To address the theme, Martin Heidegger, reader of Aristotle,¹ I will start from the conference TheConceptofTime given in Marburg in July 1924. I will take the guiding question of that conference, “What is time?”, to emphasize how Aristotle’s thought was essential for Heidegger to develop his conception of original time and vulgar time. I will also refer to the HistoryoftheConceptofTime: Prolegomena (1924), BeingandTime, and TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, both from 1927, because, in addition to indicating a possible answer to the aforementioned question, they are equally important for clarifying the Heideggerian concepts of Temporality (Temporalität) and temporal/temporality (Zeitlichkeit). Our challenge here is not only to explain the conception of the Temporality of being, but first of all, to highlight how the Temporality of time grounds the Temporality of being. From this perspective, we will have a double difficulty, since Heidegger did not say how he engenders the Temporality of being, nor did he use the term “Temporality of time.” We coined this term to refer to the temporalizationsoforiginaltime, considering that it is totally pertinent to Heidegger’s thought to name how the “it gives time” happens (see [9]). During our exposition, it will be easier to see how, from the HistoryoftheConceptofTime: Prolegomena, BeingandTime, and TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, it is possible to construct both the Temporality of being and the Temporality of time. We will face this challenge based on the concept of ecstatic-horizonal temporality, since we assume that through it we will be able to point out how, in the 1920s, the Temporalities of time and the Temporalities of being were constructed in Heidegger’s philosophy. Our purpose is to clarify how innerworldliness (Innerweltlichkeit), the transcendence of Dasein, and within-timeness (Innerzeitigkeit) are constituted by the temporalizations of the Temporalities of time and of being. We will divide our presentation into three parts. In the first, we will elucidate the phenomenon of stretched (erstreckt) temporality, to demonstrate that it is a determination of vulgar time characterized as within-timeness. For methodological reasons, we will purposely begin our presentation by thematizing within-timeness in line with the methodology of existential analytic. We know that in BeingandTime the author returns to the everyday modes of being (ontic-existentiell) of Dasein to describe the characters of being, i.e., existential (ontological) that structure Dasein. Phenomenologically, the author returns to the ontic to scrutinize the ontological and explore his existential analytic. From our point of view, we believe that Heidegger uses the same resource to describe the Temporalities of time, that is, he analyzes the everyday temporals of vulgar time to describe the temporalizations of original time. In the second part, we will investigate how we can inquire into the Temporality of time to underline why it is called original time. Our aim in this part is to outline how the Temporality of time composes the ecstatic-horizonal temporality and the Temporality of being. In the third part, we will discuss how the Temporalities of time and of being determine the innerworldliness of the world and the character of transcendence of Dasein.

In the conference TheConceptofTime and in TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, the philosopher uses passages from Aristotle’s Physics to highlight that the Stagirite conceives of time as linked to nature, since he treats time in relation to changes of place and the measurement of movement. Thus, time is seen as a “here” that happens between “over there and there” or, as a “now” that happens between “before and after.” Heidegger also emphasizes that in Physics, time is described as continuity and as relative to numbers, that is, as long or short time and as much or as little time. We also need to remember that after these reflections on the nature of time, Aristotle ends up asking himself: Would time exist if there were not someone who was capable of dealing with numbers, counting, measuring displacements, and pointing out changes of place? Does the existence of time depend on the existence of the soul? (See [1]: 4.10.217b29-4.14.224ª17). Perhaps Heidegger was influenced by this Aristotelian questioning when, in the conference TheConceptofTime, he established an intrinsic relationship between time and Dasein, the entity which we ourselves are, by stating that “time is temporal. Dasein is not time, but temporality. […Based on this reasoning, he concluded that the question] What is time? The question became: Who is time? [Faced with this conclusion, he asked himself:] Are we ourselves time? Am I time?” ([10]: pp. 123, 125; [8]: pp. 20E, 22E). Why, when questioning time, did Aristotle and Heidegger correlate time with human existence? If time is temporal and the human being is not time, how is he the temporalization of time? Do we have a contradiction here?

