This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and the financial performance of firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) in 2019, a period following the Greek sovereign debt crisis. A growing crisis-focused literature underscores why revisiting governance-performance links in turbulent periods is empirically valuable; recent studies examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance under financial stress (e.g., Ahmad et al., 2023 ; Mansour et al., 2022 ). Examining this relationship at that juncture is of particular interest, as a “theoretically” developed national market within a euro area (EA) member state had been severely affected in the preceding years by a deep fiscal crisis, followed by a major financial crisis ( Kalemli-Özcan et al., 2016 ). This unprecedented episode attracted considerable scholarly attention, with studies focusing on its consequences and on the measures adopted to restructure the Greek financial system, as well as on the responses of non-financial corporations (e.g., Kosmidou et al., 2015 ). Beyond the operational and financial repercussions, the crisis also brought about significant changes in corporate governance practices. At the same time, Greece can also be viewed as “developing” country along certain structural dimensions ( Vadasi et al., 2021 ), and the literature increasingly investigates governance-performance links in developing or emerging settings (e.g., Abebe Zelalem et al., 2022 ; Antwi et al., 2021 ; Miao et al., 2023 ) and the role of country-specific governance environments in shaping this relationship ( Wu, 2021 ). Further, recent work underscores both the research salience of the Greek case during the crisis ( Tsiapa, 2022 ) and the functioning of corporate-governance mechanisms in that period (e.g., Arvanitis et al., 2022 ; Kalantonis et al., 2022 ; Vadasi & Polyzos, 2023 ). Specifically, Greece exhibits concentrated ownership patterns, weaker institutional enforcement, and limited market discipline, dimensions that can condition how governance mechanisms map into performance.

This study connects directly to prior Greek evidence on corporate governance and performance during the crisis period. It relates to Bekiaris (2021) , who analyzes how board structure relates to performance in Greek systemic banks over 2008-2018, and to Kalantonis et al. (2023) , who examine listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange over 2008-2016. Both studies focus on crisis-era conditions and document how board attributes map into performance in the Greek setting. The analysis extends this research agenda by shifting the lens to the immediate post-crisis year and by concentrating on non-financial ASE-listed firms in 2019, thereby assessing whether the crisis-era relationships persist, attenuate, or reverse once extraordinary conditions recede.

The choice of 2019 is deliberate and central to our contribution. It is the first full year after Greece’s exit from its economic adjustment programs (August 2018) and the last pre-pandemic year before large exogenous shocks (COVID-19, supply-chain disruptions, geopolitical tensions, inflation) reshaped corporate outcomes from 2020 onward. Studying 2019 allows us to isolate the legacy effects of the sovereign-debt crisis on governance-performance links without contamination by new global shocks, while also maintaining continuity with the time windows in Bekiaris (2021) and Kalantonis et al. (2023) . In this sense, 2019 functions as a transitional post-crisis year, a pivotal point between the crisis decade and the subsequent shock-prone period, providing a clean setting to evaluate governance mechanisms in a country specific market.

Importantly, 2019 captures a transitional business and institutional environment. Firms had largely absorbed crisis-era reforms, yet these arrangements had not been “stress-applied” under new adverse conditions; the acceptance of new norms was broadly in place, but their practical implementation, maturation, and measurable impact on performance still required empirical scrutiny. The Greek crisis and its aftermath therefore operate as a natural stress test for corporate-governance theories (agency, resource dependence, stewardship) under tight credit, heightened regulatory oversight, macroeconomic uncertainty, and stronger transparency demands. This context, combined with crisis-era conditionality and supervisory scrutiny that effectively turn regulation into a quasi-experimental policy backdrop, offers evidence on the external validity of governance mechanisms. As the last pre-pandemic year, 2019 provides a clean benchmark with generalizable lessons for jurisdictions experiencing or exiting fiscal, banking, or confidence crises.

At the onset of the crisis, corporate governance in Greece was characterized by numerous laws, legislative acts, regulations, and regulatory decisions (e.g., Law 2190/1920; Law 3016/2002; Law 3601/2007; Law 3606/2007; Law 3864/2010), which, despite their complexity, generally conformed to contemporaneous corporate-governance requirements ( Bekiaris, 2021 ; Nerantzidis & Filos, 2014 ). However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms was relatively weak compared with international standards ( Lazarides & Drimpetas, 2011 ). Subsequent changes in corporate governance introduced stricter rules for the effective functioning of boards of directors (BoDs), a clear separation among executive, non-executive, and independent board members, and reinforced the independence of the chairpersons of key board committees.

