The issue of recruiting public officials is important for at least four reasons. First, it concerns the economic performance of public enterprises. According to [1], internal resources and skills constitute an essential source of organizational capacity. The quality of managers influences financial management, strategic planning, risk control, investment mobilization, and service quality.

Secondly, it concerns the responsibility of the state as a shareholder. In agency theory, [8] demonstrate that delegating management creates a risk of opportunism on the part of the agent. The state, citizens, and users entrust the management of public assets to managers who often possess superior information about the company’s operations. The selection and oversight of agents thus become essential mechanisms for reducing agency costs.

Third, the problem concerns institutional legitimacy. When citizens believe that jobs and responsibilities are allocated based on personal connections rather than competence, trust in the administration declines. Meritocracy not only produces technical efficiency; it also contributes to the legitimacy of the state.

Fourth, the issue concerns the modernization of public governance. The introduction of a call for applications for the recruitment of directors of public enterprises reflects a governmental desire to formalize, make more transparent, and professionalize the selection process. However, the existence of a formal procedure alone does not guarantee a transformation of practices.

[11] demonstrate that organizations can adopt formal structures to meet the expectations of their environment while maintaining different internal practices. This phenomenon of institutional decoupling poses a major risk to the application process. A procedure may be published but not actually determine the final decision.

The reform of the recruitment of public officials in the DRC is part of the legal transformation of public enterprises initiated by the laws of July 7, 2008, and the decrees of April 24, 2009, which sought to correct inefficiency, politicization, and the confusion between commercial companies and public institutions. Within this framework, the digital platform, technically managed by Lawson Human Resources, represents a useful innovation for centralizing applications, securing files, and displaying criteria of merit, competence, fairness, and gender. However, it does not, on its own, change the final power of appointment, which remains with the President of the Republic, the Government, and the Council of Ministers.

The core of the problem lies in the coexistence of two logics: a meritocratic logic, based on competence and transparency, and a clientelist logic, based on personal loyalty and networks of influence. [11] explain that formal rules can serve as a facade without transforming actual practices; thus, calls for applications and digitization modernize the procedure, but their effectiveness depends on their impact on the final decision. Similarly, [8] show that delegating management in public enterprises, such as those in the DRC, can create a risk of opportunism: if the appointment is based on political loyalty rather than competence, the appointee becomes more beholden to their patron than to the enterprise and the public interest.

The persistence of clientelism is also explained by the dynamics of patronage and neo-patrimonialism. [6] describe an exchange of resources and loyalties between patron and beneficiary, while [3] show that formal institutions often coexist with personal power relations in Africa. In this context of public enterprises in the DRC, the ideas of [16] are particularly relevant when they suggest that public enterprises can be used for distributive or political purposes, to the detriment of economic efficiency. Furthermore, [1] resource-based view reminds us that human skills are a strategic resource: clientelism thus undermines performance by replacing competence with proximity, while simultaneously underutilizing the profiles available in the private sector, the diaspora, and the provinces.

The central governance issue also concerns information asymmetries, the concentration of power, and weak accountability. The legal framework grants significant power to the President, while technical bodies may be reduced to merely formalizing decisions already made. Digitalization reduces opacity in the application process, but not necessarily at the evaluation, appointment, and monitoring stages. Financial shortcomings are striking in terms of oversight: in 2021, almost the majority of public enterprises had not submitted their financial statements to the Court of Auditors; among twenty companies examined, only eight submitted their financial statements to the CPCC in 2019, nine in 2020, and eight in 2021, representing an average of 41.6%. Despite the existence of numerous oversight bodies, accountability remains merely formal as long as information is not verifiable, reports are not published, and sanctions remain weak.

