Development and use of technologies prone for dual-use, characterized as those technologies that can be employed both for civilian applications, or for typical military missions (with or without minor adaptations), is a historical phenomenon, detected all along the human species evolution. Such a duality takes place bi-directional, sometimes civilian devices are adapted from originally bellicose purposes equipment, other times in a reverse direction. Commonly cited examples of the first are: the animal traction vehicles, and maritime navigation artifacts. More contemporarily, the worldwide web, born from a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s communications network, under the name ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network).

The first decades of the 21st century witnessed a rebirth of polarization between states in conjunction with social conflicts, increase of inequalities between peoples, and a re-emergence of state geostrategic opposition, all of which challenges the balance of forces carved out after WWII in a phenomenon branded by most experts as the “return of great power competition”, that affects all regions of the planet, including LAC. One group of nations led by the United States identifies China and Russia as the main concerns, and another group, driven by China and Russia, perceives the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as nemeses.

This particular moment in history is a golden chance for LAC to catch-up with modernized economies, and also for Western countries, the United States especially, to decrease dependence on more distant and potentially unfavorable supplier countries through a process of nearshoring whereby manufacturers or service providers move all or part of their business to another geographical location, usually one relatively close to the company’s area.

The most cited example of nearshoring nowadays involves the common border between the United States and Mexico. However, the Inter-American Development Bank indicates that nearshoring moves by Western industrialized nations (especially the United States) to LAC could add up to US$ 78 billion annually to the entire region’s economy.

This article indicates ways in which LAC’s capabilities for providing dual-use technologies can be leveraged in a nearshoring regime for the benefit of the entire Western Hemisphere.

Dual-use technologies are those fed from a common core technology, defined by end use (rather than by the source of the resources for development), can find either civilian or military users, and often serve both ( Gummett & Reppy, 1988 ). Another interesting and elegant simple definition of dual-use technologies is:

Dual-use technologies are those that have application by both the military and the civilian sectors of the market. In this way, the dual aspect of technology can be seen as something to be promoted and pursued in research and development of innovations, as it serves two important aspects: i) allow the maintenance of a good defense technological base, amidst the limited budgets available, and ii) improve the economic competitiveness of the country as a whole, through a more efficient allocation of Research and Development (R&D) funds ( da Motta, 2011 ).

It is important to note, however, that some of the most important dual-use technologies are not often the “artifacts” traditionally considered technology but are often what could be described as “technical” or “tacit” knowledge, including not only the science base but also the workforces’ experience, skill, and artisanry (i.e., human capital, “know-how and why”) ( Jensen et al., 2022 ). Additionally, manufacturing processes and management skills, such as systems integration ( Watkins, 1990 ), required to produce those artifacts also fall under dual-use technologies.

As a comparison, two relatively antagonistic models of dual-use technology development were chosen: The US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

One particular feature of US dual-use technologies development policy is the lack of any single centralised document or governmental agency, unlike in other countries; ( Nichols, 2008 ) rather, US development is spread out over various public and private organisations. Each area is subject varying degrees of controls and sectorial policies, some heavily regulated as in the case of nuclear energy, space, or advanced computing ( Steinbock, 2014 ).

For its part, PRC innovated the Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), which sharply differs from US model in the fact that all the Chinese programs are highly centralised and planned, with the specific aim to surpass other countries, especially the US, geopolitical technological advantages. From Chinese writings, it is clear that MCF is not a simple addition to China’s other national strategic priorities but rather a strategy whose components are to be woven into China’s system of national strategies to form an organic, powerful, and comprehensive national strategic system to advance the PRC’s overarching security and development goals.

Despite the philosophical and economic differences of these two dual-technology development models, it may be noted both rely in two operational concepts, namely: a defense industrial base (DIB) and a permanently close integration between government, academia, and corporate actors.

On a superficial level, the idea of a DIB is straightforward. It constitutes the companies supplying defense and defense-related equipment to national security and military organisations. Defining defense industry itself is not simple because of the wide range of products involved. A useful way to classify DIB products is to consider their relationship to military action or warfare: lethal large or small arms systems; non-lethal but strategic products (e.g., vehicles and fuel); and other products consumed by the military (e.g., food and clothing) ( Dunne, 1995 ).

It is important to acknowledge that this hierarchy does not necessarily reflect importance to the military or security production. Most weapons systems could not operate without strategic products, fuel, and transportation, and soldiers could not survive without food. The companies that make up the DIB are differentiated, both in the degree of their dependence on military production and their importance to the DIB. Some large, diversified firms may consider their DIB activities to be marginal, but they may be vital producers of specific weapon systems, while some smaller firms may be totally dependent on military orders but not important suppliers ( Dunne, 1995 ).

