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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ns</journal-id>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Natural Science</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
      <issn pub-type="epub">2150-4105</issn>
      <issn pub-type="ppub">2150-4091</issn>
      <publisher>
        <publisher-name>Scientific Research Publishing</publisher-name>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.4236/ns.2026.188013</article-id>
      <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">ns-154230</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group>
          <subject>Article</subject>
        </subj-group>
        <subj-group>
          <subject>Biomedical</subject>
          <subject>Life Sciences</subject>
          <subject>Chemistry</subject>
          <subject>Materials Science</subject>
          <subject>Earth</subject>
          <subject>Environmental Sciences</subject>
          <subject>Medicine</subject>
          <subject>Healthcare</subject>
          <subject>Physics</subject>
          <subject>Mathematics</subject>
        </subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Universal Theory of Existence: Multilevel Perception</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">0000-0002-7070-0497</contrib-id>
          <name name-style="western">
            <surname>Agrawal</surname>
            <given-names>Pramod Kumar</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <aff id="aff1"><label>1</label> Universal Theory Research Centre, Jaipur, India </aff>
      <author-notes>
        <fn fn-type="conflict" id="fn-conflict">
          <p>The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.</p>
        </fn>
      </author-notes>
      <pub-date pub-type="epub">
        <day>28</day>
        <month>08</month>
        <year>2026</year>
      </pub-date>
      <pub-date pub-type="collection">
        <month>08</month>
        <year>2026</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>18</volume>
      <issue>08</issue>
      <fpage>181</fpage>
      <lpage>194</lpage>
      <history>
        <date date-type="received">
          <day>
          </day>
          <month>
          </month>
          <year>
          </year>
        </date>
        <date date-type="accepted">
          <day>
          </day>
          <month>
          </month>
          <year>
          </year>
        </date>
        <date date-type="published">
          <day>28</day>
          <month>08</month>
          <year>2026</year>
        </date>
      </history>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>© 2026 by the authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
        <license license-type="open-access">
          <license-p> This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license ( <ext-link ext-link-type="uri" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</ext-link> ). </license-p>
        </license>
      </permissions>
      <self-uri content-type="doi" xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.4236/ns.2026.188013">https://doi.org/10.4236/ns.2026.188013</self-uri>
      <abstract>
        <p>Existing theories of perception generally explain processes within particular scientific domains, such as physical activation, biological sensation, psychological emotion, or intellectual interpretation. However, a broader conceptual question remains: how does information progressively transform across these different levels of reality and finally become perceived and interpreted? The purpose of this paper is to develop a common ontological framework for examining this continuity from cosmological activation to intellectual perception. The framework proposes that Nature operates through common organizational principles across cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual levels, while the form of realization changes at each level. Perception is described through four universal constituents: appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity. Appearance and identity together constitute availability, while diversity and intensity constitute essence; availability and essence together form perception. On this basis, the paper develops a multilevel process through which incoming activation is accepted, synchronized with the internal organization of the receiving entity, perceived, and expressed. The framework is intended to provide a common conceptual basis for investigating how the same underlying reality can undergo successive transformations across levels and can ultimately give rise to different perceived realities.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group kwd-group-type="author-generated" xml:lang="en">
        <kwd>Perception</kwd>
        <kwd>Cognition</kwd>
        <kwd>Memory</kwd>
        <kwd>Information Processing</kwd>
        <kwd>Conceptual Framework</kwd>
        <kwd>Multilevel Systems</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Perception is one of the most fundamental yet least understood processes associated with life [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B2">2</xref>]]. The physical sciences explain how energy propagates through the physical world; biology explains how organisms respond to stimuli; psychology examines emotions and behavior; and the cognitive sciences investigate the processes of interpretation and knowledge [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B3">3</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B4">4</xref>]]. However, these disciplines typically examine perception within their own domains [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B5">5</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B6">6</xref>]]. The transition from one level to another is often assumed rather than explicitly explained [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B4">4</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B7">7</xref>]]. This paper proposes a unified explanation of how information progresses from physical activation to human interpretation; here, the human being is considered a composition of all known levels of the universe up to the intellectual level.</p>
