(1) History², we believe, can help research, in its effort to reveal the long-term patterns that any industry, as well that of the Greek-owned Shipping, followed. In fact, we studied 30 published CVs, presented in summary here in 3 tables ( Tables 1-3 ). We have also added our remarks & the relevant analyses under the science of Modern American Management.

(2) We have to admit, however, that we have faced the fact that many shipping companies refused to be interviewed! Those companies clearly did not want ever to reveal their former business strategies! Nevertheless, shipping businesses are simple & straightforward ( Goulielmos, 2024 ).

(3) Moreover, from my experience as a supervisor of doctoral theses, a 15% (in Greece) or 20% (in UK) of replies are considered what a researcher has to expect from either questionnaires sent or interviews made!

(4) The Greek-owned fleet, in 2023, made-up by 4507 rather large ships (of over 20,000 dwt each), as follows, vis-à-vis 2022 ( Table 1 ):

Source: Data from “Naftika Chronica” (a Greek maritime weekly journal).

As shown, the Greek ship-owners owned bulk-carriers by majority (62% in numbers) in 2023! The tanker fleet showed a 1% reduction (in numbers), due to the “Ukraine-Russia” war & the rise of the oil price. The low average age of the LNGs-LPGs indicates, we believe, that Greeks obtained these types the last 7, or so, years, on average…, which we consider to be a rather slow adaptation!

Figure 1 shows, in diagrammatic exposition, the number of ships owned by the Greek companies between 2022 & 2023 in their 4 main categories.

As far as fleet’s dwt is concerned this was as follows ( Figure 2 ).

(5) The distribution of ships & their capacity among the companies was as follows in 2023 ( Table 2 ):

Source: as in Table 1 .

As shown in Table 2 , the majority of the companies managed less than 8 ships each (total 71% in numbers!); those having 25+ ships (10%) can be recognized as the…champions, with 320 m dwt (68%). But the millionaires, (at or above 1 m dwt each), however, were 83 companies (14%) managing 3617 ships of 377m dwt or 79.4% of the total! Clearly the majority of the “sea wealth” (expressed in tons) is in the hands of only 83 out of the 592 companies!

(6) Worth noting, however, is the trend, (not so clear here), for the small companies to become medium, & the medium large, & the champions, to increase their dwt as time goes-by, in order to become millionaires! The Greek fleet added about 10m dwt the last 12 months (2022-2023).

(7) The structure of the medium & large Greek-owned shipping companies is standard, organized in about 18, or so, departments/functions (known as departmentalization). Of course, the number of departments, with a Manager in charge, is met in companies of certain size. At the very start, 1 Captain (often the owner of the vessel), 1 Engineer, 1 secretary & 1 telephone girl, are the typical scheme for managing 1 - 2 small ships!

The medium & large shipping companies are organized as follows:

The ship-owner is the general Manager/Leader/Figurehead of the company by depositing the larger amount of money in company’s (share) capital, independently of his/her business’ knowledge or ability! The company’s staff has to have the best shipping business know-how! Selecting the more efficient & effective staff/crew is a key-function!

The structure of the medium & large Greek-owned shipping companies is further based on the system, of what we will call the “the minimum manageable group of ships”, meaning to construct a number of groups by “adding-down” company’s vessels, (say maximum 6-8 ships in each group), on the basis of the ability of one “middle manager” to manage them efficiently & effectively. This person is the Operator. This system permits to focus on the management of the ships only which belong to the group, by limiting attention & effort of the Operator etc. to a smaller number of ships vis-à-vis Company’s entire fleet! The slogan: “all for one & one for all”, (ships), does not work in shipping!

We intended to examine, in an as brief as possible manner, the business history of 30 –selected randomly- Greek-owned shipping companies, revealing their business patterns & their style of management. This purpose is believed to help the reader to understand what the particular managers did, how they did it & why, & if they were successful! Thus the purpose of this work is revealing but also pedagogical.

This work is cast in 3 parts, after literature Review, as follows: Part I, dealt with the business performance of the first 10 Greek-owned shipping companies; the II, with the next 10 & the III with the last 10. Management theory is also confined in 4 appendices. Finally, we concluded.