Governments are the major buyers and, often, the only buyers of defense equipment (monopsony); therefore, to survive, defense industries need to adjust to uncertainties resulting from technical change and external shocks. Companies require (R&D) resources to be innovative in military and civilian markets ( Hartley, 2015 ). In fact, defense-related R&D spending represents the most important source of public subsidies for innovation ( Moretti et al., 2019 ). Private contractors and corporations soften the impacts of declines in defense budgets by having a flexible workforce shared with similar companies and by partnering with other public spending or non-governmental institutions, like universities, which may bring their own human and technical skills to assist with costly and time-consuming development of profitable applications, whose funds will return benefits in the form of enhanced scientific knowledge and a more highly skilled workforce.

This well-studied collaboration cycle has been branded by different names, but the most current version is the triple helix model of innovation. The triple helix can be defined as a model of innovation in which university/academia, industry, and government, as primary institutional spheres, interact to promote development through innovation and entrepreneurship ( Etzkowitz & Zhou, 2017 ).

Concepts of entrepreneurial university and the triple helix are closely interrelated. In this context, universities are required to be entrepreneurial. Other terms such as the third mission, academic capitalism, and mode II of knowledge production are associated with the idea of the entrepreneurial university. The notion disrupts traditional teaching and research paths of academia and leads it to seek reciprocal relationships with stakeholders, for example in industry and government ( Cai & Amaral, 2021 ).

This creates a new dynamic bringing technological demands to the university and disseminating research results through cooperative relationships with companies. However, this process of alteration of the productive dynamics is not a simple achievement ( Vega-Jurado et al., 2007 ). Innumerable researchers, mostly university professors, many in public universities, tend to reject attempts to approach industry; they see these as “commercialisation” of teaching and research. Such repulsion can be even more intense when governmental and corporate initiatives are part of defense related projects ( Mancebo, 2004 ).

The collaboration between governmental defense entities and private industries tends to be stronger. Recent research highlights an interesting phenomenon known as the “crowding in” effect. When there are heightened levels of government-funded R&D directed towards the defense industry or specific defense companies, it significantly influences private sector R&D within the same industry. The magnitude of this effect has been quantified to be around a 5% to 6% increase in private sector R&D activities. It means that as the government invests more in R&D for defense-related purposes, private businesses operating within the same industry respond by ramping up their R&D efforts ( Moretti et al., 2019 ). Moretti, Steinwender, and Van Reenen revealed the consequential outcome of this phenomenon. Their study on OECD countries confirmed that the boost in private sector R&D activity induced by the rise in public defense R&D investments leads to a subsequent increase in productivity.

In essence, a local economy has the potential for consistent growth through innovation when the triple helix model is effectively implanted in its territory. This circumstance also creates several spillover effects that advantage other industries, and economic sectors. The cluster is a higher stage of the triple helix implementation. Innovation, resulting from integrating university/academia, industry, and government, is enhanced when combined with other specific territorial elements.

According to Porter, forming a regional industrial cluster provides competitive advantages rooted in shared infrastructure, a skilled labour pool, collaborative research and innovation projects, inter-company competition, and institutional incentives. These factors work together to foster an environment conducive to economic growth and innovation. The proximity of diverse resources and stakeholders encourages cooperation, knowledge exchange, and rapid technological advancement, enhancing the cluster’s competitiveness on a global scale ( Porter, 1990 ). This approach benefits individual companies and stimulates overall regional economic development by attracting investment, generating jobs, and cultivating a culture of innovation.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, as elsewhere, innovation policies serve as a potential antidote to regional and global economic uncertainties; nevertheless, even if the overall scores increased during the last years, countries in the region still struggle with fulfilling their innovation potential. No country in the region outperforms in innovation relative to its level of development (as India and Vietnam did, for example), and the largest countries in the region have not seen improvements in their rankings. Numbers are also limited in terms of patent applications filed and scientific articles published ( León, 2017 ).

However, even if the general innovation landscape is daunting, world-class development poles exist, within which there still is strong technological development based on the influence of the local support structure for innovative activity, wherein the sharing of a regional environment and physical proximity contributes to the interaction between industry and innovation. This is not limited to institutions and organisations directly linked to research and technological development but also to the effort of building the region’s urban infrastructure, such as accessibility and telecommunications, associated with the existence of a broad structure of services oriented to meet the demands of innovative ventures, such as financial support, insurance, training, and qualification ( Dos Santos & Caliari, 2012 ).

