Masculinity is a dynamic concept that has evolved significantly over time, as has the notion of adolescence, especially since the beginning of the twentieth century. The 1970s saw the emergence of “youth culture”¹, which not only distinguished adolescence from other age groups, but also divided itself into youth subcultures based on race, ethnicity, economic status, public appearance, or a variety of other factors ( Hughes & Short, 2015 ). The reshaping of masculinity among the younger generations is now the subject of growing interest, albeit not one without controversy². It is in this historical context that our typological research into models of adolescent masculinity in the European region of Wallonia (Belgium) has been carried out? Rogers, Nielson and Santos (2021) have recently authored a review of the literature on adolescent masculinities and have highlighted the relevance of a developmental and contextual approach to masculinities. While interpersonal relationships play a crucial role in the construction of masculinities through the process of socialization, masculinities cannot be isolated from broader socio-cultural systems. Adolescents do not live in a vacuum; they grow up in a particular time and place. As stated in the public significance statement of Rogers, Nielson, and Santos’ article, “research in the past two decades evidences the relevance of masculine gender-role socialization during adolescence. Many youth devote significant energy to navigating male-role norms in their relationships and social environments. Their accommodation of masculine norms has identifiable implications for development in regards to health, relationships, and academics”.

In fact, it appears that we are confronted with evolutions in masculinities consisting of accommodations and contradictions.

Gender equity and equality have been widely promoted in our societies over the past decades. While general support for gender equality, including among the male population, is increasing, this support often appears conditional with respect to young men ( Off, Charron, & Alexander, 2022 ). Numerous studies in English, French, and Spanish affirm that contemporary forms of adolescent masculinity are accompanied by a reinforcement of gender-based divisions in many countries ( Burn-Murdoch, 2024 ; Campbell, May, Duffy, Skinner, Gottfried, & Hewlett, 2024 ; Sanmartín Ortí, Kuric Kardelis, & Gómez Miguel, 2022 ) and the persistent maintenance of a hegemonic identity model ( Galland, 2010 ; Dabrowski, 2018 ). This model is notably characterized by toughness; detachment from schoolwork ( Ayral, 2011 ); sporting prowess ( Phoenix, 2004 ); financial ambition; and competition between peers ( Neff, Cooper, & Woodruff, 2007 ).

These findings prompted us to design a research project with a focus on identifying models of masculinity in adolescence rather than highlighting general trends. The approach is thus inductive and does not require the a priori formulation and verification of precise assumptions.

The definition of masculinity used in this study refers to the sociological concept of gender. Masculinity is not seen as a natural, biological attribute, but rather as a multidimensional concept molded by everyday social practices and interactions that are subject to significant social and cultural pressures, and which materialize in opinions, representations and attitudes ( West & Zimmerman, 2009 )³.

The sociologist Connell (2005b) has stressed the importance of adolescence in the construction of masculinities as it is a particular period when models of masculinity are either appropriated and embodied, or negotiated and, on occasion, rejected, and that this is no small way due to interactions between peers.⁴ However, Connell has warned against the temptation to think of adolescence exclusively in terms of the individual without considering existing power relations, notably in the domain of sexuality.⁵ An early advocate of feminist epistemology,⁶ Connell’s thinking is informed by critical feminist and Gramscian theories, which are clearly reflected in two of her theoretical assertions: a) masculinity is relational, plural, and dynamic; and b) masculinity is conceived as “configurations of practices” shaped by complex, concrete social relations (of power, production and affect) situated in time and space.

Although the theoretical approach Connell adopts in Masculinities in 2005 is not the only one,⁷ it is an essential milestone in the emergence and constitution of the field of masculinity studies, especially where the societal context is concerned, and remains a reference for a new generation of researchers ( Bridges & Pascoe, 2016 ). This approach, therefore, appeared to be the most relevant foundation for our research work, especially given that the way identity construction of “being a man” is often conceived remains overly essentialized and thought of as homogenous, particularly in psychology.

Based on empirical research (life stories or observations of adults in this case), Connell’s (2005a) work highlights the diversity of masculinities from which emerge four ideal types of configurations of practice, including a central model. These ideal types⁸ account for both the relationships men maintain between each (how they distance themselves or not from a so-called hegemonic model of masculinity) as well as those they maintain with women (how men and women experience power relationships and the effects of these on their bodily, material, relational, and symbolic experiences).