The impact of corporate governance on the performance of firms and financial institutions has attracted considerable scholarly attention (e.g., Alodat et al., 2022 ; Assenga et al., 2018 ; Erena et al., 2022 ; Farooq et al., 2022 ; Johl et al., 2015 ; Sarwar et al., 2022 ; Terjesen et al., 2015 ). Against this backdrop, this study examines the relationship between corporate governance and the performance of firms listed on the ASE in a post-crisis period, thereby complementing existing research.

In brief, the evidence points to three core results: board independence and female representation are positively associated with firm performance, while CEO duality is negatively related. These patterns hold under a robustness check using ROE, with the independence effect even stronger, indicating that the findings are not proxy-specific.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design, sample, data collection, and model specification. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and discussion. Section 5 concludes, highlighting implications, limitations, and avenues for future research.

Over the past twenty-five years, corporate governance has emerged as a core theme in academic research, initially triggered by high-profile corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, Parmalat, WorldCom) and reinforced by the continuing demand for transparency and accountability. Beyond safeguarding shareholder interests ( Shleifer & Vishny, 1997 ), a persistent question is whether governance structures translate into measurable effects on firm performance. Empirical studies document associations between governance features and economic outcomes ( Alodat et al., 2022 ; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008 ; Bhagat & Bolton, 2019 ; Farooq et al., 2022 ), yet the evidence on specific mechanisms remains inconclusive. Scholars widely acknowledge that no single theoretical framework, whether agency, stewardship, or stakeholder theory, sufficiently captures the heterogeneity of findings ( Kiel & Nicholson, 2003 ). In response, several authors advocate integrative perspectives that combine insights from multiple theories ( Gaur et al., 2015 ; Rodriguez-Fernandez et al., 2014 ).

A common element in prior research is the emphasis on the significance for firm performance of board-related attributes such as board size, board independence, board diversity, board ownership, internationalization of the board, and potential conflicts arising from overlapping leadership roles. This study focuses on the effect of board composition on the performance of firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. In line with this literature, the study follows the variable design of Bekiaris (2021) for the banking sector during the crisis and examines a set of board characteristics largely overlapping with those in Kalantonis et al. (2023) , with the distinction that the analysis also includes the presence of foreign directors. Accordingly, the literature links the following board characteristics to performance: 1) board size, 2) board independence, 3) board diversity (gender diversity), 4) board diversity (the presence of foreign directors), and 5) CEO duality.

Board size. The effect of board size on firm performance has been the subject of extensive empirical research, yet the evidence remains inconclusive. Larger boards may be beneficial by broadening the pool of expertise, increasing monitoring capacity, and facilitating access to external resources, thereby enhancing performance ( Gaur et al., 2015 ; Johl et al., 2015 ). From a resource-dependence perspective, directors provide critical linkages to the external environment, and a more populated board can channel diverse knowledge and connections into strategic decision-making ( Hillman & Dalziel, 2003 ; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978 ). However, agency theorists caution that overly large boards risk coordination problems, slower decision-making, and diffusion of responsibility, thereby diminishing effectiveness ( Jensen, 1993 ; Pathan & Faff, 2013 ).

Empirical findings reflect this theoretical ambiguity: some studies document a negative association between board size and performance ( Guney, 2020 ; Miao et al., 2023 ), whereas others report a significant positive effect (e.g., Abebe Zelalem et al., 2022 ; Kapil & Mishra, 2019 ). Given the conflicting results but drawing on the theoretical expectation that larger boards improve monitoring and resource access, the following hypothesis is formulated:

H1: Board size is expected to have a positive association with firm performance.