Paper’s contribution, we believe, is in revealing the business performance of 30 out of 1159 Greek-owned shipping companies, of various sizes, for which no one knew much before, but all desired to learn about! Certainly, in simple mysteries, as this, always is asked the same question: “how a considerable wealth can be built-up, out & fast, out there, in the World Oceans, by the protagonists of Greek Ship-owners?”

Half of this work made possible, of course, given the CVs of the companies –published-out of interviews, taken by the maritime research, while the number, the size & the type of the shipping companies was a random element, based on the fact that the companies interviewed, were those that have accepted to be interviewed!

The paper is considered successful because revealed a number of common factors that have appeared repeatedly in so many independent shipping companies! Is this random?

One may come to the conclusion that one shipping family taught the other or one shipping family copied the other -in the islands - where one is a biographer of the other… This element, i.e. the fact that some shipping companies performed as prototypes or as an example for the rest, has not been investigated so far in the depth it deserved! This paper challenges this unique fact by posing the question of how the knowledge of managing a shipping company is diffused among the population…?

Couper et al. (1999) dealt with 8 shipping companies, in 1972-1997, of Greek & other ownership, which failed, & caused problems, focusing on the Greek-owned company “Adriatic Tankers” from Cephalonia Island:

“Tidal Marine” collapsed, in 1972, because its owner financed its growth on the back of its purported & often fictitious chartering commitments! “Colocotronis” collapsed, in 1975, due to 2 large shipping ill-timed investments of 2 ULCCs. “Saleninvest” collapsed, in 1984, due to a crisis in all company’s markets, coupled with an unfavorable $ parity. “Sanko” “collapsed”, in 1985, by investing heavily in the dry cargo shipping market, which soon depressed.

“Regency Cruises” collapsed (1995-7) due to the knock on effect of the late delivery of a new vessel & industry’s slump etc. “Baltic Shipping” collapsed by 1997 due to the break-up of the Soviet Union & other reasons. “Unimar Maritime Services” collapsed in 1996 due to its inadequate management & the deterioration in company’s relations with its Russian partner. “Dragonix” collapsed in 1997 because its major shareholder- after creating debts of million $ - fled-away from Singapore & disappeared!

Theotokas & Harlaftis (2007) (in Greek), wrote a book of almost 500 pages, telling the business history of 142 Greek-owned family shipping companies, out of 1159. This, we consider it to be, a colossal work!

Lorange (2009) argued that the traditional shipping companies, under one organizational roof, were on decline, in 2009, & they were destined to be replaced- gradually by new, & more specialized, companies with more strategic clarity & managerial focus! The scene at that time was dominated by maritime specialization & innovation, as argued! Apparently Lorange described the management style adopted by the Norwegians maritime companies!

The creation of various Norwegian shipping strategies were done by (1) moving into new markets ( Lorange, 2009 : p. 81) (“van Oord” case) & (2) by developing new business models, based on technical or commercial technology, especially those addressing the pollution issue (e.g. “Skaugen I. M. case”). There was also the trend towards specialization, by decomposing the value chain, as identified by Lorange.

All shipping companies, in this part, were family ones! In addition, 7 out of 10, had ship-owners coming from a Greek island!

Concluding this part, we may gather the main patterns of the companies presented in a Table ( Table 3 ).

Source: text.

We believe that the family hierarchy applied also in managing the vessels ( Goulielmos, 2021b )! For this, we must take into account the character of the Greeks, where 2 Greeks have at least 4 different (business) opinions! The father, however, was the leader, & the 2^nd in command was the older son. The shipping families initially tried to have many male children to secure business succession (e.g. in Andros Island)! Later girls excelled in ship-owning (e.g. Frangou Angeliki; Anna Angelicoussis & others) ( Goulielmos, 2021c )!

The modern, (after the 2^nd World War), shipping companies were only ship-owners/ship-managers, & not merchants as well, as used to be. The shipping know-how obtained mainly through serving in ships owned by relatives, or by owners coming from the same island & having already shipping offices (in NY or London or elsewhere in the trade ports abroad -as merchants &/or as ship-owners).

Greeks learned further the shipping businesses mainly from the British (tramp ships) & latter from the Norwegians (tankers; e.g. Onassis) mainly through partnerships!

As a rule, the generations after the 1^st one tried to study one of the maritime professions offered by the world universities at their time, mainly “naval architecture” or “marine engineering”, while the “management of the shipping companies” started to be taught properly in 1992, by the author, for the first time in Greece.

