This study employed a mixed-methods case study approach to examine hazard recognition and control processes in a food and beverage manufacturing facility. According to Yin (2018), case study methodology is particularly suitable for investigating contemporary phenomena in real-life contexts where boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident [7] . The research adopted both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods to ensure that there was a comprehensive analysis of workplace hazards and control effectiveness.

The research was conducted at a food and beverage manufacturing plant over a 3-month period from September 2023 to November 2023. The study period from September to November 2023 represents a focused timeframe sufficient to capture comprehensive hazard identification data across all operational shifts while allowing for systematic implementation and evaluation of safety committee inspections and audit processes, which according to occupational safety research standards, provides adequate data for meaningful analysis without extending beyond practical operational cycles [10] . The facility operates continuous production processes with approximately 150 employees across five shifts. As stated by Suri and Das (2016), manufacturing environments present unique hazard profiles requiring systematic assessment approaches [9] . The study involved all operational areas including production lines, warehousing, maintenance workshops, and administrative facilities.

Incident data was extracted from the company’s incident management system covering a five-year period (2019-2023). This period provides sufficient longitudinal context to identify hazard trends and patterns while establishing baseline safety performance metrics against which the current findings of the study can be compared, as recommended by occupational safety research standards for trend analysis [4] [10] . According to Cassidy et al. (2018), longitudinal analysis of incident data provides crucial insights into hazard patterns and control effectiveness [11] . The data-set included 247 recorded incidents, near-misses, and safety observations, and training records from the learning management system of the company were analyzed to assess employee competency development over the study period.

Multiple hazard identification techniques were systematically deployed as recommended by the International Labour Organisation [1] . These recommended hazard identification techniques include Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies, What-if-Checklist, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Inspection Checklists, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Assessment forms as stated in Section 3. Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) was conducted for 35 critical tasks across all operational areas. Morrish (2017) recorded that JHA methodology reduces workplace incidents by 23% when properly implemented [12] . Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies were performed for high-risk processes involving chemical handling and pressurised systems.

Weekly safety inspections were conducted using standardized checklists developed from industry best practices such as OSHA’s workplace inspection guidelines, ISO 45001 occupational health and safety management systems standards, and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) hazard identification [13] [14] . They include standardized checklists for equipment safety, housekeeping, personal protective equipment compliance, and emergency procedures. Genta et al. (2020) argued that systematic inspection processes improve hazard detection rates by 34% compared to informal approaches [15] . Monthly comprehensive audits covered compliance with regulatory requirements and internal safety standards.

The study included all permanent employees (n = 150) and temporary workers (n = 25) present during the observation period. According to Viegas et al. (2020), comprehensive sampling in workplace safety research ensures representative hazard identification across all job categories. Participants represented diverse roles including production operators (n = 95), maintenance technicians (n = 30), supervisors (n = 20), and administrative staff (n = 30).

Incident frequency rates were calculated using standard occupational safety metrics as defined by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (2023) [16] . Examples of these metrics are Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR), Days Away Restricted Transfer (DART) rate, and Lost Time Incident Rate (LTIR), which are industry-standard measures for comparing safety performance across organizations [17] [18] . Risk assessment utilized a 5 × 5 matrix (check Appendix A) approach correlating probability and severity ratings, which is a matrix already being used by the company, so the methodology reflects their existing risk assessment tool. Statistical analysis included trend analysis of incident patterns and correlation analysis between training interventions and safety performance indicators to identify patterns in the incident data over the 3-month period and measure whether safety interventions actually improved safety outcomes.

Thematic analysis was employed to categorize hazards and identify recurring patterns in incident causation. Bhagwat and Delhi (2022) showed that qualitative analysis of safety data reveals underlying systemic issues not apparent through quantitative methods alone [19] . Root cause analysis was conducted for all serious incidents using the 5 Whys technique and fishbone analysis methods, which are standard approaches in manufacturing safety investigations as outlined by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2024) [20] .

Data triangulation was achieved through cross-verification of incident reports with witness statements and physical evidence. According to Jespersen and Wallace (2017), triangulation enhances reliability in workplace safety research by reducing single-source bias [21] . Certified safety professionals conducted an independent review of hazard assessments to ensure consistency and accuracy.

