<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v3.0 20080202//EN" "http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/3.0/journalpublishing3.dtd">
<article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="3.0" xml:lang="en" article-type="research article">
 <front>
  <journal-meta>
   <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">
    jss
   </journal-id>
   <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title>
     Open Journal of Social Sciences
    </journal-title>
   </journal-title-group>
   <issn pub-type="epub">
    2327-5952
   </issn>
   <issn publication-format="print">
    2327-5960
   </issn>
   <publisher>
    <publisher-name>
     Scientific Research Publishing
    </publisher-name>
   </publisher>
  </journal-meta>
  <article-meta>
   <article-id pub-id-type="doi">
    10.4236/jss.2024.1211025
   </article-id>
   <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">
    jss-137460
   </article-id>
   <article-categories>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
     <subject>
      Articles
     </subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="Discipline-v2">
     <subject>
      Business 
     </subject>
     <subject>
       Economics, Social Sciences 
     </subject>
     <subject>
       Humanities
     </subject>
    </subj-group>
   </article-categories>
   <title-group>
    U.S. Elite Fragmentation and Global Instability: Navigating the Road to Autocracy in the 21st Century
   </title-group>
   <contrib-group>
    <contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple">
     <name name-style="western">
      <surname>
       Michael
      </surname>
      <given-names>
       Gerlich
      </given-names>
     </name>
    </contrib>
   </contrib-group> 
   <aff id="affnull">
    <addr-line>
     aCenter for Strategic Corporate Foresight and Sustainability, SBS Swiss Business School, Kloten, Switzerland
    </addr-line> 
   </aff> 
   <pub-date pub-type="epub">
    <day>
     31
    </day> 
    <month>
     10
    </month>
    <year>
     2024
    </year>
   </pub-date> 
   <volume>
    12
   </volume> 
   <issue>
    11
   </issue>
   <fpage>
    352
   </fpage>
   <lpage>
    363
   </lpage>
   <history>
    <date date-type="received">
     <day>
      23,
     </day>
     <month>
      October
     </month>
     <year>
      2024
     </year>
    </date>
    <date date-type="published">
     <day>
      16,
     </day>
     <month>
      October
     </month>
     <year>
      2024
     </year> 
    </date> 
    <date date-type="accepted">
     <day>
      16,
     </day>
     <month>
      November
     </month>
     <year>
      2024
     </year> 
    </date>
   </history>
   <permissions>
    <copyright-statement>
     © Copyright 2014 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. 
    </copyright-statement>
    <copyright-year>
     2014
    </copyright-year>
    <license>
     <license-p>
      This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
     </license-p>
    </license>
   </permissions>
   <abstract>
    This paper examines the critical role of elite configurations in influencing the stability of democratic systems, focusing on the potential re-election of Donald Trump in the United States in 2024. Through a theoretical exploration, the paper delves into how various elite structures—disunited elites, devoid elites, and imposed unity elites—can lead to democratic erosion and a shift towards autocracy. The analysis draws upon comparative examples from countries such as Turkey, Hungary, Azerbaijan, and others, where elite reconfigurations have facilitated similar shifts away from democracy. Employing scenario analysis and insights from expert opinion, the paper presents findings that highlight a significant probability of democratic backsliding in the U.S. if these elite dynamics persist, with a potential consolidation of autocratic tendencies. The study also considers the global ramifications of U.S. political developments, arguing that elite cohesion and the reinforcement of democratic norms are essential to halting the slide into autocracy. Employing the Delphi method, multiple scenario analysis, and probabilistic modelling, this study examines elite configurations and their implications for democratic stability in the U.S., particularly concerning the potential 2024 re-election of Donald Trump. This research contributes to the ongoing discourse on elite theory, political transitions, and governance in fragile democracies, offering a broader understanding of how elite behaviour can shape the future of both domestic and international governance structures.
