In discussions about peacebuilding, confidence and trust are often treated as the same, despite their significant differences. Trust involves believing that another party has good intentions or goodwill, and is based on relationships and moral considerations. Trust suggests that people will act in ways that benefit others because they genuinely want to. Confidence, however, is about believing that behavior is shaped by enforceable rules, institutional structures, social reputations, or material benefits, rather than by kindness or moral alignment ([8]).

In African post-conflict contexts, trust may not be a realistic or appropriate expectation, especially in societies that have been shaped by trauma, group anger, or shared memories of violence. Demands for immediate trust or emotional healing can be counterproductive, increasing resistance and skepticism. Former enemies do not need to like or forgive each other to live in peace; they need to believe that rules are followed, violations are addressed, and behavior is consistently managed when norms are broken. This functional confidence is enough to provide a baseline of predictability, allowing actors to function in a fragile environment without resorting to preventive violence.

Focusing on confidence rather than trust changes how the story is told. Reporting that highlights patterns of behavior, compliance with institutional guidelines, or consistent enforcement of agreements allows the public to measure progress based on observable and verifiable actions. For example, in Rwanda, confidence in post-genocide governance was not initially based on reconciliation across ethnic groups, but on the predictable enforcement of laws and delivery of services. Citizens could anticipate how the government would respond to security issues or administrative requests, even if trust between groups was low ([14]). In contrast, efforts to portray post-apartheid South Africa as emotionally unified risked overemphasizing the immediate level of emotional cohesion, while underemphasizing the importance of reliable institutions ([10]).

Conflict and violence are often fueled by uncertainty about the intentions, abilities, and future actions of others. In African post-conflict settings, worst-case assumptions often dominate, making preventive or preemptive violence a logical response for individuals and groups facing insecurity. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) act as tools to reduce this uncertainty. By narrowing the range of interpretations about others’ behavior, CBMs allow actors to engage gradually, reducing the need for defensive actions in advance.

Successful CBMs are credible because they are limited in scope, costly to undo, and reversible. They enable participants to test intentions without committing to a final resolution. Examples in African contexts include monitored demobilization of combatants in Liberia, phased electoral reforms in Sierra Leone, and incremental judicial reforms in post-apartheid South Africa. Each step signals that commitments are being kept, even in the presence of ongoing risks or residual violence ([25]; [3]).

Partial steps must be effectively communicated to the public. Actions such as troop withdrawals, monitored pauses in fighting, or pilot reforms may seem inadequate when compared to full-scale solutions, yet they are essential in building confidence. Dramatic, all-or-nothing approaches often fail because they require a level of confidence that has not yet developed. Media stories that present incremental progress as a thoughtful risk-management strategy—rather than as indecision or weakness—can shape public perception and reinforce the gradual impact of CBMs. For instance, in Liberia, media coverage emphasized the gradual verification of disarmament and reintegration programs rather than focusing on isolated incidents of violence. This helped build a growing public perception of institutional reliability and predictable processes ([3]).

Even though confidence-building measures (CBMs) are frequently linked to diplomacy or security arrangements, the most lasting form of confidence-building in African post-conflict situations is rooted in institutions and administrative systems. Post-conflict recovery is essentially a governance issue, as the success of peace depends on reliable and predictable behavior from institutions ([13]). Courts that give fair judgments, police that apply laws impartially, and administrative bodies that provide services without discrimination send a clear message to citizens that power is limited and rules are important. Over time, these consistent behaviors help build confidence, even in societies where reconciliation is not complete or trust between groups is low.

Institutions act as communicators. Every decision they make, every ruling they issue, or every administrative action they take communicates something about who is considered important, what behaviors are encouraged or punished, and whether agreements can be enforced. In African post-conflict societies, institutions often have a history of being exclusionary, repressive, or only partially legitimate. Building trust requires more than a single reform or one-time effort. It needs visible, repeated, and steady actions over time. A single fair court ruling or a single improvement in service delivery is not enough. Confidence comes from patterns that people can see, understand, and rely on.

Publishers play a vital role in this process. By tracking how institutions perform over time, explaining setbacks, and showing trends in how rules are followed, media helps societies see gradual progress and reduces the sense that things are unstable. For instance, in Rwanda, reporting on the consistent enforcement of laws and regular government communication helped citizens form expectations about how institutions would behave, even during social tensions ([14]). Similarly, in post-apartheid South Africa, media stories that showed steady improvements in service delivery and judicial independence strengthened public trust, supporting symbolic efforts like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ([10]).