Comparative analysis of Africa confirms that the politicization of recruitment remains a major obstacle, but that credible reform depends on transparency, professionalization, managerial autonomy, and performance evaluation. In Ghana, the creation of the State Interests and Governance Authority by the SIGA Act of 2019 illustrates the clarification of the state’s role as a shareholder; the [19] emphasizes that a better separation between ownership and management improves performance. In Kenya, calls for applications and selection committees are in place, yet the distribution of positions can remain influenced by political rivalries, making it important to document the decision-making process. In Nigeria, political coalitions have at times influenced the management and control of state-owned enterprises. In Rwanda, performance contracts and administrative discipline have played an important role in strengthening public-sector management, although this approach is closely linked to a highly centralized political and administrative context. In South Africa, these experiences demonstrate that well-designed rules alone are insufficient when the institutions responsible for implementing them become subject to political capture.

The ranking should result from a collegial process including eligibility verification, application review, interviews, presentation of the strategic plan, integrity checks, assignment of scores, calculation of weighted scores, and drafting of a final report. Each candidate’s score could be established using the following formula: Si = Ej × lnwj × xiji. In this formula, S represents the final score of candidate i, wj represents the weight of criterion j, and xij represents the score obtained by candidate i for that criterion. Each score should be linked to specific elements of the application, interview, or submitted plan. Committee members should sign a declaration of impartiality and conflict of interest, and the minutes and evaluation documents should be retained to allow for future audits. This requirement aligns with the analysis of [10], according to which the quality of governance is based on accountability, transparency and the control of corruption.

The political authority may retain the final appointment power, but its authority must be legally and institutionally regulated. A discrepancy between the technical ranking and the final appointment could only be permitted for exceptional, objective, and duly justified reasons. Such reasons could include a specific strategic requirement, particular experience insufficiently assessed by the ranking system, the need for urgent restructuring, a crisis affecting the continuity of public service, new information concerning a candidate’s integrity, or a legal incompatibility discovered after the ranking.

On the other hand, political loyalty, family ties, personal proximity, or membership in a network cannot constitute legitimate grounds for preference. Any decision deviating from the ranking must be made in writing and subject to independent review. It must specify the reasons why the selected candidate, although not ranked first, remains competent, ethical, and capable of achieving the company’s objectives. This requirement is fundamental, as the discretion of the political authority must not be confused with arbitrariness. The exercise of public power must be based on principles of justification and equal treatment: the authority can choose, but it must explain the reasons for its choice. Similarly, state capture becomes possible when particular networks influence public decisions without effective control mechanisms.

The appointment of the agent should also be linked to a performance contract that includes financial, operational, social, environmental, and ethical objectives. Financial indicators could include revenue growth, loss reduction, cost control, debt levels, improved collection, reduced operating subsidies, and regular audits. Operational indicators should cover service continuity, productivity, service quality, reduced interruptions, adherence to deadlines, equipment maintenance, and user satisfaction.

The evaluation should also incorporate governance indicators, including the regularity of board meetings, the quality of internal controls, the publication of financial reports, compliance with procurement rules, conflict of interest management, implementation of audit recommendations, and fraud prevention. Social and environmental dimensions could be measured through equitable access to services, respect for workers’ rights, operational safety, environmental protection, and contribution to national development. This multidimensional approach aligns with the balanced scorecard model proposed by [9], which recommends evaluating organizations along several dimensions rather than solely on the basis of financial results. The Rwandan experience also confirms the value of contracts based on measurable and regularly assessed objectives.

The reform must also strengthen boards of directors, which should be composed of competent, independent members capable of effectively overseeing management. Specialized committees could be established in the areas of auditing, risk management, appointments, compensation, and ethics. The state should also clarify its role as a shareholder by setting corporate objectives, defining public service obligations, ensuring transparent financing, and avoiding interference in day-to-day operations.

A consolidated annual report on state-owned enterprises should present their financial situation, subsidies and guarantees received, performance of their managers, audits conducted, appointment procedures, sanctions imposed, and recommendations not implemented. The Court of Auditors, Parliament, inspectorates, and anti-corruption bodies should have access to selection documents and be able to verify the regularity of appointments. According to [15], combating corruption precisely requires reducing unchecked secrecy and increasing the traceability of decisions.