Of course, the schools destined to educate the seamen (Captains; Engineers) established quite early in Greece: e.g. the “Hydra Academy of Merchant Marine” started in 1749! The 1^st generations obtained the required know-how empirically, but soon they felt the need for its 2^nd generation to learn “shipping finance”, in London, after the prices of ships increased in serious amounts, after 1960s, due to scale economies.

Partnerships among relatives, or with people coming from the same island, apart from being relatives, were frequent, based on the trust derived from knowing one each other. The dominant personality was usually a Captain, who mobilized the young people of the island so that to become sailors, & partners, & who owned the vessel.

Marriages among ship-owners were also common, till nowadays, so that to strengthen the power of the company & keep the wealth inside the “holy Hellenic family”, away from foreigners etc.!

Worth noting is that 10 out of 10 ship-owners came from a “shipping family cluster”, based on the common endeavor of ship-owning!

It seems that the proper ingredients for dealing with shipping businesses were present in the Greek (infertile) islands, or in the stony & inhospitable continental land, providing by Nature a beautiful & unlimited & “promising” & adventurous Sea! But only 1 out of 592 companies was listed at that time!

Fortunately for the growth of the Greek-owned shipping was the fact, due to the character of Greeks, we believe, that each person wanted, in the long run, to create, one day, his/her company & manage it better –as thought- than hitherto (a clear split-up trend)! Is this a manifestation of egoism? Thus, many shipping companies created, where sons, brothers, cousins, uncles, nephews, colleagues, friends, partners, & others, founded eventually, by splitting-up, their personal company!

This profession, of the ship-owner, offered indeed an independent management & the manner where one can prove what is worth for! Shipping is the unique industry where the names of the single entrepreneurs are mentioned & not those of the companies! Is this a manifestation of egoism?

The above patterns made the Greek-owned shipping great by creating a plethora of small shipping companies, really in a small country of only 7 - 11m people, known only for its ancient philosophers, its Sea, its Sun, its Sand & its many islands, helped, no doubt, also, by the global & Greek maritime banks⁵, located eventually in Piraeus/Athens in 1960s & thereafter!

Moreover, given that Piraeus lacked strong cargo-broking offices, & thus cargoes, Greece being a country of a limited foreign trade⁶, & occupied for almost 400 years by Türkiye (1421-1829), the shipping companies of a certain size opened, as a rule, offices in London or NY, or Tokyo, & even elsewhere, so that to have access to the international “trade”, through the “trade exchanges” - like e.g. the famous British “Baltic”, having 5000 members by 2024.

In addition, certain companies benefited from the USA’s decision to “sell” to its allies, who lost their ships during the 2^nd WW, the 2722 or so liberty ships, built for the cause of Liberty (Appendix 3: Corporate Strategy of diversification). Part of these ships, (107), were a kind of yeast for the eventual growth of the Greek-owned shipping during the post 2^nd WW... Greeks “bought” in total about 500 of them! Economies of scale, however, removed this type of ships in the 1960s or so & were replaced by the… “Freedoms”.

This 2^nd group of shipping companies is made-up also by family companies & 9 companies, out of 10, were established by persons coming from a Greek island!

(a) The 2^nd generation of the above family took-over after the 1^st WW, where at least 4 brothers (1888-1972) formed 1 company, & 1 son formed a 2^nd company (1880-1921). In 1947 one company bought 3 liberties from the 107 “sold” by USA, till 1965. One of the family companies built ships in Japan &, in particular, tankers (1953 3 of over 20,000 dwt & by 1960 8 & by 1970 additional 6). By 1965 this company owned 20 ships of 1/2 m dwt! It followed a MGS. The fleet split-up in 2 (in 1965) & by 1971 & by 1981 managed only 7 ships.

(b) A 2^nd company (1970), belonged to a family branch, owned 11 ships of 300,000 dwt by 1975 & by 1986 managed 10 ships, applying the Greek-owned shipping strategy of larger & younger ships during a (1980-1990) shipping crisis! By 1990-2000 this company managed 7 ships. (c) Another company established in 1972, managing 2 ships & by 2000 managed 10! (d) A 4^th company established in 1930, or so, in London! So many companies created by a multi-member family cluster!