All employee data was anonymised and handled under data protection requirements referring to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and data privacy laws requiring anonymisation of personal information [22] . Participation in interviews and surveys was voluntary, with informed consent obtained. The research protocol was approved by the company’s ethics committee, ensuring compliance with occupational health research guidelines like informed consent and voluntary participation as outlined by Iavicoli et al. (2018) [23] .

The research was limited to a single manufacturing facility, which may restrict generalisability to other industrial settings. Li et al. (2016) noted that site-specific factors significantly influence hazard profiles in manufacturing environments [8] . Additionally, the study period coincided with operational changes that may have influenced baseline safety performance metrics. For example, new equipment installation or machinery upgrades that altered existing hazard profiles and required updated safety procedures, and implementation of new production processes or product lines that introduced different risk factors not previously assessed.

The unit supervisor works with safety personnel to evaluate each job activity. They identify what could cause injury or damage to people, property, or the environment. According to Vista Oil and Gas (2019), systematic hazard identification reduces workplace incidents by 43% when properly implemented [4] . Multiple resources support this process. These include past injury records, OSHA 300 Log reviews, employee exposure monitoring results, and equipment failure data [26] . According to Jeelani et al. (2017), experience and detailed knowledge of operations provide the foundation for effective hazard recognition [3] . The full hazard assessment matrix is in Appendix B.

Each identified hazard receives a risk rating using frequency (Check Appendix C for frequency rating definitions) and severity measures, as each frequency assessment determines how likely an incident will occur. Consequence assessment estimates potential impact or damage severity to people, environment, asset and company reputation. Check Appendices D, E, F and G for severity rating definitions used for people, environment, asset and company reputation respectively. The facility uses a 5 × 5 risk matrix to classify hazards because it provides optimal granularity for distinguishing between risk levels while remaining simple enough for consistent application by frontline supervisors, as recommended by ISO 31000 risk management standards for manufacturing environments [24] . This approach combines probability and impact ratings to produce overall risk scores. Vasconcelos and Junior (2015) showed that standardized risk matrices improve consistency in hazard prioritization across manufacturing facilities [27] . Check Appendix B for the full hazard assessment matrix.

Supervisors create controls to eliminate or reduce each hazard, and they must address the root cause, not just the hazard itself [26] . According to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2024), the hierarchy of controls guides this process, starting with elimination and moving through substitution, engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment [20] . Goh and Goh (2016) argued that systematic control implementation reduces incident severity by 67% compared to ad-hoc safety measures [28] .

According to the International Organization for Standardization, all hazard assessments require written documentation, which includes identified hazards, risk ratings, and implemented controls, and every employee involved in the task must review and sign the documentation [24] . In line with this, clear communication should be there to make sure that all team members understand the hazards and required safety measures as emphasized by in a study by Morrish (2017) which established that comprehensive documentation improves safety compliance by 54% in manufacturing environments [12] .

Hazard assessments require regular review when work conditions change, and managers, supervisors, and safety personnel monitor control effectiveness continuously because they track injury rates and incident patterns to measure success [26] . This ongoing monitoring identifies when additional controls become necessary, as Suri and Das (2016) recorded in their study that systematic monitoring programmes detect emerging hazards 78% faster than reactive approaches [9] . The process creates a continuous cycle of improvement as each step builds on the previous one to strengthen overall safety performance.

Check Appendix B for the full hazard assessment matrix.

This section presents a structured analysis of hazard sources identified through the systematic inspection process conducted between September and November 2023. Below are the hazards identified in the manufacturing plant, and it is not exhaustive as we are still driving for employee competencies in hazard recognition and reporting. The source is the 2023 Company Safety Committee Inspection Report. The distribution analysis is shown in Figure 3 below.

Fall hazards ( Figure 4 ) represent the predominant risk category within the facility, accounting for 34% of identified hazards. According to Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2024), falls from height constitute the leading cause of workplace fatalities in manufacturing environments [30] . Primary fall risk locations include unprotected fixed ladders in melting and holding tank areas, elevated platforms in batching and palletizing zones, and inadequate fall protection during maintenance activities on step ladders and extension ladders across production areas. The pre-whip area presents particularly acute fall risks due to tank access requirements during cleaning operations. Goh and Goh (2016) highlighted that systematic fall protection implementation reduces incident rates by 67% in similar manufacturing contexts [28] .

