Before the installation of the Park, the city had already defined its trajectory as a technological-industrial-aerospace complex through the creation of the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), mediated by the Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA) in 1946 ([35]). Progress in the national aeronautical sector, achieved through the CTA, the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) in 1961, and Embraer in 1969, resulted from the relationship between education and research. Achieving this level of development required not only significant investments in science and technology (S&T) and research and development (R&D), but also the careful design and execution of guidelines by governmental authorities. The idea of constructing an arrangement such as the PIT took shape only in 2006 with the creation of the São Paulo System of Technology Parks (SPPqTec), later incorporated into the São Paulo System of Innovation Environments (SPAI), both initiatives of the State of São Paulo ([31]).

Among the cities of the State of São Paulo, São José dos Campos benefited from significant investments in S&T, especially through the creation of research institutes and universities with graduate programs. The presence of infrastructure for development, research, and technology gives the municipality the characteristics of a scientific-technological hub ([35]).

Inaugurated in 2006 in the repurposed plant of a former electronics factory, the Innovation and Technology Park (PIT) became the first space to be integrated into SPAI, which led the initiative to implement up to 32 such environments in the State of São Paulo. The construction of the Park converged with the agendas and objectives promoted by the previous municipal administration of former mayor Emanuel Fernandes, who governed from 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2004. Among Fernandes’s priorities was the centrality of citizens’ entrepreneurial spirit as a means of overcoming the crisis the city faced in 1998, as well as the concern to position the city for the new millennium ([29]). The narrative introduced by this administration in São José dos Campos and the subsequent opening of the PIT became strong markers of a new image and of the productive restructuring process experienced by a municipality previously known for its Fordist industrial vocation.

In the Argentine context, although early national initiatives were diffuse and scarce, they date back to 1990 and 2001. The first was the Law for the Promotion and Support of Technological Innovation (Law No. 23,877), which sought to link science and technology to production. The second was the Science and Technology Law (Law No. 25,467), which established a general framework for promoting scientific activities and created the Institutional Council for Science and Technology (CICYT), with the aim of strengthening and improving the institutions connected to science and technology and their relationship with the country’s productive apparatus.

Unlike the Brazilian object of study, the Parque Patricios Technology District (DTPP) is structured around a set of issues that go beyond economic and productive development. It is therefore essential to emphasize that this innovation device also functions as a tool for the urban transformation of the area in which it is located. The designation of the neighborhood as a technology district was part of the economic district policy implemented by the administration of Mauricio Macri, elected mayor of the city in 2007. In the southern area of the city, where the neighborhood is located, four districts were created within six years: the Parque Patricios Technology District (Law No. 2972/2008); the Arts District in La Boca (Law No. 4353/2012); the Design District in Barracas (Law No. 4761/2013); and the Sports District in Villa Soldati (Law No. 5235/2014). The southern area with creative districts became part of two instruments related to the city’s general urban planning: the Buenos Aires 2016 Strategic Plan, published in 2011, and the 2010-2060 Territorial Model. Both documents discuss the current and projected urban conditions of the city while proposing actions for the southern part of the capital ([14]).

In Parque Patricios, the large number of warehouses is a defining feature of the neighborhood. These buildings were previously used by the heavy freight transport industry, supported by permissive regulations in force in the city until 1977 ([21]). The plans developed in the recent period descend from earlier initiatives that had already proposed interventions in the city’s southern zone, justified by the need to address the imbalance between the northern and southern areas, the latter chronically marginalized and frequently described as “backward,” “deteriorated,” “abandoned,” or “dead” ([14]; [34]). In the 2000s, the Corporación Buenos Aires Sur (Law No. 470/00) publicly announced several projects called “poles”: buildings intended to concentrate firms from the same sector on land donated by the public authorities. Despite this carousel of proposals and alternatives, no evidence of the success of these projects was found ([34]).

In 2008, standing out from previous initiatives, Law No. 2972 for the Promotion of Information and Communication Technology Firms in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires was created, benefiting firms in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector located within a defined perimeter of 200 hectares. Installation in the area offered a range of tax exemptions and preferential credit lines. Later, the district was also designated “Priority Development Subarea No. 1” in 2010 through Law No. 3516/10, which relaxed land-use and occupation rules for ICT firms ([19]).

