According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency theory is concerned with the relationship that arises between two parties when one (the principal) authorizes the other (the agent) to manage their business on their behalf. Since they work as the shareholders’ agents, executives must therefore coordinate their managerial actions with the interests of the shareholders. Owners put their money into their businesses, and executives are in charge of looking after that money. An agency problem occurs when the interests of the principal and the agent conflict, making it difficult or costly for the principal to monitor the agent’s behavior. This theory explains the fundamental issue between shareholders and managers as well as the reason why shareholders typically rely on the audit committee to oversee audit quality since they are unable to do so on their own. The importance of audit committees as a tool for enhancing the quality of company financial reporting practices has been generally acknowledged. No matter the corporate governance model used in the entity’s home country, Chen et al. (2008) claimed that an efficient Audit Committee can fix or decrease agency problems in foreign organizations. Moreover, Dey (2008) discovered that organizations with more effective and efficient audit committees have lower levels of agency problems. According to Wild (1994) , the establishment of an audit committee causes the market to respond more favorably to a company’s revenues. According to Klein (1998) , the existence of an audit committee has little impact on a number of accounting and market performance indicators. According to the agency theory, having an audit committee on the board of directors is enough to guarantee the accuracy of the financial reports.

Stewardship theory is another significant theory of corporate governance. According to Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) , stewardship theory places a stronger emphasis on cooperation and collaboration than agency theory, which emphasizes control and conflict. Stewardship theory places more emphasis on the role of senior management as stewards, integrating their objectives as part of the company than it does on the individualistic viewpoint ( Donaldson & Davis, 1991 ). According to the stewardship theory, when organizational success is realized, stewards feel fulfilled and inspired. According to the stewardship theory, managers are generally trustworthy people who treat the resources entrusted to them with care. Inside directors have more in-depth business knowledge than outside directors because they work full-time for the organization they oversee. As a result, they are better able to make decisions. Stewardship theory supporters claim that a majority of inside directors will be associated with better firm performance as they naturally seek to maximize profit for shareholders. According to Davis et al. (1997) , the stewardship hypothesis has its roots in organizational psychology and sociology and states that “a steward preserves and maximizes shareholders’ wealth through company performance because by doing so, the steward’s utility functions are maximized.” The firm executive is recognized in this definition as the steward performing on behalf of the principal. Agents are therefore stewards who responsibly control and manage the company to improve its financial performance since stewards prioritize the interests of the company over their own ( Abdullah & Valentine, 2009 ). Stewards are aware that there is a trade-off between their own demands and those of the company, and they prefer to work on behalf of the company’s priorities and pursue its goals ( Cribb, 2006 ; Davis et al., 1997 ). This behavior, in turn, will benefit principals such as citizens (through good service delivery), because their objectives are advanced by the steward ( Davis et al., 1997 ). According to this theory, executive managers (Internal) are more likely than non-executive managers (External) to improve the performance of the firms since they are better familiar with their companies. External managers only improve the board’s decision-making process. Executive managers, according to Donaldson and Davis (1991) , have an abundance of knowledge about every part of the business and focus more on accomplishing organizational goals than on pursuing their individual goals. The audit committee is a key in ensuring that appropriate financial rules and controls are applied so that the stewards meet both the owner’s and their own stewardship goals. The committee must be able to monitor management conduct to make sure it is in line with the owners’ goals, that management is coming up with plans to make the best use of resources, and that there are no instances of misappropriation of business assets.

This theory, which is founded on the idea of cooperation, focuses especially on the efforts made by a board of directors to establish suitable connections with the outside environment in order to grow the firm. Accordingly, the provision of varied resources by the board of directors is the primary source of improving organizational operation, company performance, and organizational life ( Daily et al., 2003 ). Furthermore, Nguyen et al. (2014) underline that a company’s board of directors gives it a way to acquire essential resources when making its case from a resource dependency theory perspective. Also, Point out how this theory describes the positive association between board diversity and business value. According to Pearce and Zahra (1991) , Goodstein et al. (1994) , the board of directors is the primary cooperative mechanism through which the organization links to the external environment to access crucial resources and protect itself against unfavorable environmental change. Given that its members can offer guidance based on their expertise and experience, the board may play a significant role in enhancing a company’s performance. According to the resource dependence theory, the audit committee is a hidden asset that could enhance an organization’s expertise, reputation, coordination, and connections so it can attract more resources. The board’s role increases the outward-looking border to benefit a corporation, according to resource dependency theory, which emphasizes this point. Therefore, the question of whether the audit committee’s involvement in Egypt adds value or offers the company additional services in addition to performing its independent control may be raised. As a result, increasing the number of qualified audit committee members is thought to be a key strategy for accurate financial reporting and high-quality audits from which businesses may get valuable resources.

