1)ResourceandCapacityConstraints

Inadequate finance, limited technical capacity, and infrastructure deficits are pervasive. For instance, digitalization efforts at The Gambia’s National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC) were critically hampered by a lack of funding, modern tools, and digital skills among personnel ([24]). Similarly, civil service reforms (2008-2015) faltered due to fiscal constraints, leading to low pay and insufficient resources for capacity building ([22]). In Tanzania’s rural water sector, resource constraints translated into low service quality and unsustainable infrastructure ([7]). This suggests that river transportation in The Gambia likely faces analogous challenges, such as poor dredging, lack of safety equipment, and insufficient operator training ([18]). These are exacerbated by a cycle of underfunding and underinvestment.

2)InstitutionalWeaknessesandFragmentation

Institutional deficits, including lack of transparency, absence of performance management, and corruption, are endemic. The Gambian civil service has struggled with governance deficits inherited from colonial structures, compounded by over-expansion and patronage hiring ([22]). Weak cross-sectoral collaboration and unclear institutional roles further cripple service delivery, as seen in studies of urban river management in Africa ([25]; [13]). In The Gambia’s public sector, challenges such as low staff morale, political interference, and limited expertise undermine strategic plan implementation ([21]). These insights point to a probable regulatory vacuum and coordination failures in river transport, where the mandate of the Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) may not effectively extend to remote river crossings, creating a dangerous policy implementation gap.

3)ServiceQualityandSustainabilityFailures

Governance failures ultimately manifest in poor and unreliable services. The absence of performance management systems in The Gambia’s civil service directly contributed to low productivity and poor service quality ([22]). In river transport, this likely translates into the documented crises of overloading, frequent accidents, and operational inefficiencies, which erode public trust and hinder economic development.

Governance is not shaped in a vacuum. Political interests and historical legacies create path dependencies that constrain reform. In Ghana, government policies have historically favored road transport to satisfy diverse socio-political interests, entrenching it as the mainstay of public mobility ([17]). In The Gambia, colonial administrative structures and subsequent patronage politics have created institutional inertia that is difficult to overcome ([22]; [11]). This historical context is crucial for understanding why river transport, despite its socio-economic importance, may remain chronically under-prioritized in national planning and budgeting.

The Gambia River Basin Development Organization (OMVG) and [26] reports rightly cite inadequate infrastructure, poor funding, and sedimentation as key challenges for the river. However, these diagnoses often stop at symptoms. This review argues, based on cross-sectoral evidence, that these symptoms are rooted in systemic public administration failures: fragmented regulatory frameworks, financial mismanagement, institutional corruption, and weak accountability. The reform experience from other sectors is instructive. The Gambia’s Economic Recovery Programme in the 1980s succeeded due to comprehensive reforms backed by strong donor support ([11]), while more recent civil service reforms failed under fiscal and political constraints ([22]). This underscores that technical fixes for river transport will fail without addressing the underlying governance pathologies.

This study builds on these foundations by applying a public administration framework directly to the river transport sector in the Central River Region (CRR). It thereby seeks to fill the identified literature gap and contribute to a deeper understanding of how governance structures determine the performance of essential public services in sub-Saharan Africa.

The fragmentation identified in this study is rooted in the statutory mandates of Gambian public institutions. The Gambia Ports Authority Act (Cap. 72:03) establishes the GPA as the primary body responsible for “the management, operation, and development of ports in The Gambia.” However, the Act’s definition of “ports” has historically been interpreted to apply exclusively to the Port of Banjul and its immediate environs, leaving inland river crossings, including Janjanbureh, Bansang, and Kuntaur, without a clearly designated regulatory authority. The Local Government Act (2019) vests Area Councils with powers over “local infrastructure and services” but does not explicitly confer authority over water transport safety, vessel licensing, or navigation standards. The Ministry of Transport, Works, and Infrastructure retains policy oversight but lacks a dedicated department for inland waterways. The Gambia Maritime Administration, established under the Merchant Shipping Act (2007), focuses on international shipping and large commercial vessels, not artisanal canoes or small ferries operating on inland routes. Consequently, no single agency holds a comprehensive mandate for safety inspections, fare regulation, vessel registration, or accident investigation for river transport services outside Banjul. This statutory vacuum creates what policy scholars term an “institutional void” ([5]), a space where formal rules are absent or contested, enabling inconsistent enforcement, jurisdictional disputes, and the proliferation of informal practices documented in this study.