Four countries in the region have established industrial clusters: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. In the defense field, the most successful case is the São José dos Campos aerospace cluster, with EMBRAER as its leading company ( Salarichs, 2015 ). Beginning with an initial impulse from the government to advance the field of Brazilian aeronautics back in 1969, this industrial conglomerate evolved significantly over time. Currently, it encompasses an array of over a hundred companies. These entities collaborate with researchers and academics to push the boundaries of innovation. Their efforts extend across the entirety of the value chain, encompassing not only ground-breaking advancements but also a comprehensive spectrum of services. This collective endeavor serves as a testament to the collaborative synergy between various stakeholders, all of whom contribute to the growth and vitality of this intricate industrial network.

As such, there are human and material resources that can be harnessed to develop a dual-use defense technology development framework through improving what already exists (in fact or potentially) in some countries, in addition to those of United States and Canada. These nations could be interested in collaborating on the regional development of a hemispheric defense technology network in an integrated defense effort against threats from other regions of the world ( Leal & Figueiredo, 2021 ).

This research discovered there is no specific measurement method for assessing a group of countries’ abilities to develop defense innovation, nor dual-use technology within that. Creation of a completely new quantitative model for such analysis would surpass this investigation’s scope and length, and for this reason, one methodological decision is, partially, the extraction of indicators from other already validated models, such as the system used by the World Intellectual Property Organisation for its Global Innovation Index (GII) ( Dutta et al., 2022 ).

GII inventors depart from the understanding that contemporary innovation capability is increasingly understood as the ability to exploit new technological combinations, including the notions of incremental innovation and “innovation without research.” Even non-innovative expenditure, such as for people and cultural adjustments, is an important component of harvesting benefits (). Therefore, borrowing some GII’s metrics allows for its broader definition of innovation, which helps in the domain of dual-use technologies considering that even if they are not unprecedented, given their inherently restricted nature and the autonomous ability to produce them is itself a sort of innovation.

GII conceptual framework is based on a correlation of two sub-indices: the Innovation-Input Sub-Index and the Innovation Output Sub-Index, whereas the global score is the average function of both the sub-indices ( Dutta et al., 2022 ). An in-depth analysis of all sub-indices GII accounts for would far exceed the research’s scope; however, it is noteworthy that the GII does not consider factors such as the limited publicity of defense related technologies (often deliberately not patented to avoid disclosure of sensitive features), the capacity for a sustainable scale production, or the geopolitical propensity of a given country to pursue defense related technology, even if for commercially available dual-use.

Another major flaw is that, for various reasons, GII does not list all Western Hemisphere countries. Therefore, the researcher needed different analytic tools. Analysis of research production in business by country shows paper production is concentrated in three countries: Brazil, Chile, and México.

Research production by country in business does not follow the same trend as in all sciences, where Argentina has a stronger position, which seems to be an indication that not only size is a key variable for producing business research, but additional structural factors, such as the strength and competition level in the university and business school market, can also be important. For example, good business research statistics of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in the Central American region may be linked with the strength of INCAE Business School in those countries. This level of academic competitiveness between innovative scholars may be the cause for augmented research production in countries like Chile or, increasingly, in Peru, México and Colombia ().

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita figures in Latin America may be correlated with the number of research publications, in particular with economics and business publications (r = 0.54) and business publications alone (r = 0.49), compared to social sciences or all sciences (r = and 0.39 respectively). Such is consistent with findings on a certain relationship between research production and GDP, and indicates the likelihood that in the near future, business research production may increase for those countries that are consistently growing (i.e., Brazil, Chile, México, Peru, Colombia, and Panama) ( Olavarrieta & Villena, 2014 ).

Departing from an assumption that a nation state should be the provider of external and internal security as a public good, in terms of defense innovation in the LAC, impulses for domestic or regional defense technology initiatives, in progress for some decades, have been concerning for the region’s governments. To that end, special attention should be directed to projects in space systems, cyber defense/cybersecurity, maritime safety/security, environmental protection, sustainable energy, and others where civil-military synergies can be achieved with dual-use technology projects ( Pellerano, 2022 ).

One major problem for Latin American governments to overcome is the issue of excess spending in personal instead of modern military hardware, which drains an average of 60% of all resources, leaving less than one percent budget space for (R&D) funding ( Vega & Comini, 2017 ). This factual framework makes it essential to identify not only institutional models of articulation among the productive, governmental, and academic sectors but also an objective framework of project financing that may enable the participation of private capital, if defense innovation it to be achieved ( Salarichs, 2015 ).

On the other hand, it is necessary to recognise the great asymmetry between nations in the region, which makes a direct comparison between them erroneous; therefore, for methodological purposes, we aggregated the region’s countries into three groups and then examined them according to the characteristics of these groups. This study relies on an average of data already taken from scientific publications on the topic of military science and technology that seem to point with some homogeneity to certain groups of countries that are more advanced in military and security technological developments.