   </abstract>
   <kwd-group> 
    <kwd>
     Elite Configurations
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Democratic Erosion
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Autocracy
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      United States Politics
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Governance
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Political Transitions
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Disunited Elites
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Devoid Elites
    </kwd>
   </kwd-group>
  </article-meta>
 </front>
 <body>
  <sec id="s1">
   <title>1. Introduction</title>
   <p>The structure and configuration of elites in a society profoundly influence political stability, governance forms, and the overall trajectory of a nation’s future. This is particularly evident when observing the shifting elite dynamics in democratic systems, where elite fragmentation or consolidation can mark the difference between democratic resilience and a slide toward authoritarianism. Elite theory, notably articulated by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
     Higley and Burton (2006)
    </xref>, provides a crucial framework for understanding how elite groups—whether consensually united, ideologically united, or disunited—shape the governance structures that emerge in various political systems. Elites, by virtue of their disproportionate control over resources and decision-making power, play an instrumental role in determining whether a nation sustains its democratic foundations or transitions into an authoritarian regime.</p>
   <p>The United States, often heralded as a bastion of democratic governance, now stands at a critical juncture where elite reconfigurations could fundamentally alter its political future. With the upcoming 2024 presidential election, the potential re-election of Donald Trump raises significant concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and a possible shift toward authoritarianism. During his presidency, Trump demonstrated a clear pattern of undermining established democratic institutions, often working to centralise power within a tightly controlled inner circle. If he were to return to power, the risk of further destabilising elite structures in the United States—leading to the potential dismantling of democratic processes—looms large.</p>
   <p>This paper explores the potential impacts of elite reconfigurations in the context of Trump’s possible re-election and the broader implications this shift may have for global governance. By examining Trump’s approach to consolidating elite power within the U.S. and comparing this with global case studies, such as Turkey and Azerbaijan, this paper argues that the configuration of elites is pivotal in understanding shifts from democracy to autocracy. Drawing from Higley and Burton’s elite configuration theory, the analysis considers how elite fragmentation, power consolidation, and ideological unity can either safeguard or dismantle democratic systems. Furthermore, this study places these developments within the wider global context, acknowledging that the consequences of a U.S. shift towards authoritarianism could catalyse broader geopolitical instability, mirroring patterns seen in other nations where elite reconfigurations have led to democratic decline.</p>
   <p>This study addresses a critical gap in understanding how elite fragmentation and imposed unity elites contribute to democratic erosion, with significant implications for U.S. political stability. As <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
     Higley and Burton (2006)
    </xref> suggest, elite dynamics are foundational to governance forms, while recent analyses (e.g., <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
     Körösényi, 2020)
    </xref> reveal that populist-led elite fragmentation accelerates democratic decline.</p>
   <p>As the world grapples with increasing geopolitical volatility, understanding the configurations of elite power offers essential insights into the future of global governance. This paper, therefore, positions the U.S. presidential election and its elite power dynamics as a critical case for examining the fragility of democracy in the 21st century. By drawing on theoretical frameworks and empirical examples, we seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of how elite reconfigurations can reshape not only national futures but also the global political order.</p>
   <p>Theoretical Framework</p>
   <p>The configuration of elites within a political system plays a pivotal role in determining the stability and direction of governance, particularly when considering potential shifts from democracy to autocracy. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
     Higley and Burton’s (2006)
    </xref> theory of elite configurations provides a valuable framework for understanding how different forms of elite interaction shape the trajectory of governance. According to their model, elite structures can be classified into three primary categories: consensually united elites, ideologically united elites, and disunited elites. Each of these configurations offers insight into how societies maintain democratic stability or experience democratic erosion.</p>
   <p>Consensually united elites refer to political systems where competing elite factions share a common commitment to maintaining democratic governance. Although they may engage in competition for power, these elites agree on the fundamental norms and rules that preserve the political system’s integrity. The United States has historically been characterised by consensually united elites, where political actors, despite ideological differences, maintained a shared respect for democratic institutions and processes (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
