Economic sanctions constituted one of the principal instruments through which Western states sought to constrain Russia’s capacity to sustain the war. The measures introduced after the February 2022 invasion targeted financial resources, trade, investment, technology, and key state-owned entities. Among the most significant measures were restrictions on the Central Bank of Russia’s foreign reserves, limitations on access to international financial markets, exclusion or restriction of selected Russian financial institutions from international payment systems, and measures directed at strategically important enterprises.

The objectives of these measures extended beyond imposing immediate economic costs. Restrictions on financial resources were intended to constrain Russia’s ability to finance military expenditure and international transactions, while trade and technology controls sought to reduce access to advanced technologies, specialized machinery, semiconductors, and dual-use goods relevant to industrial and military production. Sanctions thus operated simultaneously through financial, commercial, and technological channels.

Empirical research confirms that sanctions generated measurable economic effects. [5] estimate that sanctions imposed between 2014 and 2019 reduced trade in affected sectors and generated an estimated real-income loss of approximately 0.3% for Russia, while a broader decoupling involving the European Union and its allies could have generated substantially larger effects. [7] similarly estimates that a hypothetical combination of comprehensive import tariffs and export taxes could reduce Russian GDP by approximately 3% - 7%, although the magnitude of the effect depends significantly on the participation of major trading partners such as China and India.

These findings demonstrate that the effectiveness of sanctions depends not only on their formal scope but also on the structure of international economic relations. Where alternative markets, suppliers, financial channels, and trading partners remain available, the ability of sanctions to produce complete economic isolation is constrained. Sanctions can nevertheless increase transaction costs, restrict access to critical resources, and alter the geographical and institutional structure of external economic relations.

The Russia-Ukraine case therefore illustrates an important characteristic of geoeconomic coercion: its effects are not limited to direct economic losses. Sanctions can also reshape the networks through which an adversary obtains resources, conducts trade, accesses technology, and maintains international economic relationships.

Financial restrictions represented a second major dimension of the geoeconomic confrontation. Measures targeting Russian financial institutions, foreign reserves, capital-market access, and international payment channels sought to restrict the country’s ability to conduct transactions through established global financial networks.

The strategic significance of these measures can be understood through the network structure of international finance. [4] show that actors occupying central positions within global economic networks can exercise disproportionate influence because access to critical nodes and chokepoints can be monitored or restricted. In this context, restrictions on financial infrastructure can affect not only the immediate target but also firms and institutions in third countries whose transactions depend on access to dominant financial networks.

Russia responded by attempting to reduce its dependence on Western financial infrastructure and by expanding alternative payment and settlement arrangements. These efforts included greater use of national currencies in bilateral transactions, the development of alternative payment mechanisms, and stronger financial relationships with non-Western partners ([9]).

The financial confrontation consequently became a two-sided process. Western measures attempted to exploit Russia’s dependence on established financial networks, while Russia sought to modify the structure of that dependence. The strategic outcome was therefore not simply the restriction of Russian financial capacity but also an acceleration of efforts to diversify external financial relationships.

This dynamic demonstrates that geoeconomic power can operate through both coercion and adaptation. Control over critical financial networks provides leverage, but targeted states may respond by developing alternative channels, thereby reducing some forms of dependence while potentially creating new dependencies elsewhere.

The technological dimension of the conflict further demonstrates the close relationship between economic and military capabilities. Western export controls targeted advanced semiconductors, microelectronics, information technologies, specialized machinery, and dual-use goods that could contribute to Russian industrial and military capabilities. These measures sought to limit not only immediate imports but also Russia’s longer-term access to technologies required for advanced production.

Technology controls are strategically significant because contemporary military capabilities depend on complex industrial and technological systems. Restrictions on access to critical components can therefore affect the production, maintenance, and modernization of military equipment as well as broader industrial capacity.

Russia responded through efforts to strengthen domestic production, promote import substitution, and develop alternative sources of technological inputs. [9] describe this broader adaptation as part of Russia’s attempt to reduce vulnerability to external economic pressure and reorganize its economic relations. The response demonstrates that technology controls can generate both constraining and adaptive effects: they may reduce access to advanced Western technologies while simultaneously encouraging the development of alternative supply chains and domestic capabilities.

The technological dimension therefore reinforces the argument that economic and military power are increasingly interconnected. Economic restrictions can affect military-industrial capabilities indirectly by altering access to technologies, components, production equipment, and international supply chains. Conversely, the requirements of military production can influence the direction of economic adaptation.