In order to reflect on this issue, it is important to recall the objective of Heideggerian philosophy in the 1920s. On the one hand, it was to investigate how to treat being as being and no longer in relation to entity, as had predominantly been the case in Western metaphysics since the Greeks; and on the other, it was to research how to conceptualize time from time itself neither with a view to nature or movement, as for example Aristotle had done in antiquity, nor in relation to the observer (see [10]:[10]p. 109; [8]: p. 3E), as Einstein proposed in his theory of relativity in contemporary times. In this vein, Heidegger stated that being manifests itself and time temporalizes itself. This implies that we access the manifestation of being as a phenomenon or character of being. In the ProlegomenatotheConceptofTime (see [3]; [6]), the phenomenon of being is conceived of as an apriori and in BeingandTime, the characters of being are defined as existentials and categories, with the existentials structuring the modes of being of Dasein and the categories determining the modes of being of the objective presence of things [Vorhandenheit]. On another occasion, he characterized the phenomena of time as ecstases, namely: future [Zukunft], having-been [Gewesenheit], and present [Gegenwart] (see [5] p. 329; [12]p. 314). In both BeingandTime and TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, the unity of these ecstases constitutes the phenomenon of temporal/temporality, through which we appropriate that which we understand as time. In these texts, each temporalization of the ecstatic unity of temporality is considered as a phenomenon of original time (see[7]p. 376; [4] p. 266). But to what extent does the co-appropriation of the characteristics of being and ecstatic unity engender the temporality of Dasein? How do the phenomena of original time determine the innerworldliness of the objective presence of things, the transcendence of Dasein, and the within-timeness of time? To what extent did Aristotle’s questions about time in Physics contribute to Heidegger’s elaboration of his concept of time?

The fact that in our everyday language we constantly use expressions that indicate temporal references confirms Heidegger’s reasoning, according to which our existence is tied to temporalizations of time. However, how do we identify such references in our daily lives? When we say that we do not have time to carry out certain activities, or that we spend a lot of time performing a certain task. When we state that a situation happened before or after an event, or when we say that the climate on Earth was milder in the past, but today we observe that climate change can affect our future. Or even when, on the one hand, we assume that our existence is a continuous temporal event composed of a succession of hours, days, years, seasons, etc.; but on the other hand, we also notice temporalizations in our daily lives when we quantify time, that is, when we count the time we have already lived and the time we have left to live, when we calculate the time it takes us to leave one place and arrive at another, or when scientists discuss when the universe was created or when humans appeared on Earth. Through this scaling of the constant presence of temporalizations in our daily lives, Heidegger inferred that the time of our existence consists of a unity of nexuses of temporalities that extend from our birth to our death. He called this extension of temporality an arc or a span of extended temporalities (see [2]). Due to this scope of stretched temporality, we generally conceive of time as an arc formed by periods or lapses of time [Zeitraum], for example, past, present, future, yesterday, today, tomorrow, before, now, after, once upon a time, etc. It is precisely because our daily existence is permeated by this range [Spannweit] of time lapses established by the stretched temporality nexus that we designate our existence as temporal and historical. This implies that the range of time lapses underlies the range of Dasein’s existence as a unity of the nexus of stretched temporalities. What is this nexus of temporalities called? Within-timeness: the mode of temporalization through which we appropriate the lapses of time, through which we understand the temporals that we interpret as dimensions of time on a daily basis. This reasoning regarding the constitution of stretched temporality in Heidegger makes it clear that Aristotle’s questioning of time contributed to the definition of within-timeness as the mode of temporalization that we experience in our daily lives. From this perspective, Heidegger claims that within-timeness is a way of temporalizing vulgar time.

What is the determining character of within-timeness? Levelling. Why? Since stretched temporality and its time lapses, as modes of temporalization of within-timeness, concern the counting, measurement, and dating of time. While within-timeness reduces the temporalizations of original time to spatial, geometric, and mathematical conceptions, it levels such temporalizations to the modes of being of extended entities, which involve division, summation, standardization, and regulation, among others. With this reduction, within-timeness levels the temporalities of time to the modalities of space and being, which is why it is characterized as levelling. Drawing a parallel with Heidegger’s purpose in BeingandTime, which is “to show that time is that from which Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like being at all. [Or rather,] time as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being” ([5] p. 17; [12] p. 17), we infer that, if on the one hand time is the opening through which the manifestation of being as meaning takes place and, if on the other hand we find within-timeness to be the understanding and interpretation of being of Dasein and the world, then reciprocally, we can think that, as a levelling, within-timeness is structured by a character of closedness, to the extent that it levels the temporalizations of original time to temporal data such as: hours, days, months, years, decades, centuries, eternity, etc. In other words, it covers up the temporalizations of ecstatic-horizonal temporality. From this, we can conclude that such concealment embodies ecstatic-horizonal temporality as if it were a pile of temporal data inherent to worldly or natural events. How? In the inauthentic mode of levelling of within-timeness, anticipation, a mode proper to the future, is embodied as the expectation of future events; the instant, a mode proper to the present, is reduced to the now of our daily lives, and remembering, a mode proper to the having-been, is leveled to past facts. It is precisely in this consubstantiation, which covers the modes proper to ecstatic-horizonal temporality, that the levelling characteristic of within-timeness occurs. Therefore, we believe that within-timeness is a mode of closedness, which obscures the opening of the horizon that characterizes original time. In this context, within-timeness is the temporalization of vulgar time from which Dasein understands itself as historical and through which it interprets the innerworldliness of the world.