The committee is such a device that eliminates the intervention of publishing the company’s information and aids soften the agency costs in the firm improving the firm’s system ( Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010 ; Bédard & Gendron, 2010 ) including company reporting and publication process. Fama (1978) asserts that the market price of the stock, which is regarded as a reflection of the true value of the company’s assets, will reflect the firm value. The market price of the stock is formed between the buyer and the seller when the transaction is referred to as the value of the enterprise market. The job of the audit committee as a corporate governance structure becomes highly significant and crucial to build and maintain corporate control system in order to enhance performance and firm value. Previous research on the audit committee demonstrates that the structure of the committee affects how effective it is ( Dhaliwal et al., 2010 ; Li et al., 2012 ). As a result, having the right experience and expertise enables the audit committee to effectively carry out its duties. Thus, we can conclude that there is a link between the audit committee’s structure and the value of the firms ( Madi et al., 2014 ). Gender diversity on boards and the audit committee, according to Conyon and He (2017) , increases firm value and improves the quality of monitoring and financial reporting. The more effective the audit committee is, the higher the quality of the financial reporting will be.

Audit committee diligence signifies the total number of meetings held in a year ( Maraghni & Nekhili, 2014 ). How frequently an audit committee meets reflects how committed it is to resolve any immediate problems and to present a better review and monitoring situation. As a result, these will make it simpler to find financial statement problems. The Egypt Code of Corporate Governance (2005) emphasized the significance of diligence when it was suggested that audit committees should meet on a regular basis, preferably quarterly. There should be a clear agenda for the meeting. Numerous studies have looked into the relationship between the audit committee meetings and firm value. However, the thorough research has only produced inconsistent findings: Ashari and Krismiaji (2020) examined the effect of audit committee characteristics (independence, size and frequency of meetings) on the financial performance of manufacturing firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the year of 2016 and 2017. The results showed that audit committee independence, the audit committee size, and the number of audit committee meetings positively affect company’s financial performance. Mohammed (2018) found that the number of meetings had a positive and significant impact on the performance of 74 non-financial companies listed on the Jordanian stock exchange during the period from 2010 to 2016. Shrivastav (2022) examined the impact of audit committee characteristics on firm performance in 133 Indian companies listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) over five years from 2016 to 2020. The result showed that the number of meetings has a positive and significant impact on firm performance. On the other hand, Al-Matari et al. (2012) investigated the relation between audit committee characteristics and the performance of the Saudi companies listed in the Saudi stock exchange (TADAWL) in 2010, excluding financial companies. The results show that Audit Committee Independence and audit committee meeting have insignificant effect on firm performance. According to Alqatamin (2018) , the number of meetings has an insignificant impact on the performance of non-financial Jordanian listed firms. Al-Matari et al. (2014) found that for Omani firms, the number of meetings has insignificant effect on corporate performance.

Based on the previous discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

H1: There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee meetings and firm value.

By including female board members on the audit committee, the board’s monitoring efforts are strengthened and diversity is increased ( Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ). According to Green & Homroy (2018) , Gender diversity on boards creates strong corporate structures that improve company performance. Numerous studies have looked into the relationship between the audit committee gender and firm value. However, the thorough research has only produced inconsistent findings: Amin et al. (2021) examined the relationship between a female presence in corporate governance and firm performance, using a sample of nonfinancial firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange during the period 2008-2019.The results found that a higher proportion of women on the board increase firm performance. According to the study, having more women on boards and on corporate committees such as the audit committee enhances oversight and motivates management to focus on performance and value. According to Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008) . Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance. J (2008) , having women on the boards of Spanish companies increases the value of the company. Darmadi (2013) examined the relationship between gender diversity on the management board and the financial performance of Indonesian listed companies. The data only cover one single financial year (2007). This study used a sample comprising 92.4 percent of public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The dependent variable was firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q. The study found that the proportion of female board members has a negative influence on firm value. Alqatamin (2018) found that gender diversity of the audit committee has a significant positive impact on the performance of 165 non-financial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. Rose (2007) used a sample of listed Danish firms during the period of 1998-2001 in a cross sectional analysis. The study found there is no relationship between the proportion of females on the board and firm performance.