The first ideal type, hegemonic masculinity, echoes the observations of Sharon Bird (1996) and refers to a display of attitudes, opinions and behaviors characterized by emotional detachment, competition, and objectification, particularly the sexual objectification of women. It has played a role in perpetuating the notion that men’s domination over women and other men is the “standard” of masculinity. Unlike hegemonic masculinity, the model of complicit masculinity does not openly claim the primacy of the masculine over the feminine but does nothing to deconstruct it either. It confers the privilege of being male without taking a public stance on male supremacy. The last two models of masculinity—subordinate and marginalized—convey the marked social ascendancy that one group of dominant men exerts over the others. On the one hand, the subordinate model falls within the realm of subordination as it does not conform to the emotional, competitive, and sexual power practices expected of “real men”. On the other hand, marginalized masculinity is associated with social and material failure and/or belonging to a racial minority.

Is this typology still relevant today given that there is increasing talk of men, and society more generally, having taken up the feminist cause?

Due to its centrality and vague nature, the concept of hegemonic masculinity (which could be considered a “rascal concept”⁹) has been critically refined and revised, notably by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) and Messerschmidt (2012, 2016) . In 2019, Messerschmidt (2019) still maintained that Connell’s original emphasis on the legitimation of unequal gender relations remained essential to both the concept and the field of critical masculinity studies.

For her part, the African American sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (2009) called for power relations to be viewed from a dialectical perspective as domination also provokes redefinitions and resistances. Her work has been echoed by the Portuguese sociologist Sofia Aboim (2016) : Although multiple, the journeys of trans-masculine individuals demonstrate how bodily experiences shape and redefine masculinities in ways that illuminate the nexus between bodies, embodiments, and discursive enactments of masculinity ( Aboim & Vasconcelos, 2021: p. 43 ). Aboim has called for a distinction to be drawn between the notions of domination and hegemony: hegemony as the “historical snapshot” of what in a given moment—to a greater or lesser extent—lies at the core of the ideological field upholding the power of men, and domination, as a social process stemming from the practice of all men, in all material positions and cultural frameworks’ ( Aboim, 2016: p. 38 ). The model of hegemonic masculinity thus appears here as the result of a historical context and a process in the making, a process which involves appropriation, negotiation, and translation, as well as reconfiguration and hybridization.

Thus, while Raewyn Connell (2005a) has identified the significant role played by homophobia in the hegemonic masculinity model, this model can appropriate traits from other models of masculinity it has previously denigrated. Anderson (2016) considers that sexual attraction relationships are becoming increasingly accepted and Bridges and Pascoe (2016) have confirmed that there is a phenomenon where young adolescents appropriate certain elements of the same sex culture. However, they emphasize that this process of cultural appropriation does not necessarily lead to greater gender or sexual equality, concurring with Vörös’s (2020: p. 20) claim that “any practice of masculinity implies above all a certain degree of complicity with the patriarchal order”, as well as Demetrakis Demetriou (2001: p. 355) , who has stated that “it is precisely through its hybrid and apparently contradictory content that hegemonic masculinity reproduces itself”.

According to Aboim (2016) , the more general transformative effect of the new value accorded to intimacy, as well as women’s agency, means that are now three observable models of family functioning associated with specific and hierarchical ways of asserting oneself as a “man”:

a) an unequal sharing model governed by the norm of the male provider and protector, defending his autonomy and primacy;

b) an unequal sharing model with a man who is neither provider nor caregiver, even if he expresses a desire to be involved in the private sphere;

c) a dual provider/caregiver model based on the principle of companionship and where the objective of achieving gender equality is asserted.

This third model instinctively speaks to us as it is identifiable in our social and cultural environment and from observations we have made in previous studies.¹⁰

In 1995, Raewyn Connell insisted that hegemonic power was transversal to the gender order that justifies and structures hierarchical relations at the societal level, as well as the gender regime that concretely structures power and disciplinary mechanisms ( Hill Collins, 2009 ). The work of black feminists has been particularly valuable as it has encouraged us to pay particular attention to the interplay between social relations of sex (which we define as “gender” following Laure Bereni et al., 2020 ) and the intertwining of political economy and politics in an increasingly globalized context.