What is the relevance, for philosophy, of Heidegger’s conception of time as a horizon? For us, with the characterization of time as a horizon from which all temporalizations of time and being derive, Heidegger was able to introduce a philosophical definition of time, which is no longer centered on the subject or consciousness nor on the object, or nature, but rather on an opening, in which being is appropriated as meaning. We think that such a characterization of time was crucial for the philosopher to substantiate the intrinsic relationship he intended to establish between the appropriation of time and the event of being, in such a way that the time horizon opens up the meaning of being, through which Dasein understands, interprets, and means entities in general. In this intertwining of time and being, the temporalities of original time are appropriated and named via manifestations of being. In this theoretical perspective, it is appropriate to emphasize that this intertwining also underlies the temporalizations of vulgar time and the constitutions of the sense of being of entities in general. Therefore, with the definition of time as a horizon, Heidegger was able to show simultaneously that the openness of the horizon determines the origin of time as thatfromwhich we understand and interpret being, just as he was able to emphasize that the everyday conceptions we have of time and being originate and, therefore, derive from the horizon of time. Precisely because stretched temporalities and time lapses are derived, within-timeness is conceived as a mode of temporalization of vulgar time, which conceals and levels the temporal modes of ecstatic-horizonal temporality. Since we have already presented within-timeness as a mode of temporalization of vulgar time, we can only ask: what is the Heideggerian constitution of original time? How do the ecstases of the future, having-been, and present express the Temporality of time?

The essence of future lies in coming-toward-oneself [Auf-sich-zukommen]; that of the past (having-been-ness) lies in going-back-to [Zurück-zu]; and that of the present in staying-with, dwelling-with [Sichaufhalten], that is, being-with. […] As determined by this toward, back-to, and with, temporality is outsideitself. Time is carried away [entrückt] within itself as future, past [having-been], and present. […] Temporality as unity of future, past [having-been], and present […] astemporality, it is itself theoriginaloutside-itself, the ekstatikon. For this character of carrying-away, we employ the expression theecstaticcharacteroftime ([7]p. 377; [4] pp. 266-267).

In BeingandTime, we saw that the horizon is the determining character of original time, while the quote above from TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology clarifies the idea that the Temporality of time has an ecstatic character. Such statements make it clear that original Temporality is temporalized as an ecstatic-horizonal unity. Both in BeingandTime (see [5] p. 329; [12]p. 314) and in TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, ecstatikon means the original being-outside-self in which each temporal is outside itself towards another temporal. Given that the ecstatic character determines the temporalizations of time, Heidegger names the temporalities of original time as ecstases. Due to its ecstatic characterization as a temporality, the future is outside itself towards the having-been and the present; reciprocally, each of these temporalities is also outside itself towards the others. This denotes that each temporality is beyond itself. While each temporality is defined as outside-itself-beyond-itself in TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, temporals are determined by the character of carrying-away. According to Heideggerian thought, the unity of the characters of carrying-away, outside-itself, beyond-itself, and coming-towards constitutes each and every form of temporality, whether they are the temporalizations of within-timeness, for example, those of stretched temporality such as past, present, and future; or the temporalizations of ecstatic-horizonal temporality: having-been, present, and future. From this line of argument, we can infer that the ecstatic-horizonal characters are the condition of possibility for us to approach the constitution of the Temporality of time. Why?

Because the expression “temporal” belongs to both pre-philosophical and philosophical usage, and because that expression will be used in a different sense in the following investigations, we shall call the original determination of the meaning of being and its characters and modes which devolve from time its temporal [temporale] determination. The fundamental ontological task of the interpretation of being as such thus includes the elaboration of the temporalityofbeing [TemporälitatdesSeins] ([5]p. 19; [12]p. 18).