     Higley &amp; Burton, 2006
    </xref>). However, this unity is fragile and susceptible to breakdown when elite factions begin to prioritise personal or partisan gain over collective governance.</p>
   <p>In contrast, disunited elites emerge when elite factions no longer share this commitment to democratic governance. In such configurations, political actors actively compete for dominance, often undermining institutional norms to achieve personal or factional goals. This disunity creates an environment conducive to populist leaders who present themselves as outsiders capable of restoring order by challenging the entrenched elite. During Donald Trump’s first presidency, the U.S. began to exhibit characteristics of a disunited elite structure, as Trump undermined established political norms and replaced dissenting elites with loyalists, thus weakening democratic checks and balances (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-7">
     Gerlich, 2024
    </xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
     Higley &amp; Burton, 2006
    </xref>).</p>
   <p>The concept of “devoid elites”, as introduced by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
     Gerlich (2023)
    </xref>, offers further nuance to this analysis. Devoid elites are those who occupy positions of formal power but lack genuine influence or autonomy. These elites are often manipulated or controlled by more dominant factions within the political system. Trump’s strategy of appointing loyalists to key government positions, many of whom lacked the experience or influence to challenge his authority, mirrors the configuration of devoid elites. This tactic of surrounding oneself with weaker, more controllable elites is a hallmark of leaders moving towards authoritarianism (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
     Gerlich, 2023
    </xref>). <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-16">
     Mounk (2022)
    </xref> highlights how populist leaders worldwide have used similar strategies to manipulate elite structures and consolidate personal power.</p>
   <p>The notion of “imposed unity elites”, which <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
     Gerlich (2023)
    </xref> applied to post-Soviet regimes, is also relevant to the current U.S. political landscape. Imposed unity elites appear unified in public, but this cohesion is often a facade driven by coercion or the necessity for political survival rather than ideological alignment. In the case of Trump’s Republican Party, many elites have displayed loyalty out of necessity, fearing political marginalisation or electoral defeat if they break with Trump’s agenda. This phenomenon represents a shift towards an imposed elite configuration, where unity is enforced rather than organic (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
     Gerlich, 2023
    </xref>).</p>
   <p>Finally, ideologically united elites are bound together by a shared political or religious ideology, which justifies the centralisation of power and the suppression of opposition. This configuration is often seen in authoritarian or theocratic regimes. In the context of the U.S., the rise of nationalist populism under Trump raises the possibility that an ideologically united elite structure could develop, further entrenching autocratic tendencies if Trump were re-elected in 2024 (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
     Higley &amp; Burton, 2006
    </xref>).</p>
   <p>This theoretical framework highlights the importance of elite configurations in determining political outcomes. By drawing on the patterns observed in Turkey and Azerbaijan, where elite reconfigurations have played a significant role in the erosion of democratic norms and the consolidation of authoritarian power, we can anticipate similar risks in the U.S. if disunited or imposed unity elites continue to dominate the political landscape (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-5">
     Gerlich, 2021
    </xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
     Gerlich, 2023
    </xref>).</p>
  </sec><sec id="s2">
   <title>2. Methods</title>
   <p>This paper utilises a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies to explore how elite configurations influence political transitions in the context of the potential re-election of Donald Trump in 2024. The methodology is structured around three key components: the Delphi method, multiple scenario analysis, and probabilistic modelling. Each component provides a unique lens through which to analyze the interactions between elite configurations and shifts in governance, drawing on existing frameworks from elite theory and scenario planning (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-7">
     Gerlich, 2024
    </xref>).</p>
   <sec id="s2_1">
    <title>2.1. Delphi Method</title>
    <p>The Delphi method was employed to gather expert opinions on the potential trajectories of U.S. governance in the event of a reconfiguration of elites under Trump’s leadership. The method is designed to build consensus among experts through multiple rounds of surveys, each refining the issues and uncertainties identified in the previous round (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-14">
      Linstone &amp; Turoff, 2002
     </xref>). For this study, a panel of 30 senior specialists in political science, governance, and U.S. politics was assembled. Experts were drawn from institutions such as Harvard University, the Council on Foreign Relations, and major think tanks with expertise in U.S. governance and elite theory. Each expert was selected based on their contribution to the study of elite configurations and political transitions.</p>