Ultimately, overcoming the impasse of ungovernability rests on a three-pronged institutional framework: competence in recruitment, transparency in decision-making, and accountability in management. Without competence, appointments lose their economic rationale; without transparency, they lose their legitimacy; without accountability, they produce no lasting improvement. Congolese reform must therefore break with the conception of the mandate as a political reward. The elected official must become a professional entrusted with a public mission, selected according to established criteria, evaluated using precise indicators, and sanctioned based on their results. Political power can retain its strategic role, but it should no longer be able to substitute personal loyalty for expertise, opacity for justification, or political protection for the obligation to perform.

The appointee must cease to be the beneficiary of a political favor and become the custodian of a public mission, subject to verifiable criteria, regular evaluation, and effective sanctions in the event of mismanagement. Thus, our hypotheses are formulated as follows:

This research analyzes the potential effects of management recruitment methods on the governance and performance of public enterprises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is based on the idea that the quality of managers is a determining component of the organizational capacity of these enterprises, but that this quality itself depends on the institutions, selection procedures, and power relations that structure appointments.

From an institutional perspective, [12] distinguishes between formal rules and observed practices. This distinction is particularly relevant in the context of public enterprises, where the existence of regulatory appointment procedures does not necessarily guarantee their impartial application. [11], from a neo-institutional perspective, demonstrate that organizations can adopt formal mechanisms without these mechanisms entirely determining actual practices. The question of meritocracy must therefore be addressed by examining the gap between the official rule and the actual selection process.

To this end, the research adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining a quantitative analysis of 254 observations with a qualitative investigation based on document analysis and depending on the accessibility of the field, semi-structured interviews and institutional observations. The quantitative component identifies regularities and statistical associations; the qualitative component aims to explain the social, political, and institutional mechanisms likely to produce these regularities. This approach improves the credibility of the findings by examining evidence from different sources and perspectives.

General hypothesis

The general hypothesis maintains that the methods of selecting representatives influence the quality of governance and the organizational performance of public companies, subject to the effect of institutional, organizational and sectoral factors.

The null hypothesis (H0) states that there is no statistically significant association between the method of recruiting representatives and the governance and performance indicators selected.

H1. Political influence, relational capital and nomination

H1 postulates that the intensification of political influence and relational capital increases the likelihood of recruitment based on loyalty, proximity and personal networks rather than on professional qualifications.

This hypothesis aligns with the neo-patrimonial approach of [3], who demonstrate that formally bureaucratic institutions can operate according to personal and relational logics. It also highlights the contrast between rule-based authority and personalized forms of power, with the former emphasizing formal rules and competence and the latter relying more heavily on personal relationships.

Hypothesis H1 is examined based on recruitment method, network capital, political sponsorship, political affiliation, experience, educational level, and the suitability of the candidate’s profile for the position. When the dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic regression will be used to estimate the probability of meritocratic recruitment based on these factors.

H2. Transparency, control and respect for the rules

H2 argues that procedural transparency, traceability of decisions and the existence of independent control mechanisms promote the effective application of meritocratic criteria.

The hypothesis rests on the idea that formalizing a procedure is not enough to guarantee its impartiality. [12] emphasizes that institutions only produce predictable effects when the rules are effectively applied. Similarly, [15] show that reducing corruption and arbitrary discretion requires credible mechanisms for control and accountability.

In this case, hypothesis H2 is therefore assessed based on information relating to job postings, the prior definition of criteria, the verification of qualifications, the declaration of conflicts of interest, the archiving of decisions, the independence of the committees, and the appeal and sanction mechanisms. If these dimensions are not directly present in the quantitative database, H2 is primarily tested through documentary and qualitative analysis; it is then artificially presented as a quantitatively verified hypothesis.

H3. Meritocracy, Governance and Performance

H3 posits that the selection of agents based on professional, transparent and verifiable criteria is positively associated with the quality of governance and the performance of public enterprises.

This hypothesis draws on [7], who highlight the role of bureaucratic professionalization in state capacity, as well as on [5], who link merit-based bureaucratic systems to better institutional governance. The [13] also emphasizes that the professionalization of boards and management in public enterprises is an important condition for their effectiveness and accountability.