In this way, confidence-building is both practical and shaped by social interaction. Institutions create patterns of behavior that can be observed. Publishing helps explain these patterns, explaining their context and sharing the patterns with the public. When the actions of institutions align with what people hear from the media, confidence grows. When they don’t match, even well-intended reforms may not build trust or predictability, leaving societies open to sliding back into violence. African post-conflict experiences show that peace isn’t just the absence of conflict, but the presence of reliable, credible governance supported by consistent public stories.

Rwanda’s post-genocide reconstruction is one of the most talked about cases of fast institutional rebuilding in modern African history. After the 1994 genocide, which killed an estimated 800,000 people in about 100 days, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took control and was responsible for rebuilding a broken political and social system ([14]). What made Rwanda’s approach different from other post-conflict situations was the centralized authority, an all-encompassing justice plan that combined formal and traditional methods, and a focus on predictable governance.

In the early years after the genocide, the Rwandan government carried out major reforms in legal, economic, and administrative areas. The Gacaca court system, for example, was set up to deal with the huge number of genocide cases through community-based trials, combining public involvement with government oversight ([6]). At the same time, regular courts and legal changes were strengthened to ensure a consistent application of the law. These actions helped meet judicial needs but also supported broader goals of predictability—defined here as citizens’ ability to expect how institutions would behave and what outcomes they would bring.

[14] suggests that this predictability built vertical confidence, meaning that citizens came to believe in the state’s ability to provide essential services, ensure safety, and uphold laws. For many Rwandans, life after 1994 involved regular interactions with institutions that were becoming more predictable in their actions and expectations. Schools reopened, health services were restored, and local government systems operated with a level of consistency that had not been seen immediately after the genocide. Such institutional reliability was a powerful tool for restoring daily life and basic order.

However, Rwanda’s experience also shows the limits of vertical confidence, especially when horizontal confidence—trust between different communities and across social groups—is limited. Since 1994, the political environment in Rwanda has been tightly controlled, with restrictions on political diversity and limited space for different opinions. Scholars like [21] and [20] argue that this control helped bring stability but also prevented open discussions about identity and governance. As a result, horizontal confidence—the kind that comes from real social reconciliation and mutual trust between groups—has not been widespread.

In terms of narratives, Rwanda’s media environment—including official messages, news reports, and international coverage—played an important role in shaping how institutions were seen. Government messages focused on themes like national unity, economic progress, and social change, reinforcing the idea that Rwanda was on a clear path to stability. At the same time, international media and academic analysis often highlighted Rwanda’s development successes, especially in poverty reduction and public health, even as they questioned the political limitations. This narrative support helped solidify public views of reliability, presenting predictable institutions as the main part of post-conflict recovery.

A concrete example of narrative reinforcement can be seen in the role of The New Times, Rwanda’s leading English-language newspaper, which consistently framed post-1994 governance through themes of national unity, anti-corruption enforcement, and performance-based accountability. Regular reporting on local government evaluations under the Imihigo performance contract system presented administrative compliance as measurable and expected, reinforcing vertical predictability ([14]; [21]). In broadcast media, Radio Rwanda and affiliated outlets repeatedly emphasized security updates, development milestones, and official responses to dissent, often presenting state intervention as orderly and procedural rather than coercive. This repetition normalized the expectation that disputes would be managed institutionally. International coverage in outlets such as the BBC and The Economist similarly amplified Rwanda’s economic growth and public health successes, contributing to an external narrative of technocratic reliability even while academic literature questioned political pluralism ([20]).

Yet the Rwandan case also warns against seeing predictability as a sign of inclusive legitimacy. While institutional actions were consistent and led to real benefits, the space for different opinions remained limited, and true horizontal reconciliation was uneven. This suggests that long-term social confidence requires more than well-functioning institutions—it requires inclusive legitimacy, where different groups feel represented and heard.

South Africa’s shift from apartheid to a democratic system in 1994 serves as a contrasting example where symbolic confidence had a major role. The agreement that ended many years of institutionalized racial separation led to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a constitutional guarantee of human rights, and new legal protections intended to recognize past wrongs and guide a fairer future ([10]).

The TRC became a strong symbol of moral accountability. It offered a public space where victims and those who committed violence during the apartheid period could share their stories, ask for forgiveness, and face the consequences of systematic injustice. As [22] explains, the TRC helped build a narrative of national unity by acknowledging pain and asserting a shared commitment to democracy. In the early days of democracy, this symbolic confidence turned into broad optimism, both at home and abroad. South Africa was praised as a model of peaceful change and moral leadership.