    <p>The Delphi process was conducted in three rounds:</p>
    <p>1) Round 1 consisted of open-ended questions exploring the key uncertainties surrounding Trump’s re-election and its potential impact on elite configurations.</p>
    <p>2) Round 2 refined the issues identified in the first round, focusing on specific scenarios where Trump’s re-election could lead to a shift from democratic to autocratic governance.</p>
    <p>3) Round 3 achieved consensus on the most likely scenarios and their potential implications for U.S. democracy.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s2_2">
    <title>2.2. Multi Scenario Analysis</title>
    <p>Building on the results of the Delphi method, a multiple scenario analysis was conducted to examine the possible outcomes of elite reconfigurations under Trump’s leadership. Multiple scenario analysis allows for the exploration of various combinations of uncertainties, offering distinct but plausible future scenarios. This approach has been widely used in strategic forecasting and future studies, particularly in contexts where the future is highly uncertain (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-17">
      Schoemaker, 2020
     </xref>).</p>
    <p>Four key scenarios were developed:</p>
    <p>1) Scenario 1: Trump re-elected with a majority in Congress, leading to a complete reconfiguration of U.S. elites and a shift towards authoritarianism.</p>
    <p>2) Scenario 2: Trump re-elected but with divided government, resulting in elite fragmentation and continued democratic erosion.</p>
    <p>3) Scenario 3: Trump loses the election, but political polarisation continues, leading to elite instability.</p>
    <p>4) Scenario 4: Trump loses decisively, and elite consensus is restored, stabilising democratic governance.</p>
    <p>Each scenario was developed by mapping the key uncertainties and driving forces identified in the Delphi process, such as the cohesion of Republican elites, the role of the judiciary, and public trust in democratic institutions (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-7">
      Gerlich, 2024
     </xref>).</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s2_3">
    <title>2.3. Probabilistic Modelling</title>
    <p>To quantify the likelihood of each scenario, probabilistic modelling was employed. This involved defining probability distributions for key variables, such as the strength of elite cohesion, the probability of democratic backsliding, and the impact of populist rhetoric on public trust. A Monte Carlo simulation was used to generate multiple possible outcomes, allowing for a robust assessment of risks and uncertainties (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-12">
      Kroese et al., 2011
     </xref>). This method provides a statistical basis for understanding the potential variability in political outcomes, ensuring that the scenarios developed are grounded in empirical data. Monte Carlo simulation, employed to model the probability of political shifts, involved defining probability distributions for elite cohesion and the likelihood of autocratic shifts, drawing on empirical data to support scenario likelihood assessments (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-12">
      Kroese et al., 2011
     </xref>). This technique ensures that results are both statistically sound and reflective of potential variability in elite dynamics.</p>
    <p>The combination of the Delphi method, multiple scenario analysis, and probabilistic modelling provides a comprehensive approach to understanding how elite configurations could shape the future of U.S. governance. The Delphi method, a structured communication technique, is critical for achieving expert consensus on uncertain political trajectories, as validated by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-14">
      Linstone and Turoff’s (2002)
     </xref> foundational work. Additionally, scenario analysis has gained prominence in understanding political uncertainties (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-17">
      Schoemaker, 2020
     </xref>), while probabilistic modelling, particularly Monte Carlo simulations, allows quantitative risk assessment of potential outcomes (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-12">
      Kroese et al., 2011
     </xref>). By drawing on expert consensus and employing rigorous quantitative analysis, this methodology ensures that the conclusions drawn are both robust and reflective of the complex interplay between elites and political transitions.</p>
   </sec>
  </sec><sec id="s3">
   <title>3. Results and Discussion</title>
   <p>The findings from the Delphi process, scenario analysis, and probabilistic modelling present a complex picture of how elite configurations in the U.S. may evolve if Donald Trump is re-elected in 2024. The scenarios explored in this study highlight the precarious balance between democracy and autocracy, contingent on the behaviour and cohesion of elite groups.</p>
   <sec id="s3_1">
    <title>3.1. Elite Fragmentation and Democratic Erosion</title>
    <p>The consensus from the Delphi method suggests that U.S. elites are currently exhibiting characteristics of a disunited elite configuration, a state that tends to destabilise democratic systems (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
      Higley &amp; Burton, 2006
     </xref>). Many experts highlighted that Trump’s previous presidency catalysed a breakdown of the traditional consensual unity among elites. By undermining long-established democratic norms and installing loyalists in key positions, Trump fostered an environment where personal loyalty took precedence over institutional integrity (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-7">