Board independence. The independence of the board of directors has long been regarded as a cornerstone of good governance, yet empirical evidence on its impact remains far from consistent. Several studies document a positive association between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance, highlighting their role in strengthening oversight and constraining managerial opportunism ( Farooq et al., 2022 ; Kalantonis et al., 2023 ; Mansour et al., 2022 ; Miao et al., 2023 ; Shahrier et al., 2020 ). Other research, however, identifies either negative or insignificant effects: independence has been linked to lower performance in certain contexts ( Gaur et al., 2015 ) and to statistically non-significant outcomes in others ( Assenga et al., 2018 ; Erena et al., 2022 ; Johl et al., 2015 ). Systematic reviews likewise underscore this lack of consensus, particularly in emerging markets where institutional environments may shape the governance-performance nexus ( Antwi et al., 2021 ). Despite these divergent findings, agency theory underscores the role of independent directors in strengthening monitoring and limiting managerial entrenchment, while corporate governance codes (e.g., IoD, 2016 ) reinforce this expectation by formally promoting greater board independence; these arguments support the following hypothesis:

H2: A greater proportion of independent directors is anticipated to be positively related to firm performance.

Gender diversity. A substantial body of research has examined whether board diversity affects firm outcomes, with much of the evidence indicating a positive association between diversity and financial performance (e.g., Assenga et al., 2018 ; Erhardt et al., 2003 ; Lückerath-Rovers, 2011 ). Gender diversity has been a particularly prominent dimension of this debate. Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that female directors can strengthen monitoring and improve board decision-making, thereby enhancing effectiveness. Terjesen et al. (2015) provide supporting evidence, showing that firms with higher female representation tend to perform better across both market-based (Tobin’s Q) and accounting-based (ROA) indicators. More recent studies reinforce these findings in country-specific contexts. Arvanitis et al. (2022) , examining firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange, report a positive relationship between gender diversity and performance, and show that corporate outcomes are maximized once female participation reaches roughly one-third of board membership. Bekiaris (2021) , analyzing Greek banks during the financial crisis, also identifies a significant positive impact of female directors on performance. Gordini and Rancati (2017) , using Italian firms, further demonstrate that gender diversity measured through quantitative indices has a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q, while the mere presence of one or more women directors without broader representation does not yield significant performance effects. Sarhan et al. (2019) similarly conclude that the benefits of gender diversity are more pronounced in well-governed firms, underscoring its complementarity with other governance mechanisms. Based on the above arguments, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H3: Higher female representation on the board is expected to be associated with superior firm performance.

Foreign directors. Another salient dimension of board diversity concerns the appointment of foreign directors. Prior studies have reported mixed evidence, with some showing performance gains and others pointing to drawbacks or null effects ( Assenga et al., 2018 ; Masulis et al., 2012 ; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003 ). More recent evidence underscores the context-dependent nature of these effects. In the Greek banking sector, Bekiaris (2021) documents that foreign directors are negatively associated with bank performance, raising concerns about monitoring effectiveness. Oh et al. (2021) , studying non-financial firms, show that firm value is affected by changes in the composition of foreign independent directors. Nguyen (2023) shows that foreign directors with strong expertise, experience, and networks are positively associated with firm performance; however, appointing additional foreign members does not necessarily enhance outcomes, as it may generate misunderstandings and slow down decision-making. Beyond purely financial metrics, Wu et al. (2024) find that foreign directors contribute positively to firms’ ESG performance, highlighting their broader role in shaping corporate sustainability strategies. Given the conflicting findings, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H4: Firm performance is either positively or negatively associated with the presence of foreign directors on the board.

CEO duality. Stewardship theory posits that unifying the CEO and chair positions can concentrate authority, accelerate decision-making, and align managerial effort, thereby supporting effective governance ( Donaldson & Davis, 1991 ). By contrast, most corporate governance codes caution that combining the two offices may undermine board independence and monitoring capacity; accordingly, they advocate role separation to mitigate agency risks and protect minority shareholders ( HCGC, 2021 ; IoD, 2016 ). Empirically, the evidence is mixed: some work reports performance gains under CEO duality (e.g., Gaur et al., 2015 ) in line with stewardship theory, whereas several studies document penalties, consistent with agency-theoretic predictions. For example, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find that CEO-chair separation is positively associated with operating performance (i.e., duality underperforms); Assenga et al. (2018) and Shahrier et al. (2020) report negative effects on ROA/ROE in Tanzania and Malaysia, respectively; Bekiaris (2021) shows a negative association between CEO duality and performance in the banking sector; Kapil and Mishra (2019) show that separated role of CEO and Chairman of board of directors is impacting all three performance measures, Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE, positively and significantly. Based on the above, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H5: CEO duality is expected to be inversely related to firm performance.

Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework by mapping the research hypotheses (H1 to H5) and the expected signs for each predictor relative to firm financial performance: board size (+), board independence (+), female directors (+), foreign directors (±), and CEO duality (−).

This study examined whether board composition is associated with firm performance in a post-crisis, single-country setting. Using a hand-collected cross-sectional sample of 120 non-financial firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) in 2019, the first full year after Greece’s exit from its adjustment programs and the last pre-pandemic year, OLS models were estimated of ROA on a set of board attributes and firm controls. By situating the analysis in 2019 as a transitional post-crisis year, the analysis isolates legacy effects of crisis-era reforms from subsequent global shocks and provides a clean benchmark for governance–performance links in the Greek market.

The empirical results are clear on three dimensions of board structure. First, board independence is positively related to performance, consistent with the view that a stronger independent component enhances monitoring and board objectivity. Second, female representation on the board is positively associated with performance, aligning with arguments that gender-diverse boards deliberate more effectively and strengthen oversight. Third, CEO duality is negatively related to performance, in line with agency-theoretic concerns that combining the CEO and chair roles weakens the board’s monitoring function. By contrast, board size and the share of foreign directors show no statistically significant association with ROA once other covariates are included. A robustness specification using ROE confirms the baseline patterns: signs are unchanged and the independence effect is even stronger (1% level), reinforcing the interpretation that these links are not proxy-specific.

These findings contribute to the literature in several ways. Conceptually, we extend crisis-period Greek evidence to the immediate post-crisis context, testing whether previously observed relationships persist once extraordinary conditions recede ( Abebe Zelalem et al., 2022 ; Antwi et al., 2021 ; Miao et al., 2023 ; Wu, 2021 ). Empirically, the study provides country-specific, post-crisis evidence for ASE-listed non-financials, complementing prior Greek studies on banks and on listed firms conducted during the crisis decade ( Bekiaris, 2021 ; Kalantonis et al., 2023 ). Substantively, the results identify the board levers most closely associated with firm performance in this environment, namely independence, gender diversity, and the separation of CEO and chair, while documenting null effects for board size and foreign representation once other factors are controlled. These results refine the map of governance mechanisms that appear most salient in the Greek market’s transition out of crisis.

There are practical implications for policy and practice. For regulators and standard setters, the evidence is consistent with frameworks that promote board independence, encourage substantive female participation, and separate the CEO and chair roles to preserve board oversight. For boards and investors, the results suggest that board composition choices, in particular, increasing the independent share and building meaningful gender diversity, are associated with better operating performance, whereas simple expansion of headcount or the addition of foreign directors, per se, may not yield detectable gains in this setting. These recommendations are consistent with the 2021 Hellenic Corporate Governance Code ( HCGC , 2021 ), which promotes board independence and includes provisions on gender diversity; our findings align with these provisions by linking them to superior firm outcomes.

This study is also subject to some limitations. First, the design is cross-sectional and single-year, which constrains causal inference and limits our ability to track dynamic adjustments or lagged effects. Second, the analysis is market-specific (ASE-listed, non-financial firms) and may not generalize to other institutional environments. Third, performance is proxied by accounting-based measures (ROA and ROE), which may not capture all dimensions of firm performance. Another limitation concerns potential endogeneity: for example, better-performing firms may be more likely to attract independent or female directors, implying possible reverse causality that cannot be ruled out within the current cross-sectional design.

These limitations suggest several directions for future research. Panel analyses spanning multiple years (pre-, during, and post-crisis; pre- and post-governance-code updates) would allow researchers to assess dynamics, persistence, and policy effects. Other performance measures, such as market-based metrics (e.g., Tobin’s Q), and non-financial outcomes (e.g., ESG), could show which aspects of performance are most affected by governance. Enriching governance measures (board tenure, expertise, committee structure, network centrality) could test mechanisms and boundary conditions, including potential non-linear/threshold effects in diversity variables. Finally, qualitative approaches, such as semi-structured interviews with directors and senior executives or structured surveys of board practices, could elicit complementary “soft” information (e.g., deliberation quality, informal influence, board dynamics) that is not observable in published filings and would enrich the interpretation of the quantitative results.