By respecting competitive mechanisms, public interventions in the market help to impose discipline on the behaviour of firms in order to improve their functioning, by addressing some of their shortcomings ([10]).

Prior to the adoption of Law 37-2024 regulating the gambling market in the Republic of the Congo, this market was characterised by malfunctions and shortcomings. Through this law, the State hopes to rectify this situation. By intervening in a given economic sector, the State regulates it to make it efficient, in light of the observed limitations of self-regulation. This intervention by the public authority in a sector that had been operating for over thirty years, with a view to correcting its imperfections, is an example of the limitations of the “invisible hand” theory ([16]), which is based on the premise that the market is the most effective means of regulation in existence, whereby each actor’s pursuit of their own interest leads to the common good.

However, this state intervention in the market must be carried out in accordance with the law, respect for property rights, honouring of contracts, and the impartiality and effectiveness of judicial decisions. The regulatory state thus becomes inseparable from the neoliberal perspective, making the interplay of market mechanisms an essential element of economic dynamism ([6]).

According to this author, such intervention must in no way be detached from the competitive process but rather contribute to restoring the conditions for satisfactory competition when a market imperfection is identified.

Through regulation, the state remains present in the economy, but in a different way: its role consists of supervising economic activity, by establishing certain rules and intervening on an ongoing basis to ease tensions, resolve conflicts and ensure the maintenance of an overall balance; Through regulation, the State therefore no longer acts as a player but as an “arbitrator” of the economic system, confining itself to setting rules for operators and striving to harmonise their actions (Chevallier, op. cit.).

In most economies, whether developed or developing, from a legal perspective, the gambling sector has often operated under state control, either in the form of a competitive monopoly with partial liberalisation. This allows the public authorities to “keep an eye” on what is happening.

According to the literature, three key factors generally justify this oversight, namely: (i) the sector’s proven growing profitability; (ii) the public safety risks inherent in gambling, exacerbated by the presence of an illegal market; and (iii) public health risks arising from addiction.

From an economic theory perspective, the gambling sector is a contestable market in the sense defined by [5]; it is characterised by the presence of multiple operators of all types (public and private). This leads, on the one hand, to significant changes with all that this entails in terms of the risks faced by all countries; and, on the other hand, to the emergence of innovative products resulting from globalisation, such as sports betting.

In light of these characteristics, the central argument of our article is based on the premise that, as this market has demonstrated weaknesses and dysfunctions that render it inefficient and vulnerable to the risks inherent in gambling, its regulation by the state is the most appropriate means of ensuring its optimal functioning, guaranteeing fair competition and protecting the interests of all stakeholders.

Consequently, Keynes’s approach—which has always advocated state intervention and a strengthening of the relationship between the market and the state so that the latter can correct market failures—is reinforced.

We start from the hypothesis ([15]) that market regulation finds its foundation in its theoretical justification and its legitimacy in the belief that an optimal economic situation can only result from the perfect functioning of markets.

The idea developed here is that regulation serves as a substitute for the competitive forces of the market in situations where these are absent or weakened due to failures, malfunctions and externalities that render the market ineffective. In the sense of ([4]), these conditions constitute sufficient justification for government intervention.

The rationale behind such an approach lies in the need for the Congolese government to address the shortcomings and imperfections associated with the potential exercise of market power by firms in monopoly or oligopoly situations.

In the absence of such a provision, market prices would be set at an abnormally high level, reducing both demand and competition due to the barriers to entry that may be erected, thereby generating supernormal profits ([1]).

Consequently, sectoral regulation, through the establishment of an Independent Regulatory Authority which acts as an incentive or governance mechanism, would help to improve the performance of firms and the sector by encouraging investment and technological innovation, and by ensuring the social optimum.