Mechanical hazards ( Figure 5 ) concentrate primarily around point-of-operation exposures where inadequate machine guarding creates caught-in, crush, and amputation risks. Critical exposure points identified include pre-whip machines on production lines 3 and 9, portion manufacturing area equipment, and case sealing operations. Haghighi et al. (2019) argued that systematic machine guarding assessments prevent 78% of mechanical injury incidents in food manufacturing facilities [32] . Rotating and reciprocating machinery components pose additional risks through exposed moving parts during operational and maintenance activities. The quartz line filling machine and conversion area equipment require immediate attention for comprehensive guarding implementation.

Ground-level incidents primarily result from inadequate housekeeping practices and surface contamination. Major contributing factors include liquid ingredient spills creating slip hazards, plastic wrapping and cardboard materials creating trip hazards, and unattended water hoses across walkways. According to Mahto (2016), effective housekeeping protocols reduce slip-trip incidents by 45% within manufacturing environments [33] . Emergency egress routes frequently become compromised through blocked aisles, obstructed emergency exits, and pallet placement in critical walkways. The secondary palletizing area demonstrates consistent aisle blockage issues requiring systematic traffic management protocols. ( Figure 6 )

Chemical exposures occur through disinfectant and cleaning fluid usage by sanitation teams, creating both acute and chronic health risks. Lebelo et al. (2021) identified cleaning chemical exposures as contributing to 23% of occupational illnesses in food processing facilities [35] . Biological hazards include potential bloodborne pathogen exposure during first aid responses and bacterial contamination risks from improper sanitation procedures. Wastewater handling presents additional exposure risks requiring systematic personal protective equipment protocols and engineering controls for containment and treatment processes [36] . ( Figure 7 )

Temperature extremes across manufacturing areas create worker discomfort and fatigue, particularly in freezer operations and heated processing zones. Noise exposures from equipment and material handling vehicles exceed recommended threshold levels in multiple production areas. Leung et al. (2016) demonstrated that combined environmental stressors increase incident likelihood by 56% compared to controlled workplace conditions [37] . Ergonomic risks concentrate around manual handling activities including cardboard box lifting, ingredient bag manipulation, and repetitive motion tasks. Awkward posturing during tank cleaning and equipment maintenance creates additional musculoskeletal risk factors. ( Figure 8 )

Electrical safety concerns include frayed electrical cords, missing ground pins, and improper wiring configurations throughout production areas as illustrated in Figure 9 . Lockout-tagout procedure deficiencies during equipment maintenance create serious energy isolation risks. According to the Electrical Safety Foundation International (ESFI, 2025), systematic electrical safety programs prevent 89% of workplace electrical incidents in industrial settings [39] .

Workplace organizational hazards included inadequate training for new employees, non-compliance with safety rules, and systematic deficiencies in hazard communication processes. Reason (2016) argued that organizational factors contribute to 67% of serious workplace incidents through inadequate safety management systems [40] . Work-related stress factors include excessive workload demands, insufficient supervisory support, and inadequate professional boundaries among colleagues. These organizational hazards create indirect safety risks through reduced situational awareness and increased human error probability [17] . ( Figure 10 )

Aim to control the hazard at the source. Engineering controls limit the hazard but do not entirely remove it. Examples of controls adopted in the plant include the re-design of tools/guards, the installation of mechanical guards at the point of machine operation, and the enclosure/isolation of dangerous components of the equipment.

Aimed at reducing employee exposure to hazards, but does not remove the hazard. Approaches adopted in the plant include the use of written safety policies and safety rules, schedule changes for workers, including frequent rest breaks, job rotation, adjusting the work pace, and training of workers to reduce the duration, frequency, and severity of exposure to hazards. Examples of training we used are the Alchemy training material and the observation tool.

Aimed at reducing employee exposure to hazards, but does not remove the hazard. In the plant, we wear special clothing, safety glasses, a face shield, earplugs/earmuffs, steel-toe safety shoes, gloves for maintenance and logistic teams, and disposable gloves for workers in the manufacturing area for hygiene and prevention of cross-contamination of products.