In an interview granted to the research group, one of the project’s designers, linked to the government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (CABA), emphasized the search for foreign references and consultation with ICT firms as essential. These firms made clear their interest in an area connected to the urban fabric, rather than isolated, as is often the case in the technology park model. In this sense, the effort undertaken through meetings and visits became crucial to legitimizing the project’s implementation. Alongside the consolidation of the area as a technology district, significant efforts were made to make the area more attractive to technology-based companies (TBCs).

The PIT in São José dos Campos is managed by a private nonprofit organization, the Associação Parque Tecnológico de São José dos Campos (APTSJC), characterized as an Institute of Science and Technology (ICT) whose main objective is to promote and implement research associated with S&T. According to the entity’s statute, the Park’s governance is divided into four distinct bodies: i) General Assembly; ii) Board of Directors; iii) Executive Board; and iv) Fiscal Council. Based on a model of checks and balances, the organization seeks to avoid centralization and promote transparency. For this reason, the functions performed by each body are distributed heterogeneously ([1]).

The area on which the Park’s core rests is part of a large perimeter covering 25 million square meters and designated in the city’s land-use regulations as the Special Zone of the Technology Park (ZEPTEC). Buildings constructed in the ZEPTEC beyond the Park’s core are managed by various owners, such as universities and firms, and must be approved by both the city government and the managing entity before they are built.

The main building, known as the “core,” houses most of the firms physically associated with the Park, in rooms of varying sizes according to firm scale. To support the activities developed by associated firms, the Park offers shared laboratories for research, development, and innovation (R&D&I) projects. Support, integration, and communication among actors, mediated by the institution, are materialized through a wide range of programs. This support network aims to: i) improve products, services, and technologies for business development, while connecting firms to specialized partners; ii) introduce innovation into public management by providing services to municipalities; iii) support soft landing, business internationalization, and the Park’s insertion into the global framework; iv) integrate teaching and research institutions; v) foster entrepreneurship in peripheral areas by training microentrepreneurs with a view to innovation and social impact; vi) support development and innovation in specific sectors; and vii) incubate and accelerate businesses.

When firms physically associate with the site, they are not necessarily limited to installing themselves in the Park’s core; they may also choose the Cidade Tecnológica subdivision. Built northeast of the main building, this development aims to physically anchor larger firms to the Park while also creating an area for employees of associated firms, that is, individuals belonging to the creative class. This strategy reveals the arrangement’s future intention to transition from park to district by attempting to seed in its surroundings the dynamics typical of consolidated urban areas.

Like other innovation environments, the Park is structured under the conceptual umbrella of the Triple Helix ([12]), promoting a development model based on innovation and entrepreneurship. A more detailed analysis of the roles and responsibilities of the actors essential to structuring technology parks in Brazil highlights not only public authorities, universities, and firms, but also actors such as the STI entity, the master developer, and real-estate developers ([36]), as described below:

1. Public authorities: this role encompasses all levels of government (municipal, state, and federal), which are responsible for helping articulate the guidelines, vocations, and goals to be implemented in the park. As the central inducer of public policies, the State not only ensures that the objectives of the technology park are achieved, but also defines the S&T project.

2. Universities: knowledge-generating agents that contribute to the implementation of the S&T project and also constitute a valuable source of human capital.

3. Firms: private technology-based companies (TBCs) of varying sizes associated with the park. They generate high-value-added activities, have low environmental impact, and demand skilled labor.

4. STI entity: a public or private entity, with or without nonprofit status, responsible for managing the technology park. Its main functions include contributing to the development of science, technology, and innovation (STI) public policies; facilitating university-firm knowledge transfer; developing the marketing plan; defining criteria for the installation of firms in the park; monitoring innovation development; offering support services to entrepreneurs; preparing the operational plan; defining the management structure; and collaborating in the articulation of the real-estate project.

5. Master developer: responsible for the real-estate dimension on a larger scale, operating in the construction of physical spaces and urban infrastructure suitable for firms. It develops the real-estate master plan for the land, the building code, environmental policies, and the approval process, and assumes the financing of infrastructure works.