In this article, we seek to present and analyse the factors that led the Congolese state to regulate the gambling market. This analysis is based on the findings of a survey conducted in 2019 by NOOH on behalf of the Ministry of Finance and the Budget with a view to legislating for and regulating the sector. It was finally in 2024 that Law No. 37-2024 of 11 October 2024 on the regulation of gambling and games of chance was adopted by Parliament. However, to date (March 2026), no regulatory text (decree) has been issued, nor has any institution provided for by the said law been established.

Among the findings of this study, it is clear that the Congo’s gambling market suffers from several shortcomings due to the lack of regulation; this also results in financial losses for the State.

Therefore, to achieve our objective, the main question we will seek to answer is as follows: what are the factors that characterise the dysfunction and contribute to the weakening of the gambling market, which led the State to adopt legislative measures aimed at regulating this market? From this question arises a second one, namely: what form of regulation could optimise the functioning of this market?

We have adopted a two-stage methodology. The first stage consists of a literature review of several studies relating to conceptual analysis and the importance of regulation in connection with our subject of analysis.

The second consists of an analysis of the factors identified by the field survey of the regulation of this market, using descriptive statistics.

The rest of the article is organised as follows. The first section presents a literature review on the need to regulate this market. The second section analyses the shortcomings that prompted the Government to legislate on the legal framework for this sector.

Gambling involves staking money (or another object of value), with the possibility of obtaining a financial return from a game with an uncertain outcome ([22]).

In most countries, gambling is governed by legislation that organises and regulates the market in order to mitigate the risks inherent in such activities.

The Republic of the Congo was one of the few countries without such legislation, even though gambling had been practised for over three decades up until 2024. This legal framework for the sector is known as sectoral regulation. It comprises legal provisions that vary from one country to another and within a single country.

For [7], regulation is a set of measures, primarily administrative police measures, which enable the public authorities to intervene in the market to ensure competition and to require it to take into account external public interests (equality of citizens, accessibility, continuity, sustainable development).

Through this mode of governance, the public authorities abandon direct means of action on the economy (for example, price controls or public enterprises) in favour of legislation organising the economy, that is to say, regulating economic operators whilst guaranteeing them maximum freedom ([7]).

In an economic sense, regulation is defined as a wide variety of public interventions, generally sector-specific in nature, ranging from strictly economic measures (prices, quantities) to ethical rules applicable to a profession or the protection of privacy. It can also be understood as “the control of market power for the purpose of achieving economic efficiency” ([3]).

This makes it a tool at the service of economic power, enabling it to create “a legal and regulatory framework that guarantees the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, as well as the interests of all stakeholders, and to safeguard the general interest of the sector.”

The implementation of these measures is often entrusted to public authorities independent of the government, tasked with applying transparent and non-discriminatory rules within the framework established by law, to limit conflicts of interest, particularly with the state as a shareholder.

In this article, we seek to understand the factors that led the government of this country to ultimately regulate this market. For it must be acknowledged that gambling is not an ordinary business ([13]).

In the literature, several studies highlight these factors that justify the regulation of this market. These essentially involve the pursuit of objectives relating to stability, transparency and the protection of the interests of the various stakeholders in the sector (the State, State bodies, bettors/players and private companies). These objectives may take the form of various measures aimed at ensuring the market functions optimally, such as the fight against money laundering, addiction, terrorism and the exploitation of workers, etc.

Regulation is all the more important given that, thanks to globalisation and technological advances—through the development of the internet and the falling cost of smartphones—the gambling craze now knows no borders ([22]). Gambling is available online and accessible almost everywhere, to all social strata worldwide, and at any time.

Furthermore, the profitability of this sector is growing steadily. According to the H2 Gambling Capitalplatform, a global market data provider specialising in the gambling sector and based in the United Kingdom, the global gambling industry generated USD 536 billion, of which 24.6% came from online gambling, with a projected growth rate of 7%. Revenue estimates by 2028 stand at over 700 billion US dollars, driven by smartphone usage in low- and middle-income countries. It should be noted that these figures from H2 Gambling Capitalonly account for legal activities, whilst illegal gambling is also thriving.