Concluding this part, the business patterns did not change vis-à-vis the 1^st group, but what we have to stress is that none of the Greek-owned shipping companies was prepared to face a shipping depression! In a shipping business world, where almost everything is unpredictable, preparing for the war is the only way to secure peace!

A number of the above Greek-owned shipping companies were, as mentioned, traditional. This is a characteristic of companies in businesses for more than 1 generation! To be in the tradition of a shipping family, or in that of a father-Captain, means to have the same features, & where some things have to be done as in the past! This pattern of tradition is maintained till nowadays where the fathers inherit their companies to their sons (e.g. the “Thenamaris Ship management Inc.”).

All companies in this 3^rd group are also family ones & almost all came from a Greek island!

(a) This case-study is worth presenting in depth, as being one of a number of more than 1 dynamic ship-owners, performing over several traditional, (over 21/2 centuries), shipping families & over 4 generations! The 1^st generation started in 1860, or so, while the 2^nd generation mobilized 5 sons by 1920! The 3^rd generation created 4 shipping companies! One located in NY; 1 in Piraeus; 1 in London & 1 dealing with the Passenger shipping & Cruises. One company in 1946 ran offices in NY (London & Piraeus), in 1947, by 5 sons (1907-1994), buying 50 ships, built in USA & Canada, while the 1^st vessel was a Liberty from the 107! They built ships in 1953-4, especially in Japan (1956-94) & Poland (1983-4). They preferred the long time charters, as e.g. the job to carry 5m tons from Persian Gulf to Europe! By 1958 the company managed 82 ships of various types & flags placing it in the 2^nd position among Greek ship-owners! A RGS—rapid growth strategy case!

(b) In 1965 & thereafter 1 company turned heavily to new-buildings of 20 tankers & 25 dry cargoes of 1.3m dwt & by 1970 54 ships of 2.7 m dwt (of which 34 tankers)! In 1975 the fleet arrived at 64 ships, of recent technology, of over 5m dwt (with emphasis to tankers: 50%)!! In 1980-1990 in charge in Piraeus was one from the 3^rd generation & his nephews (4^th generation). In 1981 the company owned 43 ships of 4m dwt (!), while by 1986 it shrunk to 19 vessels of 2m dwt, while by 1990-2000 fell to 1.5m dwt. A RGS—rapid growth strategy case!

(c) A 2^nd shipping family branch ran an office, in about 1906, by the father & his 2 sons, & soon having offices in London & Piraeus, owning more than 30 liberties by 1958, & increasing the fleet by 1965 to 27 ships of 300,000 dwt & by 1975 to over 400,000 dwt! A MGS case!

(d) This 3^rd traditional shipping family branch ran a London office in 1952, where the 3 sons joined- managing 40 vessels by 1958! They preferred the new-buildings (1950-1960), built in Japan, & by 1965 they managed 38 ships of 850,000 dwt, while by 1975 arrived at 46 ships of 2.5m dwt! The 2^nd generation continued to build ships & especially the 1st VLCC/Very large crude carrier (1972). In 1970, the company obtained also a shipyard in Greece. By 1980, owned 25 ships on average of 1.5m dwt! A RGS—rapid growth strategy by building not a shipping company, but a shipping Empire! (3) The 4^th shipping family branch falls outside our research interests.

The above case-study was really impressive indicating how a multi-member family could create so many very strong shipping companies, with a very good reputation as well! Such families as the above made the Greek-owned fleet great!

Concluding this part, we saw that the patterns did not change vis-à-vis those of the 1^st & 2^nd group. This means that the Greek ship-owners copied perhaps one another in their business endeavors, miming especially those ship-owners who were successful! However, one company in the 3^rd group was the millionaire-ship-owner, with a really remarkable performance, coming from the Greek island of Andros!

We believe, that we have shown the basic manners by which the Greek-owned shipping became great: a plethora of infertile islands with a promising sea; trade as the initial profession with ship-owning as the subsequent one; large initially male families acting as partners; pioneering ship-owners antagonizing one member family the other in rapid growth strategies & in building fleets in Japan; a tradition which determined also the future businesses; moving to places abroad, where ship-owning has been flourished & demand existed; in tramp shipping: do as British did or even better!