6. Developers: associated with the master developer, they act as sellers or lessors of spaces for TBCs and service providers, such as hotels, offices, restaurants, and other facilities.

Having identified these actors, it is important to note that sustaining this type of arrangement in Brazil solely through public authorities is unfeasible. For this reason, technology parks also mobilize the real-estate market as part of the equation needed to ensure the model’s economic and financial sustainability. In this sense, real-estate participation should be understood as a means rather than an end.

By contrast, the DTPP is managed through the city government, and therefore lacks a council or managing committee capable of granting it autonomy, as occurs in the Brazilian case. Its main strategy consists of fiscal benefits and facilitated credit lines granted by the Banco de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires to firms belonging to the ICT sector. Among the benefits offered by Law No. 2972 are: i) exemption from gross income tax; ii) under certain conditions, exemption from stamp tax; iii) exemption from property tax-related fees for lighting, sweeping and cleaning services, and maintenance and conservation of drains; and iv) exemption from delineation and construction rights, transferable construction capacity (CCT), applicable construction capacity (CCA), and the works verification and service fee ([18]).

The educational field is also addressed in the project’s definitions. At the time, the objective was to make the area a priority for the implementation of pilot projects for English-language teaching, computing, the installation of technical schools, scholarships, curricula aimed at integrating young people into the technology sector, fiscal incentives for educational institutions installed in the area, provided that they were oriented toward science and technology, a training program for computer programmers, and programs for educational promotion, employment, and technology ([18]; [34]).

The arrangement proposes to organize itself according to the logic followed by the 22@ innovation district in Barcelona, an agglomeration of technology-related firms in a formerly industrial area transformed through an urban revitalization process. The interests and conditions demanded by large firms when consulted by the developers of the DTPP support the discussion advanced in field-defining studies such as [24]. In this sense, beyond the interaction among key actors proposed by Triple Helix theory, this type of arrangement must also rely on a triad of assets ([24]):

1. Economic assets: this group consists of firms, organizations, and institutions that drive innovation-rich environments. It first includes innovation drivers, such as large firms, laboratories, start-ups, and entrepreneurs seeking to develop high-technology products and services. It also includes innovation cultivators, that is, organizations dedicated to supporting the growth of individuals and firms, such as incubators, accelerators, proof-of-concept centers, and coworking spaces. This asset also includes neighborhood amenities such as medical offices, markets, restaurants, and local commerce, which activate public space.

2. Physical assets: public and private physical spaces, including buildings, open spaces, streets, and infrastructure, designed to stimulate new levels of connectivity, collaboration, and innovation. While the public realm includes spaces such as parks, squares, and streets, the private sphere consists of flexible workspaces, laboratories, and smaller housing units. The removal of physical barriers to integrate the urban fabric, as well as infrastructures such as fiber optics and transportation networks, are also included here.

3. Networking assets: these are defined by the relationships established among individuals, firms, and institutions that can contribute to the advancement of ideas. In this perspective, dense networks are recognized as fundamental for access to critical information, the strengthening of trust, and intersectoral relations.

Effectiveness in firm attraction and business support: according to the Park’s performance reports, the PIT expanded its cumulative number of associated or physically installed firms over the period analyzed (Figure 1). This does not mean that the figure represents annual entries of new firms; rather, it indicates the stock of firms reported by the Park in each reference year. As previously mentioned, the arrangement has multiple programs and facilities geared toward business support, making association, incubation, and networking easier and more successful for entrepreneurs.

Gateway to flows: interview evidence from the Park’s international affairs division, triangulated with the 2023 activity report, indicates that the PIT has become an intermediary between firms and the global arena through programs that facilitate soft-landing and smart-launching processes, helping TBCs position themselves in Global Production Networks (GPNs). According to the 2023 activity report, 53 associated firms carried out international business through the export of products and services ([2]). The Park encourages its firms to internationalize through courses, workshops, training, and business rounds, bringing small and medium-sized enterprises closer to large global players. Because the aerospace Local Productive Arrangement (APL), which includes firms such as Embraer, Airbus, Boeing, and Visiona, has international prominence and requires compliance with strict international standards, many firms are already prepared to compete globally ([31]).