The research applies Hood’s principles of public management ([6]), particularly the congruence between authority, responsibility, and capacity. The framework helps analyze regulatory fragmentation and policy implementation gaps through the lens of institutional design and mandate clarity.

Ostrom’s framework informs the examination of rule systems, monitoring mechanisms, and graduated sanctions in common-pool resource management ([14]). The river transportation system is analyzed as a common-pool resource requiring collective action and institutional arrangements to prevent degradation.

Klitgaard’s corruption formula (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability) provides the analytical lens for examining accountability deficits ([8]). This framework elucidates how monopoly power and discretionary authority, when unchecked by accountability mechanisms, enable systemic corruption.

This perspective explains the persistence of governance failures despite reform attempts ([16]). Colonial administrative legacies and subsequent patronage politics in The Gambia create institutional inertia that systematically under-prioritizes riverine communities.

As illustrated in Figure 1, this study’s theoretical framework integrates four complementary perspectives. Hood’s public administration principles underpin the analysis of regulatory fragmentation and financial mismanagement ([6]). Ostrom’s institutional analysis informs the examination of coordination failures and rule systems ([14]). Klitgaard’s corruption formula operationalizes the accountability deficits ([8]). Pierson’s path dependency explains the historical-political constraints ([16]). Together, these theories position administrative failures as independent variables directly influencing service delivery outcomes (dependent variables), with political economy factors acting as moderating variables that shape the strength and manifestation of these relationships.

Source: Adopted from Combined Public Admin theories.

Figure 1. Theoretical framework.

Synthesis:AnIntegratedAnalyticalLens

This study does not apply these theories in isolation but synthesizes them into a single, integrated analytical lens. Hood’s principles provide the benchmark for assessing institutional design and mandate clarity ([6]). Ostrom’s IAD framework guides the examination of the operational “rules of the game” at landing sites ([14]). Klitgaard’s formula operationalizes the critical accountability deficits that enable corruption ([8]). Finally, Pierson’s path dependency explains the historical inertia that makes these failures resistant to piecemeal reform ([16]). Operationally, this synthesis positions the four core administrative pathologies (fragmentation, financial mismanagement, corruption, and coordination failures) as the primary independent variables. Their combined effect on service delivery, safety, and economic development constitutes the dependent variable. The moderating role of political and historical context is systematically examined in the discussion. This integrated approach allows for a diagnosis that moves beyond symptoms to uncover the systemic, institutional roots of governance failure.

The Central River Region (CRR) of The Gambia was selected as a critical case study ([4]). Its total dependence on the River Gambia for socio-economic connectivity, with no major bridging infrastructure, makes the impacts of governance failures in river transportation starkly visible.

The target population comprised all stakeholders in the river transportation service delivery chain within CRR, including service users, operators, regulators, and local community representatives.

A multi-stage, multi-strategy sampling approach was used to ensure representativeness and depth. The total sample was 300 participants. Table1 details the sampling framework. The study covered five major river crossing points in CRR: Janjanbureh, Bansang, Kuntaur, Jakhaly, and Karantaba. These sites were selected based on their high traffic volumes, representation of both formal ferry services and informal canoe operations, and their geographic spread across the north and south banks.

Table 1. Sampling framework and achieved participant distribution.

Note: The sum of achieved participants across sub-categories is 287 (108 + 48 + 19 + 28 + 18 + 9 + 19 + 14 + 14 = 287). No additional participants were added beyond these categories. Source: Research Design (2026).

Of the 287 total participants, 230 completed the structured survey (175 service users and 55 operators). The remaining 57 participants took part only in semi-structured interviews: 19 public administrators, 14 local authorities (Alkalos), 14 community/fisheries representatives, and 10 operators who were not captured in the survey phase due to their irregular schedules. All five landing sites (Janjanbureh, Bansang, Kuntaur, Jakhaly, and Karantaba) were covered. The survey response rate among targeted service users and operators was 95.8% (230 out of 240 approached), while the interview acceptance rate was 95.0% (57 out of 60 approached).