Energy became one of the most visible areas in which economic interdependence was transformed into strategic competition. Before the full-scale invasion, Russia was a major supplier of energy to European markets. The [8] reports that Russian gas accounted for more than 40% of EU gas demand on average during 2018-2021. This interdependence created economic benefits for both sides but also generated strategic vulnerabilities.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian gas supplies to the European Union declined from approximately 152 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2021 to 80 bcm in 2022, a reduction of about 47%. European states responded by seeking alternative suppliers and accelerating efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy ([3]).

Data from the [14] illustrate this reorientation in the oil sector. The share of Russia’s crude oil exports directed toward Asia and Oceania increased from approximately 34% in 2021 to 63% in 2024. India accounted for roughly 34% of Russian crude oil exports in 2024, while China accounted for approximately 26% ([14]).

The energy dimension therefore illustrates the transformation of interdependence into geoeconomic competition. Russia sought to preserve export revenues by redirecting energy flows toward alternative markets, while European states sought to reduce their strategic dependence on Russian supplies. The result was not the disappearance of energy interdependence but its geographical and institutional reconfiguration.

The most significant empirical dimension of Russia’s economic adaptation was the transformation of its external trade geography. The contraction of trade with Western economies was accompanied by increasing economic relations with China, India, and other non-sanctioning or less restrictive partners. This process indicates that the effects of sanctions cannot be assessed solely through the volume of trade lost with sanctioning states; they must also be examined through the redirection of trade toward alternative markets and corridors.

[13] provides evidence of substantial trade reallocation following the invasion. For February-August 2022, Ukrainian imports were estimated to be 47.3% below their counterfactual level, while Russia experienced an estimated trade gain of approximately $68.3 billion, including around $41.1 billion in additional trade with Asian economies. These findings illustrate how disruption in one part of the international trading system can generate significant redistribution elsewhere.

OECD data provide a broader picture of this transformation. In 2023-2024, Russian trade with EU and other sanctioning countries declined substantially, while trade with China, India, and other non-sanctioning partners increased. The main changes are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Geographical reorientation of Russia’s external trade.

Note: Changes compare average trade values in 2023-2024 with the corresponding average in 2020-2021. The figures represent changes in bilateral trade flows and should not be interpreted as changes in Russia’s total external trade. Source: [12]. OECD category as reported by the source; not equivalent to non-sanctioning economies.

The pattern indicates a substantial geographical redistribution of Russia’s external trade rather than complete economic isolation. While trade with European and other sanctioning economies contracted, China, India, and other non-sanctioning economies became increasingly important external partners. This reorientation was accompanied by the development of alternative trade corridors and logistics networks ([6]).

The OECD category “Other OECD countries” should not be treated as synonymous with “non-sanctioning economies”. OECD membership is a statistical classification, whereas participation in sanctions is a separate policy classification. The +90% series in Table 2 is therefore reported as an OECD-defined category and is not used in this study as evidence that all OECD members were non-sanctioning partners. The surrounding discussion has been revised accordingly so that the table and the text do not conflate these two classifications.

[6] documents the increasing importance of alternative routes involving the Russian Far East, overland connections with China, the Northern Sea Route, and southern corridors through Türkiye and Iran. These changes demonstrate that trade reorientation involved more than the substitution of one market for another. It also required the restructuring of transportation routes, logistics systems, commercial relationships, and institutional connections through which international trade could be maintained.

Foreign-market reorientation can therefore be interpreted as a form of geoeconomic adaptation. Rather than eliminating the effects of external pressure, Russia sought to modify the geographical and institutional configuration of its external economic relations. The resulting system reduced some forms of dependence on Western markets while increasing the importance of alternative partners and routes.

The role of third countries is central to understanding the limits and adaptive effects of sanctions. However, three processes should be distinguished analytically: lawful trade diversion, import substitution, and sanctions evasion. Trade diversion refers to the redirection of legitimate transactions toward alternative markets or suppliers after restrictions change market access. Import substitution refers to replacing restricted foreign inputs with domestically produced or otherwise legally sourced alternatives. Sanctions evasion is narrower and requires evidence that a transaction, intermediary, or routing arrangement was used deliberately to circumvent an applicable restriction. In this study, increased trade with a third country is therefore not treated as evidence of evasion by itself.

The growing importance of China, India, Türkiye, and other non-sanctioning economies illustrates trade reorientation and the emergence of alternative economic networks. These relationships provided Russia with opportunities to maintain trade, redirect energy exports, obtain selected goods and technologies, and develop new financial relationships ([9]; [12]). Such changes should not, however, be automatically classified as sanctions evasion. For the purposes of this study, the evidence threshold for describing a third-country transaction as evasion is documented evidence from competent authorities, sanctions-enforcement records, or reliable transaction-level investigations identifying circumvention of a specific restriction. Aggregate increases in bilateral trade are treated as evidence of reorientation or adaptation unless such additional evidence is available.