Figure 1. Cumulative number of companies associated with or physically installed in the PIT, by reference year. The values represent cumulative totals reported by the Park’s performance reports, not annual new establishments. Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the Park’s performance reports ([2]; [3]).

Reading this paradigm at a broader scale opens the way for a possible interpretation of São José dos Campos as a gateway city. This condition can be justified for three main reasons: i) the Park acts as an arrangement that encourages the internationalization of firms; ii) it establishes international agreements and offers soft-landing services to foreign firms; and iii) firms in the aerospace APL have headquarters outside São José dos Campos but depend on the city for certification, training, and the construction of international connections. In both directions, the Park operates as an entry and exit point through which firms establish global connections ([31]).

Institutional articulation and university-firm relations: the first challenge identified in the PIT concerns the difficulty of transforming physical proximity into effective cooperation among actors. Interview evidence from directors of academic institutions physically associated with the Park points to weak interaction between universities and firms. Joint STI projects that require hybrid financial contributions from private and public sources are often managed by organizations linked to the Brazilian government, which is unattractive to firms and generates insecurity. This interview-based perception is consistent with the broader diagnosis that firms engage only modestly with the academic sphere, a condition that is undesirable given that experiences such as Silicon Valley and similar arrangements in China show very close relations between these two spheres. From the perspective of the director of another associated educational institution, excessive university bureaucracy also appears as a complicating factor.

A related governance concern is the perception, expressed by one academic leader, that the Park has become excessively inclined toward an “events agenda” and toward the real-estate field. Although the organization of events and the handling of real-estate matters do fall within the responsibilities of the managing entity ([36]), this perception suggests a possible imbalance: these activities may overlap excessively with other dimensions that are equally important for characterizing the arrangement as an innovation ecosystem.

Urban disconnection and weak community integration: a second set of challenges concerns the Park’s physical and community-based integration with its surroundings. At the time of writing, effective integration with the surrounding area remains one of the major difficulties faced by the PIT. Located far from the city center, surrounded by large plots and rugged terrain, the arrangement has few access roads connecting it to nearby neighborhoods, which are residential, suburban in character, and home to a socioeconomically vulnerable population. The issue of opening the Park to poor surrounding communities was highlighted in an interview granted by one of the city’s former mayors, shedding light on the problem of inequality between these spaces when placed side by side.

Located in front of a high-traffic highway, the most effective way to access the site is through private vehicles such as cars and motorcycles. The Park is served by the city’s bus lines, but the existing routes are few and not direct, making the trip long and relatively unattractive, especially for students at the academic institutions located there. Since 2019, the area has been expected to be served by the “Linha Verde,” a transport axis structured longitudinally through the city and characterized by biarticulated electric buses operating on segregated lanes. However, the project has been only partially completed and remains delayed, with no fixed date for completion. In response to deficient connectivity, the Park has mobilized efforts to address mobility demands, including an attempted partnership with the Toyota Mobility Foundation and investment in a shared-ride program. It is not clear, however, whether the Park was successful in proposing these alternative solutions.

The model of this type of arrangement, inspired by the same principles through which Silicon Valley was structured, namely a suburban, distant environment accessible mainly by private vehicles, has reduced validity in the current paradigm. For innovation environments, density and agglomeration are advantageous for economic and cultural reasons. In dense areas, knowledge transfer among workers and among firms is facilitated, and proximity is advantageous for intersectoral interaction and for applying new technologies to traditional industrial processes ([24]). Complementarily, the interests of the creative class, street-level culture, walkability, physical activity, and facilitated mobility converge not only toward the design of amenity-rich places equipped with efficient public transport, but also toward what Jane Jacobs and Saskia Sassen defend: density, complexity, diversity of people and cultures, and the overlap between old and new ([13]; [24]).

