<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE article  PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v3.0 20080202//EN" "http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/3.0/journalpublishing3.dtd"><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="3.0" xml:lang="en" article-type="research article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ME</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title>Modern Economy</journal-title></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2152-7245</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Scientific Research Publishing</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.4236/me.2023.142013</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">ME-123457</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="Discipline-v2"><subject>Business&amp;Economics</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>
 
 
  Shipbuilding: The Neglected Industry among Those of Shipping, Maritime &amp; Marine: The Case-Studies of UK, Japan &amp; S Korea
 
</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Alexandros</surname><given-names>M. Goulielmos</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"><sub>1</sub></xref></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><label>1</label><addr-line>Department of Maritime Studies, Faculty of Maritime and Industrial Studies, University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece</addr-line></aff><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>03</day><month>02</month><year>2023</year></pub-date><volume>14</volume><issue>02</issue><fpage>196</fpage><lpage>229</lpage><history><date date-type="received"><day>5,</day>	<month>December</month>	<year>2022</year></date><date date-type="rev-recd"><day>25,</day>	<month>February</month>	<year>2023</year>	</date><date date-type="accepted"><day>28,</day>	<month>February</month>	<year>2023</year></date></history><permissions><copyright-statement>&#169; Copyright  2014 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. </copyright-statement><copyright-year>2014</copyright-year><license><license-p>This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</license-p></license></permissions><abstract><p>
 
 
  Adam Smith observed that UK endowed by 
  different “natural gifts” vis-&#224;-vis other nations, and so he proposed 
  specialization and 
  trade. Also, 
  the 
  mechanization
   could boost the productivity of manual labor, leading to the 1<sup>st</sup> Industrial Revolution. One unintentional mistake of Smith occurred in basing economic development only on “resource-based industries”! Mercantilists discovered that UK’s “wealth” can be derived from a positive Balance of Trade! British also realized
  , 
  using 
  their 
  Navy
   
  that a number of colonies would promote their trade, and UK’s wealth, and formed the 1<sup>st</sup> sea Cartel (1875). This led British to obtain the highest share in global seaborne trade, since 1890, but also to be first in 
  the 
  global shipbuilding
  . This advantage lost by UK in the 1960s, and also lost by Europe in 1978, and obtained by Japan, S Korea and China!
   
  Piracy determined nations’ territorial sea! The liberated colonies voted the “Law of the Sea”, in 1982, creating the “Marine Economies”! Arabs in 1975, and others in 1979, and Russia in 2022, created a great challenge for economists of how to achieve “sustainability”.
   
  The cyclicality of shipbuilding, since 1948, is shown as well the behavior of ship-owners, during 1975-1987 depressions. Interesting were the results of a survey carried-out among 50 Greek shipping companies of how to select a shipyard. We created 3 diagrammatic &amp; mathematical models to analyze the way shipbuilding prices are determined, and the role of fixed cost, including the case of a <b>price war</b>. Finally, we elaborated the issues of why to establish an <b>ephemeral</b> shipbuilding industry at all, and why to build ships for foreigners…
 
</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>The Promotion of Seaborne Trade</kwd><kwd> The Promotion of UK Liners</kwd><kwd> The Creation of Maritime Economy 1965 &amp; Marine Economy in 1982</kwd><kwd> The Law of the Sea 1982</kwd><kwd> Obstacles to Growth 1986</kwd><kwd> The Economics of Shipbuilding</kwd><kwd> A Greek Ship-Owners’ Survey to Order Ships</kwd><kwd> 2004</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><body><sec id="s1"><title>1. Introduction</title><p>The British Maritime economist late Professor  Goss (2002)  and the Greek Marine Economist  Goulielmos (2001) , defined 3 terms determining their sciences: Marine, Maritime and Shipping. Shipping includes two industries: shipping and shipbuilding, and this is a historical fact as the first economists used to deal with ships and their building.