The study operationalized five core constructs based on the theoretical framework. Each was measured using multi-item Likert-scale indices (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree) to ensure reliability and validity.

RegulatoryFragmentation: Defined as the degree to which oversight authority for river transportation is dispersed across multiple agencies without clear jurisdictional boundaries or coordinated mandates. Measured using a 5-item composite scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.84) covering: 1) clarity of which agency has authority at river crossings, 2) overlap or gaps in regulatory mandates, 3) consistency of enforcement across sites, 4) existence of unified operational guidelines, and 5) jurisdictional ambiguity in emergency situations.

FinancialMismanagement: Defined as deficiencies in the planning, allocation, disbursement, execution, and accountability of public funds intended for river transport infrastructure and operations. Measured using a 6-item composite scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.89) covering: 1) timeliness of budget releases, 2) alignment of expenditures with intended purposes, 3) transparency of revenue collection, 4) existence and effectiveness of audit mechanisms, 5) adequacy of maintenance funding, and 6) perceived waste or leakage.

CorruptionIncidence: Defined as the systematic abuse of public authority for private gain within river transport operations, operationalized using Klitgaard’s formula (Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability) ([8]). Measured using a 5-item composite scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.91) covering: 1) frequency of informal payments for boarding priority, 2) prevalence of ticket fraud, 3) selective enforcement of safety rules, 4) bribery for licenses or permits, and 5) perceived impunity for corrupt acts.

CoordinationFailure: Defined as the absence of effective information sharing, joint planning, and synchronized operations among agencies with overlapping responsibilities for river transport. Measured using a 4-item composite scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.82) covering: 1) frequency of inter-agency meetings, 2) alignment of schedules (ferry timetables vs. market days), 3) information sharing across agencies, and 4) existence of joint problem-solving mechanisms.

ServiceQuality(DependentVariable): Defined as the perceived reliability, safety, accessibility, and affordability of river transportation services from the user perspective. Measured using a 6-item composite scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.88) covering: 1) schedule reliability, 2) vessel safety and maintenance, 3) boarding efficiency, 4) affordability relative to income, 5) accident frequency, and 6) overall user satisfaction.

For all composite scales, item scores were summed and averaged to produce a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 5 for each construct. Higher scores indicated greater perceived dysfunction for the governance variables (fragmentation, mismanagement, corruption, coordination failure) and higher perceived quality for the service quality outcome.

A.QuantitativeInstrument(StructuredSurvey)

Development: Items were generated based on the theoretical framework (e.g., Hood’s principles, Klitgaard’s formula) and literature review constructs (regulatory fragmentation, accountability, etc.).

Validation: The questionnaire underwent expert review by three scholars in public administration and pilot testing with 30 respondents. Reliability was confirmed with a Cronbach’s Alpha score > 0.80 for all scaled sections.

Content: Included Likert-scale questions (1=Strongly Disagree to 5=Strongly Agree) and closed-ended questions on service quality, safety, corruption frequency, regulatory awareness, and satisfaction.

B.QualitativeInstruments

Semi-StructuredInterviews: Guides were used with open-ended questions to explore institutional challenges, coordination mechanisms, and experiences with constraints.

Non-ParticipantObservation: This method provided an unfiltered view of on-ground realities, mitigating the potential bias of self-reported data. A protocol guided the documentation of infrastructure conditions, boarding processes, and official passenger interactions at key landing sites.

Document Analysis: Policy documents, GPA reports, and audit reports were systematically reviewed.

Data analysis proceeded in two streams corresponding to the mixed-methods design. The qualitative findings were then used to explain, contextualize, and give meaning to the quantitative results. This fulfills the explanatory sequential design. Triangulation across all data sources strengthened the credibility of the conclusions drawn.

A.QuantitativeAnalysis

Survey data were analysed using SPSS (Version 26).

DescriptiveStatistics: Frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations were calculated to summarize the data (e.g., Table 2 perceptions).