      <p>The theory is based on the proposal that the universe is made of a series of worlds, extending from the unknowable to the unknowable. Between these unknown horizons are the known worlds considered in the present framework: cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual. Each higher-level world emerges over and is activated through the reality of the immediately lower world. It remains unknown from what the cosmological world emerges and what higher-level world may eventually emerge over the intellectual world. The human being possesses all these known levels.</p>
      <p>The present work approaches perception from a multilevel perspective. The lowest activation considered within the framework is physical activation, which operates through a cosmological substrate. Physical energy is a complex realization of cosmological fields; biological sensation is a complex realization of physical energy; psychological emotion is a complex realization of biological sensation; and intellectual interpretation is a complex realization of psychological emotion. Thus, the higher-level realization does not abolish the lower-level reality but develops over it as a more complex organization. Accordingly, cosmological realities are realized by the elementary physical particle (EPP) as physical energy; physical energies are realized as sensations in biological cell bodies (vegetation stage), biological sensations are realized as emotions in psychological entities (animal stage), and psychological emotions are finally realized as interpretations in the intellectual entity (human stage). A human being contains all these levels, and information reaching the intellectual level passes through all the preceding stages, encountering the capabilities and limitations of each receiving level.</p>
      <p>Within this framework, perception is understood not as the passive reception of information but as an active process of acceptance, synchronization, and expression. The model distinguishes between availability and essence and identifies four fundamental constituents of perception—appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity. Appearance and identity together constitute availability, while diversity and intensity constitute essence; availability and essence together form perception. The framework further explains how memory, codes, and the perception chamber contribute to image formation. Memory provides previously internalized relationships, codes determine perceptibility, and the perceived image emerges through the interaction of incoming data with these organizational structures.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec2">
      <title>2. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXISTENCE AND ENTITY</title>
      <p>The terms existence and entity are often used interchangeably in ordinary language [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B8">8</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B9">9</xref>]], but in the present framework, they denote two distinct concepts. An entity is a particular realization, whereas existence is the enabling condition that makes any realization possible. We may speak of the existence of a table, but not of the table of an existence. Existence is therefore the more fundamental and universal term. It is understood as composed of three dimensions: capability, time, and consciousness. These dimensions remain the same in principle across all levels, although their empirical manifestations differ. A full treatment of existence is beyond the scope of the present paper.</p>
      <p>Existence is unavoidable in perception, thought, and imagination [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B10">10</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B11">11</xref>]]. Even if one imagines that nothing exists, the act of imagining itself exists. Within the present framework, existence becomes operative in different domains; accordingly, we may speak of cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual forms of existence.</p>
      <p>An entity emerges when a specifically organized corpus is activated by the corresponding level of existence. A lower-level entity may therefore serve as the corpus for the emergence of a higher-level entity. For example, a seed is a physical entity, but from the biological perspective it functions as an organized corpus containing the code required for biological activation. Through germination, biological existence becomes active and the seed develops as a biological entity.</p>
      <p>The framework assumes that Nature operates through universally applicable principles rather than independent mechanisms at each level. The differences among cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual entities arise from differences in realization, while the underlying organizational principle remains common [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B12">12</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B13">13</xref>]]. This principle may be expressed as:</p>
      <p>Specifically organized lower-level entity + higher-level existence = higher-level entity, Accordingly:</p>
      <p>a) Energy-capable cosmological fields + physical existence = physical entity (energy and mass);</p>
      <p>b) Sensation-capable physical energy + biological existence = biological entity (sensation and liveliness);</p>
      <p>c) Emotion-capable biological sensations + psychological existence = psychological entity (emotion and temperament);</p>
      <p>d) Interpretation-capable psychological emotions + intellectual existence = intellectual entity (interpretation and knowledge).</p>