</p><p>Thereafter, shipping economists recognized the importance of ports and coined the term maritime, by extending the circle of their original science to include Ports (&amp; Canals) and their economics (1965). This extension was successful because it soon attracted the research interest of the shipping economists.</p><p>In 1982, UN decided to vote the law of the sea and to determine a number of zones in the sea, beyond territorial one, and also and more important to connect the zones to the coastal nations, which could exploit the resources there. This way marine economies were established in a wider circle to include shipping and maritime sciences.</p><p>Namely Marine economy includes 17 industries (listed below). Important, for economic reasons, and especially nowadays (2022), is to pump-out oil and gas trapped in the sea (Picture 1)!</p><p>Shipping economists, before 1965, dealt occasionally with Ports!  Goss (2002)  argued that the economic principles underlying the 3 most important activities of Ports: construction, extension and operation, were unclear 4 decades ago (1965). He also (2002, p. 399) argued that Mr. Price E<sup>1</sup> proposed the term “Maritime” so that the Ports to become a part of the ships.</p><p>Shipping appeared together with life on earth, more than 5000 years ago  (Stopford, 2009: pp. 3-45) . The 1<sup>st</sup> great economists  Smith (1991) <sup>2</sup>,  Ricardo (1847)  and  Marshall (1890) <sup>3</sup>, made extensive references to “Shipping” and “Sea Commerce”!</p></sec><sec id="s2"><title>2. Aim and Structure of the Paper</title><p>The paper studied primarily Shipbuilding: historically, geographically and economically. We also answered the question: “Why certain global shipbuilding powers, like UK and Japan, had eventually to step back?” In addition, we presented the enlargement of shipping economy towards Ports, in 1965, and the enlargement of Maritime economy towards Marine, in 1982.</p><disp-formula id="scirp.123457-formula1"><graphic  xlink:href="//html.scirp.org/file/11-7203268x3.png?20230303161208339"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p>Picture 1. An artist’s idea of platforms extracting oil (North Sea, 1990). Source: the 1990 “Platou SA” report.</p><p>The paper has 12 parts, after literature review: 1) Why Seaborne Trade mattered to Nations? 2) How the “territorial Sea” determined? 3) The “Marine Economy”. 4) Are there obstacles to economic Growth? 5) The unintentional error of Adam Smith. 6) The “Maritime Economy”. 7) The history of Shipbuilding. 8) The main characteristics of Shipbuilding. 9) The economics of shipbuilding. 10) The “new-building” Price. 11) To build or not to build for export? 12) What are the benefits from having shipyards? Finally, we concluded.</p></sec><sec id="s3"><title>3. Literature Review</title><p>The UK “Physiocrats” (18<sup>th</sup> c) influenced economics, and Adam Smith, by their focus on Agriculture. They believed that the “wealth” comes from labor (in conjunction with land) (Quesnay F; 1694-1774)<sup>4</sup>. The early economists, and Adam Smith, had to find-out the sources of “wealth”<sup>5</sup>!</p><p> Koopmans (1939)  argued that: “a high level of rates leads to large-scale orders (for tankers)…upon their completion, about one year later, they have a depressing influence on the (tanker) freight market…producing cycles” (bolds &amp; parentheses added). Modern tankers need now at least 2+ years to be completed and extra 6 years, if there is an exceptional boom (like in 2003-8)  (Goulielmos, 2022) !</p><p>Certain scientists defined, indirectly, the content of shipping economics by their writings: the Norwegian  Svendsen (1958) , the Swedish  Thorburn (1960)  and the English  Sturmey (1962) . The first wrote a “shipping economics’ textbook” (translated into English), a product of his doctoral thesis. The 2<sup>nd</sup> dealt with the Supply &amp; Demand of ships. The 3<sup>rd</sup> dealt with UK shipping and the question: “why the tonnage registered in the UK declined from over 45% of world total (in 1900) to about 16% (in 1960)”?</p><p>In USA, there were  Ferguson et al. (1961) . In Japan, there was  Shimojo (1979) .  Alderton (1999: p. 225)  wrote about ports and argued that the same ship and cargo, in 1988, paid $150,000 in Finland &amp; Southampton and $12,500 in Lisbon!  Stopford (2009: p. 81)  mentioned ports occasionally. Professor  Talley (2012)  (editor), however, devoted 1/3 of pages to port economics, and almost nothing to shipbuilding!</p><p> Heaver (2012)  categorized the 659 papers, written by maritime economists, into 14 segments, during the recent 30 years or so: 1982-2009 ( <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>LR1), in two only journals: Maritime Policy &amp; Management &amp; Maritime Economics.