H3 is examined based on several organizational outcomes: performance, financial orthodoxy, service quality, managerial stability, and social climate. This multidimensional approach prevents us from reducing public performance to a single financial indicator. However, in accordance with [8], and [17], the effects of managerial competence are likely to be mediated or moderated by agency mechanisms, institutional dependencies, available resources, and policy interventions. The analyses thus allow us to establish statistical associations, but not, on their own, definitive causality.

The research adopts a pragmatic, predominantly empirical approach, complemented by a comprehensive and interpretive perspective. This approach is consistent with the use of mixed methods, since the phenomenon under study simultaneously possesses an observable and measurable dimension and a social and institutional dimension that requires an interpretation of meanings and practices.

The empirical component falls within a tradition close to positivism, insofar as it seeks to measure the characteristics of recruitment and identify statistical regularities. Recruitment methods, experience, networking capital, political patronage, and performance indicators are thus transformed into observable and analyzable variables.

This approach, however, does not lead to viewing social practices as mere statistical regularities. Social action should be understood by considering the meanings that individuals attach to their actions. A political recommendation may thus be perceived by some actors as an obligation of solidarity, whereas, from the perspective of administrative rationality, it may constitute a breach of the principle of equal access to public office. The interpretive approach therefore allows us to interpret the mechanisms of clientelism, nepotism, and patronage without reducing them to normative judgments. It also allows us to analyze the coexistence between rational-legal domination and personalized practices. The stance adopted is thus compatible with a conception of research in which measurement establishes regularities, while interpretation explains the mechanisms. The convergence of these two dimensions constitutes the epistemological foundation of the methodological framework.

The research is based on a mixed methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative data.

The quantitative component uses 254 observations contained in the SPSS and JAPS database created for the study. The unit of observation is kept constant across all analyses and corresponds to the unit actually recorded in the database: agent or company-agent unit, depending on the initial data collection method.

The quantitative sample consists of observations meeting the inclusion criteria defined by the research and containing the information necessary for analysis. Missing data will not be automatically considered null values and have been subjected to specific processing depending on the variable concerned.

The cleaning procedure includes checking for missing values, extreme values, theoretical modalities, potential duplicates, and coding anomalies. Any inconsistent value was verified in the source before being recoded or excluded.

The qualitative component includes a literature review, a document analysis of legal texts, regulations, job descriptions, appointment decisions, and institutional documents, as well as semi-structured interviews when access to the field allows. The qualitative sampling is purposive and based on the relevance of the profiles rather than statistical representativeness.

Triangulating quantitative data, documents, and testimonies made it possible to compare observed practices with formal rules. This strategy is particularly important in the study of informal and potentially hidden phenomena.

Meritocratic recruitment refers to selection based on verifiable professional criteria: qualifications, relevant experience, competence, suitability for the position, integrity, past performance, and a competitive process. Relational capital refers to the mobilization of family, community, professional, or personal relationships that can facilitate access to a position. Political clientelism refers to a relationship in which access to a position or public resource is linked to a relationship of loyalty, support, or political proximity. Political sponsorship is an indicator of this dimension but cannot, on its own, encompass the entire concept of clientelism. Service quality refers to the level of quality of services provided by the public enterprise, according to the scale used in the survey.

Performance refers to the level of achievement of the economic and organizational objectives identified in the study. Financial orthodoxy refers to adherence to the principles of discipline, control, and financial management as defined in the corresponding index. Managerial stability refers to the continuity of the leadership team and the stability of organizational management. The social climate refers to the quality of professional relationships, internal cohesion, and the level of social stability within the organization.

This operationalization is accompanied by a dictionary specifying for each variable its SPSS name, JAPS, its level of measurement, its modalities and its coding system.