We have used these words from BeingandTime to reinforce the fact that with the expression “Temporality,” Heidegger intends to make a distinction between the temporal and Temporality senses of time. He simply maintains the term “temporal” to designate the temporalizations of vulgar time, such as within-timeness, and he preserves the expression “Temporality” to define the temporalizations of original time, namely, ecstatic-horizonal temporality. He also preserves the word “Temporality” to show how the temporalizations of time and being occur. In line with this terminological distinction, at this point, we will return to our purpose, which is to investigate to what extent the characteristics of ecstatic-horizonal temporality express the constitution of the Temporality of time and the Temporality of being.

To this end, we will turn our attention to the determining characteristics of ecstatic temporality, namely, outside-itself, beyond-itself, carrying-away, and coming-towards, to show that each ecstasis has a horizon or schematic pre-designation, which is conceived as a formal structure of the wheretooftheremoval (see [7] p. 429; [4] p. 302). That is to say: in TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, the horizon is the whereto each ecstasis is directed to insofar as it is determined by the character of carrying-way. This implies that “each ecstasis as such has a horizon that is determined by it and that first of all completes that ecstasis’ own structure” ([7] p. 435; [4]p. 306). In this consummation, each ecstasis is constituted by a horizon with a view to which each of them projects itself outside itself and temporalizes itself as the ecstasis that it really is.

Now, if in BeingandTime we consider the horizon of time as the fromwhichofopenness, and in TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology we can see that the horizon is defined as the wheretooftheremoval, we should ask: does this conceptual difference indicate a contradiction? We assume that instead of contradicting each other, these concepts complement each other. Let us remember that, in BeingandTime, openness or disclosedness is conceived of as anticipation. In the theoretical context of existential analytic, on the one hand, anticipation is both the proper mode of the ecstasis of the future, and it is the whereto which the instant comes towards, i.e., the wheretofromwhich the instant is temporalized as a proper mode of the ecstasis of the present. In this case, anticipationisacharacterofthetemporalityoftime, but on the other hand, anticipation temporalizes the character of being of Dasein, determining it as the entity which, by existing, projects its possibilities of being towards the understanding and interpretation of the meaning of being of entities in general. In this case, anticipationisacharacteristicoftheTemporalityofbeing. It is necessary to point out here that the temporal character of anticipation is so crucial to existential analytic that it is present in the very semantics of the word “Dasein.” Why do I say that? We only need to recall that the prefix “da”, which appears next to the verb “sein” and constitutes the being of Dasein, in BeingandTime, is defined as anticipation and disclosedness (see [5] pp. 132,[5]; [12] p. 129). In accordance with this definition of “Da,” existentials, as characters of being that structure Dasein, are founded as disclosedness, and existence, which is the essence of Dasein, is conceived as possibilities of being towards which Dasein projects itself. Therefore, within the scope of BeingandTime, we should emphasize that the horizon, as an anticipatory opening of time, is both the whereto being manifests itself as meaning, and the from-whichDasein understands the meaning of being of entities. In this manner, the horizon can be seen as Dasein’s sending [Schicksal], that is, as the whereto from which Dasein “first starts upon a way of revealing” ([11]p. 329), and comes to understand and interpret its possibilities of being. Therefore, from the perspective of openness and sending, the horizon is also determined by the ecstatic character of carrying-away, that is, the outside-itself-beyond-itself.

We saw that in TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, the horizon or schematic pre-designation constitutes the sending or the whereto which each ecstasis is directed to. This suggests that the direction in this lecture referred to the ecstases of temporality themselves, and not to the possibilities of being as in BeingandTime. So, on the horizon as a schematic pre-designation or whereto of an ecstasis, we do not find the conception of time as that from which Dasein understands and interprets being; rather, in this lecture, we suppose that Heidegger chooses to clarify how the Temporalities of original time and vulgar time happen. We know that BeingandTime presents a clear distinction between time and being, as well as unequivocally establishing the differences between the Temporalities of time and the modalities of understanding and interpreting being. By equating these two of the philosopher’s writings, our intention is not only to indicate the peculiarities of each of these writings with a view to defining horizon, but rather to defend that TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology complements and better explains the conception of temporality described in BeingandTime. Why? Because in this lecture, Heidegger explains how the temporalization of original time, which underlies ecstatic-horizonal temporality is constituted, as he had already explained in the HistoryoftheConceptofTime and in BeingandTime. As we already mentioned in our introduction, we are calling the temporalizations of original time “Temporality of time”. That said, there is nothing more opportune than asking: how is the Temporality of time constituted?

