The role of governance and institutions in the process of economic growth and development has been the subject of particular attention within the academic community and among policymakers, especially in developing countries, since the early 1990s. Political institutions, which determine how society is governed and the extent of political participation, are an important aspect of the study of the role of governance and institutions in a country’s economic development. There is a wealth of literature on the subject, including the relationship between political regime and economic growth and, more specifically, the relationship between democracy and economic growth, which is a key area of study in this field.

The political system of a state refers to the institutional architecture that frames the rules of the political game. It structures the way leaders are chosen, decisions are made, and conflicts are arbitrated ([44]). Thus, the political regime refers to the set of institutions, rules, and practices that organize political power, define how it is exercised, and structure the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. [28] and [18] analyze the political regime from several angles: the method of appointing those who govern, the degree of separation of powers, the level of political pluralism, respect for civil and political liberties, and the role of the armed forces in the political system. There are several types of political regime, including democracy and single-party rule ([25]).

Democracy can be defined as a political system in which citizens have the effective opportunity to participate in political decisions through free, fair, and frequent elections ([17]). It is based on popular sovereignty, separation of powers, political pluralism, and the protection of fundamental freedoms ([29]; [18]). In contrast, the single-party system, widespread in Africa in the post-independence decades, is characterized by the monopolization of power by a single party, the absence of meaningful electoral competition, and tight control of society and the media ([11]).

Analysis of the relationship between political regime, democracy, and economic growth suggests different results that remain very mixed. Some authors, such as [35] and [1], argue that democracy promotes growth by strengthening institutions, protecting property rights, and reducing political instability. Others argue that this relationship is not direct. They argue that democracy promotes growth by improving human capital accumulation, reducing income inequality, reducing inflation and political instability, and increasing economic freedoms ([45]; [19]). The analysis by [46] relativizes the idea that democracy is necessary for growth. Indeed, she argues that East Asian countries and regions such as Taiwan region and South Korea have experienced periods of strong growth thanks to interventionist and strategic states that have pursued policies in non-democratic contexts. She even suggests that in some contexts, democracy could reduce growth. [43], while distinguishing between economic democracy and political democracy, believes that political democracy indirectly influences growth by improving economic democracy. In line with this idea, others show that democracy acts more through political stability and the improvement of economic institutions and therefore that in the case of weak institutions or compromised stability, democracy may have no effect on growth or even be slightly restrictive for growth ([8]). According to [27], the number of changes in a country’s leadership has a positive effect on long-term economic growth, and being in a year of change tends to penalize growth because of the costs associated with political change.

Côte d’Ivoire is a prime example for exploring this complex relationship, as its history combines political change, sociopolitical crisis, institutional instability, and various periods of growth. Indeed, since gaining independence in 1960, it has experienced two major political regimes: the single-party system that lasted from independence until 1990, and the multiparty system that began in 1990 and continues to this day, marking the beginning of the country’s democratic process, not to mention the military coups and socio-political crises that punctuated these periods. In view of the different results achieved in terms of economic growth under these two regimes, one may wonder about the link between political regime and economic growth. Has multiparty politics led to better economic performance than a single-party system? What were the most important factors contributing to wealth creation under each of the regimes? With the democratic process underway, what conditions are necessary for the country to maximize its economic growth?

The objective of this study is twofold: (i) first, to empirically analyze the relationship between political regime and economic growth in Côte d’Ivoire, taking into account the country’s political trajectory since 1960; (ii) second, to identify the institutional, economic, and social mechanisms through which democracy can influence economic performance.

This study is justified first and foremost by the fact that Côte d’Ivoire remains a young democracy after some 30 years of multiparty rule. Thus, unlike in the major democratic powers, efforts to effectively practice democracy are still hampered by multiple problems. Indeed, constitutional amendments aimed at maintaining power, the lack of consensus and transparency in the electoral process, election rigging, post-election conflicts, the strong tribalization of politics, and the lack of complete independence of the judiciary are all problems that can undermine political life in Côte d’Ivoire, as in most young democracies. After years of effort, it is therefore important to measure the contribution of this transition to democracy to economic growth. To our knowledge, no study of this kind aimed at establishing links between democracy and economic growth has been conducted for the specific case of Côte d’Ivoire. This study is interesting in that it makes a quantitative comparison of the performance of the two political regimes that have existed in Côte d’Ivoire to date. These main points do not seem to have been sufficiently taken into account in studies seeking to establish a link between democracy and economic growth. Indeed, most of these studies use panel data that do not allow for the type of political regime to be taken into account. Furthermore, panel data ignore variables specific to each country in their democratic process in order to integrate variables that are aggregate indicators. In addition, this study highlights the specific nature of Côte d’Ivoire in the search for a link between democracy and economic growth. This will make it possible to establish the specific criteria in terms of democracy that are necessary for stronger growth in Côte d’Ivoire.