InferentialStatistics: Correlation analysis was used to examine relationships between key governance variables (e.g., fragmentation vs. service quality). Regression analysis was conducted to test the predictive power of identified administrative failures on service delivery outcomes.

RealizedQualitativeSample: A total of 57 semi-structured interviews were completed: 19 public administrators (GPA officials, Ministry of Transport, local council staff), 14 local authorities (Alkalos), 14 community representatives (fisher association leaders, women’s group representatives), and 10 operators (boat captains and vessel owners) who were not captured in the survey phase due to their irregular schedules. Interviews lasted between 35 and 90 minutes, with a mean duration of 52 minutes. All interviews were conducted in either English or Mandinka (the predominant local language), with translation performed by a trained research assistant and verified through back-translation.

CodingProcess: Thematic analysis followed Braun and Clarke’s six-phase framework ([1]). Two researchers independently coded the first five transcripts to establish intercoder reliability, achieving a Krippendorff’s α of 0.87 after resolving discrepancies through discussion. The remaining transcripts were coded by the primary researcher, with weekly peer debriefing sessions to review coding decisions and emerging patterns. Coding was conducted using NVivo 14 software. Initial codes were inductive, derived from participant language, and then organized under the four theoretically specified governance failures (regulatory fragmentation, financial mismanagement, corruption, and coordination failure) as higher-order themes. A fifth theme, “community coping strategies”, emerged inductively and was integrated into the analysis as a contextual factor.

SaturationAssessment: Thematic saturation was assessed using the information power framework ([9]). Given the study’s specific aim (diagnosing governance failures), dense sample specificity (stakeholders with direct experience), established theoretical framework, and strong dialogue quality across interviews, saturation was achieved after 45 interviews, with the remaining 12 interviews confirming existing themes and yielding no new substantive insights. This was verified through a saturation grid documenting the point at which each theme was first identified and subsequently confirmed.

B.QualitativeAnalysis

Interview transcripts and field notes were analysed using Thematic Analysis ([1]).

Familiarization: Repeated reading of transcripts.

Coding: Generation of initial codes capturing key ideas.

ThemeDevelopment: Collation of codes into potential themes (e.g., “financial leakage”, “accountability voids”).

ReviewandRefinement: Ensuring themes accurately reflected the dataset.

Triangulation: Qualitative themes were explicitly used to explain and give deeper meaning to the quantitative results, fulfilling the explanatory sequential design.

Table 2. Data collection matrix.

Source: Research Design (2026).

The study received ethical approval from the Review Board of the University of The Gambia. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. For illiterate participants, the consent form was read aloud, and verbal consent was witnessed and documented. Anonymity and confidentiality were strictly maintained throughout data handling and reporting.

The survey data provide strong quantitative evidence of stakeholder perceptions and the relationships between key governance variables (Table 3).

Table 3. Stakeholder perceptions of challenges and solutions (n = 240).

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

A correlation analysis was conducted to examine the relationships between the core governance failures identified in the qualitative phase.

While these descriptive statistics confirm the widespread perception of crisis, the study sought to go further by quantifying the statistical relationships between the core governance failures identified in the literature and the perceived quality of service delivery. The following correlation analysis tests the hypothesis that these failures are not isolated but constitute a synergistic system.

Interpretation:Table 4(a) shows that all four governance dysfunctions are strongly and positively intercorrelated, suggesting they form a synergistic system. More critically, each dysfunction is strongly negatively correlated with Service Quality, confirming their strong statistical association with lower service quality.

MultivariateRegressionAnalysis:

To extend the bivariate correlations and test the relative predictive power of the four governance dysfunctions on service quality, a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted. Service quality (continuous composite score) served as the dependent variable. Regulatory fragmentation, financial mismanagement, corruption incidence, and coordination failure (all continuous composite scores) were entered as independent predictors.

ModelSpecification:

Service Quality = β0 + β1 (Fragmentation) + β2 (Mismanagement) + β3 (Corruption) + β4 (Coordination) + εService Quality = β0 + β1 (Fragmentation) + β2 (Mismanagement) + β3 (Corruption) + β4 (Coordination) + ε.