We previously said that due to the ecstatic structure, each ecstasis projects outsideitselftowardsanotherecstasis. Now, our purpose is to highlight the idea that due to the character of carrying-away, which constitutes the ecstasis of original temporality, each ecstasis projects itselfoutwardstowardsitshorizonalschemesorschematicpre-designations. In this projection, there is a modification of the unity of the ecstatic-horizonal temporality, and, along with this, with each projection and carrying-away of the ecstasis beyond itself, there is a modification of the unity of the schematic pre-designations whereto each ecstasis projects itself. In other words, as the temporality of each ecstasis occurs, reciprocally, the schematic pre-designations that constitute them modify themselves and become temporalized. In short, the temporality of the ecstases consists in their projecting themselves outwards towards their horizon. Precisely for this reason, in TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology, the horizon is defined as the whereto each ecstasis is directed and consummated as the ecstasis that it is. This means that the horizon or schematic pre-designation, formally characterized as the whereto of the removal, determines the temporal structures that constitute each ecstasis as such. In this temporality, the horizon is outside of the ecstasis and, consequently, it is beyond the ecstasis that it determines as this and not another ecstasis. It is worth noting that, although the horizon is constituted as the whereto of the removal and is defined as ecstatic, it does not have an ecstatic structure like the ecstasis which it structures (see [7] p. 435; [4]p. 306). In this way, all temporalization is ecstatic, but only the ectases have an ecstatic structure.

After this explanation of how the temporalization of ecstatic-horizonal temporality is based, we conclude that the Temporality of time is constituted by the horizon or schematic pre-designation, which structures the ecstases of the future, the having-been, and the present, and brings them together in an ecstatic-horizonal unity. It is important to emphasize here that, as a mode of the Temporality of time, the ecstatic-horizonal unity changes both when the ecstases are carried away from themselves towardstheirhorizons, and when they project themselves towardsotherecstases. At the same time, we need to note that the Temporality of time also determines stretched temporality and the lapses of time, because when the ecstatic-horizonal unity changes structurally, it can change in the proper mode of temporality or in the improper mode of temporality. What are the horizons or schematic pre-designations that structure the Temporality of time?

Whatdoespraesensmeanwithregardtotimeandtemporalityingeneral? […] The name “praesens” itself already indicates that we do not mean by it anecstaticphenomenon as we do with present and future. […] Nevertheless, there exists aconnectionbetweenpresentandpraesens which is not accidental. […] The ecstasis of present has within itself a schematicpre-designation of the whereoutthere this “beyonditself” is. That which lies beyond the ecstasis as such, due to the character of removal and as determined by that character, or, more precisely, that which determines the whitherofthe “beyonditself” as such in general, is praesensashorizon. The present projects itself within itself ecstatically upon praesens. Praesens […] as basicdeterminationofthehorizonalschemaofthisecstasis, it joins in constituting the complete time-structure of the present. Corresponding remarks apply to the other two ecstases, future and present (repetition, forgetting, retaining) ([7]pp. 433, 435; [4]pp. 305, 306).

Unfortunately, Heidegger only named the horizon of temporality that structures the ecstasis of the present. He called it Praesenz, and conceived of it as the wheretowhich the ecstasis of the present is projected to and temporalized by (see [2]). In other words, it is because the ecstasis of the present is projected towards Praesenz that it temporalizes itself as present. As we have already stated, the temporal and ecstatic character of this ecstasis is the instant. However, the instant also temporalizes itself and changes in the “mode of the present, of the entpresenting of something, which can express itself with saying of ‘now’” ([7]p. 434; [4] p. 306). Because the “now” is a modification of the instant, it is considered a mode derived from ecstatic-horizonal temporality, which we have already described as within-timeness. Simultaneously with the modification of the instant in “now”, a structural modification occurs in the temporal character of the ecstasis of the present, that is, the entpresent. In this characterization, the present is a mode derived from the Temporality of time. Hence, we understand that the ecstasis of the present with its structural modification is the condition of possibility both for the constitution of within-timeness, which embodies the Temporality of original temporality, and for innerworldliness, which determines the significance of the world. These findings allow us, on the one hand, to conclude that within-timeness is a modification of ecstatic-horizonal temporality and, on the other hand, to add that the temporal horizon of the constitution of the sense of being of the innerworldly entities is Praesenz. By explaining the connection between the horizon or schematic pre-designation of Praesenz and the ectasis of the present, we believe we have shown that the Temporality of time occurs through the connection between the schematic pre-designations and their corresponding ecstases. To what extent does the Temporality of time constitute the Temporality of being?