Recently, the anthropologists Cornwall, Karioris and Lindisfarne (2016) have re-emphasized the need to articulate the gender order from a political economy perspective. This is due to the fact that the era of neoliberal hegemony a) naturalizes inequality by framing it as genetic and as a matter of individual responsibility; b) increases gender marking linked to the commodification of social relations; and c) expands the physical and cultural distance between elites and ordinary people. Numerous studies have highlighted the persistence of links between gender and political and coercive mechanisms ( Wacquant, 2012 ; Mohr, 2019 ) that are put in place to regulate gender relations in particular institutions ( Aboim, 2016 ). For instance, schools continue to enforce a gendered division of labor ( Connell, 2005b ) and participate in the dissemination of messages that contrast girls with boys ( Smith, 2007 ). For their part, families and peer groups undeniably continue to play an important role in the transmission of gendered practices and subliminal messages ( Gavray & Boulard, 2021 ). Such messages include the happiness injunction described by the psychiatrist Edgard Cabanas and the sociologist Eva Illouz (2018) as spearheading the neoliberal political economy’s cultural revolution. They evoke a mode of governmentality in which happiness and its industry have invaded all the interstices of society, including citizenship and new management styles, as well as our individual obsessions, particularly where sexuality is concerned. In both real and virtual spaces, sexual stereotypes that disadvantage girls and women are still legion. Whether sexist beliefs, opinions, and practices are benevolent or hostile ( Glick & Fiske, 1996 ), they serve to reaffirm relations of domination and (re)position each sex “in its place” in the gender order.¹¹ Dabrowski (2018) points to the emergence of a generation of “man-children” as characteristic of early masculine culture where anything goes, which is notably reflected in casual and libertarian sexual encounters. The existence of a sexual double standard in relationships of the same sexual attraction highlighted by studies in social psychology refers to the idea that men are more sexually demanding than girls and have less control over their sexual desires, making girls custodians of normative sexuality ( Kaltiala-Heino et al., 2018 ) and responsible when things go wrong.¹² At the same time, increasingly younger teenage girls are encouraged to use their “sexual freedom” to achieve pleasure, often without realising that they are expected to become desirable, consenting the same sexual attraction’s subjects. Most girls who have engaged in sexting say they do so under pressure, as opposed to only a handful of boys. For their part, boys are required to present a tough, the same sexual attraction masculinity for their peers through certain types of performances, as well as through technological affordances, including “the ‘phallic’ collecting, posting, tagging, and rating of girls’ and women’s digital bodies” ( Naezer & Ringrosse, 2018: p. 416 ). Boys tell each other about their first encounters with “pornos” in order to show off to their peers, while girls see this material as useful for informing themselves and debating with friends ( Amsellem-Mainguy & Vuattoux, 2020 ). Thus, sexuality appears to remain at the heart of competition between male adolescents.

Alison Phipps and Isabel Young (2014) have demonstrated how competitive and commercial individualism, which is based on the image of a rational and entrepreneurial social subject, undeniably influences the way we think about and construct ourselves from an early age. The Portuguese philosopher and journalist Maçaes (2022, online) points out that “the new political economy reaches deep inside your soul. The darkest side of the knowledge economy is that it has gradually destroyed the separation between intellectual and material life”, and moreover, “social media offers no respite from social pressure. It reinforces and intensifies the need to conform well-adjusted”. For Evans (2024) the ideological polarization of the sexes is also sustained, more often unconsciously than not, by gendered cultural bubbles, including communities of opinion created by social media networks and nurtured by misogynistic influencers, as well as by the economic resentment young men feel in response to the widening scope of women’s cultural production. Gefjon Off (2023) and Gefjon Off, Nicholas Charron, Amy Alexander (2022) have made a similar observation having found that young men living in regions where unemployment was rising and confidence in public institutions was low were particularly likely to be opposed to women’s rights. This has led some researchers to argue that gender equality cannot be promoted without supporting men’s emotional flexibility ( Croft, Atkinson, & May, 2021 ). But would such an approach be sufficient?

These factors forcefully underscore the fact that collective and individual contexts are closely intertwined, as are material and psycho-social manifestations. They must be considered in conjunction and at the intersection of gender and class relations ( Naezer, 2020 ; Clair, 2023 ). It is for this reason it was important to pay attention to all these elements in our research.