      <p>Thus, an entity at one level may become the corpus for the emergence of an entity at the immediately higher level. The resulting hierarchy is discussed in the following section.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec3">
      <title>3. THE MULTILEVEL UNIVERSE</title>
      <p>Within the knowable domain, the present framework recognizes five levels of reality: cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual. Each level operates within its own frame of reference, possessing its corresponding substance, activations, laws, sciences, and mode of existence [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B14">14</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B15">15</xref>]]. None is more real than another, and further levels may exist beyond the presently known range.</p>
      <p>As illustrated in <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig1">Figure 1</xref>, these levels form a continuous hierarchy in which each higher-level entity develops over an organized lower-level corpus [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B16">16</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B17">17</xref>]] while retaining the lower levels as its substrate. Thus, physical organization develops over the cosmological, biological over the physical, psychological over the biological, and intellectual over the psychological. In the human entity, all five levels remain simultaneously present and active.</p>
      <p>The organization and adaptation occurring within these levels are proposed to involve diversification, multiplication, and selection. Darwinian evolution represents the biological manifestation [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B18">18</xref>]] of this broader organizational process, which the present framework proposes to operate at every level of reality. <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig1">Figure 1</xref> illustrates this multilevel organization and the continuity from cosmological foundations to intellectual interpretation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec4">
      <title>4. MULTI-LEVEL ACTIVATION</title>
      <p>A human being is a composition of all the lower-level entities. However, each level receives only those activations of the immediately lower level that are compatible with its capabilities. Thus, the physical entity receives energy-capable cosmological fields as physical energy [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B19">19</xref>]]; the biological entity receives sensation-capable physical energies as biological sensation [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">20</xref>]]; the psychological entity receives emotion-capable biological sensations as psychological emotion; and the intellectual entity receives interpretation-capable psychological emotions as intellectual interpretation. Through self-flow (thinking), interpretations may further contribute to the formation of knowledge.</p>
      <p>As illustrated in <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig2">Figure 2</xref>, information is therefore not received directly across levels. Cosmological information in the form of modulated fields is received by the physical entity; physical information in the form of modulated energies by the biological entity; biological information in the form of modulated sensations by the psychological entity; and psychological information in the form of modulated emotions by the intellectual entity.</p>
      <p>Each lower-level manifestation comprises two inseparable aspects: availability and essence [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B21">21</xref>]]. During higher-level inflow (acceptance), availability serves as the carrier and the embedded essence as the rider. During lower-level outflow (expression), their roles are reversed: essence serves as the carrier and the embedded availability as the rider. Thus, the same two aspects participate in acceptance and expression in complementary roles.</p>
      <p>Activation includes three processes: inflow (acceptance), self-flow (internal synchronization), and outflow (expression). Each operates through the immediately lower-level substrate: physical activation through cosmological fields, biological activation through physical energy, psychological activation through biological sensation, and intellectual activation through psychological emotion. Self-flow operates internally through previously retained activations and contributes to their synchronization and reorganization.</p>
      <fig id="fig1">
        <label>Figure 1</label>
        <graphic xlink:href="https://html.scirp.org/file/8303893-rId13.jpeg?20260928013531" />
      </fig>
      <p><bold>Figure 1.</bold><bold>Multilevel</bold><bold>u</bold><bold>niverse. The figure illustrates the proposed organization of the knowable universe into five nested levels: cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual. Each higher-level entity emerges through the activation of an organized lower-level corpus by the corresponding higher-level existence, while simultaneously becoming the corpus for the next higher level. Together, the five levels form a continuous hierarchy linking cosmological reality to human interpretation</bold><bold>.</bold></p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec5">
      <title>5. PERCEPTION CONSTITUENTS</title>
      <sec id="sec5dot1">
        <title>5.1. Four Constituents (Definitions)</title>
        <p>All perceptions are composed of four fundamental constituents: appearance (AP), identity (ID), diversity (DI), and intensity (IN). This classification is not arbitrary but arises from a binary decomposition of perception into two primary aspects: availability and essence.</p>
        <fig id="fig2">
          <label>Figure 2</label>