Based on a generalized linear model (GLM) applied to the Cobb-Douglas growth model, the study first aims to test the significance of the relationship between political regime and economic growth. It then determines the factors that contribute most significantly to the formation of gross domestic product (GDP) according to the type of regime. Finally, it conducts a simulation and then compares GDP between single-party and multiparty systems.

This study is organized into three sections. Section 1 reviews the literature on the link between political institutions and growth. The methodological approach is presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the results and findings.

Analysis of the link between political systems and economic growth remains dominated by the relationship between democracy and economic growth. Studies on the latter show, on the one hand, a positive and significant relationship between democracy and economic growth and, on the other hand, a negative and significant relationship, whether theoretical or empirical.

Pioneering work on the general framework of the relationship between institutions and economic performance dates back to [35]. He developed an analytical framework to explain how institutions and institutional changes influence the performance of economies at a given point in time and over time.

Thus, following his work, several studies support the idea of a positive, direct or indirect effect between democracy and economic growth. [24], in a summary of studies on the relationship between democracy and growth, indicate that some empirical studies show that democracy promotes growth. These include [9], who argues that democracy facilitates modernization and growth, and [13], who point to a positive link between democracy and development. This is because democracy, when it promotes political competition, encourages leaders to adopt economic policies that are conducive to economic growth ([32]). Indeed, any government in a democratic country that adopts inappropriate regulations is removed by citizens through the electoral process ([35]). Another explanation for the positive relationship between democracy and growth is that democracy, as a factor of institutional quality, improves the ability to adapt to shocks, stability, predictability ([41]; [22]) and promotes more stable, inclusive, and sustainable growth ([42]). In addition, the effects of democracy on growth are mediated by an increase in life expectancy for poor countries and secondary education for non-poor countries ([7]).

For other authors, the effect of democracy on economic performance is not direct. [45] highlight the indirect nature of the institutional framework’s impact on growth. In their view, the institutional form of a regime is not a priori linked to the rate of production accumulation, but it does seem essential in determining the efficiency of certain factors of production and establishing a climate conducive to growth. In the same vein, [19] show that democracy has no direct effects on economic growth, but it does have robust, significant, and positive indirect effects thanks to higher human capital, lower inflation, less political instability, and higher levels of economic freedom. For [37], the positive effect of democracy on growth comes through democratic capital, i.e., the accumulation of experiences, practices, and institutions related to democracy that reinforce its stability and impact on growth. However, this positive effect is only observable after a certain period of time, as during the democratic transition period growth declines before stabilizing in the medium and long term at a high level thanks to better protection of property rights, reduced social tensions, improved economic policies, and greater openness to trade and investment ([36]). [21] show that political regime change leads to a long-term increase in the economic growth rate of 1 percentage point regardless of the direction, but that a gradual transition to democracy has no significant effect on growth.

Finally, for other authors, such as [43], [22], and [38], there is no robust relationship to support the claim that democracy systematically guarantees economic growth. Democracy can even have negative effects on the economy. [8] show that the effect of democracy on growth is statistically insignificant in the absence of a stable political framework and that, ultimately, it is democracy in a politically stable environment that has a significantly positive effect on growth. For [6], democracy can have a negative effect on foreign direct investment for countries dependent on natural resources, thereby slowing growth, as [46] shows in certain cases. Indeed, as [3] show, forcing redistribution by allowing low-income individuals to vote in favor of income redistribution policies can be detrimental to growth.

To our knowledge, no study of this kind aimed at establishing links between democracy and economic growth has been conducted for the specific case of Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, the vast majority of these studies use panel data that do not allow for the type of political regime (single-party versus multiparty) to be taken into account. This makes it impossible to carry out a comparative analysis between the different regimes. Furthermore, panel data ignore variables specific to each country in their democratic process in order to integrate variables that are aggregate indicators based on specific variables. This study therefore provides a clearer picture of the specific characteristics of Côte d’Ivoire in the search for a link between democracy and economic growth. This will make it possible to establish the specific criteria in terms of democracy that are necessary for stronger growth in Côte d’Ivoire.

