When Shakespeare averred, “a rose by any other name would smell as sweet”, we precisely knew the attributes associated with this thing called “ROSE”. But do we really know what Quantum supremacy [1] or Quantum advantage [2] exactly entails within the Quantum Computing (QC) space, except that the latter appears more politically correct than the former? How do we achieve supremacy or advantage unless we precisely know what threshold needs to be reached to qualify? Can that threshold be totally oblivious to ethics and humane interests? What good a nuclear chain reaction is if it cannot be controlled to serve humanity? In the same breadth, the definition of quantum advantage cannot be just limited to achieving algorithmic superiority over legacy computing systems, particularly when a section of the experts attributes catastrophic threat [3] that unrestrained QC may cause by collapsing the current cryptographic infrastructure [4] resulting in amplified existential risk to humanity [5] . These predictions are relevant only if QC becomes commercially viable and deployable in the service of humanity. No technology can be a one-way ticket to catastrophe, and neither can the definition of superiority of that technology be. If there are catastrophic risks, QC can never enter the public domain as a minimum viable product (MVP) unless safeguards are in place. So obviously, those safeguards should become an integral part of the definition of its superiority over conventional computers and a standard to be met to pass the MVP threshold. NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) is pursuing the standardization of Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as that safeguard [6] . However, with 80 of the 82 candidate PQCs failing in initial rounds [7] and companies already offering QC as a service [8] , there is an urgent need for an alternate strategy. Our research proposes a novel encryption agnostic approach [9] to secure our infrastructure from the impending threats from QC [10] and articulates a comprehensive definition of an MVP that can potentially set a gold standard for defining commercially viable quantum advantage over classical computing.

In recent years, quantum computing has made great leaps in its promise to offer breakneck computational speeds by using quantum phenomenon to break the bounds of classical computation and reach “Quantum supremacy” [1] or, more politically correct—“Quantum advantage” [2] . Despite these exciting new advances, quantum computing has its limitations. NISQ, or the Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum, defines a current era of quantum computers’ handling of intermediate executions of 50 - 100 qubits, which can surpass classical computing abilities but still suffer from quantum gate noise rendering fault-tolerant quantum computing, a prospect that for now remains beyond reach [11] [12] [13] . In any case, for real-world general-purpose tasks, quantum computers will never replace classical computers, nor are they intended to do so. At best, they will become an integral part of high-performance computing (HPC) for specialized use cases for various important scientific tasks [14] .

In 2012, John Preskill coined the phrase “quantum supremacy” to describe the moment when quantum computers solve tasks and problems that conventional computers cannot realistically solve [13] . He later claimed that 30 years is “not an unrealistic timescale” for achieving general-purpose quantum computing supremacy [14] . However, in 2019, Google claimed that their Sycamore quantum processor solved a problem in three minutes, which would take a classical computer over a thousand years [15] . Not letting Google’s claim go unchallenged, IBM rushed a preprint report claiming that they solved the same problem in 2.5 days using a classical technique [16] , dismissing Google’s quantum supremacy claim (the point where quantum computers can do things that classical computers can’t). When Nature published Google’s breakthrough on quantum supremacy [15] , quantum researchers objected to using the term “supremacy”, calling it irresponsible to override the historical context of the descriptor, which risks sustaining divisions in race, gender, and class. They called on the community to use “quantum advantage” instead [2] . In response to the controversy, Preskill explained why he called it “quantum supremacy” [17] .

According to a recent report, private investors have funded at least 52 quantum-technology companies globally since 2012, and governments and large companies have poured billions into hardware that does not yet exist [18] . Quantum research is progressing faster than originally predicted [19] , and the race for supremacy is getting hot and confrontational, with peers challenging Google’s claim of supremacy [15] [16] . While it is abundantly clear that quantum supremacy or advantage is far from being achieved, it is worth taking a step back and precisely defining [20] what it should entail, or rather, what we want quantum supremacy to be.