          <graphic xlink:href="https://html.scirp.org/file/8303893-rId14.jpeg?20260928013532" />
        </fig>
        <p><bold>Figure 2.</bold><bold>Acceptance and</bold><bold>expression of multilevel activati</bold><bold>on. The figure illustrates the proposed cyclic organization of multilevel activation. During acceptance, lower-level essence is received in the form of the immediately lower entity and transformed into a higher-level perceived image through memory and code-mediated processing. During expression, the process operates in reverse, allowing higher-level intentions to be realized through the corresponding lower-level entity. Self-flow is the internal synchronization process that occurs simultaneously with acceptance and expression</bold><bold>.</bold></p>
        <p>Availability is composed of:</p>
        <p>Appearance (without identity);Identity (without appearance).</p>
        <p>Essence is composed of:</p>
        <p>Diversity (without intensity);Intensity (without diversity).</p>
        <p>Although described separately, these four constituents are mutually dependent and compensatory. In practice, none exists in isolation. Appearance always encompasses diversity and intensity; identity likewise encompasses diversity and intensity. Similarly, diversity encompasses appearance and identity, while intensity encompasses appearance and identity. Thus, every perception is a unified organization of all four constituents.</p>
        <p>In principle, the decomposition may be extended to eight, sixteen, or more constituents. However, for the present framework, four constituents are sufficient to explain the mechanism of perception and image formation at all levels.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec5dot2">
        <title>5.2. Empirical Manifestations of the Four Constituents</title>
        <p>The present framework proposes that the four perceptual constituents remain universal throughout the multilevel hierarchy, consistent with broader accounts of hierarchical organization [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B22">22</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B23">23</xref>]]. Their empirical manifestations, however, differ according to the substance, activation, and mode of existence of each level. <bold>Table 1</bold> presents representative examples intended to illustrate this continuity rather than an exhaustive or definitive classification.</p>
        <p><bold>Table 1.</bold><bold>Representative empirical manifestations of the four perceptual constituents across the multilevel hierarchy.</bold></p>
        <table-wrap id="tbl1">
          <label>Table 1</label>
          <table>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td>Level</td>
                <td>Appearance(without identity)</td>
                <td>Identity(without appearance)</td>
                <td>Diversity(without intensity)</td>
                <td>Intensity(without diversity)</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Cosmological</td>
                <td>Fullness</td>
                <td>Hollowness</td>
                <td>Visibility</td>
                <td>Forcibility</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Physical</td>
                <td>Appearance</td>
                <td>Individuality</td>
                <td>Feature</td>
                <td>Strength</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Biological</td>
                <td>Livingness</td>
                <td>Species</td>
                <td>Variation</td>
                <td>Vitality</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Psychological</td>
                <td>Motivation</td>
                <td>Personality</td>
                <td>Caution</td>
                <td>Courage</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Intellectual</td>
                <td>Information</td>
                <td>Concept</td>
                <td>Analysis</td>
                <td>Confidence</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
        <p><bold>Table 1</bold><bold>—</bold>The examples represent level-specific manifestations of the four constituents within the proposed framework and are intended to illustrate continuity of organization across levels.</p>
        <p>The cosmological manifestations—fullness, hollowness, visibility, and forcibility—were introduced in earlier work [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B24">24</xref>]]. In the present framework, they represent the cosmological manifestations of appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity, respectively.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec6">
      <title>6. PERCEPTION PROCESS</title>
      <p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig3">Figure 3</xref> illustrates the complete mechanism of perception. The inflow enters through two complementary structures: <bold>DI</bold>-<bold>AP</bold>-<bold>IN</bold>, AP is embedded with DI and IN, and <bold>DI</bold>-<bold>ID</bold>-<bold>IN</bold>, ID is embedded with DI and IN. Thus, diversity and intensity are already embedded in both incoming structures before they encounter memory.</p>
      <fig id="fig3">
        <label>Figure 3</label>
        <graphic xlink:href="https://html.scirp.org/file/8303893-rId15.jpeg?20260928013533" />
      </fig>
      <p><bold>Figure 3.</bold><bold>Mechanism of</bold><bold>multilevel image formatio</bold><bold>n. The figure presents the proposed mechanism by which incoming activations, memory contributions, and code-filtered structures interact to produce a momentary perceived image. The four constituents—appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity—are temporarily reorganized within the perception chamber before being redistributed to update memory and support expression. The same organizational principle is proposed to operate at every level of the multilevel hierarchy</bold><bold>.</bold></p>