The probable weak point of this paper is the possibility that the 30 out of the 1159 (2.6%) companies analyzed are not a sufficient sample to make the conclusions drawn indisputable! Of course we are prepared to present analytically a total of more than 140 Greek-owned shipping companies (12.2%), i.e. additional 90+ shipping companies.

This strategy means⁷ to acquire either company’s suppliers or its corporate customers, so that to have a more reliable supply of inputs, or of markets, for company’s products ( Samuelson et al., 2022 : p. 451)! This strategy is conceived as the opposite of outsourcing. It favors clearly the in-house production/attendance, which could guarantee quality, & improvements⁸ in products or services!

V. I. conforms to the old saying: “if you want something to be done right, do it yourself”. V. I. obviously tried to face the shortcomings of the outsourcing strategy. A classical example of outsourcing is the strategy to keep the offices of the company clean… In-house or out-house?

In shipping companies, outsourcing is almost over all functions possible! Chartering is the apparent first candidate; operations; supplies, including bunkers (purchasing); personnel; sales & purchases of ships; finance etc. But the fact that all shipping activities can be outsourced does not mean that a shipping company has not to examine the cost of producing a service in-house or out-house!

Moreover, there are actions/activities that a company has to focus personally! These are those which characterize the shipping company’s fame/style (& profitability) mainly vis-à-vis its charterers & its bankers, as well its suppliers! These have to be managed in-house for a better co-ordination, higher safety & to avoid the frequent, outside the company, corruption! In-house activities declare company’s personality & reveal company’s manner of management, given that all Greek owned shipping companies are personal.

In shipping one may mention another saying of ours: “the pocket of every one working in a shipping company is nearer than company’s pocket”! But in order not to confuse the reader, economics suggest to examine the cost of the 2 alternatives, as mentioned, before outsourcing or insourcing a departmental function!

In shipping, clever ship-owners, (e.g. Onassis), tried to have good relationships with their charterers, because this was what they lacked (i.e. the demand/seaborne trade). This need arose when the merchants ceased to be ship-owners (demand & supply were then in the same person)! These public relations applied scholastically by Onassis & Niarchos, as well by others! A well-known example is a Greek ship-owner who maintained but died young- an intimate relationship with Mexico’s President, thus serving the transport of country’s oil…

Shipping companies surely have to adopt first of all, & above all, the competitive strategy, meaning to compete through maintaining a lower cost, vis-à-vis company’s competitors, especially during a shipping depression, known as functional strategy. This strategy is especially recommended for shipping companies, which no doubt are very sensitive to total cost & the seaborne trade/demand variations!

Companies should decide what businesses the company will be in, or wants to be in, & what it wants to do with these businesses ( Robbins & Coulter, 2018 , Chapter 9). The RG, corporate strategy, is adopted by a shipping firm, when it wants to expand fast by investing in other types of ships than hitherto. E.g. a ship-owner who manages bulk-carriers & tankers decides to buy/manage Gas carriers or containerships or LNGs/LPGs. For shipping industry, adding ships or increasing company’s dwt, consist also a growth strategy & especially when the shipping company decides to build ships bearing a greater risk…

The growth pattern of the Greek-owned shipping companies -before Onassis- was, however, to use the previous years’ profits to buy a rather cheap & over-aged (tramp⁹) vessel… Given that shipping is a cyclical industry, as a consequence, this growth model was, as a rule, ineffective for rapid growth! Onassis remarked that other’s people money is available in the banks, & it can help shipping companies in their fast growth…provided that the (Greek) ship-owners restored their bad reputation at that time with their bankers!

Onassis, as it is recorded, restored the bad reputation of the Greek ship-owners with their bankers! Of course, Onassis & other Greek ship-owners, did not avoid the new buildings, as the prior ship-owners did, due to the higher risks involved! Because he applied in his agreements¹⁰ certain proper strategies, like the “long term time charters” of 15 - 20 years! Certain Greek ship-owners indeed bankrupted, however, by building 1 - 2 rather large ships, when the market fell upon delivery (the “Colocotronis” case mentioned above)!

Greek ship-owners used to invest in both tankers¹¹ & bulk carriers following a traditional rule, till nowadays & especially in bulk carriers by majority, as shown above ( Table 1 ) so that to protect their firms from cycles that would occur exclusively in one of the 2 main markets!