      Gerlich, 2024
     </xref>). This trend aligns with <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-3">
      Diamond’s (2020)
     </xref> broader analysis of global democratic recessions, where similar elite reconfigurations have been key in weakening democratic structures. This breakdown of elite consensus aligns with other studies, such as <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
      Körösényi (2020)
     </xref>, who observed similar elite fragmentation under populist leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Körösényi’s analysis demonstrated that disunited elites contributed to democratic backsliding by weakening institutional safeguards, a pattern currently emerging in the U.S. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-2">
      Bogaards (2021)
     </xref> highlights similar patterns of elite disunity in Hungary, showing how fragmentation can lead to the erosion of democratic norms. Building on these expert insights, probabilistic modelling offers a robust statistical basis for understanding the likelihood of different elite configurations and their implications. The probabilistic model applies 1,000 Monte Carlo iterations to estimate scenario probabilities across multiple dimensions of political and social change, including elite fragmentation, imposed unity elites, and devoid elites within the U.S. political landscape. This extensive simulation provides a comprehensive range of likely outcomes, leveraging input from historical data, expert insights, and existing models in comparative political contexts.</p>
    <p>In this extended analysis, the following probabilities are assigned based on cumulative expert evaluations and literature sources (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
      Körösényi, 2020
     </xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
      Higley &amp; Burton, 2006
     </xref>):</p>
    <p>1) Elite Fragmentation and Democratic Erosion: The likelihood of significant democratic erosion under elite fragmentation remains high at 70%, reflecting the recurrent patterns observed in other fragile democracies (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
      Gerlich, 2023
     </xref>). This high-risk probability underscores how U.S. elite disunity, akin to observed political shifts in Hungary and Turkey, can destabilise long-standing democratic structures, particularly under populist leadership.</p>
    <p>2) Devoid Elites and Concentration of Power: The model reveals a 65% probability that devoid elites, characterised by figurehead positions without substantial decision-making influence, will increase under Trump-like leadership. This scenario, derived from similar structures in post-Soviet states, aligns with the findings of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
      Gerlich (2023)
     </xref>, who argued that devoid elites weaken institutional checks and facilitate authoritarian shifts.</p>
    <p>3) Imposed Unity Elites and Authoritarian Consolidation: This configuration presents a 60% probability of elite unity being maintained through coercive or politically necessary alignments rather than genuine ideological cohesion. This outcome reflects patterns seen in autocratic contexts, where apparent elite solidarity conceals internal discord, as demonstrated in the political strategies observed in Hungary and Azerbaijan (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
      Körösényi, 2020
     </xref>).</p>
    <p>4) Scenario-Based Likelihoods for Key Political Outcomes:</p>
    <p>The scenario analysis reveals a high probability of further elite fragmentation if Trump is re-elected. According to the Monte Carlo simulation results, there is a 70% probability that elite fragmentation will lead to significant democratic erosion by 2028. This outcome reflects broader global trends where populist leaders leverage elite disunity to dismantle democratic institutions, as seen in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-4">
      Esen &amp; Gumuscu, 2016
     </xref>). In Turkey, elite fragmentation allowed Erdoğan to consolidate power by weakening democratic norms and concentrating authority within his inner circle, a strategy Trump could replicate if given another term. Building on these expert insights, probabilistic modelling offers a robust statistical basis for understanding the likelihood of different elite configurations and their implications.</p>
    <p>These scenario probabilities align with global trends where elite reconfigurations frequently exacerbate instability. For instance, Erdoğan’s consolidation in Turkey and Orbán’s centralisation in Hungary resulted from leveraging elite disunity to weaken opposition forces (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-4">
      Esen &amp; Gumuscu, 2016
     </xref>). The simulation’s high-risk outputs in the U.S. context reveal the potential for a similar trajectory if populist-driven elite dynamics persist.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s3_2">
    <title>
     <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-"></xref>3.2. The Emergence of Devoid Elites</title>
    <p>A critical insight from this study is the increasing presence of devoid elites within the U.S. political system, a concept first explored by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
      Gerlich (2023)
     </xref> in the context of post-Soviet regimes. The Delphi panel identified Trump’s tendency to appoint loyalists with limited decision-making power as indicative of a devoid elite structure. These individuals, while holding formal positions of authority, lack the genuine influence or autonomy to challenge Trump’s agenda, serving more as figureheads than as active participants in governance. The implications of devoid elites are significant. As <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