Descriptive analysis constitutes the first step in processing the 254 observations. Its aim is to establish the distribution of variables before any explanatory analysis. The available results indicate an average of 1.38 for the recruitment method, 3.42 for network capital, and 3.68 for political patronage. General experience has an average of 2.18, compared to 2.64 for relevant experience. The suitability of the candidate’s profile to the position reaches 1.39. The organizational indicators also show average levels: 1.85 for performance, 1.84 for financial orthodoxy, 1.97 for service quality, 2.50 for the social climate, and 1.68 for managerial stability (Table 1).

Table 1. Descriptive table of statistical observations.

These statistics suggest a significant influence of relational and political factors on appointment processes, alongside areas for improvement in several organizational indicators. However, they do not allow us to conclude that the recruitment method has a causal effect.

The interpretation is particularly cautious due to missing data and coding anomalies.

Qualitative analysis provides an interpretative extension of quantitative analysis by explaining the mechanisms underlying the observed regularities and statistical associations. While the quantitative approach identifies relationships between variables and highlights general trends in the recruitment of public sector employees, the qualitative approach allows us to understand the “how” and “why” of these relationships. This complementarity aligns with the logic of mixed methods, according to which combining quantitative and qualitative data strengthens the overall understanding of a phenomenon. Thus, qualitative analysis sheds light on the institutional, political, and strategic rationales that explain the statistical results, while also placing these results within their social and organizational context. Their integration therefore makes it possible to move beyond simply describing empirical regularities to construct a more in-depth and multidimensional interpretation of the processes involved in recruiting public sector employees.

The use of a qualitative component is also justified by the inherent limitations of purely statistical analysis. Certain variables studied in the quantitative component, such as relational capital, political sponsorship, or political affiliation, can hardly capture the full complexity of recruitment practices. A statistical variable can identify the apparent existence or absence of an association, but it does not always allow us to answer questions about the concrete mechanisms by which this relationship occurs.

The concept of relational capital provides a significant example in this regard. A network can represent a professional resource built through experience, reputation, and institutional interactions. However, it can also constitute a privileged access tool to certain positions when personal connections become more decisive than professional qualifications. Qualitative analysis thus allows us to distinguish a legitimate professional network from potential favoritism, a distinction that a single quantitative variable cannot always make.

This approach is also important for examining the hypothesis regarding transparency, control, and compliance with rules. [12] emphasizes that institutions only produce predictable effects when rules are effectively applied. The formal existence of a recruitment procedure is therefore not, in itself, proof of its impartiality. Qualitative analysis thus allows us to question the effectiveness of rules through the advertising of positions, the prior definition of criteria, the verification of qualifications, the independence of selection bodies, the management of conflicts of interest, the traceability of decisions, and the possible existence of appeal or sanction mechanisms. [15] remind us in this regard that reducing arbitrary discretion largely depends on credible control and accountability mechanisms. The qualitative component therefore plays a crucial role in explaining areas insufficiently illuminated by quantitative data. It does not aim to transform testimonies into statistical evidence, but to understand the meanings, mechanisms and institutional conditions surrounding the observed relationships.

An analysis of the recruitment of executives in public enterprises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo highlights that the issue of meritocracy cannot be reduced to a simple opposition between political appointment and formal administrative procedures. More fundamentally, it relates to the capacity of institutions to ensure that impersonal, transparent, verifiable, and effectively applied criteria prevail in access to leadership positions. The existence of calls for applications, digital platforms, and selection committees represents significant institutional progress, but these mechanisms remain insufficient when the final decision can still be influenced by loyalty, personal networks, or political considerations.

The study also shows that the relationship between recruitment methods and organizational performance is more complex than a direct causal link. The quantitative results from the 254 observations do not systematically confirm the existence of a statistically significant effect of recruitment methods on performance, service quality, or financial orthodoxy. These results thus suggest moving beyond a simplistic interpretation that simply adopting a meritocratic procedure is sufficient to guarantee improved organizational results. The effects of recruitment also appear to depend on intermediary mechanisms, such as the actual quality of the selected candidate, the manager’s autonomy, network capital, control mechanisms, accountability, and available institutional resources.