The African continent is not on the sidelines of this phenomenon, as according to the SCCG Researchreport entitled “Research report on Africa’s Online GamblingMarket” dated 25 June 2025, revenue from the gambling market in Africa is expected to reach USD 20.43 billion in 2025; and revenue is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR 2025-2029) of 2.07%, resulting in a projected market volume of USD 22.17 billion by 2029.

Africa possesses several factors that make it a highly lucrative market for multinationals in the sector, such as the young age of its population, the majority of whom are unemployed. This is the case in the Republic of the Congo, where young people account for 70% of the population and are predominantly poor, according to the latest general census of population and housing.

For this section of the population, gambling offers an easy way out of poverty and precarious living conditions, as playing requires not only a mobile payment account and internet access (either on a phone or by visiting a retail outlet) but also the ability to pay one’s stake. To satisfy this clientele and boost their turnover, operators offer them innovative games driven by globalisation, leveraging the trio of the internet, mobile telephony and mobile payments, thereby constantly breaking down barriers to entry into this market and reducing the distance.

According to WHO forecasts, the average revenue per user (ARPU) in the market is expected to reach USD 116.56 by 2025, and the number of users is projected to reach 185.6 million by 2029. Whilst user penetration in this market is expected to reach 12.9% in 2025, Congo’s penetration rate is among the highest, hovering around 45% according to 2025 data.

The gaming market is a contestable market in the sense that it attracts all kinds of players wishing to benefit from its financial returns, provided they comply with the local regulations in force. The theory of contestable markets suggests that the expected effects of pure and perfect competition do not depend on the number of producers, but on the freedom to enter and exit such markets. For a market to be classified as contestable, certain conditions must be met, two of which are essential. The first assumes: no constraints in terms of production techniques or product quality, the existence of profits, and free exit (no costs other than the depreciation of the capital employed). Low-cost freedom of exit must facilitate freedom of entry. Freedom of entry and exit in a market (the theory of contestable markets as defined by [5]) allows us to assess potential competition in situations of imperfect competition. The low barriers to entry into this market and the low exit costs for operators make it a contestable market in the sense of ([5]) and turn the products offered there into mass-market goods ([19]).

The second factor involves the threat posed by potential entrants to the market (firms not currently in the market) who, by offering a lower price, can divert demand away from existing firms (firms currently active in the market). The atomistic nature of this market is not a decisive criterion and does not allow for the verification of a competitive situation, nor is it one of the necessary conditions for such a situation. Firms behave as if a new entrant were about to challenge them. Perfect competition exists even in the absence of competitors, and the mere threat of potential competition is sufficient to drive efficiency.

The application of this theory to this specific market is illustrated by the ease with which anyone can access the gambling sector. For to take part in gambling or place a bet, no particular level of education is required. Gambling stirs the financial appetites of all players and bettors, raising the hopes of players—particularly the most disadvantaged—who see it as an opportunity to strike it rich with a single ticket.

From the governments’ perspective, for centuries the gambling sector has always constituted a financial niche at both the continental and global levels; the revenue generated by the sector represents a financial niche that governments can exploit for social projects and to cover part of their budget deficits.

This was already the case in France, where, with the aim of raising the funds needed to financially support agricultural work and the Army, the 1891 Act was passed, thereby relegating religious and moral arguments to second place in favour of the public interest. Thus was born the Pari Mutuel Urbain (PMU). To achieve these economic and financial objectives, the public authorities had to confine gamblers to closed and discreet gaming venues in order to maintain a certain moral balance.

The 1907 Act authorised casinos, and the 1933 Act established the National Lottery, continuing to pursue economic objectives such as raising funds to provide financial compensation to soldiers maimed in the Great War (the “gueules cassées”), widows and orphans ([18]). To this day, a significant proportion of the revenue generated by this sector is used to fund social projects.

However, it is important to note that in practice, and in most of the world’s economies, the gambling market can be regarded as a regulated competitive sector, given the presence—not to say the close supervision—of state authorities.

