.1)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\927b184c-35cc-4095-8b9b-4779900f3f23.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>where <img src="5-1490190\95a035c8-1ef7-4f8b-988c-0f069375ec2b.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106020"><label>(1.1.2)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\e628f576-41a7-4987-a7bb-2e6fe1e08ad4.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>is the agent’s value function after liquidation and with no business. The entrepreneur’s optimal liquidation strategy implies the following smooth-pasting condition at the endogenously determined liquidation boundary<img src="5-1490190\8cb771b7-0e4e-4eb5-b8db-0700d6aba681.jpg" />:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106021"><label>(1.1.3)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\78e772b2-f87d-4abe-810c-260ebd6b2bd4.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>Using<img src="5-1490190\0598d062-27e3-450b-a67d-eee7d1fa4f01.jpg" />, Equations (1.1.1)-(1.1.3), and simplifying, we obtain the scaled value-matching and smooth pasting conditions given in Equations (1.23) and (1.24), respectively.</p><p>As <img src="5-1490190\d21ff9a8-80cb-466b-83cc-bdcacf219a21.jpg" /> approaches infinity, firm value approaches the first-best value and</p><p><img src="5-1490190\0301a413-d1af-445a-8036-a1ba59c05ba2.jpg" /></p><p>which implies Equation (1.22).</p><p>The CE wealth<img src="5-1490190\17e803c1-346b-4fc6-9613-91fd61deb865.jpg" />, where <img src="5-1490190\d13d40cf-0814-4d81-92c4-4c6aff15b3df.jpg" /> is given by</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106022"><label>(1.1.4)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\28be4fde-9216-44dd-9b33-a2a4ed85035a.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula></sec><sec id="s9"><title>Appendix B. Calculation of <img src="5-1490190\e0003432-c92d-41b5-8f69-c02e6e0b3d72.jpg" /> and<img src="5-1490190\fbfcf6c2-8239-4c22-93f4-96177d563e74.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\a9742074-c359-458b-9c4c-ce62db3e4fdd.jpg" />and <img src="5-1490190\38f5b955-4fc5-4080-a281-a5b4d847d9f5.jpg" /></title><p>Let<img src="5-1490190\cc0607c3-a18b-4a1c-8271-ec23454bbb29.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\d7e7e523-72e9-49fa-b787-3b0302567561.jpg" />, and replace them in Equations (1.18) and (1.19), we have</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106023"><label>(1.2.1)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\a15e9a51-98e2-47ba-90a7-f6c59a6bd385.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106024"><label>(1.2.2)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\63fb7c09-b53b-4ab5-a66f-fa8a7b768970.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>When w converges to infinity, <img src="5-1490190\b12830de-ce28-4b66-b704-ed63a6575983.jpg" />approaches to<img src="5-1490190\0bca9a68-1c0c-4eb9-8075-5df1f47ffa84.jpg" />, <img src="5-1490190\077c0171-291e-4c61-9254-2967cfebd730.jpg" />approaches to <img src="5-1490190\3c5dea73-ae9a-425c-99dc-50f01fb75a77.jpg" /> and the coefficient before w is zero:</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106025"><label>(1.2.3)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\57f6e25e-3f31-422b-be26-670acda0d0bf.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106026"><label>(1.2.4)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\8c3a88e0-8d90-4978-88dd-ac4f36bd5c99.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>Solving Equations (1.2.3) and (1.2.4), we obtain that <img src="5-1490190\17e7a8a1-8d30-445f-978a-afcc27c8073c.jpg" /> and <img src="5-1490190\39747bf4-dd72-487a-8db6-9aea2a753ae4.jpg" /> satisfy</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106027"><label>(1.2.5)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\7d02c184-0b0c-4764-b9af-341f0810940d.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106028"><label>(1.2.6)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\ffe11e8a-a91a-4553-bee8-31a0a4afcf0b.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>Consider the remaining part, and we find that <img src="5-1490190\7a469267-93c6-4b77-878c-874204967695.jpg" /> and <img src="5-1490190\55b732bc-033d-4bed-88bb-2431afabaf32.jpg" /> satisfy</p><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106029"><label>(1.2.7)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\a57a5b57-873f-4f50-8265-ca971eab2666.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><disp-formula id="scirp.35896-formula106030"><label>(1.2.8)</label><graphic position="anchor" xlink:href="5-1490190\08bc53fa-d2be-41c3-bb5c-a66c2ba723b7.jpg"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula></sec></body><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="scirp.35896-ref1"><label>1</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">J. 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