</p><p>Four new sub-sectors<sup>6</sup> appeared for the 1<sup>st</sup> time in 2000, reflecting the fresh interest of maritime economists, but also of the international community! Ports gained the lion’s share followed by liner shipping economics.  Heaver (2012)  underlined that the research of maritime economists remained diverse and certain subdivisions of the field are necessary. For the segment of shipbuilding, Heaver quoted  Dikos (2004)  and argued that there is a variety of subjects.</p><p>Shipping economists had to take part in the pricing policy of ports<sup>7</sup> earlier, we believe! As a result, Ports did not adopt the “95% dwt capacity” in deciding tariffs, as they should, and instead adopted the ship’s size (GRT/NRT). This based on the na&#239;ve assumption that “the bigger the ship, the more she earns”!</p></sec><sec id="s4"><title>4. Part I: Why Seaborne Trade Mattered?</title><p>Smith observed that Nations were endowed. More important, however, was that each country had different endowments! Endowments are the “natural resources<sup>8</sup>” laid-down by God! As a result of the different endowments, the theory of economic autarky<sup>9</sup> could not be applied! This was clear to Adam Smith (1723-1790), writing in 1776 the “Wealth of the Nations” (Picture 2)!</p><disp-formula id="scirp.123457-formula2"><graphic  xlink:href="//html.scirp.org/file/11-7203268x6.png?20230303161208339"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>LR1. Papers written by maritime economists on 14 main subjects, 1982-2009. Source: data from  Heaver (2012: p. 26) .</p><p><img src="//html.scirp.org/file/11-7203268x8.png?20230303161208339" /><img src="//html.scirp.org/file/11-7203268x7.png?20230303161208339" /></p><p>Picture 2. Adam Smith’s book cover (London 1776) (left). (*) The liner ships were dearer, faster with own loading/unloading means, keeping a schedule of departures and arrivals, capable to carry cargo and passengers, built by the British to serve the trade with their colonies. Greeks specialized in the simpler and cheaper ships called “tramps”, becoming the “cargo taxis” of the seas; (**)  Marx Jr. (1953)  analyzed the workings of this (conference) system; (***)<sup>10</sup>.</p><p>Moreover, “economic autarky” could not bring-in silver &amp;/or gold as “Mercantilists” in UK (and France) wanted (16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> c)! “Mercantilists” saw the importance of seaborne trade, when they identified silver &amp;/or gold with “wealth”! Mercantilists’ economic philosophy was powerful, however, as held by the merchants and the statesmen of UK. They arrived, however, at a dogma: “exports, (using “navigation acts”, tariffs, subsidies etc.), should exceed imports, so that silver/gold<sup>11</sup> to pour-in (the UK)”. Moreover, the trade of colonies had to be exclusively with the mother country (UK)!</p><p>The big European nations, and, par excellence, UK, tried to make the manual workers more productive using “machines”. In the late 18<sup>th</sup> century the power of machines multiplied that of humans, known as the 1<sup>st</sup> “industrial revolution<sup>12</sup>”  (Robbins &amp; Coulter, 2018: p. 67) . Management also influenced by mechanization, but mainly since 1911, when the book of Taylor F W, on “scientific management”, published in USA. The Production at home succeeded by the production in “factories”, under the direction of “managers” and/or “supervisors”.</p></sec><sec id="s5"><title>5. Part II: The Territorial Sea</title><p>Although this is not known, the pirates are “responsible” for the nations to adopt a territorial sea! Piracy was the ancient threat for coastal nations and/or for their islands. Nowadays  (Mejia Jr. et al., 2012)  pirates are also a serious threat for ships in Somalia and elsewhere. Places had, in the distant past, for their protection, walls<sup>13</sup> and cannons. The cannons had a range from 3 to 6 n. miles<sup>14</sup>, and this, since then, became the range of territorial sea!</p></sec><sec id="s6"><title>6. Part III: The Marine Economy</title><p>Τhe Marine industries, created by the “law of the sea”, voted in 1982 by UN in its 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting, are about 17 so far (<xref ref-type="table" rid="table1">Table 1</xref>)  (Stopford, 2009: 663-666) .