In an attempt to overcome isolation and disconnection and to foster urbanity, the PIT has sought, through strategic partnerships, to structure its immediate surroundings. Covering an area of 309,000 square meters, the “Cidade Tecnológica” project, launched in 2019, envisioned a neighborhood bringing together industrial, residential, and commercial uses, consolidating what was presented as the country’s first planned innovation district. However, despite visible infrastructure already in place, such as public roads and lighting, no building had been installed at the time of writing, preventing the arrangement from generating the intended density and agglomeration. More recently, a new attempt to occupy the nearby area can be observed through the “Cidade Sete Sóis SJC” development, launched in 2025 in partnership with the MRV construction company and covering 670,000 square meters. However, in the master plan, with large lots intended for multifamily housing, there is no clear provision for uses other than residential. The strictly residential character, the presence of walls, and the absence of facade activation mechanisms describe two of the developments already announced for the area. These characteristics depart from the concepts of street-level culture and functional diversity defended by Jacobs and Sassen, both of which are fundamental for vitality and attractiveness. Observing the PIT, it is imperative that the Park, as well as the other actors responsible for real-estate development in nearby areas, transform the immediate surroundings according to the premises of good urbanism, while also thinking inclusively about improving integration with adjacent communities.

Fragmented articulation as public policy: a third challenge concerns the limited articulation of technology parks as part of a broader public policy. The absence of projects and programs capable of connecting such environments at a larger scale, for instance as a national policy, was recurrently mentioned in the interviews conducted with academic and institutional actors. The political field has not yet properly understood how the dynamics of these spaces operate, and this lack of knowledge makes the debate around the theme even more difficult. In this sense, the interviewees’ criticism regarding Brazil’s lack of maturity in treating S&T as a State policy, and regarding the dependence of projects of this kind on favorable political arrangements and temporary positions, is legitimate.

This policy fragmentation also appears in the implementation of SPAI, which accredits technology parks in the State of São Paulo. A more detailed analysis of the program revealed a sequence of shortcomings and difficulties in its effective execution ([31]). No robust impact was verified on the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) of the regions, that is, on the sophistication of an economy’s productive knowledge. Institutional failures were also identified, such as: i) evaluation indicators lacking technical and scientific rigor; ii) scarcity of financial and logistical resources for monitoring visits; and iii) an approach that does not focus on the surroundings in which technology parks are located, thereby suppressing what should be one of the priorities of this policy: improving the region as a whole, not only the arrangement. It is therefore valid to infer a paradigm in which public investment aimed at leveraging business activities in the innovation field responds primarily to the immediate needs of the market. This diverges from strategic State-led innovation models based on public institutions such as INPE, DCTA, and IEAv.

This broader policy issue is directly connected to the historical trajectory of São José dos Campos. From the perspective of science and innovation, the PIT has increasingly emerged as a central actor despite its limitations. This differs from the relationship that existed between the 1960s and the 1990s, a period marked by significant State action in the creation of projects and institutions oriented toward technoscientific development, such as the Department of Aerospace Science and Technology (DCTA), the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), the Aeronautics Institute of Technology (ITA), Embraer, and higher education institutions.

The PIT is aligned with post-1990s scientific guidelines, largely linked to the logic of Toyotist flexibility, a form of scientific flexibility subordinated to the immediate interests of the market. Innovation is seen as the main product of science, with a focus on patents and results that can be commercialized, and with less emphasis on basic and foundational research. Even so, the Park maintains a significant link with manufacturing, as shown by the activities of firms such as Autasa, Ionic Health, and Siatt—a positive feature when considering local industrialization processes and the fulfillment of industrial demands.

Even though they are associated with the technology park, some of these institutions currently face severe budgetary difficulties, exposing the fragility not only of these organizations but also of S&T as a national policy. If technology parks and similar arrangements are to function as strategic instruments for economic development and the sophistication of the local economy, the synergistic integration of these institutions, given their broad technical expertise, is fundamental. In this sense, it is important that they not be weakened.

In the case of INPE, for example, entire teams from the divisions of satellite development and construction and from geotechnology areas have retired or are retiring without transmitting the scientific and technological knowledge already developed to new researchers in the field, since INPE faces a chronic personnel shortage caused by the lack of public hiring processes for science and technology workers. In addition, official photographs of the cooperation team with the People’s Republic of China for the construction of satellites under the CBERS program (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite) are telling. While the Chinese side shows strong team renewal, visible in the black hair of the young scientists who frequently participate in the program, the Brazilian side, without renewal of its scientific staff, presents a team composed only of senior members, a feature reflected in the gray hair visible in official photographs.