Note that the Caribbean countries Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Panama, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have officially renounced maintenance of traditional military organisations, even though security forces execute functions normally committed the military ( Barbey, 2015 ). This is why this research considers possibilities to develop dual-use technologies proper for internal security goals area and also because for some countries in the region, it is not easy to distinguish, using official reports, the allocation of financial resources, training of technical personnel, etc. for defense from that for public security.

Another element this research considers is that some countries in the region are part of the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly British Commonwealth) and consequently have varying degrees of defense structures and services provided by the United Kingdom ( Mckenzie, 2006 ). The same is to be observed of former colonies of the Netherlands ( Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008 ).

Innovation studies tend to look separately at countries with development programs of greater complexity and at a more prominent stage and those at a less advanced stage. For purposes of cataloging, this study indicates a third residual category to contemplate countries with a very low level of technological innovation (in general and military), or else, which are very opaque to external analysis, usually due to censorship of their production data.

Olavarrieta and Villenara have identified some LAC countries as relevant producers of scientific and technological innovation, others as evolving producers of scientific and technological innovation, and a third group with either very low scores or none at all (due to unavailability of data during their research) ( Olavarrieta & Villena, 2014 ).

Pelerano identified some relevant defense technology innovators based on a given set of complex projects in development from 2016 to 2030 ( Pellerano, 2022 ). Franko and Herz singled out countries based on statistic variables of autonomy, spending, and integration versus the trade-offs in each country’s strategy while facing the pressure of rising costs of technologically sophisticated systems ( Franko & Herz, 2018 ). Pasquarelli indicated promising countries in the regional by appraising current economic, scientific, and academic abilities in the realm of AI, considered to be a key strategic factor for development and leadership ( Economist Impact, 2022 ).

Cross-referencing these findings, already validated by peer reviewed aggregated analysis, as shown in Table 1 , we empirically established the following groups of countries (alphabetically) in terms of capacity to generate innovative dual-use technology:

1) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico;

2) Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru;

3) Remaining Latin American and the Caribbean, plus Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, due to the general absence of updated data for credible research of these.

Table 1. LAC countries’ classification by dual-use technological development capacities: Selected Indicators (2022).

Source: Elaborated from multiple sources: * https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex , ** https://milex.un-arm.org/ |, *** https://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/se/SAE-ASS-12-21.pdf , |**** https://www.congreso.gob.pe/Docs/comisiones2021/Presupuesto/files/cronograma_de_sectores/sectores/defensa/resumen_ejecutivo_sector_defensa_2022.pdf |, **** https://www.hacienda.gob.do/ |, *****Secretaria de Defensa (2022) Ejecución del Presupuesto por Objetivos a Nivel de Actividades Obra. República de Honduras| ~ https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-latin-america.php#google_vignette | <> https://www.globalinnovationindex.org /Home; Note: (1) An ideal PwrIndx score of 0, means that the lower the PwrIndx value, the greater a nation’s conventional combat effectiveness is ( https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php ). n/a: data not available or not applicable; []: indicates data prior to 2022.

The first group of nations this research examines is countries with already functioning domestic DIB and with a set of economic, institutional, and academic features able to, theoretically, support implementation of a triple-helix style effort focused on developing relevant and innovative dual-use technologies in the subset of Western Hemisphere geography, as adopted by this research.

As previously stated in the methodology section, some countries in the LAC region did not demonstrate a sufficient combination of economic conditions, industrial bases, and a critical mass of personnel in science or technology professionals, which could, even if only hypothetically, allow a forecast of potential dual-use technologies development. However, this is not to say other countries in the region do not have defense or technological capabilities.

Findings of dedicated research groups within the Inter-American Defense College point to the existence of limited defense and security technologies initiatives. For example, the Dominican Republic ( Valencia et al., 2022 ), which develops imported combat airplanes integration in its air force and a technology institute ( Ferreira, 2022 ). Additionally, Uruguay has a notable cybersecurity infrastructure ( Opazo, 2021 ) and collaborates in scientific, high-performance infrastructure ( Nesmachnow & Iturriaga, 2019 ); however, Uruguay seems to have purposely removed both from its defense or security institutions.

Small countries still part of Britain’s Commonwealth of Nations indicate a preference to rely on United Kingdom defense commitments, including the permanent deployment of Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels on the Caribbean ( Navy Lookout, 2020 ); this deployment is dedicated mostly for counternarcotic missions and disaster relief. Generally, the Royal Air Force maintains its strategic position on the Isle of Ascension ( Raf, 2023 ), whereas the Royal Army still keeps garrisons in Belize ( Miller, 2020 ) and, increasingly, in Turks and Caicos ( Turks and Caicos Islands, 2020 ). If it were not for this reliance, some of these states would present basic economic, educational, and institutional conditions to start developing defense technology projects ( Heritage Foundation, 2023 ), especially considering the relative ease with which they could participate in other Commonwealth of Nations scientific forays ( Commonwealth, 2020 ).