The EuroQCI (European Quantum Communication Infrastructure) initiative was launched in 2019. Seven Member States initially signed the EuroQCI Declaration, and all EU Member States subsequently joined the initiative [21] . The US Congress passed the Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act (H.R.7535) in July 2022 [22] , and on December 21, 2022, President Biden signed it into law [22] , which encourages “federal government agencies to adopt technology that will protect against quantum computing attacks”. These legislations mark a major milestone in the global effort to develop and deploy quantum-resilient cybersecurity, making the world move quickly against the coming quantum computing threat since it takes significant effort and years to upgrade existing governmental and commercial cryptography infrastructure. Moreover, as many companies have already started offering commercial QC services for specialized computing needs [8] , many questions demand urgent answers. How do you judge the performance of QC in the absence of a gold standard? How would anyone know a candidate QC has succeeded without a gold standard? How do you define a gold standard? Researchers predict that QC can cause havoc, resulting in a global catastrophe [3] . The same characteristics that make QC exponentially powerful also make it devilishly difficult to control if it breaks every possible encryption that makes today’s Internet work [23] . Some experts claim the possibility of QC causing the collapse of the current cryptographic infrastructure is real [4] , and the existential risk to humanity is amplified [5] . All these predictions are relevant only if QC becomes commercially viable and deployable in the service of humanity. And if they do, can they achieve supremacy without effective control to prevent their exploitation against humanity by bad actors? In other words, just as autonomous mobility cannot reach supremacy without an efficient braking mechanism, quantum computing cannot go anywhere without culling its catastrophe-causing capabilities. Technological supremacy can never trump humanity and humane interests. No technology can be allowed to go rogue. Not challenging the political correctness of the term, can ‘quantum supremacy or advantage’ be achieved merely by solving tasks beyond the capacity of classical computers? Unless safeguards are in place, can a new technology become commercially deployable and deliver any tangible value, particularly when experts associate catastrophic or existential risk with the technology? What good is an autonomous car or a nuclear chain reaction without the safeguard of a braking mechanism? If the risks limit its full commercial deployment, will QC ever be expected to achieve supremacy/advantage over classical computing? The answers to all the questions would come over time as QC evolves, but what is urgently needed is clearly defining the four corners of quantum supremacy/advantage as it is the most widely used terminology in quantum research and a goal that every quantum researcher is striving to achieve. Complete clarity of the goal will keep the quantum research focused.

The principal objective of this research is to alleviate the looming catastrophic threats to the Internet from QC, as QC research advances from a futuristic concept to a near-term reality as companies have already commenced offering NISQ (Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum) computing services to their customers [8] . As discussed in detail in section 4.1, QaaS (Quantum-as-a-Service) is fast evolving as a preferred cloud-based QC business model. As today’s Internet security is almost entirely cryptography-dependent [33] , it remains vulnerable to the impending threats from the enormous computing power of the future QC. Currently, PQC is the only defense that has been explored to secure the Internet from the Q-Day threat. As reasons, therefore it is incumbent upon us to:

i) Firstly, articulate a comprehensive definition of quantum supremacy/advantage that sets the ethical goals to render QC sustainable;

ii) Secondly, design a plan B if ongoing PQC standardization by NIST and other standardization authorities falter.

Recently, a new encryption-agnostic cybersecurity paradigm of Zero Vulnerability Computing (ZVC) was proposed [9] [10] . The ZVC computing devices essentially merged all the conventional layers of firmware, drivers, operating system (OS), and the application layer to deliver a compact Solid-State Software on a Chip (3SoC) system that was completely secure with zero attack surface, was robust and energy efficient [10] . ZVC was explored as an alternative to PQC (Post Quantum Cryptography) as most of the 82 candidate PQC algorithms failed [7] [34] [35] , seriously jeopardizing NIST’s PQC standardization initiative [6] . ZVC’s novel encryption agnostic 3SoC client-server framework was proposed as an Intranet solution to segregate QC from the mainstream Internet as QC companies deliver QC service in a QaaS business model. Based on the zero third-party permissions architecture ZVC/3SoC technology, an absolute zero trust (AZT) network that extends the zero trust concept to trust no application and trust no code was recently introduced [37] .

Arriving at a precise definition of quantum supremacy/advantage will largely depend on:

i) The evolution of the business model for delivering QC services to the end users (Section 4);

ii) The safeguards that secure the Internet from quantum threats and are relevant to that business model (Section 4).

Each of these elements is discussed in detail in the succeeding section, along with the description of the novel QaaS framework architecture proposed in this study (see Section 5).

Research in QC is advancing exponentially, and the prospects of its future potential to deliver “quantum advantage” look bright [11] - [19] . However, before QC delivers the quantum advantage, NISQ (Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum) defines the current era of quantum computers’ handling executions of 50-100 qubits. For now, NISQ suffers from quantum gate noise, rendering fault-tolerant QC beyond reach [11] . Our problem statement identifies the inadequacies in dealing with future Q-Day threats when QC with sufficient qubits eventually becomes a reality. The first order of business in planning a defense of the Internet from the impending Q-Day threat is articulating a precise definition of the quantum supremacy/advantage, which will help us understand what exactly it entails and help us set specific goals and KPIs to achieve the quantum supremacy/advantage. This largely depends on the following:

i) Understanding the evolution of the business model for delivering QC services to the end users;

ii) The safeguards that secure the Internet from quantum threats are relevant to that business model. The relevant state-of-the-art in each of these areas is presented herein.