      Gerlich (2023)
     </xref> argued, devoid elites undermine the institutional capacity of democratic systems, making them more vulnerable to autocratic shifts. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-10">
      Kornai (2020)
     </xref> further supports this argument, demonstrating how devoid elites erode the foundations of democratic checks and balances, paving the way for autocratic governance. This study’s findings confirm that Trump’s use of devoid elites weakens the checks and balances within the U.S. government, concentrating real power in the hands of a small group of loyalists. This is similar to <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-8">
      Gherghina &amp; Volintiru’s (2021)
     </xref> findings in their analysis of elite structures in Eastern Europe, where devoid elites facilitated the erosion of democratic institutions by allowing autocratic leaders to centralise power without significant resistance.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s3_3">
    <title>3.3. Imposed Unity Elites and the Risk of Autocracy</title>
    <p>The probabilistic modelling also suggests that an imposed unity elite configuration is likely to emerge under Trump’s re-election. In this scenario (<xref ref-type="table" rid="table1">
      Table 1
     </xref>), elites publicly display loyalty to Trump, but there is little ideological cohesion or genuine consensus. This facade of unity creates the appearance of stability, masking the deeper divisions and elite discontent that threaten the democratic system (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
      Gerlich, 2023
     </xref>). The Delphi experts noted that Trump’s dominance within the Republican Party already exhibits characteristics of imposed unity, where many elites support him publicly out of political necessity rather than ideological alignment. This elite configuration poses a significant risk to U.S. democracy. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-15">
      Magyar (2016)
     </xref> explains that imposed unity within elite groups, as seen in Hungary, often creates the illusion of stability while masking deeper elite discontent, which can hasten the transition to authoritarianism.</p>
    <table-wrap id="table1">
     <label>
      <xref ref-type="table" rid="table1">
       Table 1
      </xref></label>
     <caption>
      <title>
       <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-"></xref>Table 1. Scenario probabilities for elite configurations in the U.S. (2024).</title>
     </caption>
     <table class="MsoTableGrid custom-table" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="44.58%"><p style="text-align:left">Scenario</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="39.49%"><p style="text-align:left">Key Characteristics</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="15.93%"><p style="text-align:left">Probability (%)</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="44.58%"><p style="text-align:left">Scenario 1: Trump re-elected with a majority in Congress</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="39.49%"><p style="text-align:left">Complete reconfiguration of U.S. elites, shift to autocracy</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="15.93%"><p style="text-align:left">65</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="44.58%"><p style="text-align:left">Scenario 2: Trump re-elected, divided government</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="39.49%"><p style="text-align:left">Elite fragmentation, continued erosion of democracy</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="15.93%"><p style="text-align:left">70</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="44.58%"><p style="text-align:left">Scenario 3: Trump loses, but political polarisation continues</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="39.49%"><p style="text-align:left">Instability due to elite disunity</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="15.93%"><p style="text-align:left">50</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="44.58%"><p style="text-align:left">Scenario 4: Trump loses decisively, elite consensus restored</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="39.49%"><p style="text-align:left">Stabilisation of democratic norms</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="15.93%"><p style="text-align:left">40</p></td> 
      </tr> 
     </table>
    </table-wrap>
    <p>The Monte Carlo simulation indicates a 60% probability that the U.S. will experience significant autocratic tendencies by 2030 if an imposed unity elite configuration persists. This is consistent with the findings of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-1">
      Acemoglu and Robinson (2019)
     </xref>, who have argued that elite unity, when coerced or imposed, can accelerate the shift towards authoritarianism by eliminating meaningful dissent and concentrating power. The scenario analysis also resonates with studies on authoritarian regimes, such as in Azerbaijan, where imposed unity among elites helped maintain the appearance of governance while concealing the centralisation of power (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
      Gerlich, 2023
     </xref>).</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s3_4">
    <title>
     <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-"></xref>3.4. Comparative Analysis with Global Elite Configurations</title>