In light of the above, from a theoretical perspective, we believe that the regulation of the gambling market in the Congo can be justified by the state’s desire to reduce information asymmetries in the sector, given its contentious nature and the innovations in the sector resulting from globalisation and new technologies, which make its control increasingly difficult. Gambling can threaten the balance both in terms of players’ health and as a source of risks to public order and security. Similarly, the results of the survey we will present below show that the local market suffers from several shortcomings that justify its regulation, as in other countries.

A brief analysis of the first two factors demonstrates that compulsive gambling leads to addiction and mental health problems.

According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), 1.2% of the global adult population suffers from a gambling disorder. Specifically, approximately 5.5% of women and 11.9% of men worldwide suffer, to varying degrees, from the harmful effects of gambling ([21]).

Rintoul, A., Dwyer, J., Millar, C., Bugeja, L., Nguyen, H., in their article: “Gambling-related suicide in Victoria, Australia: a population-based cross-sectional study. The Lancet Regional Health—Western Pacific, 2023”, found in a study focusing on the Swedish case that people with a gambling disorder were 15 times more likely to commit suicide than members of the general population.

Meanwhile, [11] in the state of Victoria, Australia, found that at least 4.2% of suicides were linked to gambling.

Compulsive gambling can lead to serious health problems linked to financial difficulties, relationship breakdowns, domestic violence, mental illness or suicide. The consequences of the harmful effects of gambling can last a lifetime and even affect several generations ([22]).

According to the Gambling Research Exchange Ontario (GREO) 2019. Proportion of revenue from problem gambling GREO,Guelph Other harms linked to gambling, such as stigmatisation, criminal activity to obtain money (theft, fraud), child neglect and the erosion of civil institutions due to corruption and political activities carried out by companies in the gambling industry, may arise.

In the case of the Republic of the Congo, there are no scientific studies on the harmful effects of gambling, such as addiction; the weakness of the legal framework in this area, combined with the widespread proliferation of gambling establishments in working-class neighbourhoods, makes it difficult to monitor underage gambling and other dangers inherent in the practice of gambling.

The second factor that may have led to the regulation of the gambling market is linked to its vulnerability to the risks of money laundering, illegal activities and security threats.

In the case of the Republic of the Congo, two reports analyse the country’s situation.

Indeed, illegal gambling opens the door to money laundering operations and threatens public security. Without regulation, this market also attracts criminals posing as operators who exploit its cross-border nature to launder their funds discreetly.

Due to their porous borders, the lack of oversight mechanisms for both land-based and online betting, and the weaknesses in their legal frameworks, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa provide fertile ground for these illegal practices.

For example, two reports, including one by the Action Group Against Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC)¹ and GIABA on the Republic of the Congo, have highlighted the country’s vulnerability.

According to GABAC, the country’s gambling sector is characterised by weak AML/CFT measures (…). Casino operators do not fulfil their customer due diligence obligations. Player registration is not carried out systematically, due to the absence of dedicated registers. The use of cash is very high in the sector, particularly for the payment of bets and winnings.

As for GIABA, a 2020 report indicates that the gambling sector in Congo makes the country vulnerable to terrorist attacks and money laundering.

According to the report, the checks carried out by the supervisory authorities (Directorate-General for Leisure, Directorate-General of the National Police, Directorate of Civil Security) do not cover AML/CFT.

Consequently, professionals in this sector could easily be exploited for money laundering purposes by their clients and owners. The Note also indicates that supervision of casinos in Congo is weak, resulting in an increase in dubious patronage. Slot machines also operate in places that escape the scrutiny of the public authorities. However, this market segment (casinos) is known to be one in which money laundering is a recurring issue. Venues where such games are played, such as casinos, are known to have a bad reputation, stigmatised for their alleged links to organised crime and money laundering. The majority of these slot machines are located in the cafés of luxury hotels, where senior officials from public and private administrations come to play. Here too, revenue that should go to the state is not collected because the taxation system is lacking.