The incident involved a holding tank used for intermediate product storage prior to final processing. According to Heinrich’s accident causation theory, 88% of workplace incidents result from unsafe acts combined with unsafe conditions [41] . The tank cleaning procedure had operated without incident since installation, creating a false sense of security regarding operational safety. The holding tank design incorporated a hinged lid mechanism that opened to a 90-degree position without dead-stop engineering controls. Vasconcelos and Junior (2015) indicated that equipment design deficiencies contribute to 45% of serious manufacturing injuries when combined with procedural inadequacies [27] .

The tank experienced unusual clogging requiring manual intervention beyond standard cleaning protocols. Normal cleaning procedures involved introducing water hoses into the tank while monitoring levels through Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system controls remotely [42] . Sarkheil (2021) argued that procedural deviations significantly increase incident probability when combined with inadequate risk assessment [17] .

The tank lid design lacked dead-stop mechanisms, preventing uncontrolled closure. Klačková et al. (2021) established that mechanical dead-stops reduce equipment-related injuries by 73% in manufacturing environments [43] . The 90-degree opening position relied solely on gravitational balance without positive locking mechanisms.

No documented procedure existed for manual tank cleaning operations beyond standard automated processes like the automated water introduction and SCADA monitoring process, where employees introduce the water hose into the tank, and observe the water level using the SCADA system without manual intervention. Ajayeoba et al. (2015) showed that comprehensive written procedures reduce incident rates by 56% during non-routine maintenance activities [44] . Employee training focused exclusively on normal operational cleaning procedures without addressing emergency or non-routine cleaning scenarios.

The systematic hazard identification programme failed to recognize risks associated with tank lid design deficiencies. This was due to lack of dead-stop mechanisms as it failed to identify the potential for gravity-induced lid movement during manual cleaning operations, and failed to assess the struck-by hazard from the tank lid’s 90-degree opening position without positive locking. It also failed to recognize the inadequacy of relying solely on gravitational balance for lid stability during worker access. According to Jeelani et al. (2017), 67% of serious workplace injuries involve previously unrecognized hazards in established work processes [3] . Management oversight during equipment design and procurement phases missed critical safety engineering requirements for mechanical locking mechanisms.

The primary cause of the key hazard identified is inadequate equipment design lacking proper mechanical safety controls for lid operation.

The contributing factors are:

Morrish (2017) argued that multiple contributing factors amplify incident severity when primary safety barriers fail simultaneously [12] .

The incident resulted in a serious hand injury requiring medical treatment and work restriction. Using the facility’s risk matrix classification system, this incident was rated as severity level 3 (major injury affecting work performance) with frequency level 2 (has happened in industry). The resulting risk score of 6 classifies this as medium risk requiring systematic management intervention.

The immediate impacts are as follows:

Ajayeoba et al. (2015) and Genta et al. (2020) established that serious incidents typically require 6 - 12 months for complete corrective action implementation and effectiveness verification [15] [44] .

The incident investigation showed significant gaps in training effectiveness measurement in the organisation’s safety programme. According to ILO (2021), organisations that systematically measure training outcomes achieve 45% better safety performance compared to those using informal assessment methods [25] .

The existing training programme did not have a quantitative measurement of employee competency development in hazard recognition. While training materials were delivered through the company’s learning management system, no systematic assessment measured knowledge retention or practical application effectiveness.

Reason (2016) explained that effective safety training programmes need both leading and lagging indicators for performance measurement [40] . Key metrics should include:

Implementation of comprehensive training measurement systems needs systematic investment. For example, a 2017 study on occupational health and safety expenditures in Ontario by Mustard et al. (2017) found out that goods-producing sectors spent significantly more per worker ($2417) than service sectors ($847), and in the goods-producing sectors, the mining industry showed the highest expenditure ($4433 per worker) [46] . So, this shows that efficient systematic investments have to be done to implement a successful training program for employees of an organization on hazard and risks mitigation.

The organisation should implement systematic measurement approaches including pre-and post-training assessments, practical competency demonstrations, and longitudinal tracking of safety performance indicators linked to training interventions.