      <p>Each incoming structure interacts with its corresponding memory chambers. The <bold>DI</bold>-<bold>AP</bold>-<bold>IN</bold> stream is supplemented by the AP-DI and AP-IN memory dyads, while the <bold>DI</bold>-<bold>ID</bold>-<bold>IN</bold> stream is supplemented by the ID-DI and ID-IN memory dyads. In this way, incoming data are enriched by previously established relationships before proceeding further.</p>
      <p>The memory-enriched structures then pass through their corresponding code chambers. Until this stage, the incoming lower-level data remain imperceptible at the higher level. The codes provide higher-level perceptibility according to the capabilities and limitations of the receiving entity [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">20</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B25">25</xref>]].</p>
      <p>The resulting perceptible structures enter the perception chamber, where the incoming structures are dismantled. Appearance and identity are released from their relationships with diversity and intensity, making all four constituents—appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity—simultaneously available. They complement one another and organize into a compatible configuration, forming the perceived image [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B26">26</xref>]]. Constituents not incorporated into the image remain as possibilities.</p>
      <p>The perceived image exists within the <bold>present moment</bold>. Before this moment, appearance and identity approaching perception lie in the future of the perceived image. After perception, diversity and intensity lie in its past. Thus, the perceived image exists at the transitional point where the incoming future becomes the outgoing past.</p>
      <p>For expression, the perceived image is dismantled and restructured into two complementary outflow structures: <bold>ID</bold>-<bold>DI</bold>-<bold>AP</bold> and <bold>ID</bold>-<bold>IN</bold>-<bold>AP</bold>. These structures pass through their corresponding code chambers, where higher-level perceptibility is converted into lower-level executability. The resulting relationships may also be deposited into the corresponding memory chambers before becoming expressed activations. Thus, the same cyclic process that uses previous memories during perception can also modify memory for future perception.</p>
      <p>The process does not always require both external inflow and external outflow. When inflow occurs without expression, the resulting relationships may be deposited into memory. When expression occurs without external inflow, the required relationships may be drawn from memory. When neither external inflow nor external outflow occurs, memory serves as both source and destination. This internal cyclic activation is termed <bold>self-flow</bold>; thinking is an example of intellectual self-flow.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec7">
      <title>7. IMPORTANCE OF MEMORIES</title>
      <sec id="sec7dot1">
        <title>7.1. Dyadic System</title>
        <p>The present framework follows a binary organization. Perception consists of two complementary aspects: availability (appearance-identity) and essence (diversity-intensity). The cross-relations between these constituents form four dyads—AP-DI, AP-IN, ID-DI, and ID-IN—represented by the four memory chambers in <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig3">Figure 3</xref>.</p>
        <p>The four dyads are:</p>
        <p><bold>AP</bold>-<bold>DI:</bold> diversified appearance and appearable diversity (<bold>Dissimilarity</bold>);<bold>AP</bold>-<bold>IN:</bold> intensified appearance and appearable intensity (<bold>Potentiality</bold>);<bold>ID</bold>-<bold>DI:</bold> diversified identity and identified diversity (<bold>Discernment</bold>);<bold>ID</bold>-<bold>IN:</bold> intensified identity and identified intensity (<bold>Support</bold>).</p>
        <p>Each dyad is bidirectional: the first expression describes the first constituent as modified by the second, while the reverse expression describes the second as realized through the first. The dyads remain dormant while stored separately and do not constitute complete perceptions. They become active during perception and expression, contributing relational information to incoming and outgoing activations.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec7dot2">
        <title>7.2. Cyclic System of Memory</title>
        <p>The dyads become functionally important because they participate in a continuous cycle of perception and memory. During inflow, incoming data are supplemented by relevant dyadic memories. Perception is therefore constructed from both incoming data and previously established relationships.</p>
        <p>During outflow, the perceived image is divided into diversity and intensity and forwarded towards the corresponding memory chambers before expression. Thus, memory is not merely used during perception; it is continuously modified by every perceptual cycle.</p>
        <p>The process may be summarized as:</p>
        <p><bold>Incoming Data + Memory → Perception → Updated Memory for Future Perception → Expression</bold></p>
        <p>Thus, every perception may modify memory, while existing memory contributes to future perceptions. As accumulated relationships increase, perception may become faster and increasingly influenced by previous experience.</p>
        <p>In self-flow, where external inflow and outflow are absent, memory provides the internally available data for the perceptual cycle. Through repeated cycles of interaction, diversification, multiplication, and selection, new relationships may form and be deposited back into memory, contributing to future thinking and perception.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec7dot3">
        <title>7.3. Empirical Application of Memory</title>