We are aware of the exploratory nature of our analyses. It would have been interesting to reproduce the typological analysis across two survey years in order to speak of evolution with greater assurance concerning the population studied, but this was not possible as the questionnaires used were not exactly identical. It would also be great if we had the possibility of following survey respondents over time and creating a real longitudinal database. Comparisons between countries and different interview languages are even more complicated and it remains essential to interpret the results with caution.

We cannot rule out the phenomenon of social/societal desirability, but it is not clear who a young person would aim to please: the interviewer or their friends, who are also taking part in the survey. When asked to what extent they thought their friends would like them to resemble what is traditionally expected of a boy, almost half the respondents answered more than 7 on a scale of 10. Both Enzmann et al. (2010) and Torrington et al. (2024) have demonstrated the validity of self-evaluations in an educational context when used with certain precautions (such as the absence of teachers or educators when a questionnaire is administered, the independence of teachers in their methodology and contact with the group, and the interference of parents in the decision to participate). Of course, there are many known factors (educational programs, the specific culture of each school and its physical and sociological environment, etc.) that can influence what adolescents experience and say about themselves, their opinions, and behaviors. However, our article did not focus on these elements. Finally, it would have been ideal to conduct individual and group meetings with teenagers to discover how qualitative data based on adolescents’ stories might challenge the interpretation of results from the quantitative survey.

The use of exploratory results to identify models and ideal types as defined by Marx Weber confirms, as do Ravn and Roberts (2021) , a situation in which adolescents still find it difficult to distance themselves completely from the hegemonic masculinity despite increasing support for the principle of equality between sex groups (with regard to rights, intelligence).

The model that emerges from Cluster 1 clearly does not have a monopoly on continuing to endorse asymmetry between sex groups. In the model embodied by Cluster 2, the pursuit of status and financial dominance in public and private spheres is significantly associated with the minoritization of girls and women. In addition, our results show that the assertions of competitive and unfettered sexuality play a central role alongside professional aspirations in building this type of masculinity ( Clair, 2013 ). It is certain that Cluster 3, which is as large as Group 2 (44% of respondents are related to it), reflects a model of masculinity farthest from stereotyped representations and attitudes and the most favorable to gender equality, but without necessarily espousing or assuming a political position that could be described as “feminist”²², and this in spite of the fact that 62% of young people in this group say they are interested or very interested in politics, compared with 33% in Cluster 1 and 39% in Cluster 2. Ultimately, our results confirm that male domination is in fact a dimension of class domination, with both relations of domination being “intertwined” ( Oeser, 2022 ). As Connell (2005b) has argued, adolescence is an important period of life in today’s world. There is a wide variety of social spaces and actors that contribute to how existing models of masculinity (and femininity) are appropriated, lived, negotiated, and even interrogated. Being aware that a pole cannot be studied independently of the pole which is presented as opposite or complementary²³, it would be useful to study the models of femininity in comparison and in relation to the models of masculinity highlighted in this study; to observe the evolution of the potential similarities with the male models in transformation. Demetriou (2001) has argued that masculinities must be thought of in dynamic terms, hybridizing²⁴ and reconfiguring different models of masculinity that came before. This process of hybridization and reconfiguration takes place at a specific moment in time in a simultaneously globalized and conflictual world. Regardless of the broad diversity of individual positions in terms of opinions and attitudes, it would appear that the three models identified ultimately share, to varying degrees and in specific forms, the same basis: an embrace of certain neoliberal prescriptions. In the case of Cluster 1, this is to counter the risk of social downgrading; for Cluster 2, it manifests in an insistence on success; and, for Cluster 3, it can even be identified in the way a “slow” lifestyle is pursued. As Messerschmidt (2016) has speculated, the ceaseless and intricate entangling of structures and actions in reflexive activities can be accompanied by the persistence of gender distinctions and hierarchies, whether symbolic or material, and this despite repeated claims of neutrality ( Falquet, 2014 ).