Based on the previous discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

H2: There is a significant positive relationship between the existence of women in the audit committee and firm value.

The number of members on the audit committee, or the committee’s size, indicates the Resources that are available to it. According to Mohammad-Nor et al. (2010) given that a larger committee will improve the resources that are available to it and result in better monitoring, it is likely that potential issues with the financial reporting process will be identified and fixed. In Egypt, the Egypt Code of Corporate Governance (2005) has recommended that a minimum of three non-executive board members must be on the audit committee. Numerous studies have looked into the relationship between the audit committee size and firm value. However, the thorough research has only produced inconsistent findings: According to Bouaziz (2012) examined the effect of audit committee characteristics on the financial performance of Tunisian companies. Used a sample of 26 Tunisian companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the period 2007-2010. The results showed that the size, independence and expertise of the audit committee have a significant effect on financial performance. On the other hand, Bazhair (2022) investigated the effect of audit committee on the financial performance of Saudi non-financial firms. The data included 100 Saudi non-financial listed companies from 2010 to 2019. The results found that audit committee size and meetings negatively impact firm performance. However, audit committee independence and financial expertise indicate a strong and positive relationship with financial performance. Sarker and Hossain (2024) examined the impact of corporate governance practices on enhancing firm value in manufacturing industries in Bangladesh. Using a sample of 131 companies from 10 manufacturing industries listed in Dhaka stock exchange (DSE). Using the multiple regression method, the study analyzed 1193 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2021. The results showed that audit committee size has no significant influence on firm value. Al-Matari et al. (2014) examined the effect of audit committee characteristics on Firm Performance in Oman. The data included 162 non-financial companies. The results showed that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between audit committee size and firm performance (Tobin’s Q). The study also found that there is a significantly positive relationship between audit committee independence and Tobin’s Q.

Based on the previous discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

H3: There is a significant positive relationship between Audit Committee size and firm value.

Monitoring the management is one of the audit committee’s duties. To fully receive the benefits of the audit committee’s establishment, its members should be independent of corporate influence. According to their level of independence from corporate management, the audit committee can be said to be independent ( Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2014 ). The Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance, (2016) states that the members of the audit committee must be independent and non-executive members of the board of directors or outsiders to the firm. The independence of directors’ diligence is significant in producing higher-quality financial statements that will end up creating real economic value and profitability for the companies ( Kapoor & Goel, 2019 ; Salehi et al., 2018 ). Numerous studies have looked into the relationship between the audit committee independence and firm value. However, the thorough research has only produced inconsistent findings: Oradi et al. (2017) investigated the relation between audit committee characteristics (financial expertise, independence, and size) and the performance of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. The data included 132 companies from 2012 to 2014. They found a positive and significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and firm performance, based on Tobin’s Q and ROA. Also, a positive and significant relationship was observed between audit committee independence and firm performance, based on ROA. Nonetheless, there was no significant relationship between audit committee independence and firm performance, based on Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the results found no significant relationship between audit committee size and firm performance, based on Tobin’s Q and ROA. Robin and Amran (2016) examined the relationship between audit committee characteristics and family firm’s performance in Indonesia. Used a sample of 122 family companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2010-2014. The results showed that the audit committee independent has a negative relationship with firm performance. The study also found that the size of the audit committee has a positive relationship with firm performance. Ifeoma & Evelyn (2018) investigated the effect of audit committee characteristics on performance of selected non-financial firms in Nigerian Stock Exchange. The data included 50 listed firms from 2007 to 2016.The study found there is a significant positive relationship between audit committee independence, audit committee meeting and firm performance. On the other hand, Bansal and Sharma (2016) investigated the role of audit committee characteristics (independence and frequency of meetings) in improving firm performance in India. Used a sample of 235 non-financial public limited companies listed in National Stock Exchange (NSE) 500 between 2004 and 2013.The study found that audit committee independence and its meeting frequency did not affect firm performance.

Based on the previous discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

H4: There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee independence and firm value.