Since the birth of the modern computer, cryptography has remained the mainstay of the security of our computing infrastructure. Internet security is inconceivable without cryptography [46] [47] [48] [49] . Also inconceivable in the prior art is building computer hardware or software devoid of 3rd party permissions [9] [10] [37] . These permissions allow diverse applications to run on a computer and make the computer useful. Without these permissions, a computer would be useless. However, on the flip side, these 3rd party permissions allow bad actors to access the computer’s computing resources and create attack vectors that exploit those permissions to inject malware. As long as the 3rd party permissions exist, a computer will remain vulnerable to an attack surface that a bad actor can target with malware. A computer with zero attack surface is impossible in prior art, and for the same reason, foolproof cybersecurity remains impossible [9] [10] [37] . Because a computer always remains at risk of being accessible to a non-native rogue program or code, a strong encryption scheme is required to authenticate such access. However, if all non-native programs or codes are by design declined permissions to access a computer’s resources, the need for encryption to authenticate 3rd party access becomes inconsequential. Zero Vulnerability Computing (ZVC) is a new cybersecurity paradigm developed on these encryption-agnostic security hypotheses ( Figure 1 ) [9] [10] [37] . If a technology can secure a connected computer without needing user-facing access authorizing encryption algorithms, it will automatically make the connected device quantum safe. ZVC is the encryption agnostic approach recently proposed as an alternative to the Internet-wide deployment of the resource-intensive and expensive PQC [10] . Winning a Seal of Excellence from the European Commission ( Figure 2 ), ZVC revolutionizes the classical architecture of computers by completely obliterating a computer’s attack surface by banning all 3rd party permissions, and as illustrated in the graphical abstract in Figure 1 , transforms the multilayered legacy computing systems to solid state software on a chip (3SoC) [51] .

As stated, a good majority of the 75 billion devices connected to the Internet by 2025 [53] will have minimal computing and energy resources, posing significant restrictions on their hardware and software [52] . The communication between these devices, their limited energy source, and their limited processing power make running any cryptographic algorithm with longer keys challenging [52] . 95% of current Internet security is cryptography-based [31] , bearing significant resource and cost consequences on the devices connected to the Internet. Moreover, in the future, quantum machine learning [54] and quantum generative learning models (QGLMs) [55] may surpass their classical counterparts and will be able to train faster, delivering a clear advantage over the classical models to become mainstream. The IoT devices with limited resources will be impacted the most.

All the evidence suggests that QC is experiencing an inflection point [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] , compelling us to prepare for this new computing paradigm. Moreover, as companies have already commenced offering QaaS cloud services [8] , the need to secure the Internet from impending quantum threats is greater than ever. Recent setbacks may jeopardize the original NIST timeline for PQC standardization, estimated at 15 years for a full transition to Quantum-safe Internet ( Figure 6 ). Global PQC implementation is a massive undertaking impacting each computing device in the entire Internet ecosystem. It is not just time-consuming but a resource-intensive and expensive undertaking [60] . However, the alternate approach for quantum resilience that this paper proposes limits its implementation to QCSPs offering discerning QaaS subscription exclusively to highly selective special need clients, warranting no Internet-wide implementation of QC. Thus keeping the QC from exploiting bad actors at bay. Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 6, the process of validation and full transition to quantum-safe internet via ZVC/3SoC can be accomplished much faster than the PQC timeline projected by NIST.

The astronomically high cost of QC virtually rules out universal, unfettered access to quantum algorithms by all and sundry. As a natural corollary, the QaaS business model evolves as relatively more sustainable. QaaS can be implemented by enforcing regulatory policies and rendering all malicious activities by bad actors technologically out of bounds. The regulatory authorities can control the former and the latter by deploying the ZVC-powered 3SoC client-server QaaS network architecture proposed in this paper. The impending quantum threats to the Internet can be best dealt with by segregating all subscription-based QC activities from the mainstream Internet by regulating the QaaS access rather than attempting to protect each Internet-connected device individually from quantum attacks. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows:

1) The astronomically high cost of QC makes it unaffordable for the common man, so QC can never be as accessible as legacy computers are to everyone.

2) Because of QC’s prohibitory costs, QaaS is fast evolving as a subscription-based cloud computing business model for offering quantum computing services.

3) QaaS’ business model makes it easier to regulate QC technologically and legally than securing each Internet-connected computing device individually with PQC.