This distinction is important for assessing sanctions effectiveness. The persistence of alternative trade does not necessarily demonstrate that sanctions failed. Sanctions can reduce access to particular markets and technologies, increase transaction and transportation costs, and force an economy to rely on more limited or geographically distant networks. At the same time, adaptation can create new forms of dependence. The reduction of dependence on Western markets and financial systems may, for example, increase Russia’s reliance on a smaller number of major economic partners ([9]).

The emergence of alternative networks therefore represents a second-order effect of geoeconomic confrontation. Economic pressure changes the incentives and constraints faced by the target state, while adaptation changes the structure of international economic relations through which that state operates. The result is neither complete isolation nor unchanged interdependence, but a reorganization of economic connectivity.

The empirical evidence reveals several interconnected outcomes of the geoeconomic confrontation surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war. First, financial sanctions and restrictions on international economic transactions increased the costs of maintaining external economic relations and reduced Russia’s access to established Western financial networks. Second, technology controls strengthened the connection between economic policy and military-industrial capabilities by restricting access to technologies and components relevant to advanced production. Third, energy competition transformed the previous pattern of Russia-Europe interdependence and contributed to a substantial reorientation of Russian energy exports toward Asian markets. Fourth, the reorientation of foreign markets and trade corridors demonstrated that economic pressure can stimulate the reconstruction of external economic networks rather than produce complete isolation.

Taken together, these developments indicate that geoeconomic power involves more than the capacity to impose economic costs. It also concerns the ability to control or restrict access to markets, finance, technologies, energy resources, and international networks, as well as the ability of targeted states to reorganize those relationships in response to pressure. The Russia-Ukraine case therefore illustrates a broader restructuring of the economic environment in which interstate strategic competition takes place.

The empirical evidence also indicates that military and geoeconomic power should not be treated as mutually exclusive forms of state power. Economic measures affected the resources, technologies, energy relations, and external networks relevant to the continuation of the conflict, while the requirements of war stimulated changes in trade, financial, technological, and energy relationships. The confrontation consequently involved an interaction between military objectives and geoeconomic capabilities rather than a simple substitution of one for the other.

These findings provide the empirical basis for the discussion in the next section, which examines whether this interaction represents a broader transformation in the relationship between military force and geoeconomic power.

The evidence does not support the interpretation that military strategy has been replaced by geoeconomic strategy. Rather, it indicates a closer integration of military and geoeconomic capabilities. Economic instruments have been used to constrain resources, restrict technological access, increase the costs of war, and influence the external economic environment of the adversary. At the same time, Russia’s responses demonstrate that military conflict can stimulate the restructuring of trade, financial, technological, and energy relationships.

This interaction suggests that geoeconomic capabilities increasingly form part of the broader strategic environment in which military power is exercised. Military effectiveness depends not only on battlefield capabilities but also on access to financial resources, industrial inputs, technologies, energy, and international markets. The Russia-Ukraine war therefore illustrates what can be termed the geoeconomic expansion of military strategy.

This interpretation extends rather than replaces conventional understandings of strategic power. Geoeconomic instruments can constrain an adversary’s capacity to sustain military operations, but their effects depend on the availability of alternative resources and networks. Military and geoeconomic power should consequently be understood as interconnected rather than competing forms of state power.

The evidence also complicates the distinction between military force and economic coercion. Sanctions are frequently presented as an alternative to direct military intervention because they impose costs without the immediate use of armed force. In practice, however, their strategic function in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been closely connected to the military dimension of the war.

Financial restrictions, trade controls, and technology sanctions have sought to constrain Russia’s resources and capabilities, while Russia’s adaptation has attempted to preserve access to markets, finance, and critical imports ([5]; [7]; [9]). Sanctions should therefore not be understood simply as a substitute for military action. They constitute an additional instrument through which states seek to influence the strategic capacity of an adversary.

Their effectiveness is also conditional. The availability of alternative markets, suppliers, financial arrangements, and trading partners limits the possibility of complete economic isolation. Sanctions can nevertheless alter the costs, geographical direction, and institutional structure of economic exchange. Their strategic effect therefore lies not only in the economic losses they impose but also in the dependencies and constraints they create.

The Russian case demonstrates that geoeconomic power has important limitations. Economic pressure can restrict access to resources and technologies, but it does not automatically translate into political or military outcomes. Its effects depend on the structure of international economic networks and on the ability of targeted states to develop alternative relationships.

This finding is consistent with the logic of asymmetric interdependence and network power discussed by [10] and [4]. States occupying central positions within international networks can exercise substantial leverage, but targeted states may attempt to reduce their vulnerability by diversifying markets, payment systems, suppliers, and transport routes.