        <p>Memory represents the accumulated organizational history of an entity. Each cycle of perception, expression, and self-flow modifies this organization by adding or reorganizing relationships, thereby influencing future perception and expression.</p>
        <p>The importance of memory can be illustrated by a simple example [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B27">27</xref>]]. Imagine seeing an unfamiliar alien for the first time. Initially, perception may be slow and confusing because its unfamiliar features may satisfy only one dyad, while the remaining dyadic relationships are constructed according to previously established dyadic pairings. After repeated exposure, recognition becomes faster because previous perceptions have established relationships among those features, enabling reconstruction from partial information.</p>
        <p>A similar process occurs when searching for a friend in a crowd. One does not need to examine every detail of every face; a few recognizable features may activate established relationships and enable rapid reconstruction of the perceived image.</p>
        <p>In this framework, remembering is therefore not the retrieval of a stored picture but the reconstruction of a perception through dormant memory relationships. These relationships remain separately stored but can be re-associated during subsequent perception, expression, or self-flow.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec7dot4">
        <title>7.4. Memory and Perceptual Distortion</title>
        <p>The role of memory extends beyond facilitating recognition. The same memory structures that enable rapid reconstruction may also influence perception in ways that do not accurately reflect incoming data. Perception is therefore influenced not only by present input but also by previously established relationships.</p>
        <p>For example, a person who had a frightening encounter with a dog in childhood may later feel fear upon seeing a harmless dog, or even a dog-like figure [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B28">28</xref>]]. Likewise, perceptual illusions may arise when incomplete incoming data are supplemented by memory, producing an apparently coherent but inaccurate image [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B29">29</xref>]].</p>
        <p>Thus, memory actively participates in constructing the perceived image. It may facilitate recognition through previously established relationships, but it may also bias perception when those relationships contribute more “support ID-IN” than the incoming relationships.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec8">
      <title>8. IMPORTANCE OF CODES</title>
      <p>The Memory chambers supply previously established relationships to incoming data, but memory alone cannot create perception. Incoming lower-level activations must also satisfy the limitations imposed by the code chambers. The codes determine which incoming dyadic structures can become perceptible at the corresponding higher level. Thus, not all lower-level activations become higher-level perceptions.</p>
      <p>The function of codes may be illustrated by DNA. DNA consists of physical molecular structures, with complementary bases interacting specifically as A-T and G-C [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">20</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B25">25</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B30">30</xref>]]. Although the bases and their interactions are physical, their organized relationships form the basis for storing and transmitting biological information. Thus, DNA provides an empirical example in which relationships among lower-level physical constituents become biologically informational. Within the present framework, this illustrates how a higher-level perceptibility may be realized through the organized relationships of a lower-level substrate.</p>
      <p>In this sense, code represents the realization of the <bold>capability</bold> dimension of existence within an entity. Its manifestations differ across levels: at the physical level as properties, at the biological level as genetic capabilities, at the psychological level as temperament, and at the intellectual level as intelligence [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B20">20</xref>]]. Memory therefore influences the content of perception, whereas codes determine the range within which perception is possible.</p>
      <p>Codes perform a complementary function during expression. During acceptance, they enable lower-level activations to become perceptible at the higher level; during expression, they enable higher-level <bold>activations</bold> to become executable through the lower-level entity. Thus, code chambers mediate both acceptance and expression between immediately adjacent levels.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec9">
      <title>9. PERCEPTION CHAMBER</title>
      <p>The perception chamber, shown at the center of <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig3">Figure 3</xref>, forms the central line of the nucleus through which incoming and outgoing structures interact with the written codes. It is the ontological stage at which the four perceptual constituents become simultaneously available and form the perceived image. The chamber is therefore not the memory or the code itself, but the point at which their contributions participate with incoming activation in present perception.</p>
      <p>The perceived image exists only within this chamber and within the <bold>present moment</bold>. It is neither received as a ready-made image nor retained as a complete image after perception. The continuous interaction of appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity within this momentary stage generates the perceived information [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B31">31</xref>]].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec10">