However, this early confidence did not automatically lead to reliable institutions in the daily lives of citizens. Scholars such as [16] and [17] point out that structural inequalities in income, land ownership, access to quality education, and public services continued long after apartheid ended. While democratic institutions represented democratic values and provided symbolic assurances, many South Africans still faced unequal service delivery and limited access to economic opportunities.

Over time, the distance between symbolic promises and real outcomes weakened public confidence. There was a growing feeling that the guarantees in the constitution and symbolic gestures had not been matched by real and lasting improvements in everyday life. This shows an important lesson: symbolic actions alone cannot keep public trust alive without steady institutional performance and real results.

Media and publishing played a key role in shaping and reshaping public narratives. Early coverage of the TRC and democratic transition focused on reconciliation and the success of the constitution. However, later reporting often turned to issues like corruption, failed service delivery, and social unrest. Domestic media explored the gap between policy talk and real results, while international media highlighted the ongoing inequality and social division. The way these stories were told affected how both South Africans and the global community viewed the country’s progress.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings were broadcast nationally by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), allowing citizens to witness testimony in real time. This extensive coverage transformed the TRC into a shared national experience rather than a closed legal process, reinforcing symbolic confidence in constitutional democracy ([22]). Newspapers such as the Mail & Guardian and Business Day initially framed the transition as a moral breakthrough, frequently using the language of reconciliation and “miracle transition”.

However, in the 2000s, investigative reporting—particularly on corruption scandals and service delivery failures—shifted the narrative toward institutional accountability gaps. Coverage of municipal protests and state capture allegations ([17]) reframed public expectations, highlighting the disconnect between constitutional symbolism and material governance outcomes. This shift illustrates how media narratives recalibrated confidence from symbolic unity to performance-based evaluation.

Therefore, South Africa shows that symbolic confidence needs to be backed by real and institutional reliability to maintain public trust. When the symbolic and real aspects of governance drift apart, the result can be loss of trust and declining civic involvement.

Liberia’s civil wars (1989-2003) left the country deeply divided, with many armed groups, broken institutions, and large-scale displacement. The 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement laid the foundation for a peacebuilding effort that included a series of gradual reforms to restore governance and public confidence.

Important among these reforms were judicial restructuring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, and monitored elections. According to [25], Liberia’s peacebuilding process emphasized the step-by-step integration of former combatants into civilian life and the creation of predictable governance structures like set electoral schedules and institutional appointments.

The monitored elections that followed the Accra agreement, including the 2005 election that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf into power, played a major role in building vertical confidence—citizens saw clear patterns in how public power was managed and how political leadership changed. Reintegration programs placed former fighters into economic programs and vocational training, reducing the chances of renewed violence and promoting stability.

Media coverage in Liberia, despite limited infrastructure and uneven access, framed these developments as clear and verifiable steps towards stable governance. International media also highlighted the role of monitored elections and DDR programs in building trust. This media attention helped reinforce the predictable nature of the process and built public expectations that governance reforms were not random but part of a clear plan.

During Liberia’s disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process, local newspapers such as the Daily Observer and radio stations like ELBC regularly published verification figures on weapons collected and combatants processed. Reporting often emphasized numerical milestones—numbers disarmed, cantonment sites closed, vocational trainees enrolled—turning technical benchmarks into visible signs of procedural progress ([3]). Similarly, international reporting on the 2005 election that brought Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to power highlighted the orderly conduct of polling stations and the presence of international observers. Coverage by outlets such as Reuters and BBC Africa framed the election as peaceful and procedurally credible, reinforcing vertical confidence that leadership change could occur through ballots rather than violence.

The Liberian case shows that predictable, incremental governance reforms can stabilize expectations and that media coverage that highlights these steps strengthens public confidence. However, as in other cases, maintaining long-term confidence requires consistent follow-through on the promises made in early reforms.

Sierra Leone’s civil war ended in 2002 with a peace agreement that began a complex transition to stability. Unlike in other situations where the central government led most efforts, Sierra Leone’s post-conflict recovery focused heavily on community-driven reintegration, strengthening local governance, and judicial reform ([3]).

One of the key elements of Sierra Leone’s peace process was the reintegration of ex-combatants, supported by formal programs and community acceptance. The aim was not only to disarm fighters but also to rebuild social bonds and shared expectations within affected communities. Researchers like [15] highlight that community forums, local councils, and participatory projects formed the basis of horizontal confidence—trust among citizens who had previously been in violent conflict.