The resulting process is therefore dynamic. Geoeconomic pressure can reduce some forms of dependence while simultaneously creating new ones. The strategic importance of geoeconomics lies not in an unlimited capacity to coerce, but in the ability to reshape the economic conditions under which an adversary operates.

One of the most significant findings concerns the geographical reorientation of Russia’s external economic relations. The growing roles of China and India, the development of routes through Türkiye and Iran, stronger economic links with other non-Western partners, and the expansion of energy exports toward Asian markets indicate a substantial restructuring of Russia’s external economic geography. The trade diversion identified by [13] and the transformation of trade corridors documented by [6] illustrate different dimensions of this process.

The process should not be interpreted simply as the search for replacement markets. It involves changes in transport routes, financial relationships, supply chains, institutional connections, and patterns of dependence. Economic adaptation therefore becomes a geoeconomic process in its own right: external pressure changes the structure of international economic connectivity, while the target state attempts to reorganize that connectivity on more favorable terms.

At the same time, adaptation does not eliminate vulnerability. Greater reliance on a smaller number of alternative partners may reduce dependence on Western markets while increasing dependence on other major economies ([9]). Economic reorientation is therefore better understood as a redistribution of strategic dependence than as complete economic autonomy.

The energy dimension further demonstrates how economic interdependence can acquire strategic significance during conflict. Before the invasion, Russia-Europe energy relations created substantial mutual dependence. The disruption of these relationships transformed energy from an important component of economic interdependence into a major field of geoeconomic competition.

Russia sought to preserve export revenues by redirecting energy flows toward Asian markets, while European states pursued diversification and reduced dependence on Russian supplies ([8]; [14]). The result was not the disappearance of energy interdependence but its geographical reconfiguration.

This development reinforces the broader argument that geoeconomic competition concerns control over strategic dependencies rather than economic exchange alone. Energy infrastructure, supply routes, and access to alternative markets can influence the strategic resilience of both suppliers and consumers.

The Russia-Ukraine case suggests several broader functions of geoeconomics in contemporary conflict. First, geoeconomic instruments can constrain resources available to an adversary. Second, they can restrict access to critical technologies and networks. Third, they can increase the economic costs of sustaining conflict. Fourth, they can reshape strategic dependencies by altering trade, financial, energy, and technological relationships. Finally, they can stimulate economic adaptation, through which states seek alternative markets, suppliers, financial channels, and transport corridors.

These functions indicate that geoeconomic power should not be reduced to sanctions. Sanctions are one instrument within a broader system involving market access, financial infrastructure, technology flows, energy relations, trade networks, and investment. The strategic importance of this system derives from the interaction among these components.

The findings therefore support a broader understanding of contemporary strategic competition in which economic connectivity itself becomes a field of power. States seek not only to control material resources but also to influence the networks through which those resources circulate.

The findings provide partial support for Proposition 1.

The central theoretical implication is therefore not a transition from military strategy to geoeconomic strategy. Rather, the evidence indicates a geoeconomic expansion of military strategy, in which economic, financial, technological, trade, and energy capabilities become increasingly integrated into the broader strategic environment of interstate conflict.

This interpretation also clarifies the relationship between geoeconomic power and military power. They should not be treated as separate or mutually exclusive forms of state power. Military capabilities remain fundamental, but their effectiveness is increasingly conditioned by access to economic resources, technological systems, financial networks, energy supplies, and international markets. Conversely, military conflict can transform these economic relationships by stimulating sanctions, trade diversion, technological restrictions, energy restructuring, and the development of alternative networks.

The Russia-Ukraine war therefore illustrates a broader transformation in the strategic environment of contemporary interstate conflict: military power is increasingly exercised within a geoeconomic environment, while geoeconomic capabilities increasingly contribute to the conditions under which military power can be sustained.

The discussion therefore indicates that the Russia-Ukraine war does not represent a replacement of military power by geoeconomic power, but rather their increasing strategic interdependence. The final section summarizes these findings and assesses their implications for the research question and hypothesis.

Several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the study relies substantially on secondary academic and institutional sources rather than confidential administrative or transaction-level data, which limits the ability to observe some mechanisms directly. Second, wartime trade statistics are subject to reporting lags, revisions, partner-country reporting differences, sanctions-related classification problems, and incomplete coverage; consequently, reported trade changes should be interpreted as evidence of reorientation rather than as perfectly complete measures of actual flows. Third, the qualitative case-study design does not permit precise attribution of military outcomes to individual geoeconomic measures. The study therefore evaluates changes in the economic conditions relevant to sustaining military power rather than claiming that sanctions, financial restrictions, technology controls, energy measures, or trade diversion independently caused battlefield outcomes.