      <title>10. COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK</title>
      <sec id="sec10dot1">
        <title>10.1. Is Perception a Stored Image or a Created Image?</title>
        <p>A common assumption is that perception retrieves a previously stored image from memory [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B27">27</xref>]]. In the present framework, memory does not store complete images. Instead, it stores relational structures as dormant dyads. The perceived image is formed momentarily within the perception chamber through the interaction of the four constituents after the incoming structures have been supplemented by memory and processed through the codes. Consequently, perception is a process of reconstruction rather than retrieval.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot2">
        <title>10.2. Why Are Four Constituents Required?</title>
        <p>The framework proposes four perceptual constituents: appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity. These arise from a binary decomposition of perception into availability and essence. Four constituents are sufficient to explain image formation, memory organization, coding, perception, and expression within this framework. The model, therefore, adopts the simplest structure capable of explaining these processes.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot3">
        <title>10.3. Are the Four Constituents Observed Directly?</title>
        <p>They are conceptual constituents inferred from the requirements of perception. Their role is similar to that of theoretical constructs in other scientific and philosophical models [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B32">32</xref>]]. The value of the constituents lies in their explanatory power rather than in their separate observability</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot4">
        <title>10.4. Does Memory Store Pictures?</title>
        <p>The framework proposes that memory stores relationships rather than complete pictures. Recognition occurs when previously established relationships are activated and supplement the incoming data [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref>]]. This explains why partial information is often sufficient for rapid recognition and why memories can both assist and distort perception.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot5">
        <title>10.5. What Is the Role of Codes?</title>
        <p>Incoming data and memory data are structured in the lower-level substance. Without being perceptible to the higher level, higher-level perception is impossible. Codes are an ontologically written reality that makes lower-level activation perceptible at the higher level. This perceptibility is limited by the codes written within the code chambers.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot6">
        <title>10.6. Is Perception Passive Reception?</title>
        <p>No. Perception is an active process that integrates incoming data, memory contributions, and code-based perceptibility at the higher level. The perceived image is therefore not simply received from the external world but actively constructed within the perception chamber. Through this cyclic process, the continuous flow of perceived images generates information. </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot7">
        <title>10.7. How Does this Framework Relate to Realism and Idealism?</title>
        <p>The framework does not fully adopt either position. It acknowledges that lower-level activations exist independently of perception [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B7">7</xref>], [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B33">33</xref>]]. However, the perceived image is actively constructed through the interaction of incoming activation, memory, and codes. Thus, perception is neither a direct copy of reality nor a purely subjective creation.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot8">
        <title>10.8. What Is the Role of Qualia?</title>
        <p>The present framework does not treat qualia as fundamental entities [[<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B34">34</xref>]]. Instead, the subjective character of experience emerges through psychological perception, while interpretation-capable psychological emotions become intellectually perceptible at the intellectual level, rather than treating them as irreducible primitives.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot9">
        <title>10.9. What Is Represented during Perception?</title>
        <p>Perception does not represent isolated objects. It represents organized relationships among appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity. The perceived image is therefore relational rather than merely pictorial. The perceived image is specific to the perceiving entity and has no absolute perceptual value. For example, one person may perceive pop music as entertaining, while another may perceive the same music as harsh.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot10">
        <title>10.10. Why Are Multiple Levels Required?</title>
        <p>A physical activation cannot be directly realized as an intellectual interpretation. Between physical energy and intellectual knowledge lie biological sensations and psychological emotions. The multilevel hierarchy explains how information is progressively realized through cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual levels. A human intellectual entity cannot exist without the psychological animal level; the psychological level cannot exist without the biological cellular level; and the biological level cannot exist without the physical molecular level. There is no direct perceptual interface between physical molecules and intellectual interpretation. Information must therefore be promoted through each immediately higher level.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot11">