When granting operating licences, COGELO has no practical means of verifying the authenticity of a foreign operator’s criminal record. In some cases, the operator may not even hold a valid residence permit. According to the aforementioned GABAC report: “A criminal record is a mandatory document when establishing any legal entity in the Congo (...) it can be issued without prior verification of the parties concerned, as there is no centralised body responsible for issuing it. Similarly, there are no adequate checks (...) for foreign companies; no specific measures are implemented by the authorities at the time of their incorporation, in particular investigations and enquiries into the promoter(s) and the origin of the funds” ([9]).

The GABAC report, op. cit., p. 123, notes that “the Congo does not have a mechanism for collecting accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial owners; moreover, the information contained in the RCCM is declaratory and does not specifically include information on beneficial owners.

Consequently, information on beneficial owners is difficult for the competent authorities to access, a situation exacerbated by the fact that there is no formal mechanism for collecting, storing, updating and making such information available”.

Finally, it should be noted that the third and final factor addresses the malfunctions observed in the Congo’s gambling market. These will be the subject of the following section. These analyses are carried out using descriptive statistics derived from a field survey.

This section analyses the determinants of the malfunctions observed in the Congolese gambling market as factors in the regulation of that market. The methodology chosen is a combination of descriptive statistics from the results of a field survey, supported by data from the literature on this issue.

This article has highlighted a number of shortcomings and malfunctions—though by no means an exhaustive list—in the gambling market in Congo. The expectations of stakeholders in the sector here—whether operators, players or public services—are primarily that the implementation of Law 37-2024 of 11 October 2024 will rectify these identified shortcomings in order to enable the market to function optimally. In the sense of ([8]), the optimal functioning of the market requires the legislator to define the scope of the State’s action so that the State can maintain a balance between the protection of free competition and the achievement of other objectives, whilst guaranteeing the principles of impartiality, transparency and proportionality.

Furthermore, regulation can only improve the optimal functioning of the market by adhering to six (6) essential criteria, according to ([20]), namely: (i) the scope of regulation, (ii) the geographical reach of regulation, (iii) whether or not regulation is fragmented, (iv) market structure, (v) financial mechanisms, and (vi) excessive gambling.

As for the efficiency and optimal functioning of the Congo’s gambling market, these also depend on the choice of a legal form for the regulatory body, and the State has a choice between two forms: the Independent Administrative Authority (IAA) and the Independent Public Authority (IPA). They constitute an exception to the strict separation of powers in that they belong to the executive branch, possess regulatory powers and also the power to impose sanctions—and are therefore of a judicial nature. They have two main areas of responsibility: the protection of citizens who are consumers of a sector’s services and the regulation of a sector’s economic activity.

Their “independence from the hierarchy of the executive branch is a distinctive feature compared to other administrative bodies and the provisions of each country’s Constitution”. This body should possess a range of powers that no other state body possesses, as justified by the teleological nature of regulation.

The independence and autonomy of this body must be guaranteed by the central administration. In order to fulfil their missions, they are guaranteed the freedom to act with full autonomy, without their actions being directed or censored, except by the courts. The rules of autonomy mean that the Authority must never allow itself to be completely constrained by frameworks of dependency. It must assert its prerogatives vis-à-vis the Administration and stakeholders, the right to develop initiatives, to demonstrate its capacity to produce its own rules of action, or its willingness to co-manage a system. Its actions constitute a response to constraints, to heteronomous mechanisms, to a unitary state, to external mechanisms structuring activities, to institutions that regulate its behaviour, and to mechanisms of control and sanction. And the Republic of the Congo has opted for the model of the Public Administrative Authority.

Finally, our analysis of this market might have been more relevant had the data been collected using a different non-probabilistic sampling method, which is characterised by the potential presence of participation and selection biases—hence our caution. Similarly, the sample of punters and operators is not representative at the national level.

¹Action Group against Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC). (2022). Measures toCombat Money LaunderingandTerrorist Financing. Action Group against Money Laundering in Central Africa.