An important characteristic of the audit committee is that at least one member must have experience in finance or accounting. This is essential so that the audit committee member can evaluate the firms’ financial data. According to the Egypt Code of Corporate Governance (2016) , an audit committee must be established that is made up of at least three nonexecutive board members. It should have at least one person with experience in accounting and finance. The financial know-ledge of audit committee members is a significant indicator of the success of the committee. According to Giacomino et al. (2009) Experience alone may be insufficient to establish financial expertise. Become a financial expert requires both experience and education. Numerous studies have looked into the relationship between the audit committee expertise and firm value. However, the thorough research has only produced inconsistent findings: Dakhlallh et al. (2020) investigated the effect of the audit committee (size, independence, financial expertise, and stock owned by audit committee) on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q among Jordanian companies. The data included 180 firms from the financial, industrial and service companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) between 2009 and 2017. The study discovered that the size of the audit committee, the independence of the audit committee, and the financial expertise of the audit committee have a positive and significant relationship with firm performance. A study of 350 Financial Times Stock Exchange companies listed on the London Stock Exchange between 2005 and 2013 found a positive and significant relationship between the performance of non-family firms and the audit committee’s experience while there is insignificantly relationship between the audit committee experience and financial performance in family firms ( Al-Okaily & Naueihed, 2020 ). Alqatamin (2018) examined the effect of audit committee characteristics (size, independence, gender diversity, experience, and frequency of meetings) on firm performance .Used a sample of 165 non-financial companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange during the period 2014-2016.The results showed an insignificant relationship between the financial expertise of the audit committee and successful outcomes among Jordanian non-financial enterprises. The results also found that the size, independence, and gender diversity of the audit committee have a significant impact on company performance.

Based on the previous discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:

H5: There is a significant positive relationship between Audit committee expertise and firm value.

In this study, the sampling comprises of the top 100 Egyptian companies (EGX 100) listed in the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) for the period of eight years from 2012 till 2019. This study targeted firms from 15 different sectors. Due to their unique and varied corporate governance and disclosure standards, financial institutions are excluded from this study due to the nature of their financial statements. However, all non-financial institutions from all industries are included. This study includes listed Egyptian companies that provided full information for the period from 2012 to 2019. A final sample of 80 Egyptian companies was selected over eight years based on data availability ( Table 1 ). This paper focuses on and uses secondary data, represented numerically using the reports collected from Egyptian companies listed in the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) for the period of eight years from 2012 till 2019. The data collected from the official website of the Egyptian stock market to get the data required for the research variables. Corporate governance data will be collected manually. And also collected from “Egypt for Information Dissemination Company” (EGID) in order to complete a balanced panel data set and avoid any survivorship bias. The top 100 Egyptian listed companies are specifically chosen due to the data availability and reliability in contrast to non-listed companies.

The firm value in the Egyptian market serves as the dependent variable in the

current study. It will be evaluated using Tobin’s Q (TQ). The goal of the firm is to maximize its wealth or worth. This study uses Tobins’ Q to analyze the value of the firm using the stock price technique. According to Weston & Copelan (2008) , the method for determining a firm’s value using Tobin’s Q ratio copares the market value of a publicly traded company with the value of replacing the company’s assets. Consistent with previous studies, such as Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) ; Henry (2008) ; Wang and Huang (2014) ; Kao et al. (2019) ; Dakhlallh et al. (2020) Tobin’s Q (TQ) will be measured as the market value of equity and book value of total debts divided by book value of total assets.

To evaluate the audit committee characteristics, the research chooses Audit Committee independence, Audit Committee size, the frequency of Audit Committee meetings, Audit Committee expertise, and Audit committee gender as independent variables. Figure 1 presents the effect of Audit Committee characteristics on Firm value.

This study considers several control variables. These are Firm Size, Board Size, Board Meetings, Board Independence, Big 4, Block holder ownership, Managerial ownership, Firm leverage, and Firm growth. Table 2 presents a summary of all the variables chosen for the study.

A multiple regression model will be used in this study to examine the relationship between the variables. It helps to understand how the typical value of the dependent variable is changed when one of the independent variables change, while other variables are kept constant. It determines the overall relevance (variance explained) of the model and the relative contribution of each of the predictors to the total difference explained ( Cohen et al., 2003 ). In order to respond to the research hypotheses using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression was used. Generalized Least Squares regression was used as a substitute of OLS, when the data collected are secondary data, this happened when the research variables are not normally distributed. The Statistical package of E-Views-Version 10 program will be to generate the result from the data. To examine the effect of Audit Committee characteristics on Firm value, this study estimate using the following model:

$\begin{array}{l}{\text{TQ}}_{it}={\beta }_0+{\beta }_1{\text{ACSIZE}}_{it}+{\beta }_2{\text{ACIND}}_{it}+{\beta }_3{\text{ACEXP}}_{it}+{\beta }_4{\text{ACMT}}_{it}+{\beta }_5{\text{ACG}}_{it}+{\beta }_6{\text{Size}}_{it}+{\beta }_7\text{BIG}{4}_{it}\\ +{\beta }_8{\text{BOWN}}_{it}+{\beta }_9{\text{MOWN}}_{it}+{\beta }_{10}{\text{BDS}}_{it}+{\beta }_{11}{\text{BDM}}_{it}+{\beta }_{12}{\text{BDI}}_{it}+{\beta }_{13}{\text{LEV}}_{it}+{\beta }_{14}{\text{Growth}}_{it}+{\epsilon }_{it}\end{array}$ (1)

Where:

TQ_it = Tobin’s Q proxy by Firm Value of comapny i in year t;

AC SIZE_it = Audit Committee Size of firm i in year t;

AC IND_it = Audit Committee Independence of firm i in year t;

AC EXP_it = Audit Committee Member’s Expertise of firm i in year t;

AC MT_it = Audit Committee Meetings of firm i in year t;

ACG_{it =} Audit Committee Gender of firm i in year t;

Size_it = Firm size of firm i in year t;

BIG4_it = the auditor is a Big-4 firm

BOWN_it = Block holder ownership of firm i in year t;

MOWN_it = Managerial ownership of firm i in year t;

BDS_it = Board Size of company i in year t;

BDM_it = Board Meetings of company i in year t;

BDI_it = Board Independence of company i in year t;

LEV_it = Firm Leverage of firm i in year t;

Growth_it = Firm growth of company i in year t;

ε_it = Model error of firm i in year t.

By providing brief summaries of samples and data measurement methods, descriptive statistics is a technique that explains and provides a clear knowledge of the characteristics of a particular data collection. Table 3 illustrates the descriptive analysis for the research variables using the Mean, Minimum, Maximum and Standard Deviation for the research variables.

The mean value of Audit Committee Meetings is found to be 5.483929 with a standard deviation of 5.024066 with minimum and maximum values of 1.000000 and 48.000000 respectively. The mean value of Audit Committee Expertise is found to be 0.795083 with a standard deviation of 0.197816, with minimum and maximum values of 0.333333 and 1.333333 respectively. In addition, the mean value of Audit Committee Size is found to be 3.498214 with a standard deviation of 0.909105, with minimum and maximum values of 2.000000 and 8.000000 respectively. Moreover, the mean value of Audit Committee Gender is found to be 0.179589 with a standard deviation of 0.133619 with minimum and maximum values of 0.000000 and 0.500000 respectively. In addition, the mean value of Audit Committee Independence is found to be 0.776986 with a standard deviation of 0.269949 with minimum and maximum values of 0.000000 and 1.333333 respectively. The average firm value is discovered to be 2.381660 with a standard deviation of 12.10260, with minimum and maximum values of 0.272811 and 277.0835 respectively. In addition, Firm Size is found to have a mean value of 6.103022 with a standard deviation of 0.773201 with minimum and maximum values of 4.365132 and 8.016537 respectively. Board Sizes average value is discovered to be 8.421429 with a standard deviation of 2.788471, with minimum and maximum values of 3.000000 and 17.000000 respectively. In addition, the average number of board meetings is 9.182143 with a standard deviation of 4.336355 with minimum and maximum values of 2.000000 and 22.000000 respectively. Moreover, Board independence is determined to have a mean value 0.477097 with a standard deviation of 0.207556 with minimum and maximum values of 0.000000 and 1.000000. The mean value of Block Holder Ownership is found to be 0.613578 with a standard deviation of 0.216665 with minimum and maximum values of 0.027000 and 0.989500 respectively. Moreover, the mean value of Managerial Ownership is found to be 0.099352 with a standard deviation of 0.180803 with minimum and maximum values of 0.000000 and 0.767000. The average firm leverage is discovered to be 0.506068 with a standard deviation of 0.515911, with minimum and maximum values of 0.001260 and 7.188948 respectively. In addition, the average Firm Growth is discovered to be 1.226174 with a standard deviation of 22.21522 with minimum and maximum values of -1.000000 and 525.1668 respectively.

By testing VIFs, it could be observed from Table 4 that the VIFs of the Research Variables are less than 5, implying that there is no problem of multicollinearity between the independent variables.

