Empirical studies consistently show that gender diverse boards achieve superior financial and non-financial outcomes. Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that female directors correlate with more conservative investment and stronger executive management supervision. Furthermore, Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Sales (ROS) improve as female board members increases ( Carter et al., 2010 ). Beyond the financial metrics, female board members spearhead corporate social responsibility and ethical initiatives, thereby boosting reputation and stakeholder trust ( Bear et al., 2010 ; Post et al., 2011 ). Meta-analyses however caution that the positive correlationship depend on several factors like contextual factors, board size, national culture and industry norms which all moderate the diversity-performance link ( Nguyen, Dinh, & Truong, 2020 ; Vafaei, Saeid, Rostami, & Shoja-e-Din, 2016 ).

Global quota regimes differ sharply in both design and outcomes. In Norway, a mandatory 40% threshold for public limited companies which was strongly backed by delisting threats, drove rapid convergence on gender parity ( Seierstad & Opsahl, 2011 ; González, 2015 ). Many European countries followed the Norwegian quota threshold with France’s 40% legislated target enforced through financial penalties for non-compliant firms, similarly producing rapid gains ( Del Boca, Locatelli, & Vuri, 2013 ). By contrast, voluntary or “comply-or-explain” frameworks are most common in Africa and have yielded slower progress. South Africa’s revised Codes of Good Practice ( DTI, 2011 ) increased female board membership from 7% to 23% over a ten-year period via public reporting, yet still short of parity ( Ntim, 2015 ). Nigeria’s voluntary 35% target for state owned enterprises remains unmet, staggering below 15% ( Eme, Ordu, & Okoye, 2018 ).

Agency Theory frames boards as safeguards against managerial opportunism, aligning interests through oversight, incentive structures and information channels ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ). Women directors, by virtue of diverse socialisation and leadership styles, may enhance these governance functions. Erhardt et al. (2003) find that firms with greater gender diversity exhibit stronger monitoring and reduced agency costs. Joy et al. (2007) show that female board presence correlates with heightened audit committee diligence and lower instances of earnings management. Thus, from an agency perspective, quotas that elevate women’s board participation should logically improve governance outcomes.

Institutional Theory explains how organisations align with external norms through coercive, normative and mimetic pressures ( DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 ; Scott, 2014 ). Gender quotas often originate as coercive pressures, for instance legal requirements or normative expectations to align with investors. Organisations may adopt quotas to secure legitimacy, signal progressive values and avoid stakeholder sanctions ( Dobbin & Kalev, 2016 ). However, in the absence of enforcement, adoption can be ceremonial “window dressing” that fails to reshape underlying power dynamics in organisations ( Munyaradzi, 2024 ). The degree to which firms internalize diversity norms, rather than merely comply externally, determines the depth of institutional change.

In sub-Saharan Africa, voluntary gender initiatives are predominant. Booysen and Nkomo (2010) document that South African firms under “comply-or-explain” codes achieved moderate gains but struggled with tokenism and pipeline shortages. Women board members in Zimbabwe and Zambia often face cultural stereotypes and these have impeded their career aspirations, relegating them to roles that are deemed “appropriate”, such as compliance and governance ( Moleke, 2022 ). Mthombeni, Ntim and Boadi (2023) argue that without robust talent-development initiatives, quotas yield short-lived, superficial gains. This study builds on this regional literature by examining the unique context of the ZSE’s voluntary gender quotas and its interaction with domestic norms.

To capture both the breath of board-composition trends and the depth of lived experiences, the study adopted a convergent parallel mixed-methods design ( Creswell & Creswell, 2018 ). This approach allows simultaneous collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, followed by integration at the interpretation stage to produce a holistic understanding.

Quantitative data were drawn from a stratified random sample of 51 out of the 67 main-board firms listed on the ZSE, representing 76% of the population. First, the full list of 67 firms was divided into seven strata corresponding to the Financials, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Staples, Consumer Discretionary, ICT, and Real Estate sectors. Within each stratum, firms were randomly selected in proportion to the total number of companies in that sector, ensuring sectoral representativeness. Only firms with complete board-composition data for both the pre-quota year (2019) and the post-quota period (2020-2024) were retained in the sample, preserving data integrity across the comparative time frame ( Field, 2018 ; Creswell & Creswell, 2018 ).