    <p>The scenarios developed in this study resonate with patterns observed in other countries undergoing elite reconfigurations. In Turkey, Erdoğan’s consolidation of power followed a trajectory similar to what is currently unfolding in the U.S. under Trump. By strategically appointing loyalists and sidelining dissenters, Erdoğan was able to transition Turkey from a fragile democracy to an increasingly autocratic regime (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-4">
      Esen &amp; Gumuscu, 2016
     </xref>). Similarly, in Azerbaijan, devoid elites have played a critical role in maintaining the facade of governance while real power remains concentrated among a small group of elites (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
      Gerlich, 2023
     </xref>). These parallels suggest that the U.S. could follow a similar path if Trump is re-elected and continues to reconfigure the elite structure in his favour. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-18">
      Tilly (2021)
     </xref> argues that elite reconfigurations are often central to democratic decline, particularly when elites fail to maintain consensus. Furthermore, the U.S. elite configuration could also follow the trajectory observed in Hungary, where Orbán used elite fragmentation to centralise power while maintaining the veneer of democratic legitimacy. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
      Körösényi (2020)
     </xref> documented how devoid elites in Hungary allowed Orbán to gradually erode democratic institutions, concentrating power while preserving the appearance of democratic governance. The presence of devoid elites in both Hungary and Azerbaijan provides a useful comparative framework for understanding how elite reconfigurations in the U.S. could similarly lead to the erosion of democratic norms (<xref ref-type="table" rid="table2">
      Table 2
     </xref>).</p>
    <table-wrap id="table2">
     <label>
      <xref ref-type="table" rid="table2">
       Table 2
      </xref></label>
     <caption>
      <title>
       <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-"></xref>Table 2. Comparative analysis of elite configurations across democracies and autocracies.</title>
     </caption>
     <table class="MsoTableGrid custom-table" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">Country</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Elite Configuration</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Impact on Democracy</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">Key References</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">United States</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Disunited/Imposed Unity Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Weakening of democratic norms, rise of populism</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-7">
          Gerlich (2024)
         </xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
          Körösényi (2020)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">Turkey</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Disunited Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Shift from democracy to autocracy</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-4">
          Esen &amp; Gumuscu (2016)
         </xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-5">
          Gerlich (2021)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">Hungary</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Devoid/Imposed Unity Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Centralisation of power, erosion of democratic institutions</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
          Körösényi (2020)
         </xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-2">
          Bogaards (2021)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">Azerbaijan</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Devoid Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Maintenance of governance facade, consolidation of autocratic power</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
          Gerlich (2023)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">Brazil</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Populist Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Erosion of democratic norms, rise of authoritarian tendencies</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-13">
          Levitsky &amp; Ziblatt (2018)
         </xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-16">
          Mounk (2022)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">India</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Centralised Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Suppression of dissent, concentration of power</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-19">
          Varshney (2020)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">Poland</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Disunited Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Democratic backsliding, judicial manipulation</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-2">
          Bogaards (2021)
         </xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-21">
          Zakaria (2021)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="aleft" width="12.94%"><p style="text-align:left">Russia</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="23.70%"><p style="text-align:left">Ideologically United Elites</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="36.64%"><p style="text-align:left">Complete shift to autocratic governance</p></td> 
       <td class="aleft" width="26.71%"><p style="text-align:left">
         <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-10">
          Kornai (2020)
         </xref>, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-3">
          Diamond (2020)
         </xref></p></td> 
      </tr> 
     </table>
    </table-wrap>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s3_5">