Albeit less intensely, the same pattern affects former Dutch colonies, some of which are still part of the kingdom. Amsterdam usually provides security assistance through direct deployment of military contingents from the Dutch Caribbean Coast Guard and from the military police corps, the Royal Netherlands gendarmerie ( Antilliaans Dagblad, 2022 ). In general, former Dutch colonies do not fear traditional military threats, although they do channel security assets to counter-drug assignments; however, verbal threats from neighboring Venezuela prompted Netherlands to send reinforcements to the region, such as deploying new aerial transport and surveillance, including Reaper UAVs ( Granja Sánchez & Manzano, 2022 ). In 2022, Netherlands defense agreements with Suriname were renewed, and the Netherlands committed to provide military education and training support and to refitting Surinamese National Army and its Coast Guard ( Defensie nl, 2022 ). As a result, both British and Dutch components integrate with the Joint Interagency Task Force South, based in Key West, Florida. The taskforce is in charge of patrolling Caribbean and South American waterways ( Wilson, 2022 ).

The final group of Nations with minor capacities is distinct, as there is little scientifically peer reviewed or independent research data and an abundance of distortion-prone discourses under a logic inspired by hybrid warfare principles developed by extra-hemispheric actors ( Farah & Babineau, 2019 ). The most visible case is Venezuela, once the fastest-growing economy of the 20th century and owner of world’s largest known oil reserves; it experienced the greatest economic collapse in LAC’s history ( Jraissati & Jakee, 2022 ). After peaking in 1993, Venezuelan scientific productivity dropped to its lowest level in mid-2010s, even if official numbers about researchers or investments claim increases in recent years ( Requena, 2010 ). Regardless of Venezuela’s scientific meltdown, it is reasonable to believe some competent researchers and infrastructures are still viable ( Arocha, 2021 ) and that claims of domestically made UAVs with Iranian technology ( Nadimi, 2022 ), for example, could be true. If the conditions that existed previously return, it is realistic to forecast that the Venezuelan DIB could be restored to an advanced level, perhaps integrating extra-hemispheric dual-technologies enterprises ( MSU-BIT, 2022 ).

A second notable case is Nicaragua, a country with a small economy ( Aguirre González et al., 2018 ) and a near invisible scientific output ( Monge-Nájera & Yuh-Shan, 2017 ), which would normally indicate the probability of dual-use technologies development is very low. Notwithstanding, out of geopolitical causality, countries like the Russian Federation have installed high-tech structures in its territory, including GLONASS satellite monitoring stations ( Haines, 2016 ), a counterdrug training centre sponsored by the Russian anti-drug office, facilities for troop deployments ( Ellis, 2022 ), and more recently, investments in non-energy nuclear applications ( Baires, 2023 ). It is reasonable to believe that Nicaraguans will be at least partially retrained with the associated knowledge, which could lead to future dual-use technologies skills.

The third case worth mentioning is Bolivia, a resource-rich country that was able to channel commodities income to moderately reduce poverty and social inequalities, at least until the world pandemic crisis ( World Bank, 2023b ), but with generally low scientific-technological production ( Muriel, 2020 ). Despite its lower middle income that would normally be unattractive to investors from the innovation sector, most probably motivated by geopolitical considerations and its vast lithium reserves ( Bos & Forget, 2021 ), Bolivia has attracted higher than usual technological transfers. It has an agreement with the Russian Federation for construction of a nuclear research centre, which aims, among other goals, for the design and construction of research nuclear reactors, particle accelerators and their applications, nuclear minerals prospection, and provision of nuclear fuel cycle services for research nuclear reactors, including the supply of nuclear fuel for research nuclear reactors ( FAO, 2016 ). Additionally, China is making high-level investments in rare earths mining, including processing and industrialization transfer of technology for the recently created state-owned Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos ( Bouchard, 2023 ). Also, Chinese origin technologies and training have been transferred for Bolivia’s space program ( Ellis, 2016 ). In such a context, it is a realistic expectation that in a relatively short time, the country might evolve technological dual-use capabilities of an intermediate grade.

As discussed previously, the first decades of the 21^st century witnessed a rebirth of polarisation between states in conjunction with social conflicts, increase of inequalities between peoples, and a re-emergence of state geostrategic opposition, all of which challenges the balance of forces carved out after WWII in a phenomenon branded by most experts as the “return of great power competition.” ( Mankoff, 2020 ). In-depth analysis of such trend exceeds this work’s scope, but suffice to say that it affects all regions of the planet, including LAC. One group of nations led by the United States identifies China and Russia as the main concerns, and another group, driven by China and Russia, perceives the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as nemeses ( da Silva & Grassi, 2022 ).