Along a RGS, which, as we defined it arbitrarily, approached & passed-over the 1m dwt mark, we saw that there are also many MGS, concerning the growth of companies that arrived at 1/2 a million dwt. There is also the slow growth strategy approaching the 250,000 dwt being below the 1/2m dwt mark.

Management ( Robbins & Coulter, 2018 ) suggests also the concentration strategy, which is met when a shipping company focuses in its primary line of business, like e.g. tankers only, or bulk carriers only. The single ship sector shipping company is not, however, recommended¹², as it is better for a ship-owner to have his/her eggs in more than one & perhaps inside 5 baskets…

This is related or unrelated. The related diversification means to grow by combining with related companies (in different industries). Unrelated diversification is to grow by combining with firms in unrelated & different industries.

It is recorded ( Snyder, 2018 ) that 2710, (or 2770 or 2,742: this number varies) (in 1941-1945), ships (of 10,000 dwt each or 10,800), built for the liberty of USA’s allies, in 17 - 18 U.S. shipyards- during the 2^nd WW, by mobilizing a great number of female & African-American workers, & applying a modularized construction, an assembly line production & welding!

A number of about 2400 Liberties survived from the 2^nd WW, which had to be sold (“lend-lease”) to USA’s allies, at an initial price of $2m (or $1.5m). It is considered that the 122 (98 + 2 + 7 + 15) liberties obtained by Greek ship-owners accomplished the rejuvenation of the Greek fleet laying the foundation for its rise ( Bourneuf, 1990 )! (Appendix 5: Playing with company’s assets)

This is a term describing highly-geared investments, mainly in 2^nd hand bulk vessels, with the intention of reselling them at higher prices, within a relatively short period of say 6 - 18 months ( Stokes, 1997 : p 231-232)! Surely the above definition describes half of the story of the asset play scheme as all types of ships can be involved, provided they are subject to worthwhile variations in their prices! This also can be independent of the time elapsed between buying & selling.

The asset play scheme, we believe, is possible due to the frequent shipping cyclical recessions & especially depressions & their subsequent high upturns or very low downturns! The asset play scheme is a product of the disequilibrium between demand & supply!

Stopford (2009) counted 15 shipping cycles, & thus 15 opportunities of playing with company’s assets (1873-2007)! Shipping companies surely do not live, for this, but they can benefit from this, where a share in a ship can provide 12 times its original buying value/price…as we have experienced personally. Thus the rule is do that (the ship management), but also play with company’s assets as soon as the opportunity arises!

Stokes (1997) wrote about 2 major waves of “asset play” in shipping, which occurred in 1980-1990, in an effort to create investment vehicles to which non-shipping investors could be attracted (p. 82). By 1991, Stokes wrote that the asset play finished (p. 96). In fact, the asset play has a simple expression: “buy ships cheaply & then sell them at higher prices” ( Stopford, 2009 : p. 274).

Stopford (2009) argued further that, along the lines of Stokes (1997) , shipping needed new sources of finance through asset play (e.g. the “Bulk transport” case; in 1984 it achieved prices 4 times higher during the next 4 years!). Lorange argued (2009) (p. 52-) that ship-owners try to buy low & sell high, while a strategy based on having the lowest operating costs is more important. We agree. The “Diogenes Fund” e.g. in 1995 was a successful asset play effort in tankers by devoting $75m (1995-1998) for the cause. For Lorange (2009: p. 100) timing decisions for both entering & exiting the 2^nd hand market are critical, quite rightly.

Let us visit 2 2^nd hand markets to see what happened in 1986-1992.

As shown, a 10 years old VLCC tanker had a price of $7.5m in 1986, which reached the $42m mark in early 1990, meaning a price 5.6 times higher, within about 4.5 years ( Figure 3 )! Also, a Bulk carrier, Panamax 5 years old, has been priced at $7.5m in 1987 & reached the $25m price in end-1991, i.e. in about 5 years, she obtained a 3.3 times higher price! The double Figure 4 indicates clearly when to buy & when to sell! One point, however, is still not clear: “how a ship-owner can pre-know when a ship price is at its rock bottom level, & when it has reached its top?” Of course he/she can use the regression tool presented below! ( Figure 5 )

Figure 5 shows the variation of the actual price of a Panamax ship in 2002 (curve), (during an ending depression!), after taking into account 36 prices of her. Her lowest price is at $1.5m, at the 18 years of her age, & her highest price is at her 2 years of age at $19m.