According to Heidegger, “the fundamental ontological task of the interpretation of being as such includes the elaboration of the temporality of being [TemporalitätdesSeins]” ([5]p. 19; [12] p. 18). Although he makes this statement in BeingandTime, he did not explain, in that work, what the Temporality of being is. For this reason, at this point, our objective will be to point out how we can think about the Temporality of being. However, before we continue, it is worth pointing out that in HistoryoftheConceptofTime and in BeingandTime, when the author exposes the temporalization of existentials, he reveals how ecstatic-horizonal temporality determines the proper or improper modes of being of Dasein and not how the Temporality of being occurs. Our point of view is that the Temporality of being occurs when the Temporality of time temporalizes the manifestation of being that is shown on the horizon of time. We know that in the HistoryoftheConceptofTime and in BeingandTime, the horizon of time is seen as the opening through which the manifestation of being is understood as meaning. We assume that in this temporalization, being is appropriated in the sense of a type of apriori. This assumption of ours derives from the following statement in the HistoryoftheConceptofTime: “the apriori phenomenologically understood is […] a titleforbeing. […] The original sense of the apriori […, consists of] preparation for the specification of the structure of the apriori as a feature of the being of entities and not a feature of entities themselves” ([3]pp. 101, 102; [6]: pp. 74, 75). In other words, within the scope of the HistoryoftheConceptofTime, being is temporalized in the sense of an apriori, while in BeingandTime it is temporalized in the sense of the character of being. Therefore, the Temporality of time, characterized by the horizon as openness, constitutes the Temporality of being as an apriori and as the character of being. If, in BasicProblemsofPhenomenology, the horizon is conceived as the whereto of the removal, how can we reflect on the temporalization of being in this lecture? We understand that while being is temporalized on the horizon of carrying-away, the manifestation of being is appropriated as concealment. Why? As the horizon of carrying-away characterizes the ecstasis of temporality as outside-itself, we infer that the manifestation of being is temporalized in the sense of withdrawal. This understanding makes it easier for us to understand why, from the 1930s onwards, it becomes increasingly clear that, together with the manifestation of being, the concealment of being occurs. For us, the reflection on the temporalization of being by the horizon of carrying-away makes more evident the linguistic choices made by Heidegger to express the mode of the event of being. Among them, we can list the terms “unapparent, ungrounded, abyss, fold, and mystery,” the latter of which was defined by the philosopher as “concealed and always concealing itself, […] in a way that opens to light [i.e., that unconceals]” ([11] p. 330).

After these clarifications, we can finally affirm that the investigative line of Heideggerian philosophy in the 1920s aimed to elaborate both the temporary modalities of time, namely, the ecstatic-horizonal temporalities that expose the meaning of being, and the temporary modalities of being which reveal the characters of being that constitute Dasein and the characters of being that determine the innerworldliness of the objective presence of things. While in the HistoryoftheConceptofTime and in BeingandTime, the manifestation of being is temporalized as a character of being, Dasein’s constitution of being is structured by characters of temporality such as anticipation, openness, carrying-away, outside-itself, beyond-itself, and projective-direction.

This constitution allows us to attest that the characters of being which structure Dasein are determined by the Temporality of being. Only with examples, do we remember that the characters of temporality underlie the existentials of being-in (outside-self), understanding (disclosedness), fundamental disposedness (carrying-away), falling (beyond-itself), spatiality (projective-direction) and, reciprocally, the totality of the existential whole of Dasein’s constitution of being, which is named care (Sorge). Due to this temporalization of the characters of being which structure Dasein, in BeingandTime, the unity of ecstatic-horizonal temporality is seen as the meaning of care (see [5] p. 326; [12]p. 311). Considering that on the time horizon the manifestation of being is temporalized as a character of being and that care exposes the existential totality of Dasein, we can infer that the Temporality of time and the Temporality of being determine the meaning of being that existentially constitutes Dasein. From this perspective, the Temporalityoftime, which reveals the meaning of being as an apriori, istheconditionofpossibilityforustoaccesstheTemporalityofbeing, which reveals the meaning of apriori as a character of being. Therefore, theTemporalityoftime is the condition of possibility of the sense of being, and the Temporalityofbeing is the condition of possibility for the constitution of the sense of being of Dasein and, simultaneously, the sense of being of entities in general, since it is Dasein that constitutes the significance of the world. How does ecstatic-horizonal temporality, which is a mode of the Temporality of time, constitute the being of Dasein and the meaning of care?