Local media, especially community radio stations, played an important role in this process. By sharing stories of reconciliation, highlighting small improvements in local governance, and offering a space for various voices, these media outlets contributed to narratives of inclusive progress. Unlike top-down coverage that focused on national changes, community media helped citizens observe gradual and visible improvements in their neighborhoods and social circles.

Community radio played a particularly measurable role in shaping post-war expectations. Stations such as Radio UNAMSIL (later Radio Democracy 98.1) broadcast call-in programs where former combatants, local chiefs, and civil society representatives discussed reintegration and local governance reforms. These forums made dispute resolution visible and normalized dialogue as a legitimate mechanism for addressing grievances ([15]; [3]). Programs frequently highlighted small but concrete improvements—school reopenings, local council meetings, agricultural initiatives—framing them as shared community achievements rather than top-down directives. By focusing on local voices and incremental recovery, community broadcasting strengthened horizontal confidence and helped citizens interpret peace as participatory and ongoing rather than externally imposed.

The Sierra Leonean example suggests that horizontal confidence—trust between citizens from different social groups—can be built when governance changes involve local participants and when media coverage reflects community-level progress. This bottom-up confidence supports vertical confidence and helps create a more unified sense of public trust.

After 2005, Burundi’s peacebuilding process included a series of negotiations, agreements, and institutional arrangements aimed at reducing ethnic tensions and encouraging cooperation. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which came before the official end of widespread conflict, highlighted the importance of sharing power among ethnic groups, monitoring elections, and demobilizing armed groups ([23]).

These power-sharing arrangements created predictable frameworks for representation within government bodies and security forces, which helped reduce competition for political influence. The consistent application of agreed-upon rules, such as quotas and oversight mechanisms, enabled political actors to work together, even when trust was still fragile.

From a narrative perspective, Burundi’s political communications and media often presented disputes not as signs of system failure but as manageable issues within the broader context of peacebuilding. In situations where renewed conflict was possible, this framing helped maintain the strength of institutions by focusing on the durability of agreements and the potential for peaceful resolution. Over time, these narratives contributed to a sense of continuity, helping the public see political disagreements as part of normal governance rather than as existential threats.

Following the implementation of the Arusha framework, national media outlets and political communication platforms frequently framed ethnic quota implementation and coalition negotiations as procedural obligations rather than zero-sum contests. Reporting in publications such as Iwacu often described parliamentary disputes in terms of constitutional process—debates, votes, oversight—rather than existential ethnic confrontation ([23]). However, during moments of political tension, especially surrounding the 2015 electoral crisis, divergent narratives emerged. Independent media that questioned executive decisions were restricted or suspended, demonstrating how limits on media pluralism can weaken confidence by reducing transparency. The contrast between earlier procedural framing and later restrictions illustrates how narrative consistency is directly linked to institutional resilience.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents one of the most difficult cases of post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. Even after formal peace processes and agreements, particularly the 2003 Pretoria Accord, which was supposed to end the Second Congo War, the country has continued to face violence involving multiple armed groups, porous borders, and weak or absent state authority in many regions ([18]).

Efforts to build confidence in the DRC have included measures such as ceasefire agreements, transitional justice programs, and initiatives to strengthen local governance. While these efforts have led to some localized improvements, systemic challenges have limited their broader effects. In certain areas, vertical confidence in state institutions exists—citizens regularly interact with local offices, civil servants, or security personnel. However, horizontal confidence—trust between different ethnic or factional groups—remains weak due to recurring violence and the ongoing presence of armed groups.

In the DRC, media and international reporting often highlight incremental progress, such as local disarmament successes or electoral milestones, framing these as steps toward eventual national stability. These narratives help contextualize partial gains and prevent isolated setbacks from overshadowing overall progress. However, when institutional performance is inconsistent or violence resurges, these narratives can be undermined by conflicting interpretations, leading to uncertainty and fluctuating public confidence.

In the DRC, UN-affiliated outlets such as Radio Okapi—established by MONUC—have played a central informational role. Radio Okapi regularly reported on local ceasefire adherence, DDR participation, and election logistics, providing region-specific updates that translated complex peace processes into accessible, repeated information ([18]). This helped create localized vertical confidence even when national stability remained fragile. International media coverage of the 2006 and 2018 elections frequently emphasized voter turnout figures, logistical challenges, and observer assessments. While such reporting highlighted procedural milestones, it also exposed irregularities, contributing to fluctuating public confidence. The coexistence of progress-oriented and skepticism-oriented narratives illustrates how fragile confidence remains when institutional performance is uneven.