Board gender ratios (percentage of female directors) were calculated for each firm and year. Paired-sampled t-tests assessed mean differences between 2019 and 2024 across the full sample, while one-way ANOVA tested for sectorial variation. All analyses were conducted in SPSS Version 27, with significance set at p < 0.05.

Purposive sampling targeting 40 female directors with a minimum of two years of board experience, drawn proportionally from the same seven sectors. Recruitment leveraged professional networks and public disclosures; refusal rates were under 10%. Interviews lasting 45 to 50 minutes were conducted in person or via zoom, ensuring flexibility and confidentiality.

Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Using NVivo 12, the Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase process was independently applied: familiarization, initial coding, theme development, review, definition and write-up. Intercoder reliability exceeded 0.85 Cohen’s kappa. To enhance trustworthiness, participants were invited to review their transcripts and intercoder reliability checks were conducted to ensure coding consistency ( Creswell & Miller, 2000 ).

Integration occurred at the interpretation stage: quantitative trends in board composition were juxtaposed with thematic insights on barriers, enablers and institutional dynamics. This mixed-methods lens allowed for a deeper analysis not only on whether female representation rose, but why certain sectors advanced more rapidly and how policy signals were internalised or resisted by firms.

Analysis in Table 1 reveals that the mean female board ratio rose from 11.7% in 2019 to 22.7% in 2024, an absolute of 11% that is statistically significant (t[50] = 4.27, p < 0.001). This finding indicates that the ZSE’s voluntary recommendation has spurred moderate uptake, even absent of legal enforcement ( Booysen & Nkomo, 2010 ).

** Average percentages from 2020 to 2024.

Sectoral comparison in Figure 1 through ANOVA (F [6, 44] = 3.45, p = 0.007) highlights marked heterogeneity: Industrials and Financials posted the largest gains (+6% and +4%, respectively), whereas ICT and Consumer Staples each saw a marginal 1% decline. These divergences may reflect sector-specific pipeline and cultural constraints. For example, the ICT sector’s heavy reliance on Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) skillsets limits the pool of eligible women for board roles ( Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015 ), while Consumer Staples firms often operating on tight cost and operational margins, may deprioritize board diversification in favor of traditional management profiles ( Moleke, 2022 ). Qualitative interview data corroborate these patterns, with several ICT directors citing a shortage of female candidates possessing both technical expertise and board-level experience. Furthermore, sectors with entrenched governance norms such as finance may be more amenable to diversity initiatives, while others lag behind due to structural and cultural inertia ( Ntim, 2015 ; Bertrand et al., 2019 ).

Every female director in our sample holds at least an undergraduate degree; 68% have earned either a Master of Business Administration (MBA) or a Master of Business Leadership (MBL), and only 6% hold a doctorate degree (PhD). Professional backgrounds cluster in law (28%) and chartered accountancy (42%), with scant representation from fields such as technology, operations and marketing. This pattern reflects board preference for compliance-oriented skills thus potentially narrowing the scope of female contributions to governance rather than strategy ( Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ; Nguyen et al., 2020 ).

To achieve uniform progress across all sectors, Zimbabwe should enshrine a mandatory 30% quota for all listed firms, accompanied by enforceable sanctions such as fines or shareholder voting penalties to ensure compliance ( Seierstad & Opsahl, 2011 ; Bertrand et al., 2019 ).

Partnerships between the ZSE, universities and professional bodies can create executive fellowship programs targeting high-potential women, thereby expanding the pool of qualified board candidates ( Eagly & Carli, 2007 ).

A national coordinating body from the Ministry of Skills and Manpower Development could oversee structured mentorship initiatives, pairing senior board members with emerging women leaders replicating successful South African models ( Ntim, 2015 ).

In order to shift the culture of compliance to commitment, boards should integrate mandatory unconscious-bias training, inclusive meeting protocols and transparent reporting on gender metrics ( Dobbin & Kalev, 2016 ).

By consciously recruiting women from technology, operations and strategy backgrounds, firms can enrich board deliberations and bolster resilience amid rapid industry changes ( Nguyen et al., 2020 ).