</p><table-wrap id="table1" ><label><xref ref-type="table" rid="table1">Table 1</xref></label><caption><title> The 17 marine industries (1982)</title></caption><table><tbody><thead><tr><th align="center" valign="middle" >Industry/Activity (*)</th><th align="center" valign="middle" ></th><th align="center" valign="middle" ></th><th align="center" valign="middle" ></th></tr></thead><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Pollution prevention of sea environment<sup>15</sup></td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Oceanography</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Management of Coastal<sup>16</sup> Zone<sup>17</sup></td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Search &amp; Rescue</td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Fishery<sup>18</sup>, Aquaculture/ fish farming, river fishing, etc.</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Sea equipment</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Navy</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Sea tourism &amp; sports; hotels on coast, etc.</td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Sea-bottom resources<sup>19</sup> (oil, gas), manganese stones (**), etc.)</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Shipping, Ports &amp; Canals, Shipbuilding, Cruise shipping, Offshore industry, Short-sea shipping, Containerships</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >(*) any activity taking place certain km from the coast towards the shore, on it as well certain km towards the sea (offshore; coastal)</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >(**) containing many metals</td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Source: author.</p><p>In 1980 the “Marine science” taught<sup>20</sup> in the “London School of Economics<sup>21</sup>” (by Professor Watt D C)! The coastal nations have, since 1982, the right either to share the fish catch with those that they carry-out it, or to do it on their own. The Sea, in 1982, became a lawful 2<sup>nd</sup> economy<sup>22</sup>, equally rich as Land, but required a new generation of economists to deal with it, as well as other scientists, so that to…avoid, we reckon, to the maximum possible, the mistakes committed in the management of land and the climate.</p><p>UN wanted, especially, to preserve sea environment, and sea resources, which were exhaustible, par excellence fishery, from human greediness! In addition, the EU was also very glad when discovered, for the first time, the “EU Marine Economy” by its transport commissioner Barroso, J. M. (in 2006)!</p>The New Sea Zones<p>The Map 1 indicates the expanded territorial sea<sup>23</sup>, since 1982, as a property of the coastal state (article 3), and of course its internal waters (article 8). The remaining sea, up to the end of the “Exclusive Economic Zone”, (200 n. miles; ~370 km; article 57) can add to the GDP of the coastal state(s).</p><p>The article 76 defined the continental shelf. The impact of the LOS on economies could not be so great apart from fishery, if scientists did not estimate that the oil and/or gas are deposited in the continental shelves!</p><p>The above, legal control, of the 2/3 of the planet, became possible when colonial powers decided to liberalize their former colonies, becoming members of UN!</p></sec><sec id="s7"><title>7. Part IV: The Obstacles to Economic Growth<sup>24</sup></title><p>Economists did not believe in dear oil, till 1975, 1979 &amp; 2022! Moreover, Germany did not want to depend on nuclear energy, after the Chernobyl disaster (1986), for political reasons! Japan fights till today to restore the impact from the “Fukushima nuclear disaster” (2011), having already the experience of Nagasaki and Hiroshima (1945), where 355,000 Japanese died!</p><p>After the 2 energy crises, as well the 3<sup>rd</sup> one (2022), economists had to, and have to, deal with the issue if out there are “obstacles to growth”? We may remind that Economics as a science born-out to solve one problem: “How humans</p><p>will be able to satisfy their innumerable needs having limited means?” This problem, however, put under control though not philanthropically, by the institution of prices, meaning that “who does not work, he/she will, most probably, not eat!”</p><p>A more difficult problem emerged, however, for economists in 1986: “how to satisfy infinite human needs, with certain limited, but at the same time, exhaustible, resources?” This means to “reserve” certain means for those that come after us, in accordance with the “sustainability<sup>25</sup>” principle.</p><p>Our kind God allocated natural resources according to his wisdom, but he certainly did not mean that the Arabs, in end-1973, had to use oil as a weapon against Israel, or that Russia, in 2022, had to use gas as a weapon against NATO! Resources are there to be exchanged in peace and solidarity, as Adam Smith the moral philosopher, argued!