        <title>10.11. How Does Self-Flow Differ from Perception?</title>
        <p>Self-flow is an internal part of the perceptual cycle. During each cycle of perception, previously stored relationships are added from memory to the incoming activation, and after image formation the resulting relationships are again forwarded towards memory. This continuous internal circulation between memory and the perception process constitutes self-flow. It therefore operates together with external inflow (acceptance) and outflow (expression), rather than as an alternative to them. When external inflow and outflow are absent, self-flow may continue through memory alone; thinking is an example of such internally sustained self-flow.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec10dot12">
        <title>10.12. Could the Framework Be Shown to Be Wrong?</title>
        <p>Although conceptual, the framework makes propositions that are open to empirical examination. It would require revision if evidence demonstrated that its proposed organizational sequence or perceptual mechanism does not occur. For example, the framework would be challenged if a higher-level perception were shown to arise directly from a non-adjacent lower level without the proposed intermediate levels; if intellectual interpretation were demonstrated to occur without psychological mediation; if complete perceived images were shown to be stored and retrieved from memory without reconstruction; or if previous memory relationships were shown to make no contribution to the formation of a perceived image. Similarly, evidence that higher-level perceptibility is independent of the capabilities and limitations of the receiving entity would challenge the proposed role of codes. These possibilities provide empirical conditions under which the framework could be tested, modified, or rejected.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec11">
      <title>11. CONCLUSIONs</title>
      <p>The present study sought to develop a common conceptual framework capable of explaining perception across cosmological, physical, biological, psychological, and intellectual levels. The resulting framework provides a continuous organizational route through which information is progressively realized at successive levels, while each higher-level perception remains dependent on the immediately lower-level substrate.</p>
      <p>The analysis identifies appearance, identity, diversity, and intensity as four common constituents through which this continuity can be represented. Their relational organization provides a common basis for explaining the perceptual process, while their different empirical manifestations allow each level to retain its own substance, activation, and mode of existence. The framework thereby provides a way of describing continuity across levels without reducing one level to another.</p>
      <p>The study further distinguishes the functions required for perception. Memory preserves previously established dyadic relationships and contributes them to subsequent perception; codes determine the limits within which lower-level activations become perceptible at the higher level; and the perception chamber provides the present-moment stage in which the four constituents interact to form the perceived image. The perceived image is therefore reconstructed rather than retrieved as a complete stored image. This also explains how previous experience can facilitate recognition while simultaneously contributing to perceptual differences and distortions.</p>
      <p>The framework also establishes perception as a continuous cyclic process rather than an isolated act of reception. External inflow, internal self-flow through memory, present-moment image formation, memory updating, and expression participate in the continuing organization of the entity. Consequently, the same external activation need not produce an identical perceived image in different entities, because perception depends upon both incoming activation and the previously organized memory and code structures of the perceiving entity.</p>
      <p>The principal contribution of the framework is therefore a common ontological mechanism for describing how lower-level activation becomes higher-level perception without requiring direct contact between non-adjacent levels. Its propositions concerning successive perceptibility, relational memory, code-dependent capability, and reconstructive image formation provide identifiable conditions that may be examined and challenged empirically. The framework should therefore be regarded not as a completed account of perception, but as a testable conceptual basis for investigating how different entities can construct different perceived realities from a common external reality.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec12">
      <title>AI-Assisted Editing Disclosure</title>
      <p>During the preparation of this manuscript, the author used ChatGPT strictly to refine the language expression, improve overall text flow, and check the structural clarity of the manuscript. The author independently reviewed and edited all suggestions and remains fully responsible and accountable for the final content of the publication.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec13">
      <title>Author Contributions</title>
      <p>The author, Pramod Kumar Agrawal, is the sole author of this manuscript. He was entirely responsible for the conceptualization, development of the ontological framework, theoretical modeling, literature review, drafting of the manuscript text, and the structural creation of all vector artwork and illustrations. The author has read, verified, and approved the final version of the submitted manuscript.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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