As a result of this international configuration, similar to that of the Cold War, LAC could once again become the battlefield between extra-regional powers, whereby the risk of global conflicts could expand with negative impact, greater financial markets volatility, higher investment uncertainty, disruption of supply chains, and downward pressure on commodity prices. However, alternatively, countries in the region could find ways to increase trade competitiveness and boost regional integration, as an insurance policy, by reaching local and regional sociopolitical consensus to allow for greater democratic stability and economic growth ( Álvarez, 2020 ).

Departing from the previous assumptions about the connection between the development of dual-use technologies and economic growth associated with a consequent rapprochement and overcoming of mistrust between civilian and military institutions, a historical opportunity seems to be currently arising in the context of nearshoring. The concept of nearshoring appears as the opposite of more widespread offshoring idea (i.e., transferring business to a neighboring or closer country where production costs and wages are lower to increase profit) ( Piatanesi & Arauzo-Carod, 2019 ).

Even if both ideas tend to express similar thoughts, it is useful to differ nearshoring from back shoring. The latter denotes “the decision to relocate in the firm’s home country production or supply previously off-shored,” ( Fratocchi et al., 2014 ) whereas nearshoring happens “when a manufacturer or service provider moves all or part of their business to another geographical location, usually one relatively close to the company’s area.” ( Haar, 2022 ). Not coincidently, the most cited example of nearshoring involves the common border between the United States and Mexico.

A 2022 study by the Inter-American Development Bank indicates that nearshoring moves by Western industrialized nations (especially the United States) to LAC could add up to US$ 78 billion annually to the region’s economy ( IADB, 2022 ). Though Brazil and Mexico would benefit more, others would also gain, and even sustainability would increase, considering that current internal LAC greenhouse-gas emissions are significantly below average global trade linked emissions ( IADB, 2022 ).

Apart from purely economic considerations, in a context of worsening great-power competition, nearshoring also entails geostrategic advantages. Economic competition is inherent to great-power rivalry, which brings back industrial policy concerns. As an example, the American government identified the following as vital to national security: semiconductors, large-capacity batteries, pharmaceuticals, and critical minerals—all drawing stockpile expansion policies. However, most countries realise that, apart from a few highly sensitive or vital products, most companies are not able to fully backshore because of much higher costs. More realistically, multinational corporations would likely favor shorter, more duplicative regional supply chains giving way to corporate regionalization on the near future ( O’Neil, 2022a ).

This particular moment is a golden chance for LAC to catch-up with modernized economies, and also for Western countries, the United States especially, to decrease dependence on more distant and potentially unfavorable supplier countries ( Harrup & Montes, 2023 ). Nevertheless, nearshoring by Western corporations into the Americas would necessitate countries in the region to make a strategic decision to put themselves in a position to exploit productive capabilities already available in sectors such as automotive, food, tourism, etc. To realize these aspirations, it is imperative for LAC countries to create more knowledge transfer opportunities from more developed economies. This would lead to improvements of local innovative enterprises that may attract once offshored companies ( Bravo, 2022 ). From a developed world perspective, leveraging nearshoring as an alternative channel for private investment in the Western Hemisphere is a way to appease their companies’ need of developing a base of suppliers geographically closer, given concerns about logistics costs and risks of delays posed by farther away ones, particularly in more sensitive sectors like digital technologies, strategic minerals, green energy devices, etc. ( Ellis, 2023 ).

In addition, as corporations seek new commercial options, LAC offers attractive advantages. More than half of the electricity in LAC comes from clean sources, and region’s countries have at their disposal abundant sun, wind, and geothermal reserves, coupled with plentiful minerals essential for green technologies, which would aid multinationals’ need to reduce their global carbon footprints. Also, even if less than before, LAC still has a demographic advantage ( O’Neil, 2022b ).

What is true for economic and technological development in general is even truer for development of dual-use technologies. To the extent that a policy of integrated deterrence was proposed at the hemispheric level in 2022 at the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas ( Garamone, 2022 ), held in Brasilia, Brazil, a paradigm of progressive deepening of defense cooperation by the countries in the region depends on the improvement and communion of updated systems and logistic chains in technologically advanced defense materials. Countries cannot realistically and, from a military viewpoint, securely, be dependent on the supply from just one developed actor above all others.