GDP growth remains heavily dependent on traditional variables such as labor, capital formation, and openness to the outside world through international trade. However, the contributions of these different variables to wealth creation vary significantly depending on the type of political system. In general, when moving from a single-party to a multiparty system, GDP growth is 2% higher for multiparty systems (18%) than for single-party systems (16%), meaning that national wealth increases faster in multiparty systems than in single-party systems. According to the study’s findings, this can be explained by a greater contribution from labor and trade openness in a multiparty system than in a single-party system. On the one hand, the elasticity of GDP with respect to labor is almost equal to 1 in a multiparty system, compared to 0.65 in a single-party system. On the other hand, the elasticity of GDP with respect to trade openness is 0.57 for multiparty systems, compared to 0.52 for single-party systems. Explanations for such relationships between democracy and GDP could be provided by [41] and [45]. [41] indicates that democratic countries pay higher real wages in the manufacturing sector than authoritarian regimes. Indeed, paying higher wages in a democratic regime improves labor market conditions and promotes greater wealth creation. For [45], multiparty politics, through the accumulation of human capital, has a positive and robust effect on growth. Indeed, the labor market is stimulated, which reduces unemployment and promotes economic growth.

Furthermore, unlike labor and trade liberalization, which have a greater impact on growth in multiparty systems than in single-party systems, capital contributes more to wealth creation in single-party systems than in multiparty systems. Several explanations can be put forward to support this observation. The first is that multiparty systems are characterized by political instability and a certain degree of economic unpredictability. In such a situation, long-term capital investment is hampered. [1] show that the transition to democracy can lead to institutional instability and affect capital investment. [35] argued that political institutions have a direct effect on investment, depending on the level of predictability associated with the rules of the game. Another explanation is that decision-makers in single-party regimes may choose to direct resources toward strategic investments, thereby boosting growth ([5]; [41]).

Official development assistance does not generally contribute to GDP growth based on the data as a whole. However, during the single-party period, it had a significant positive effect on GDP. In fact, a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of development assistance led to a 1.8% increase in GDP. During the multi-party period, however, a 1% increase in the rate of official development assistance led to a significant decline of 1.6%. Thus, contrary to many studies that argue that official development assistance has a positive effect on growth ([14]), the case of Côte d’Ivoire shows otherwise. Several mechanisms could explain such a relationship. On the one hand, aid dependence tends to reduce efforts to mobilize domestic resources as well as incentive for structural reforms, whereby creating a situation of chronic vulnerability ([20]; [33]). On the other hand, some authors highlight the Dutch disease effect according to which massive inflows external aid lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, thus reducing export competitiveness and hindering productive diversification ([40]). Moreover, weak institutions and poor governance can divert aid from intended objectives, thereby limiting its impact on growth ([10]; [14]; [15]). Finally, misallocation of resources ([12]; [16]), the nature of the aid itself ([39]), and the sectorial orientation of aid ([16]) may also explain the negative effect of official development assistance on economic growth.

A comparison of economic performance results between single-party and multiparty systems shows that, overall, multiparty systems seem to yield better results in terms of economic growth. The transition from a single-party to a multiparty system led to a significant increase in GDP of between 16.1% and 18.1%. It therefore appears that multiparty systems, and even democracy, remain necessary if the country wishes to achieve better performance. However, this performance cannot be attributed to political change, since in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the study indicates that political change has a significant negative effect on growth. In fact, when the number of changes in government increases by one, real GDP falls by 10.4%, all other things being equal. This result contradicts that of [27], according to which the number of changes in government has a positive effect on long-term growth. Such a contradiction could raise the question of the conditions under which political alternation takes place in a multiparty system and the consequences of alternation. [26], in their study of the characterization of economic growth, show that breaks in growth in Côte d’Ivoire occurred in 1971, 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2010 for six regimes, including 1999-2009 and 2010-2021. The latter two periods are those in which political and military factors appear to have had a severe impact on Côte d’Ivoire’s growth ([26]). Both periods were marked by political change accompanied by serious socio-political crises, including the coup d’état of 1999, the rebellion of 2002, and the post-election crises of 2010 and 2020. Consequently, the significant negative relationship between the number of changes in government and growth could be explained by the political instability created around election years. This is all the more true given that, during its 36 years of democratic transition, Côte d’Ivoire has experienced a coup d’état and a series of post-election crises: the coup d’état of 1999, the crisis of 2000 and that of 2002, which led to the partition of Côte d’Ivoire into two parts, one under government control and the other under rebel control; and those arising from the contested elections of 2010 and 2020. Such a situation is likely to discourage capital formation and therefore investment, thereby slowing economic growth. This would undoubtedly explain why, according to this study, capital has not been significant in GDP formation over the past 30 years of the democratic process. However, although the analysis clearly establishes a link between negative effect of political alternation and instability, it should be noted that the alternation variable remains a proxy variable and that the use the political instability index could be an interesting direction for future research.

Furthermore, the fact that capital investment proved insignificant for growth during the multiparty period suggests that democratization alone does not guarantee economic attractiveness. In the current democratic context of Côte d’Ivoire, it appears necessary to strengthen the credibility of economic and political institutions, ensure the stability of the regulatory framework, and guarantee legal security for investors. Public policies should therefore prioritize the consolidation of economic governance, transparency in public markets, and the promotion of a predictable business climate in order to translate democratic gains into opportunities for sustainable investment.