Area recovery: interviewees recognize the transformation of Parque Patricios as one of the successes of the plan that turned the area into a district, and this perception is consistent with documentary and secondary evidence on the neighborhood’s redevelopment. The region, once marked by the predominance of industrial activities, became functionally obsolete due to the significant relocation of production units outside the neighborhood, leaving a high concentration of vacant logistics warehouses. Aware of the new demands of ICT firms, the conception of the DTPP was successful not only because it avoided the isolated suburban model, but also because it improved the integration of this strategically located area with the rest of the city through investment in physical assets: i) the opening of three subway stations; ii) the installation of a fiber-optic network; and iii) infrastructures favoring active mobility, including sidewalk maintenance, shared streets, bike lanes, improvements to public lighting systems, and security cameras. The solid integration of the DTPP with the surrounding urban fabric prevents its conversion into an isolated enclave.

From the same perspective of physical assets, pedestrian-scale street design combined with the design and programming of public spaces are also highly valued features ([24]). Improvements to neighborhood sidewalks and the opening of new gastronomic spaces in mixed-use buildings with active frontages generate places suitable for lingering and nightlife, contributing to a greater sense of security. As mentioned in an interview with employees of a DTPP firm, in a place previously marked by high vacancy, the emergence of nightlife observed in recent years would once have been unthinkable, due to the absence of night services and the fear of moving through an area frequently described as unsafe. Even so, although these transformations have occurred asymmetrically within the neighborhood, they were validated by the real-estate market as sufficient to raise land values in the DTPP. From 2015 to 2020, the square meter increased from approximately US$150-US$200 to US$500-US$600; commercial rents on Avenida Patricios also increased, rising by 65% between 2008 and 2011, compared to 55% in the rest of the city ([14]; [34]).

Approaching the discussion from a more critical perspective on real-estate valorization requires a more detailed analysis of this situation, since processes of real-estate gentrification are frequently anchored in such scenarios. For example, in the areas adjacent to the DTPP, the conflict between families occupying the Santa Cruz building, converted into housing in 2002 after the closure of the former textile company SELSA, and the building’s new buyer is illustrative. Under growing pressure, failed negotiations, and inertia from local authorities, the situation escalated into attempted evictions and confrontations with the city’s police forces ([16]). Even without the arrangement’s direct involvement, when considering the expansion of employment, education, and housing opportunities for low-income residents, it is imperative to adopt strategies to democratize the benefits expected from the arrangement. The Buenos Aires case points to the relevance of understanding how innovation environments can, within a Triple Helix-based governance structure, effectively operate strategies for the inclusion of low-income populations in this ecosystem.

Effectiveness in attracting firms: like the PIT, the DTPP also shows an expansion in the cumulative number of firms reported as located in or linked to the district (Figure 2). These values should be interpreted as cumulative stocks compiled from heterogeneous institutional and press sources, not as annual new establishments. In the interviews, the combination of fiscal benefits offered to ICT firms and the neighborhood’s attractive physical capital, resulting from urban recovery guidelines and the densification of infrastructure for employees and firms, is repeatedly emphasized as fundamental.

Figure 2. Cumulative number of companies reported as located in the DTPP or registered/benefiting from the district policy, by reference year. The values represent cumulative totals reported by press reports and institutional material, not annual new establishments. Source: Elaborated by the authors based on press reports and institutional material ([6]; [9]; [10]; [15]; [17]; [20]; [23]; [26]; [32]).

Local cooperation and networking deficits: despite the area’s success in attracting information and communication technology (ICT) firms, interviews with business and academic actors in the DTPP indicate the absence of local synergy and the scarcity of cooperation even among firms. This is treated as an interview-based perception, but it is consistent with the district’s institutional design, which relies primarily on fiscal incentives and spatial concentration rather than on an autonomous governance body dedicated to coordination. Beyond cafés and private sociability spaces, field observations did not identify shared institutional spaces specifically designed for networking or approximation among users. Interviewees attributed this weak interaction partly to a competitive business culture: firms tend to avoid institutional associations and to see other firms not as potential partners but as competitors. It is possible that part of this characteristic can also be explained by the DTPP’s sectoral homogeneity, since the district attracts ICT firms that often perform similar activities. Potential complementarities, which would be more likely to occur intersectorally, are thereby inhibited.