Across these six African cases, several clear patterns emerge that provide insights into broader dynamics in post-conflict governance and public confidence.

1) Vertical confidence is easier to establish than horizontal confidence. Vertical confidence—trust in the predictability and performance of state institutions—is more easily built through consistent service delivery, legal reforms, and strong enforcement of security. Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone each demonstrated that when citizens can reliably expect institutional behavior, trust in those institutions becomes more stable. Horizontal confidence—trust between communities with past conflicts—requires more intentional social reconciliation efforts and sustained engagement across group boundaries.

2) Incrementalism builds sustainable confidence. Small, measurable steps towards institutional reform, whether through monitored elections, community reintegration programs, or local governance initiatives, significantly contribute to citizens’ sense that change is real and not just talk. Incremental progress allows people to evaluate progress against clear markers, which builds trust over time.

3) Narrative alignment matters. The way media and publishing environments frame institutional actions shapes how the public interprets what is happening. When narratives consistently align with institutional actions—through national media, local radio, or international reporting—they help match public expectations with governance paths. However, when narratives do not match reality, confidence can be undermined.

4) Symbolic measures are insufficient alone. Symbolic confidence-boosting actions, such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, can create initial optimism but must be supported by ongoing institutional performance to have a lasting impact on public trust. Symbolic actions without real follow-through can lead to unmet expectations.

5) Confidence is temporal. Consistent and predictable behavior over time is more important than dramatic gestures. Trust increases when institutions reliably deliver predictable outcomes over months and years, shaping what political sociologists call institutional habitus—deeply ingrained expectations about how authority functions.

1) Incrementalism over immediacy. African confidence-building efforts focus on taking slow, step-by-step actions that can be checked and verified, instead of making sudden or large-scale changes. This way, there is less risk of overreaching and more chance of achieving realistic goals. For example, carrying out security reforms in stages or gradually improving how security institutions are managed allows all involved to track progress and make changes based on what they see happening ([5]). By focusing on clear and measurable progress, this approach helps build trust between groups that may have past conflicts or mutual distrust.

2) Predictability over ambition. Trust is usually not built through highly ambitious or risky projects. Instead, being steady and dependable over time increases the belief that others can rely on you. When actions are predictable, like keeping peace agreements or consistently providing public services, it shows that you are reliable, and this builds trust with both local and international partners ([7]). Predictable actions help reduce confusion and uncertainty in unstable situations, setting the stage for better teamwork.

3) Reversibility over permanence. Trying out or testing new approaches that can be undone if needed allows parties to experiment with working together without having to make long-term and final decisions. This idea is especially useful in societies that are dealing with the aftermath of conflict, where things are still changing and there’s a risk of going back to old ways ([11]). Using temporary missions to monitor situations, starting with small projects to reform courts, or slowly removing military forces all offer a way to see if things work, learn from problems, and gradually build trust before making final and lasting decisions.

4) Visibility without spectacle. The actions taken should be clear and noticeable enough to help build trust, but not done just for show. Measures that are publicly known, such as sharing information about security events or engaging with local communities, help show that institutions are trustworthy and responsible ([19]). By keeping things from getting too much attention, countries can avoid the feeling that they are only making fake efforts while still making sure their confidence-building steps are seen as real and meaningful.

1) Security Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).These include monitored ceasefires, joint patrols, and the removal of weapons. These measures are essential in lowering the risk of armed conflict and showing that the parties involved are serious about working together ([4]).

2) Judicial and Policing Reform. It is important to have fair and consistent application of the law to build trust in society. Reform efforts may involve training security personnel, making sure the judiciary is independent, and creating systems that hold people accountable to stop abuse and corruption ([1]).

3) Inclusive Service Delivery. Ensuring everyone has access to justice, education, healthcare, and other public services shows that the government is committed to the whole population. This inclusivity helps reduce anger and dissatisfaction that can lead to instability and builds confidence in government institutions ([12]).

4) Structured Communication. Clear and open communication through public reports, media interaction, and discussions with different groups ensures that confidence-building efforts are well understood and accepted. Good communication helps manage expectations, explain intentions, and stop the spread of false information that could harm trust ([9]).

By using these important strategies and tools, African confidence-building efforts can help create lasting peace, improve governance, and bring different groups in society together.