In this sense, without disregarding the differences between the two regions, the European model seems more adequate to achieve the effects intended by America’s integrated dissuasion proposal, whereby the European Union (EU) Defense Technological and Industrial Base Sector, within the Permanent Security Cooperation framework, aims to diminish strategic dependence on countries outside the region and provide self-sufficient means on air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains to allow the EU improved deterrence of present and future adversaries ( Eur-Lex, 2022 ). As in LAC, in the EU, there are proportionally more and less developed countries, but these view each other like peers sharing common values, and they try to generally compensate for their mutual strengths and vulnerabilities ( Tekiner, 2020 ).

It is important to highlight that, as the global COVID19 pandemic showed, improving dual- use capacities in LAC does not mean only the physical creation of new weapons and systems but also increasing the region’s workforce awareness and resilience against “under the radar” threats posed by antagonistic extra hemispherical dual-use technologies in all possible realms. Such an objective can be achieved in a homogeneous way in all countries of the region, even in those with still limited industrial innovation, by the means of shared professional education efforts ( Hirsch, 2021 ).

In this respect, a model of part-time or temporary military service with defense technology institutions, similar to what is done in the United States, could be an institutional way to offer standardized and adequate training without jeopardizing the main civilian professional or academic careers. After 1973, the US armed forces changed from a compulsory conscription model to a voluntary one with the aim, among other things, to reduce budgetary pressures; however, in doing so, a prominent role had to be envisioned for reserve components, which would permanently perform key combat support services, thus bolstering active units’ strength—a concept that eventually resulted in the Total Force concept ( Jensen, 2016 ).

Within this framework, in addition to the traditional path of joining military academies after high-school, college students could enroll in part-time reserve officers training centres or join after graduating through officer candidates’ schools. For some more specific positions, senior professionals have a chance to join as direct commission officers ( Today’s Military, 2014 ). Many of these opportunities are available specifically for military science and technology centres, such as the US Air Force’s scientific applications specialist or US Navy’s science officers ( Peer, 2022 ). To some extent, even foreign nationals are encouraged to apply for these positions via the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program ( Chishti et al., 2019 ).

A similar, more recent effort can be found in Brazil’s Technical-Scientific Service, whereby each of the armed forces branches may incorporate and directly commission Brazilian civilians with recognised technical-professional competence or scientific experts in specific fields of knowledge with the rank and pay-grade of lieutenant-commanders or majors for eight years ( SSPM, 2023 ). The disadvantage of this initiative is that it is not a regime of part-time dedication (as in the US practice), which might make it less attractive for mid-career professionals worried about possible difficulties of returning to the market at the end of their service period.

A sum of investments in the reindustrialisation of the region, conducted from a nearshoring process, with the rearrangement of existing institutional capacities, especially when it comes to the skilled labour force, in the critical sectors for innovation would allow a notable increase in the design of dual-use technologies in the region.

Several countries have been developing their military capabilities through innovation and cooperation. Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Colombia are the most important providers of South-South and triangular cooperation in LAC. This region has the potential to enhance its military capabilities by strategically focusing on a collaborative approach that involves partnerships between two countries or regions facilitated by a third party, often possessing advanced technological or operational expertise, as shown in Figure 1 .

In this context, the United States and Canada assume crucial roles as potential facilitators and contributors to this cooperative framework. By leveraging these North American countries’ experience, resources, and technological advancements, LAC nations can effectively bolster their defense capabilities through innovation and knowledge exchange. Triangular cooperation offers the opportunity to tap into the wealth of expertise that the United States and Canada possess, not only in terms of military technology but also in areas such as strategy, training, and operational efficiency. This collaborative model can lead to the transfer of cutting-edge military technologies, the establishment of joint research initiatives, and the enhancement of training programs, ultimately elevating the overall security landscape in the region. As these partnerships unfold, they contribute to strengthening the military capacities of individual nations and building a more interconnected and secure hemisphere through shared expertise and mutual collaboration.

LAC nations predominantly rely on their domestic defense enterprises to procure missile systems, firearms, ammunition, and other military equipment for their armed forces. Notable examples of these companies include Fábrica de Armas de SEDENA in Mexico, INDUMIL in Colombia, Fábricas y Maestranzas del Ejército (FAMAE) in Chile, Fábrica de Armas y Municiones del Ejército (FAME) in Peru, and Fábrica de Municiones (IMG) in Guatemala. However, the region also plays a significant role as an importer of armored vehicles, vessels, submarines, helicopters, and aircraft.

We can discern the promising opportunities in this sector by analyzing the major weapons exchanges among hemisphere countries, including the United States and Canada. The figure depicts regional arms agreements and deliveries from 2000 to 2022. It reveals that the United States is the principal supplier, exporting to 21 countries, closely followed by Canada, reaching 15 nations. Brazil is the privileged one, with sales to 10 nations. Chile and Argentina follow, exporting to 5 and 3 countries respectively. According to Mordor Intelligence, key players in the Latin American defense market include Embraer SA, Avibras Indústria Aeroespacial, and The Boeing Company ( Mordor Intelligence, 2023 ). Once again, Brazil is well positioned here, reflecting its solid Defense Industrial Base.