From an analytical perspective, this finding suggests that networking assets cannot be created by copying spatial formulas alone. They depend on trust-building, programmed interaction, institutional brokerage, and concrete opportunities for collaboration ([24]). The interviews therefore point less to a lack of firms than to a deficit of coordination mechanisms capable of transforming proximity into cooperation. Along the same axis, reflecting on the impacts of the pandemic on such arrangements and their dynamics is relevant, since confinement and hybrid work regimes challenge the traditional concept of these spaces, namely face-to-face interaction for the circulation of ideas and innovation.

Unclear guidelines and objectives: documentary sources and secondary literature suggest that Parque Patricios operates simultaneously as an innovation policy, an urban redevelopment instrument, and a real-estate valorization strategy. Its ultimate objective is therefore not always clear. At present, it appears as one component of an agenda that seeks to establish a new civic centrality in the south and to reposition the city’s economy through creative districts. While in the revitalization process the State benefits the real-estate sphere by conditioning the area for investment, the purpose of Parque Patricios as a technology district becomes ambiguous. Rising land values indicate a heated real-estate market, but the presence of research laboratories or technology transfer organizations is not observed with the same intensity.

City government reports and the secondary literature point to a limited dynamizing effect, since many firms chose not to relocate their workforce to the area but only their headquarters ([14]). Interviewees also mentioned that ICT firms located nearby commonly move into the polygon to access fiscal benefits, but without intentions of innovation or intersectoral collaboration. This scenario, combined with the low density of laboratories, joint R&D centers, and deficient networking, blocks knowledge spillovers to the local economy and does not increase the sophistication of the productive chain.

Weak integration with the local community is another challenge, as indicated by interviews and by the limited availability of documentary evidence demonstrating inclusive outcomes. The arrangement develops in a region marked by social vulnerability, but initiatives focused on integrating local youth into the jobs offered by firms remain modest. Their effectiveness cannot be fully assessed due to the lack of public data made available by organizations. As a strategic instrument for inserting young people into the labor market and mitigating the significant labor shortage, neighborhood technical schools represent a promising gateway to jobs requiring specialized knowledge in data science and ICT. Exploiting this potential, however, first requires the full incorporation of these schools into the ecosystem the arrangement seeks to build.

Productive character and design: field observations and interviews suggest that the predominance of software-oriented productive activities creates a scenario marked by a high concentration of low-technological-complexity services and consulting activities, oriented toward export markets and lacking robust integration with internal productive chains. Given the importance of setting goals for innovation districts ([24]), this finding raises questions about the productive character and long-term design of the DTPP.

Connecting the debate to a broader perspective, the technological potential of nations is directly related to their ability to produce and manufacture advanced technological products, while also adapting these new technologies to the productive processes of adjacent chains ([5]). Through the lens of the New International Division of Labor, mastery of technical capacity, skilled labor, external surplus generation, and a robust national innovation system enables the modernization of productive chains and the reduction of external dependence. Importing technology to develop value-added products does generate employment, but such employment tends to be volatile and limited in number ([5]). This dimension was discussed in one of the group’s interviews, in which the collaborator stated that the DTPP does not prioritize the development of products of greater technological complexity, the generation of spillovers, or products aimed at the domestic market, but rather the mass export of programming and design services.

The precise definition of guidelines and objectives, combined with the insertion of R&D activities articulated at a broader scale, would allow the DTPP to be understood as a strategic node in a wider network designed to produce effective territorial impact, expressed in economic development, the sophistication of the productive chain, and the expansion and absorption of STEM careers. Beyond favoring real-estate activities, such spaces should ideally: i) host robust economic assets in R&D and high technology; ii) house concrete instruments for technology transfer and entrepreneurship support; and iii) build governance based on the Triple Helix model while also including representatives of local communities ([24]). Aligning initiatives of this kind with solid STI public policies favors the insertion of territories into more complex global value chains while also strengthening the sovereignty of national states.