Therefore, according to experts including Rivoal (2018) , Aho and Peltola (2023) , despite the MeToo movement and a supposed critique of virility as old-fashioned by the ruling class, this does not mean hegemonic masculinity no longer exists and has ceased to influence power relations and elevate male-same sexual attraction above other forms of sexuality. A more inclusive form of masculinity does not automatically imply more equity and equality. This can be seen early on in young adults. The Rapport annuel 2024 sur l’état des lieux du sexisme en France ( the Annual Report on the State of Sexism in France 2024 ) confirms that men, and especially young men, are increasingly adhering to masculinist stereotypes while women are under strong pressure to be feminine and give up more and more of their freedoms. The dynamic and historical approach underpinning this hypothesis raises several questions. For instance, how can we explore new forms of gendered and social subalternity²⁵, particularly in virtual spaces? And how can we theoretically and practically comprehend ways of resisting them today, both collectively and locally in single-sex, mixed spaces ( Barbaras & Devers, 2011 ; Govers, 2019 ). All this is unfolding in right and radical right declarations that deny racism, xenophobia and sexism ( Fassin, 2024 ), which are themselves set against the backdrop of a wider discourse asserting hegemonic masculinity ( Lamoureux & Dupuis-Déri, 2015 ). Among these discourses, warrior models of masculinity ( Duncanson, 2021 ) are undergoing a revival while actors in the fourth wave of trans revolutionary feminism are calling for the deconstruction of the binary vision of gender and the supremacy of heteronormativity with which it is associated ( Preciado, 2022 ).

61% of the respondents live with both parents in the same household, 22% with their mother, almost 5% with their father, and 12% in some other situation. 82% of the young people surveyed were born in Belgium, and 85% of them speak French at home.

80% of fathers are employed, and 65% of mothers. 33% of mothers and 30% of fathers have higher education qualifications while 13.6% of mothers and 18% of fathers have less than a secondary education. 43% report that their family follows a particular religious tradition or belief and, in this case, 44% identify as Christian and 41% as Muslim.

Composition of each sub-factor (result of factor analysis solution of two factors)

Asym 1

Q20. In my opinion, it is the mission of boys/men to protect girls/women

Q29. I take care to do what is expected of boys

Q42. For a man, success in life includes starting a family

Q81. It is up to boys to initiate date with girls

Q55. I often hide my emotions

Q42. For a man, success in life includes having children

Q43. For a man, success in life includes living as a couple

Q67. In my opinion, adventure stories are more interesting than love stories

Q91. It is normal to me that the man is the main breadwinner in the family

Q88i. It is not normal to me that men spend time taking care of children or involve themselves in family organization

Asym 2

Q24. In my opinion, boys are smarter than girls

Q45. I do not support anyone who believes that girls and boys are equal

Q74. In my opinion, it is normal that men are prioritized for senior positions

Q75i. I do not support women’s participation in political/economic decision-making

Q76. In my opinion, it is normal for men to earn more money than women

Q89. As a man, it is normal to put your family after your professional career

Q102inv. I do not think it is normal for women to walk in public spaces at their leisure

Q109. In my opinion, it is normal that some occupations are reserved for girls and others for boys

Power 1

Q19. Boys should be tough rather than sensitive

Q27. I prefer situations where I am the leader

Q41. In my opinion, it is normal for a boy to use force in conflict if necessary

Q44. You have to be a leader to find your place in school

Q53. I often feel in competition with others

Q58. I find it embarrassing to ask others for help

Q62. I feel drawn to firearms

Q68. I am attracted to violent movies and games

Q65d. I think everything would be boring without violence

Power2

Q35. I have been on a drinking binge in the last 30 days

Q48i. I do not like to let others decide

Q71. As a boy, I think it is normal to disobey parents and authorities

Q78. As a boy, I have a high resistance to physical pain

Q83. It is normal for boys to prepare for war

Q103c. I like to test myself by taking risks

Q103g. I sometimes lose my temper

Sexual 1

Q34. A boy does not express his sexual desires to a girl

Q69. Persons of the same sex are not really men

Q73. The female with same-sex attraction is not really women

Q85. It is more up to boys to decide when they want to have sex with girls than the inverse

Q82. Inv In my opinion, contraception is not the responsibility of men

Sexual 2

Q49. I think it is normal for men to have multiple sexual partners

Q66. I find it normal to pay someone to have sex with them

Q84. I think girls have uncontrollable sexual desires

Q92. I think it is normal for girls and a boy to watch websites and movies for adults

¹As with gender culture, youth culture should be understood as the values and models that young people adopt to shape their behavior.

²Particularly where the alarmist discourse about the “failure of boys” is concerned.

³French-speaking Belgium, where our research has been carried out, is geographically and culturally close to France, where this definition and approach remain significant and where we often find similar trends concerning gender stereotyped opinions and practices.