Interpretation: The model explains 83.5% of the variance in perceived service quality (Adjusted R² = 0.832), indicating strong collective predictive power. All four governance dysfunctions emerge as statistically significant negative predictors. Financial mismanagement exerts the strongest unique effect (β = −0.341, p < 0.001), followed by corruption incidence (β = −0.246, p = 0.001), coordination failure (β = −0.176, p = 0.009), and regulatory fragmentation (β = −0.142, p = 0.024).

While the correlation matrix (Table 4) established strong pairwise associations, the regression analysis reveals that financial mismanagement and corruption are the most critical levers for intervention. The high R² also confirms that the four governance dysfunctions, measured as a system, collectively account for the vast majority of variation in service quality outcomes. This supports the study’s central argument that isolated technical fixes will fail without systemic administrative reform targeting these interconnected pathologies.

Table 4. (a) Correlation matrix of governance dysfunctions (n = 240); (b) Multiple regression results (n = 230).

(a) ** p < 0.01; (b) Model Fit: R = 0.914, R² = 0.835, Adjusted R² = 0.832, F (4, 225) = 285.3, p < 0.001.

The qualitative phase was designed to explain and contextualize the quantitative patterns. While the four governance failures were initially specified from theory and measured in the survey, the thematic analysis of interviews and observations served to validate, deepen, and refine these constructs, revealing how they manifest in practice and interact synergistically. No additional major governance failure categories emerged beyond the four theoretically derived constructs, confirming the adequacy of the a priori framework.

Thematic analysis of interviews and observations provided depth to the quantitative patterns, revealing four core pathologies:

RegulatoryFragmentation: The Gambia Ports Authority’s (GPA) mandate is concentrated on the Banjul port, creating a vacuum at remote crossings like Janjanbureh. As one District Chief noted, “Weseetheoverloading, butourauthoritystopsattheriverbank. TheGPArulesarepapersinBanjul.”

PublicFinancialMismanagement: Beyond budget scarcity, the issue is dysfunctional execution. An official explained: “ThedredgingfundsarereleasedinNovember, aftertherains. WemustspenditorloseitbyDecember, soitoftengoestoofficerepairs, nottheriver.”

PervasiveCorruption&AccountabilityDeficits: Corruption is systematized, not incidental. A frequent trader described: “AtBarra, theferryisalways ‘full.’ Butifyoufindthecrewmanandadd 50 dalasistothefare, aspaceappears.” This reflects Klitgaard’s formula: monopoly power + discretion − accountability.

PoorInter-AgencyCoordination: Operations are silos. A GPA scheduler stated, “Wesettheferrytimetable. ThelocalcouncilsetstheLuumo (market) days. Nobodymeetstoalignthem. Theresultischaoseveryweek.”

The mixed-methods design allowed findings to converge powerfully:

Quantitative: 100% of users cited “inadequate funding” (Table 5), and it had the strongest negative correlation with service quality (r = −0.901, Table 5).

Qualitative: Interviews revealed this was less about the amount and more about mismanagement (late releases, misallocation).

Conclusion: The problem is not merely budget size but pathological Public Financial Management (PFM), a finding solidified by triangulation.

Table 5. Triangulation: integrated analysis.

The first research question sought to identify the core governance failures. The findings reveal a synergistic quartet of dysfunctions.

First, regulatory fragmentation creates a dangerous vacuum. The Gambia Ports Authority’s (GPA) de facto confinement to the Banjul port leaves remote riverine communities in a governance shadow, as detailed in Section 2.4. The Gambia Ports Authority Act and Local Government Act create a statutory vacuum that leaves inland crossings without a clearly mandated regulator. This is not merely a resource issue but a fundamental failure in institutional design and mandate clarity. This is violating a core principle of effective public management: the congruence between authority, responsibility, and capacity ([6]). The resulting “policy implementation gap” is a classic symptom of what [10] describes as conflictual policy implementation, where unclear goals and contested authority lead to variable local outcomes, in this case, lax safety enforcement.

Secondly, public financial mismanagement perpetuates a cycle of disrepair and distrust. The issue transcends simple budget scarcity to encompass the entire PFM chain, from unrealistic planning and delayed disbursements to opaque execution and a lack of expenditure feedback. This aligns with Schick’s analysis of PFM weaknesses in developing economies, where control and compliance mechanisms are weak ([23]). These are allowing resources to leak from their intended purposes. The failure to visibly reinvest collected revenues shatters the essential social contract between service provider and user, a phenomenon observed in other failing Gambian public enterprises like NAWEC ([24]).