From this perspective, the article’s main contribution lies in the complementarity between quantitative, documentary, and qualitative approaches. While statistical analysis allows for the identification of certain regularities or associations, the qualitative approach helps to understand the social, political, and institutional mechanisms that explain the potential persistence of informal practices. Triangulation thus appears as an essential condition for studying a phenomenon characterized by the coexistence of formal rules and practices that are difficult to observe.

Ultimately, the reform of the recruitment of elected officials should be structured around four fundamental requirements: the professionalization of selection criteria, the transparency of procedures, the independence of evaluation mechanisms, and the accountability of leaders. The state’s power of appointment should not necessarily be eliminated, but it should be governed by objective procedures, reasoned decisions, and effective control mechanisms. Competence, sectoral experience, integrity, and the suitability of the candidate’s profile for the position should thus become the verifiable foundations of selection, while the exercise of the mandate should be linked to measurable objectives and regular performance evaluations. Such an approach would allow the appointment of elected officials to gradually evolve from a potentially personalized process to a genuine strategic decision of public governance.

The main managerial implication is that the appointment of a representative should be conceived as a strategic governance decision rather than a political reward.

Competence, sectoral experience, integrity, and suitability of profile must constitute the fundamental selection criteria. This requirement is consistent with the literature on bureaucratic professionalization ([7]; [5]) and with the principles of public enterprise governance advocated by the [13].

The state, as a shareholder, must retain its role in strategic guidance while avoiding arbitrary intervention in operational management. Boards of directors must have genuine oversight and evaluation capabilities.

The implementation of performance contracts, measurable indicators and periodic evaluations would make it possible to link the power of appointment to an effective obligation of results.

The reform of the appointment system should be based on four principles: professionalization, transparency, independence, and accountability. It is recommended that job descriptions and selection criteria be published before each appointment; that open and competitive procedures be organized; that technical and professional criteria be explicitly weighted; that qualifications, experience, and references be verified; that declarations of conflicts of interest be required; that the functional independence of selection committees be ensured; that all stages of the process be archived; that any decision deviating from the technical ranking be justified; that appeal and oversight mechanisms be strengthened; that appointments be subject to performance contracts; that their performance be periodically evaluated; that the capacities of boards of directors be strengthened; that internal and external audits be reinforced; that whistleblowers be protected; and that sanctions be effectively enforced. The objective is therefore not necessarily to eliminate the public authority’s power of appointment, but to transform this discretionary power into a legally regulated, justified, traceable power subject to verifiable professional criteria.

Research perspectives: Future research should develop multidimensional indices to separately measure meritocracy, relational capital, patronage, transparency, governance, and performance. A longitudinal approach would allow for comparisons of firm performance before and after leadership changes. It would also allow for a better distinction between the effects of appointments and the inherent structural characteristics of the firms. More comprehensive models could incorporate board independence, audit quality, debt levels, government oversight, firm size and age, and the competitive environment. This evolution would allow a shift from primarily descriptive and cross-sectional analysis to a more robust explanatory analysis.

The first limitation relates to data availability. Informal mechanisms influencing appointments are inherently difficult to observe and can lead to underreporting. The second concerns missing data and coding anomalies. The lack of usable data on certain variables and inconsistencies in coding can reduce the quality of the estimates. The third limitation lies in the cross-sectional nature of the data. The 254 observations allow for the identification of associations but do not allow for the definitive establishment of the temporal direction of the relationships. The fourth concerns the measurement of complex concepts. Meritocracy and clientelism cannot be fully represented by a single variable.

Finally, some hypotheses, notably H2, require more direct institutional indicators than those currently available in the database.

The study faces a difficulty inherent to its subject matter: recruitment practices are simultaneously formal and informal. Administrative procedures are observable, while the influences surrounding them remain difficult to document. Self-reported data are ambiguous in terms of social desirability, the respondents’ institutional interests, and their position within power structures. Measuring variables such as relational capital or clientelism therefore involves a degree of uncertainty. For this reason, triangulating quantitative, documentary, and qualitative data is not only a methodological choice but also a condition for the credibility of the interpretation.