Of course the ship-owner can buy this Panamax ship in a different age than the 18 years, we showed. If the ship-owner prefers, e.g. a 5-year-of-age Panamax, then he/she has to pay $12.5m, while his/her competitors will have to pay $17.5b (by not using the regression), saving $5m. Given, however, that in 2002 the market was still depressed till the next year or so, the best timing rule dictates not to sell, but only to buy then! A best selling has to be postponed till end-2008…

The reader has also to remember that the useful life of a vessel depends…on the state of the market, meaning that during a boom a ship’s useful life may be extended by even 5 additional years, & during a depression it may be shortened by as much as 5 years! Here the regression of the Panamax ship indicates that the ship has to be scrapped at her 18.8 years of age… Entering, however, in the 2003-2008 boom, this ship will provide profits till 2008, i.e. another 5 years & thus she cannot be scrapped!

Appendix 1: The vertical integration strategy-V.I.

Appendix 2: The rapid growth strategy

Appendix 3: The diversification strategy

Appendix 4: The 107 USA Liberty ships

Appendix 5: Play with company’s assets

¹One family created an empire of shipping companies, where 3 companies had a rapid growth strategy & 1 a medium one!

²The Greek-owned shipping was re-born during the Türkiye occupation in 1774 (16/07), at the time when the Greek-Türkiye treaty signed in “Kucuk Kaynarca”. Greece has registered 61 vessels of 31,000 GRT (1887). In 1915 had 475 ships of 894,000 GRT & by 1918 115 ships of 126,000 GRT- thus it lost 86% in GRT & 76% in number of ships during the 1^st WW. In 1939, Greece had 466 ships of 1,686,000 GRT & by 1945 121 ships of 508,000, thus it lost 74% in number of ships & 70% in tons, during the 2^nd WW. Greece held the 9^th position before the 2^nd WW, with 1.8m GRT, where Great Britain & Commonwealth had 21m GRT, followed by USA (+ the great lakes’ fleet) with 11.4m, Japan 5.6, Norway 4.8, Germany 4.5, Italy 3.4, Holland 3, France 3, Sweden 1.6, Denmark 1.2, Spain 0.9, & the rest of 6.4m = ~69m GRT total.

³A similar action followed by the Greek ship-owner Niarchos, S., who suggested to their employers to buy ships to serve their flour trade ( Goulielmos, 2021a ).

⁴This is a former Greek coastal town in Türkiye.

⁵Banks provided finance to Greek-owned companies at the levels of $51b in 2023, $52b in 2022 & $53b in 2021.

⁶This is a serious paradox! Greeks soon, however, had to move outside the limited borders of their small country to serve international seaborne trade, i.e. to carry the trade of all other nations, becoming what is known cross-traders. “Small occupied country, & big shipping” cannot be combined! This is surely an outcome due to historical & other events like the long occupation of Greece by Türkiye, but also that Greeks left their country to become international business men i.e. mainly merchants, in places along the Danube River, in Russia, & in many other European countries.

⁷Apple e.g. needed someone to produce “custom microchips” (2008). ArcelorMittal needed “mines” in Brazil (2008). Boeing needed “fuselage parts” (2009). Oracle needed a company to make “friendly servers” (2010). Vertical integration thus satisfies the needs of the leading company so that to secure the management of strategic components, special raw materials, knowhow or services, owned/managed/produced by other companies out there!

⁸Amazon e.g. undertook in 2013 the former outsourced delivery of its products (i.e. all shipments)!

⁹These are the so called “taxis of the Oceans” having erratic voyages.

¹⁰Oil companies, of course, “trapped” the Greek tanker owners in an apparently win-win case so that to serve their interests by boosting the supply of tonnage & thus obtaining low freight rates for their oil. Greeks, however, by applying economies of scale & a low cost of operation, succeeded to make money out of a really tough situation!

¹¹A Japanese shipping company, which owned only tankers, encountered the 1^st oil crisis in 1979/1983. Then invested in dry cargoes, but encountered the dry cargoes crisis in 1981-87. It made losses in both markets!

¹²Sanko shipping company of Japan case mentioned above (fn 13).