⁴Some twenty years later, French sociologist Clair (2023: p. 178) , in a study of teenagers, reaffirmed the hermeneutical validity of Connell’s observation that “adolescence is, generally speaking, a great moment of naturalization of gender because of the major transformations of the body that occur at this time, which go hand in hand with the entry into genital sexuality and the (social) metamorphosis into men or women”.

⁵This has been highlighted in numerous feminist studies ( Delphy, 1988 ; Federici, 2019 ; Tisdell, 2008 ).

⁶Known as “standpoint feminist theory”, feminist epistemology identifies and challenges forms of sexism, such as hierarchical relations between the masculine and feminine, which includes the production of contemporary knowledge, without losing sight of the intersectionality of power relations ( Haraway, 1988 ; Hesse-Biber, 2008 ; Clair, 2016 ; Aboim, 2016 ). It should be noted that feminist epistemology is not homogeneous. For an overview, see Harding (2004) .

⁷For an overview of different theoretical approaches, see Gottzén, Mellström & Shefer (2021) , especially the introduction (pp. 1-17).

⁸An ideal type is an abstract type or category that helps us understand or theorize certain phenomena without claiming that the characteristics of a certain type are always and completely present in the observed phenomena.

⁹Loïc Wacquant (2012) uses this term to refer to “neoliberalism”.

¹⁰This third model was particularly prevalent in families where both parents had relatively high and comparable levels of education, worked in the education or care sector, earned roughly the same salary, and took turns looking after children, particularly due to differing working hours.

¹¹Even if this clear-cut view is occasionally challenged by the discourse of female empowerment ( Kim & Ringrosse, 2018 ).

¹²Victim-blaming practices ignore complex entanglements between the public and private in relation to intimacy.

¹³Factor analyses serve to identify repeating patterns in datasets and observe common characteristics within these patterns. These analyses can be used to group variables, visualize data clusters, refine analysis and nuance interpretations.

¹⁴The FASTCLUS procedure can be applied to databases containing at least 100 observations. It performs a disjoint cluster analysis based on distances calculated from one or more quantitative variables. Observations are divided into clusters so that each observation belongs to one and only one cluster. The PROC FASTCLUS initialization method ensures that all distances between observations in the same cluster are smaller than all distances between observations in other clusters. There was no imperative requirement to standardize the variables since they use the same units of measurement, and the results were similar in both cases.

¹⁵Data from 8 students had to be excluded due to lack of responses.

¹⁶Differences in results between clusters are only shown if they are statistically significant (p > 0.001).

¹⁷Egalitarianism is defined here as promoting equal values and rights for everyone in political, economic and/or social matters within a specific context.

¹⁸One of the earliest expressions of intersectionality can be found in the mythical 1977 “A Black Feminist Statement” from the Combahee River Collective: “The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, the same sexual attraction, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking”. ( Combahee River Collective, 1983: p. 210 ). For a critique of the use of intersectionality, see Hill Collins and Bilge (2020) .

¹⁹In a recent study on adolescent love affairs, French sociologist Isabelle Clair (2023) also highlights this fact: “Male power is based in a double movement: on the one hand, to distinguish oneself from girls and their concerns (of which love is conceived as one of the most important for them), and on the other hand, to dominate them, directly in interactions with them (including amorous interaction) and more indirectly, by getting used to occupying positions that are better remunerated than theirs (in the economic sense of the word but also in terms of prestige)” (2023: 56).

²⁰This is intriguing given that 15% of the male sample say they have already fallen in love with a boy.

²¹Michel Bozon (2017: p. 46) has drawn the same conclusion.

²²Tristan Bridges et Cheri Jo Pascoe (2016) have come to the same conclusion in their analysis of post-homophobic masculinity.

²³See the definition of “gender” outlined by Bereni et al. (2020) .

²⁴According to Demetriou (2001) , the hybridization of a model of masculinity involves the appropriation of values and attitudes that were not originally specific to it.

attitudes that were not originally specific to it.

²⁵ Bracke (2016: p. 8) defines subalternity as “the structured place from which the capacity to access power is radically obstructed”. The dimensions of cultural hegemony and political economy highlight the relational nature of these processes: classifying, categorizing and hierarchizing are the result of humans interacting with each other and their environments.