For this character of carrying-away [Entrückung], we employ the expression the ecstaticcharacter of time. […] It is with this ecstatic character that we interpret existence, which, viewed ontologically, is the original unity of being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, comes-back-to-self, and enpresents. In its ecstatic character, temporality is the condition of the constitution of the Dasein’s being ([7]p. 377, 378; [4] p. 267).

According to this quote, we can say that the characters of coming-toward, outside-itself, and beyond-itself, constitutive of ecstatic temporality, temporalize the character of being of Dasein as “being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, comes back-to-self, and enpresents.” However, we cannot forget that temporality is also horizontal, and as such, it is characterized as carrying-away, and that the character of being of Dasein is temporalized as disclosedness and as the whereto towards which Dasein goes towards being, to come back to the understanding and interpretation of the meaning of being of entities in general. Because the characters of temporality of carrying-away, openness, directionality and outside-itself-beyond-itself structure the characters of being of Dasein, we understand that they set up the Temporality of being, which grounds the modalities of being of Dasein. In other words: While ecstatic-horizonal temporality temporalizes Dasein’s characters of being, the temporalization of these characters exposes Dasein’s Temporality of being. While Dasein’s characters of being are temporalized by ecstatic-horizonal temporality, Dasein is constituted as an entity that exists outside-of-itself, beyond entities, towards the meaning of being. This implies that ecstatic-horizonal temporality grounds Dasein’s being as carrying-away and constitutes the meaning of care as anticipation. In this temporalization of being, Dasein is determined as care, that is, as the entity which exists thrown into a world of significance [being-in], that lives alongside beings [being-alongside], anticipating and projecting possibilities of being [being-ahead-of-itself]. To that we can add that, as care, Dasein is defined by the characteristics of coming-toward-oneself, going-back-to, and being-outside-self. As such, Dasein is characterized as the entity that precedes itself and projects the meaning of being towards the world. This means that the constitution of the meaning of being of Dasein and of entities in general occurs in the carrying-away and overtaking of the significance of the world towards the manifestation of being on the horizon of time. Thus, we ask: How does the Temporality of being structure Dasein? The answer is: “As transcendence”, since Dasein is the entity that overtakes other entities and goes beyond itself towards being, to return to the interpretation of the meaning of being of the world. In this being-outside-self, Dasein projects the temporalized meaning of being, through which it understands and determines the way of being of entities in general. In light of these statements, we conclude that because the meaning of care concerns Dasein’s always preceding itself in and alongside the world, ecstatic-horizonal temporality temporalizes Dasein’s being as transcendence. We support the observation made in the following sentence by Heidegger: “The transcendenceof […Dasein] isfoundedinitsspecificwholenessontheoriginalecstatic-horizonalunityoftemporality [Zeitlichkeit]” ([7] p. 429; [4] p. 302). We believe that this quote from TheBasicProblemsofPhenomenology allows us to add that ecstatic-horizonal temporality grounds transcendence as a character of Dasein’s Temporality of being. But how does the Temporality of being constitute the meaning of being of the objective presence of things?

Taking into account, on the one hand, that Dasein only understands being insofar as it is temporalized as meaning and, on the other hand, that within-timeness is structural modification of ecstatic-horizonal temporality, which consubstantiates the modes of original temporality as lapses of time, we can consider that, in Heideggerian philosophy, within-timeness is the mode of temporalization through which Dasein understands the meaning of being of the objective presence of things as the significance of the world. Why? Since the objective presence of things is structured by the character of being called categories, which “let it be seen for everyone in its being” ([5]pp. 44-45; [12] p. 44). Due to this structuring of being, the objective presence of things is not characterized by existentials nor temporalized by the character of time as openness, carrying-away, or anticipation. In this way, ecstatic-horizonal temporality does not temporalize the objective presence of things; rather, the temporalization of these entities is constituted by Dasein, which, by temporalizing itself, temporalizes the entities that are with it in the world. This temporalization occurs because when Dasein is temporalized, it simultaneously understands being as meaning and understands itself as a mode of being temporalized in one way or another. And alongside this temporalization, it understands and interprets the meaning of being of the objective presence of things and institutes the significance of the world. In existential analytic, when the objective presence of things is understood and temporalized by Dasein, they are worlded and, therefore, they are called innerworldly entities. This means that the worldliness of the world is a character of being of Dasein and not of the objective presence of things. In this sense, innerworldliness is determined by the character of being of Dasein (see [7]pp. 420, 240, 241; [4]pp. 296, 169), through which it understands, interprets, and communicates the significance of the objective presence of things. Since the innerworldliness of the objective presence of things is founded on the characters of being that structure Dasein, we can affirm that the innerworldliness of the objective presence of things is rooted in the Temporality of being. How? When Dasein understands the temporality meaning of being of the objective presence of things, it enpresents the temporal character of innerworldly entities and transfigures the worldliness of the world. Because the temporal mode of innerworldly entities is that of enpresenting, they are determined by stretched temporality and its lapses of time. In this way, the mode of temporalization of innerworldly entities is that of within-timeness. Considering that the objective presence of things is temporalized and made worldly by Dasein, and that Dasein only understands and interprets the meaning of being of entities in general when it goes towards being and overtakes entities towards being, we can infer that while innerworldliness is a mode of understanding the temporal meaning of being of the objective presence of things, it is constituted by the transcendence of Dasein which, as already stated, is a character of the Temporality of being. Therefore, we understand that the meaning of the objective presence of things is projected as worldly significance, and the constitution of being of these entities is determined as innerworldliness. To this extent, we judge that innerworldliness is a mode of understanding and interpreting the meaning of being in the world, which is updated with each temporalization of Dasein. If innerworldliness is a possible determination of being of the objective presence of things (see [7] p. 240; [4]p. 169) signified and temporalized by Dasein, then, “everything extant that the Dasein encounters is necessarily intraworldly [innerworldly]” ([7] p. 360; [4]p. 255).