    <title>3.5. Potential Global Impact</title>
    <p>The potential global impact of elite reconfigurations in the U.S. cannot be understated. As highlighted in the Delphi and multi-scenario analysis, a shift in U.S. governance could exacerbate global instability, particularly if the U.S. moves towards autocracy under Trump’s leadership (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-7">
      Gerlich, 2024
     </xref>). A weakened U.S. democracy would embolden autocratic regimes globally, destabilising democratic norms and increasing nationalism. This reflects the broader global trend towards populism and autocracy, as observed in countries like Brazil, India, and Hungary (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-13">
      Levitsky &amp; Ziblatt, 2018
     </xref>).</p>
    <p>Additionally, a shift in U.S. governance could have profound implications for international power balances. The decline of U.S. democratic leadership would create opportunities for China and Russia to expand their influence, particularly in regions where U.S. leadership has historically been strong, such as Europe and the Middle East. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-21">
      Zakaria (2021)
     </xref> suggests that the rise of populism and nationalism globally is often reinforced by elite reconfigurations in influential democratic states. The global consequences of elite reconfigurations in the U.S. could, therefore, trigger further instability, polarisation, and conflict between democratic and autocratic states (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-13">
      Levitsky &amp; Ziblatt, 2018
     </xref>). As <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-20">
      Verovšek (2020)
     </xref> notes, elite-driven changes in key democratic states often influence global geopolitical alignments, particularly in regions with fragile democratic institutions. The findings underscore the increased likelihood of democratic erosion in the U.S. should elite disunity and imposed unity configurations persist, with probabilistic analysis indicating a 70% risk of significant democratic backsliding by 2028.</p>
   </sec>
  </sec><sec id="s4">
   <title>4. Conclusion</title>
   <p>This study provides a comprehensive analysis of how elite configurations, particularly in the context of Donald Trump’s potential re-election in 2024, could shape the future of U.S. governance. The results of the Delphi method, scenario analysis, and probabilistic modelling offer a nuanced understanding of the precarious balance between democracy and autocracy, contingent on the behaviour and cohesion of elite groups.</p>
   <p>The findings indicate that U.S. elites are currently exhibiting signs of disunity, a state that has historically led to democratic erosion. Trump’s previous efforts to consolidate power by replacing critical elites with loyalists, and his disregard for institutional norms, have already destabilised the traditional consensually united elite configuration in the U.S. This shift towards disunited elites, where personal loyalty takes precedence over democratic norms, mirrors elite reconfigurations seen in countries like Turkey and Hungary, where leaders have successfully transitioned their democracies into autocratic regimes (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-5">
     Gerlich, 2021
    </xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-11">
     Körösényi, 2020
    </xref>).</p>
   <p>A critical insight from this study is the increasing presence of devoid elites within the U.S. political system. These figurehead elites hold formal titles but lack real decision-making power, allowing Trump to centralise control while circumventing traditional checks and balances. This pattern is reflective of elite configurations in post-Soviet states like Azerbaijan, where devoid elites facilitated the concentration of power in the hands of a few (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
     Gerlich, 2023
    </xref>). The emergence of imposed unity elites also signals a dangerous shift, as public loyalty is enforced among elites, masking deeper ideological divisions that can accelerate the slide towards autocracy (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-1">
     Acemoglu &amp; Robinson, 2019
    </xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-6">
     Gerlich, 2023
    </xref>).</p>
   <p>The global implications of these elite reconfigurations cannot be ignored. The erosion of U.S. democracy under an autocratic elite structure would have far-reaching consequences for the international order, emboldening autocratic regimes and shifting global power balances. The U.S., long seen as a model of democratic governance, risks becoming a cautionary tale of how elite fragmentation and populist leadership can dismantle even the most established democracies. As shown through the scenario analysis, the probability of significant democratic erosion or autocratic tendencies by 2030 is alarmingly high if current elite dynamics persist.</p>
   <p>This study underscores the importance of elite configurations in shaping the future of governance, both in the U.S. and globally. The theoretical frameworks of <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.137460-9">
     Higley and Burton (2006)
    </xref>, along with empirical examples from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Hungary, provide a critical lens for understanding how elite reconfigurations can lead to democratic decline. The findings from this study highlight the urgent need for renewed elite cohesion and the restoration of democratic norms to prevent further backsliding into autocracy.</p>
  </sec>
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