Thirdly, pervasive corruption and accountability deficits operationalize the governance failure at the human level. The reported practices like ticket fraud, informal payments, and selective enforcement are enabled by the monopoly power and discretion of officials at isolated landing sites, precisely as predicted by Klitgaard’s corruption framework, in the absence of accountability ([8]). These were widely reported as not isolated acts but systemic features, reflecting a culture perceived by participants as characterized by weak vertical accountability (to citizens) and horizontal accountability (through internal controls), allowing malfeasance to persist ([22]). This erodes the very legitimacy of the state in delivering a critical public good.

Fourthly, poor inter-agency coordination ensures that these fragmented, under-resourced, and corruptible systems cannot function cohesively. The lack of synchronization between GPA schedules, local government market days, and security deployments exemplifies Peters’ “problems of coordination”, where agencies operate in silos with divergent priorities and information asymmetries ([15]). This prevents the development of holistic solutions, such as integrated demand management, echoing the fragmented governance that cripples the river and port management across Africa ([19]; [25]).

The second research question concerns the impact of these administrative failures. The consequences are severe and multidimensional.

For public service delivery, the outcome is chronic unreliability and dangerously low quality. The perceived absence of performance management and accountability was consistently linked by participants to the documented overloading, irregular schedules, and infrastructure decay. This mirrors the outcome of similar governance failures in The Gambia’s civil service, which directly contributed to low productivity and poor service quality ([22]). The service becomes a source of frustration and risk rather than a facilitator of well-being.

Citizen safety is the most immediate casualty. Participants reported that corruption enables overloading, financial mismanagement contributes to unmaintained vessels and absent safety gear, and regulatory fragmentation means no single agency consistently enforces rules. This creates a perfect storm for accidents, turning an essential service into a lethal hazard. This direct link between governance failure and physical safety in transport is well-documented globally ([12]).

For local economic development, the impact is profoundly stifling. Participants described how unreliable and costly transport constrains market access for farmers and traders, increases the price of goods, and discourages investment. As shown in Table 2, 84% of respondents believe challenges have slowed economic opportunities. The river, a potential artery for commerce, becomes a bottleneck. This neglect can be understood through the lens of path dependency ([17]). Historical policy choices favoring road transport and colonial administrative legacies have created an institutional inertia that systematically under-prioritizes riverine communities, locking them into a cycle of underdevelopment.

Addressing the third research question requires moving from diagnosis to prescription. The findings make it unequivocally clear that isolated technical fixes like a new ferry or a dredging project will fail if the administrative ecosystem that crippled the previous interventions remains unchanged. Reform must be systemic, simultaneously targeting the four identified pathologies. The proposed recommendations in Section 6 are designed to be mutually reinforcing: a dedicated authority (addressing fragmentation) with ring-fenced funding (addressing financial mismanagement) and strong oversight (addressing corruption), operating within a master plan developed through coordinated planning (addressing silos). This holistic approach is necessary to break the cycle of decline and rebuild the service on principles of good governance: transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and effective coordination.

While this study provides a detailed diagnostic study of governance challenges in Gambian river transport, several limitations should be acknowledged. First, the sample, though diverse and stratified, is confined to the Central River Region. While CRR is a critical case, findings may not be fully generalizable to all riverine communities in The Gambia or to other national contexts. Secondly, the reliance on self-reported data in surveys and interviews carries an inherent risk of social desirability bias, particularly concerning sensitive topics like corruption. Although non-participant observation helped triangulate some findings, this bias cannot be fully eliminated. Thirdly, the study’s cross-sectional design provides a deep snapshot of the system at a point in time but cannot definitively establish causal relationships or track the evolution of governance pathologies over time. Future longitudinal studies could strengthen causal inferences. Finally, the research focused on governance and administrative systems; a deeper investigation into the political economy dynamics that sustain these failures was beyond its scope, but represents a vital avenue for further research.