In this part, an equation for the effect of Audit Committee Characteristics on Firm Value with the existence of Control Variables is derived using the GLS regression technique. The GLS simple regression equation is used to create the first equation for the effect of the audit committee on firm value with control variables, which is illustrated in Table 5 . When the relationship between the Audit Committee and Firm Value is tested using control variables, this equation gives a result. Given that the related P-value is 0.0000 (P value < 0.05), it can be seen that the relationship between firm size and firm value is significantly negative. Audit Committee Size, Audit Committee Independence, Audit Committee Expertise, Audit Committee Gender, Big 4, Block Holder Ownership, Board Size, Board Independence, and Firm Leverage all have a significant positive impact on firm value, and their corresponding P-values are 0.0000, 0.0019, 0.0070, 0.0000, 0.0130, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000 and 0.0000 respectively (P-value < 0.05). Moreover, the effects of meetings of the audit committee, managerial ownership, board meetings, and firm growth on firm value are insignificant, as indicated by the corresponding P-values of 0.1866, 0.0839, 0.3246, and 0.7570 (P-value > 0.05). Also, R-squared is 0.372274, which means that 37.2274% of the variation in Firm Value is explained by the Audit Committee with the presence of control variables. The estimation of the regression equation is as follows:

Firm Value = 0.274794 + 0.302267*Audit Committee Size + 0.428235 Audit Committee Independence + 0.010270 Audit Committee Meetings + 0.489325 Audit Committee Expertise + 1.656811 Audit Committee Gender – 0.305680 Firm Size + 0.122583 Big 4 + 0.840264 Block Holder Ownership + 0.387033 Managerial Ownership + 0.068333 Board Size + 0.175287 Board Meetings + 0.066868 Board Independence + 1.048816 Firm Leverage – 0.000519 Firm Growth

According to the regression results, there is a positive but insignificant relationship between Audit Committee Meetings and Firm Value (Tobin’s Q) (P-value = 0.1866, P > 0.05). Therefore, hypothesis H1 is not supported. The findings also indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between the gender of the audit committee and the firm value (P-value = 0.0000, P < 0.05). Therefore, hypothesis H2 is supported. The findings also demonstrate a significant positive relationship between the size of the audit committee and the firm value (P-value = 0.0000, P < 0.05). Therefore, hypothesis H3 is supported. Audit Committee Independence and Firm Value are positively and significantly correlated (P-value = 0.0019, P < 0.05). The conclusion drawn from this finding is that there is a significant positive relationship between audit committee independence and firm value. Therefore, hypothesis H4 is supported. Additionally, there is a positive and significant relationship between audit committee expertise and firm value (P-value = 0.0070, P < 0.05). Therefore, hypothesis H5 is supported.

The fixed vs random effect of the audit committee on firm value in the existence of control variables can be determined using the GLS technique to determine if the influence of the audit committee on firm value is a result of different firms or of time. The P-value for the Hausman test is 0.2409 (P-value > 0.05) using the fixed vs random effect, as given in Table 6 , indicating that the fixed effect, not the random effect, is the significant influence in the data under consideration. In other words, rather than having a cross-sectional effect, the impact of the Audit Committee on Firm Value when controlling for other variables is caused by time. Using fixed effect regression, The Audit Committee Gender, Firm Size, and Firm Leverage have a significant impact on Firm Value when controlling for other variables, given that the relevant P-value is 0.0171, 0.0000 and 0.0000 (P-value < 0.05). Although there is an insignificant impact of Audit Committee Size, Audit Committee Independence, Audit Committee Meetings, Audit Committee Expertise, Big 4, Block Holder Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Board Size, Board Meetings, Board Independence and Firm Growth on Firm Value with control variables when employing fixed effect, given that the relevant P-value is 0.1879, 0.1915, 0.9821, 0.2382, 0.5951, 0.4324, 0.5840, 0.8439, 0.3693, 0.8262 and 0.9480 (P-value > 0.05).

Additionally, considering random effect, the Board Independence has a significant impact on Firm Value when controlling for other variables, given that the relevant P-value is 0.0120 (P-value < 0.05). Although, considering random effect, the Audit Committee Size, Audit Committee Independence, Audit Committee Meetings, Audit Committee Expertise, Audit Committee Gender, Firm Size, Big 4, Block Holder Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Board Size, Board Meetings, Firm Leverage and Firm Growth have an insignificant impact on Firm Value, given that the relevant P-value is 0.5116, 0.1531, 0.3373, 0.9622, 0.1307, 0.5054, 0.9098, 0.2423, 0.8470, 0.8636, 0.2256, 0.5417 and 0.8200 (P-value > 0.05).