</p><p>More important, however, is water, which easily can become the next more effective “weapon”<sup>26</sup>! The democratic worldwide community has to supervise, by a new UN body, all the important rivers (e.g., Tiger &amp; Euphrates), and their management, we strongly believe! In fact all rivers need a proper management as the summer of 2022 taught us!</p><p>The mechanism of prices, mentioned above, as a moderator of over-consumption, required someone to be “paid” in order to produce! Adam Smith instead “saw” the…“invisible hand”<sup>27</sup>! A producer, however, needs one to buy his/her products, meaning a demand accompanied by the proper amount of money meaning…a visible hand (an “effective demand” in other words, as mentioned by Keynes)!</p></sec><sec id="s8"><title>8. Part V: The Economic Error of Adam Smith</title><p>Adam Smith meant an economic development based on “natural resources”. So, a country has to grow establishing “resources-based industries”. The Japanese did not follow him. Instead, (free) Japan “copied” and improved the imported knowhow from Americans<sup>28</sup>, par excellence in the manufacturing of private cars! British, of course, followed Smith! They saw that the raw materials, which they did not have, they were owned by other people (e.g., India). British called cleverly this whole trade relationship with colonies apropos “common-wealth”!</p><p>Certain countries, like Japan, could not follow Smith, due to lack of either oil or iron-ore! Alternatively, knowledge does not need resources. It needs know-how, meaning a number of good brains  (Goulielmos, 2018) ! This, of course, diminishes by the “brain-drain<sup>29</sup>”, as this happened with especially Greeks in 2009-2018.</p></sec><sec id="s9"><title>9. Part VI: The Maritime Economy</title><p>Historically, the right “hand” of ports (&amp; canals) was inside the pocket of ships, and still is, and the left hand was in the pocket of those who import products, and still is. Some port economists claim that the port costs are made for ships’ sake, and so they have to be recouped (“Cost recovery theory”). This is partially true<sup>30</sup>!</p><p>Apropos, it appeared a new term: the “logistics”, which had to be used to reduce consumer’s transport cost, but it did not, we reckon. Logistics is a “branch of maritime economics, and of ship, and port management, which deals with the time, cost, manner &amp; information flow of ships and ports, with a view to optimize the whole process”, but it concerns only containerships.</p><p>We turn now to shipbuilding.</p></sec><sec id="s10"><title>10. Part VII: The History of Shipbuilding (1902-2021)</title><sec id="s10_1"><title>10.1. The European Shipbuilding (1902-2021)</title><p>As shown (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>1), Europe had the 90% of the world share in building ships for almost 50 continuous years (1902-1950s).</p><p>As shown, the 2 WWs reduced the global share of the “European shipbuilding” from 30% to 8%! Up to 1945, Europe exported more ships than imported! This ended. Its share fell to 60% by 1966. Its peak since 1960, was in 1977, with ~11 m GT<sup>31</sup> (not shown). This share reduced to ~10% by 2005! In 2021 (July) arrived at ~13% in cgt<sup>32</sup> out of ~76 m worldwide, showing a small rise (data from Shipping statistics yearbook, 2021, Institute of Shipping Economics and Statistics, ISL, 2021).</p><p>In more detail (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>2).</p><p>As shown, the 16 European countries, which have built ships since 1960, are presented over six decades till 2021 during selected years. Certain nations disappeared by 2021. In 2021 (July), Germany took over from UK, and Italy from Germany. The data of <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>2 is selected from  Stopford (2009)  covering the period 1960-2006 and for 2021 the data is provided by ISL. <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>2 shows the percentages of GT produced by each country in the total European production. UK was on top in 1960.</p>The W European Shipbuilding in 1978<p>Japan and S Korea in 1978 took over most of the shipbuilding businesses of W Europe (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>3).</p><p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>3 shows the global shipbuilding production in GRT in percentages from 1971 to 1987. The W European countries, in 1971 &amp; 1977, completed 41% of the global ships vis-&#224;-vis &gt; 63% 11 years ago (not shown)! This fell to 12% in 1986! Japan having more than half of the global production in 1971 reached again higher percentages in 1980s after overcoming the shipping crises in 1975-1979. Also S Korea appeared in 1972, which by 1987 obtained a 25% share attracting it both from W Europe and Japan.