4) A new encryption-agnostic cybersecurity paradigm can secure the Internet from any impending quantum threats by segregating QC and not letting QC it go wild, and significantly shorten the timeline for making the Internet Quantum-safe.

5) Universal Internet-wide implementation of computationally intense and expensive PQC may not be warranted to secure the Internet from the potential Q-Day threat.

Finally, for the purpose of benchmarking and developing KPIs for defining quantum advantage, Quantum Supremacy/Advantage can be articulated as “deemed to have been achieved when a quantum computer measurably and sustainably solves algorithmic problems that conventional computers cannot realistically solve in a timeframe and manner that restrains rogue elements from its misuse in disrupting a classical computer’s cybersecurity and compromising the integrity of the Internet”.

This paper provides theoretical support for deploying a new cybersecurity paradigm that was originally tested in a minimalist hardware wallet device [9] to secure the scam-prone, hack-prone blockchain economy. 3SoC, QaaS, Quantum Ledger Technology (QLT), and other use case scenarios are currently being explored under several collaborative research projects. These investigations have far-reaching implications on our understanding of solid-state electronics and computer hardware/software, in general, and on enhancing their security and resilience in building a robust Internet. Nevertheless, the principal objective of this study remains limited to arriving at a precise definition of “quantum supremacy/advantage” to guide future research in safeguarding the Internet from potential Q-day threats. This research generates a theoretical definition of QC as a minimal viable product (MVP) capable of commercial deployment. This will help in setting empirical KPIs (key performance indicators) to measure the outcomes of QC research for testing and validating the commercial viability of QC. The following limitations of this research should be considered before any extrapolations of the results of this study are made to the real-world scenarios:

i) The QaaS architecture is designed based on empirical data from a series of minimalist hardware wallet experiments [10] and needs to be validated in diverse QC ecosystems before it can be extrapolated to real-world computing environments.

ii) The ZVC/3SoC research is ongoing [9] [10] [37] [51] , and the inferences drawn from the available data are preliminary and subject to updates as and when available.

iii) Currently, all hardware and software architectures are based on granting third-party permissions to non-native applications. The proposed approach changes that, imposing certain limitations on the universal accessibility of computing resources to third-party applications. How that pans out in real-world practice cannot be precisely predicted.

iv) 3SoC devices inherently restrict the porting of generic or non-conforming third-party peripheral devices [9] [10] [51] and hence operate within a restricted intranet.

v) Rigorous experimentation by peer researchers is warranted for testing, replicating, and validating the conclusions before ZVC/3SoC can be established as a new encryption-agnostic security paradigm for making the Internet quantum safe.

vi) Appropriate key performance indicators (KPIs) should be identified to justify the quantity and quality of the case studies designed to investigate the proposed ecosystem.

As stated, this is hypothesis-generating research designed explicitly with the specific objective of exploring and articulating the following:

i) A comprehensive definition of quantum supremacy/advantage that sets ethical goals to render QC sustainable;

ii) A plan B if ongoing PQC standardization initiatives [6] by NIST and other standardization authorities fail.

As much as the limitations of this research warrant a cautious interpretation of the results, the report provides compelling evidence to serve both the objectives of this study. It helps us define the four corners of the term quantum supremacy/quantum advantage so that quantum research can clearly identify the goals in designing and building a sustainable QC. It also helps establish the theoretical possibility of quantum-proofing the Internet and rendering it resistant to future Q-Day threats by deploying an encryption-agnostic approach to segregate QC from the mainstream Internet. The proposed ZVC/3S0C framework not only affords protection against future quantum threats but also secures the current computing infrastructure in a less resource-intensive and cost-effective way than the cryptographic approaches.

Raheman, Fazal. Solid State Software on a Chip (3SoC) for Building Quantum Resistant Web 3.0 Computing Device. US Patent Application US29/842,535, 15 June 2022.

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

All data are either included in the paper or can be found in the sources cited in the paper.

The author is grateful to Dr Brecht Vermeulen and Professor Peter Van Daele (IMEC—Ghent University, IDLab iGent Tower—Department of Information Technology, Technologiepark-Zwijnaarde 126, B 9052 Ghentechnot, Belgium) for support in the initial hypothesis building research, and to Mr. Tejas Bhagat and Ms. Sadiya Khan for their help in preparing this manuscript. The author is also grateful to Dr. Kotzanikolaou Panayiotis of the University of Piraeus and Dr. Kostas Kolomvatsos of the University of Thessaly for being trusted partners in several consortia and initiatives involved in the development of the Zero Vulnerability Computing (ZVC) concept.