In line with our categorization, it becomes crucial to facilitate the engagement of countries positioned within the first group in collaborative innovation endeavors alongside nations positioned in the other two groups. The extensive and multifaceted value chain inherent to dual-use technologies allows diverse countries with varying economic growth and human capital levels to participate effectively. This inclusiveness is particularly significant as it permits nations at different stages of development to contribute their unique strengths and expertise to joint ventures. Furthermore, this collaborative approach does not compromise the national security interests of the participating states. A dynamic ecosystem is cultivated by involving countries from distinct groups in these joint innovation projects where knowledge exchange and resource pooling can lead to technologically advanced solutions that address common challenges.

Producing innovation in the 21st century is a challenge for all countries, with capitalism clearly linked to the continuous production of new technologies in all fields of knowledge. This phenomenon is even more intense in the defense field, wherein purely military or dual-use technologies involve geopolitical aspects in a context of remerging planetary dispute between powerful nations.

Against this backdrop, for LAC countries in various stages of development and with defense budgets squeezed by successive crises, the discussion about innovation fostered by the R&D of dual-use technologies must be taken more seriously than ever. The research highlights the presence of three different groups of countries in LAC, some developed to the point of being able to design and produce dual-use technologies autonomously, as long as the necessary economic and institutional conditions are provided, and others that, if they are not yet at the same level as the previous ones, could realistically reach such a level. That is as long as LAC nations concentrate effort in key sectors, especially in the formation of critical mass of technical personnel, and the activation, or reactivation, of basic industrial infrastructures, such as in communications, computer systems, chemistry, metallurgy, etc.

There is also a third group of countries at a very incipient level of scientific-technological capacity but that could participate in an effort to develop dual-use technologies, which in themselves do not involve so much innovation but are part of the supply chain of any armed forces. For them, it is not so absurd to imagine a significant increase in the local economy through a concentrated effort in sectors such as special materials (fabrics, ballistic protection, glassware, etc.) and primary processing of raw materials (mining, fuels, food products, etc.). In any case, for these, a concentrated effort in the general improvement of educational levels, both academic and technical-professional, is fundamental.

At present, two basic conceptions of dual technology development models seem to prevail: the first one led by the North American system, in which private initiative prevails as the generator of innovation, supported by academia, and subtly guided by the state, which uses its purchasing power and regulation of standards to induce business decisions toward a certain path. Nearly opposite, but reaching similar results, is the Chinese model of military-civilian fusion, whereby a highly centralized economic system requires that all projects from the outset be conceived with dual purposes regardless of whether they come from academia, “private industry,” or government technology centers, including the military.

A realistic balance of the current state of defense industrial bases in LAC leads to the conclusion that some intermediate form between the two main models would be appropriate. It is certain that none of the LAC countries have currently a private sector sufficiently developed to lead innovation in defense; the sector is merely advised by the respective governments. Conversely, as democratic countries with highly mobilized civil societies, it is neither possible nor desirable to completely submit technological development to government preferences. This intermediate route has been found by some countries through parliamentary legislative measures to organize and support the defense industrial base, combined with transparent development goals in critical defense sectors, preceded by debates with civil society and its elected representatives, to point out the direction and the budgetary resources to be spent.

The research also indicates that all countries, even the least developed ones, have complementary capabilities, which would favor the development of regional arrangements for production of dual technologies. In turn, this could mirror the longstanding partnership between Argentina and Brazil in the nuclear sector. In such hypothesis, linguistic facilities and similar constitutional models are useful to engage companies, public or private, universities and governments of the region in joint ventures.

Furthermore, LAC countries have the potential to fortify their military strengths by strategically focusing on partnerships between countries facilitated by a third party, with the United States and Canada playing crucial roles. This collaborative framework allows LAC nations to harness North American countries’ expertise and technological advancements, leading to the transfer of advanced military technologies, joint research, and improved training programs. Concurrently, engaging countries from diverse development stages in dual-use technology projects foster a dynamic ecosystem that taps into various strengths without compromising national security, culminating in advanced solutions to shared challenges.

In conclusion, it seems that the current moment of resumption of great powers competition serves as a historic opportunity for LAC in terms of attracting long-lasting investments capable of promoting the long-awaited development of the region. Directly associated with this, there is the possibility of a qualitative leap in the production of dual-use technologies involving the North and South of the American continent. Subsequently, this could lead to an integrated empowerment of continental allies that could bring onward, as a consequence, to the implementation of an integrated deterrence strategy against extra-hemispheric actors.