Moreover, the study shows that while the multiparty system appears to be generally beneficial for economic growth, episodes of political alternation seem to have short-term adverse effects. This apparent contradiction, which should not occur in a well-functioning multiparty system, can be explained by the distinction between the democratic institutional framework—characterized by political competition and accountability of leaders—and the contextual events of power transfer, which are often accompanied by tensions and uncertainties. When consolidated, multiparty system promotes transparency, citizen participation, and stability of the rules of the game, thereby creating a favorable environment for investment and growth ([1]). Conversely, non-institutionalized political alternations may lead to policy discontinuities, cautious behavior among economic agents, and temporary institutional instability ([4]). The challenge for Côte d’Ivoire is therefore not to avoid changes in political leadership, but to strengthen mechanisms that ensure peaceful and predictable transitions of power, so that democracy becomes a lasting source of confidence and economic performance.

Thus, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, in order to take full advantage of democracy, everything must be done to avoid political instability. This requires strengthening the rule of law and justice, ensuring electoral transparency, improving institutional transparency, and promoting the effective emergence of countervailing power to prevent democracy from being hijacked by economic and political elites. Such improvement and consolidation of democratic institutions will create an economic environment conducive to economic growth.

The objective of this study was to show that the choice of political regime has an impact on economic growth in Côte d’Ivoire. Using a Generalized Linear Model, it appears that traditional economic variables such as capital, labor, and trade openness are significant for GDP formation at the 1% threshold.

When capital increases by 10%, GDP increases by 1.87% to 2.15% on average according to the model, all other things being equal. With regard to labor, a 10% increase in labor leads to an average increase in GDP of 6.01% to 7.11% according to the model. Opening up the country’s trade to the outside world leads to an increase in GDP of between 5.28% and 5.77% when trade increases by 10%. Finally, there is a negative correlation between official development assistance and GDP; a 1% increase in the rate of official development assistance leads to a decline in GDP of between 1.3%.

Furthermore, the political regime has been found to be positively linked to economic growth at the 1% threshold. The transition from a single-party to a multi-party system in Côte d’Ivoire has led to an average increase in GDP of between 16.1% and 18.3%, all other things being equal.

However, the various contributions of the main economic variables in the model change depending on the political regime in place. Thus, with a multiparty system, capital proved to be insignificant for GDP formation even at the 10% threshold, whereas it remains very significant in the case of a single-party system, where a doubling of capital leads to a 21% increase in GDP. The opening up of the country through trade has approximately the same effect on GDP in both single-party and multiparty systems. Indeed, the elasticities of GDP in relation to the volume of trade in goods and services are 0.53 and 0.57 for single-party and multiparty systems, respectively. Labor remains the most contributory variable, whether in a single-party or multi-party system. However, the elasticity of GDP with respect to labor in the case of a multi-party system (0.996) is about 1.5 times higher than that of a single-party system (0.653).

As for official development assistance, it does not have a positive impact on GDP in a multiparty system, since a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of development assistance leads to a 1.3% decline in GDP. On the other hand, GDP increases by 1.8% following a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of development assistance in a single-party system. The alternation of power has a negative effect on gross domestic product formation in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, each transition to a new alternation of power leads to a fall in GDP of between 9.4% and 10.5% according to the model for the entire period of the study, and 13% for the period of multiparty politics alone. Finally, the simulation results indicate that, in terms of GDP growth, the performance of multiparty systems is superior to that of single-party systems. However, this is not due to alternation, as the number of alternations has a significant negative effect on GDP. This could undoubtedly be explained by the political instability surrounding election periods, in this case post-election crises, which discourage capital formation and investment and lead to a decline in economic growth.

At the conclusion of this study, rather than comparing the merits of the two political regimes experienced in Côte d’Ivoire, we emphasize that multiparty systems or democracy alone cannot be a panacea for achieving economic growth objectives. Thus, in the Ivorian case, even though multiparty politics or democracy allows for better economic performance than a one-party system, it nevertheless remains an insufficient condition for ensuring sustainable growth as long it continues to be marked by frequent political instability. It is therefore necessary to take all appropriate measures to prevent political instability if the country is fully benefit from the democratic process initiated since 1990. The State must therefore strengthen the rule of law and justice, ensure electoral transparency, ensure institutional transparency, and promote the effective emergence of counter-powers in order to prevent from being taken hostage by economic and political elites. This will help to improve and consolidate democratic institutions and, consequently, create an economic environment conducive to sustainable economic growth.