Throughout our exposition on the correlation between temporality, transcendence, innerworldliness and within-timeness, we have arrived at the following theses: 1) ecstatic-horizonal temporality, as a mode of the Temporality of time, grounds Dasein’s temporal sense of being, namely, anticipation, openness and carrying-away; 2) Dasein’s transcendence is a character of the Temporality of being; 3) within-timeness is a structural modification of ecstatic-horizonal temporality; 4) innerworldliness is a determination of Dasein’s transcendence and, consequently, of the Temporalities of time and being; 5) the Temporality of time is the horizon on which the meaning of being appears as an apriori, and as such it is the condition of possibility of the Temporality of being; 6) the Temporality of being reveals the meaning of apriori as a character of being that structures beings, which is why it is the condition of possibility for the constitution of the meaning of being of entities. These theses were essential for us to clarify that the Temporality of time is the most original mode of temporalization, because by founding ecstatic-horizonal temporality and the Temporality of being, the Temporality of time becomes the structural basis for the constitution of Dasein’s transcendence, of within-timeness and innerworldliness. For this reason, we defend both that the Temporality of time is the original and founding source of the nexuses of temporalities, which make up ecstatic-horizonal temporality and within-timeness; and that the Temporality of time grounds the nexuses of the Temporality of being, which constitute the structural totality of Dasein and the worldliness of the objective presence of things.

As a conclusion, it is important to emphasize that through the analysis of the characters of carrying-away, outside-itself, beyond-self and projective-direction, which constitute ecstatic-horizonal temporality, on the one hand, we show how it is possible to define the Temporality of time as “it gives time,” which temporalizes the sense of being as openness, carrying-away and anticipation; and on the other hand, we clarify that in the Temporality of being, Dasein is temporalized as transcendence and care. In short, we can conclude that the Temporality of time is the openness and the horizon fromwhich and whereto the manifestation of being is temporalized as apriori, and that the Temporality of being is the openness and the horizon fromwhich and whereto the sense of apriori is temporalized as a character of being.

To what extent do the theses listed above demarcate the importance of Aristotle’s philosophy for the elaboration of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology? Clearly, we can conclude that Aristotle’s questions about time led Heidegger to name one of the modes of time as vulgar and to treat it as a structural modification of the other mode of time, which he called original. Obviously, he considered the modalities of original time as the foundation for the modalities of vulgar time. As we reported previously, in the same way that Heidegger elaborates the characters of being, which structure Dasein and innerworldly entities, returning to Dasein’s everyday modes of being, we presuppose that he conceives the Temporalities of time and being by turning to the modalities of vulgar time, which he conceptualized in accordance with his reading of Aristotelian works on time. Furthermore, we cannot fail to point out here that Aristotle’s philosophy was also crucial for Heidegger to outline his concept of ontological difference and hermeneutical situation.

¹This is a revised version of the paper TemporalityastheFoundationoftheTranscendenceofDasein, ofIntraworldly, andofIntratemporality, published in the Journal Sofia, Vitória (ES-BR), V.13, N.2, pp. 01-18, Dez/2024.