</p><p>By 2021, a ~10 m CGT production took place, which accounts for the 15.5% of the production of the 3 main shipbuilding nations: China, S Korea &amp; Japan (source: ISL, 2021). W Europe stayed alive in shipbuilding, (in July 2021), by building 90 cruise ships (source: ISL, 2021)!</p><p>The above was the result of the depression in tankers (1975, 1979), and in bulk carriers (1981-1987) due to the first 2 oil crises. In October 1973, the shipbuilding boom ended  (Stopford, 1989: p. 36) . From 36 m GRT, destined to be achieved in 1975, 3.6 times larger than in 1962, shipbuilding fell, in 1978, to 12 m GRT (1/3). The increased labor cost also contributed to this decadence.</p><p>In 1977, the building cost in the European countries was higher than the Japanese one by 20% to 30%, while the methods of building ships were old and no new investment has taken place. The required hours of work in a large Japanese yard were 1/2 of those in the EU yards, including those for maintenance.</p></sec><sec id="s10_2"><title>10.2. The Scandinavian Shipbuilding</title><p>Scandinavia has a strong shipping tradition, and especially Norway (9<sup>th</sup> worldwide in 2022 with ~68 m dwt). The past share of its shipbuilding was, however, 3% (1902)! Shipbuilders originally had to switch from the wooden ships to the iron ones (1870). Also, they had to forget the home grown timber. The changes obliged ship-owners to use steam, something difficult for shipbuilders, because the raw materials, the heavy machinery and the cranes had to be imported. In addition, the new technology needed more land. These problems eventually solved, but they took 30 years (till 1900)!</p><p>Scandinavian shipbuilding retured, however, and reached a 21% share, globally, in 1933, and maintained this till 1971-1972. Sweden specialized in the production of the VLCCs, (the very large crude carriers), in a very productive way, but it could not stop the increase in its shipbuilding cost!</p></sec><sec id="s10_3"><title>10.3. The UK Shipbuilding: A Case-Study</title><p>UK was a predominant producer of wooden ships, from 1741 to 1871! One competitor of the UK was France, designing better ships; the other was USA-building better ones! UK, however, was a great seaborne trade power (in 17<sup>th</sup> c.). In 1890, UK dominated also in shipbuilding, producing more than 80% of the world ships  (Stopford, 2009: 616) ! In 1902, however, UK held a 58% share. In 1950s, UK started to lose it, and by 1960 its share was only ~15%!</p><p>The reasons of the above decadence were (Graph 1).</p><p>As shown, the 1<sup>st</sup>, valid, cause was the two WW.  Stopford (2009)  insisted that “the diminishing share of UK in the world shipbuilding” was due to the “decline of the UK fleet”!</p><p>A digression. If the above was true, then all 5 top shipping nations (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>4) should also be top global shipbuilders, but they are not!</p><p>As shown, Greece, which lost 2/3 of its fleet in both WWs, held the top shipping position with 251.4 m GT<sup>33</sup> in Nov. 2022<sup>34</sup>; China owned 235.4 m GT; Japan owned 178.7 m GT; S Korea owned 66 m GT and USA 65.6 m. These 5 countries owned 1196 m dwt out of 2200 or 54% of the world fleet of 2.2b dwt.</p><p>Continuation for UK: A 2<sup>nd</sup>, valid, argument was that UK fleet lost its share in seaborne trade. True, UK developed, up to 1890, sea trade at its maximum, while the trade flows were massive in the Atlantic and Pacific routes at that time. A 3<sup>rd</sup>, valid, argument was that the UK shipbuilding achieved a low productivity compared with Germany and Scandinavia. True, UK shipbuilding needed a double amount of man-hours vis-&#224;-vis Japan! The 4<sup>th</sup>, valid, argument was the parity<sup>35</sup> between $ and sterling!</p></sec><sec id="s10_4"><title>10.4. The Chinese Shipbuilding</title><p>China is a modern shipbuilding nation appeared in 1990-2000. In early 1990, it had an active shipbuilding activity, with many domestic yards and a full infrastructure, properly organized, with a number of research institutes!</p><p>The “Dalian New Yard” marked the major expansion in late 1990, reaching from &lt;~1 m GT in 1995 to ~6 m GT in 2005, and 11 m in 2007. By 2011-12, 40 m dwt of ships completed each year stabilizing down to about 22 m dwt by 2020. In 2021 (07), it had a 38% share in world deliveries and a 37% one in orders of ~11 m cgt. In 2022, about 37 m dwt of ships is estimated to be completed in China, or 60% of world total!</p></sec><sec id="s10_5"><title>10.5. The South Korean Shipbuilding: A Case-Study</title><p>This was carefully planned for exports, in 1971-1972, in a major investment program run first<sup>36</sup> by “Hyundai”<sup>37</sup> (1973), followed by “Daewoo”<sup>38</sup> (in early 1980) and “Samsung”<sup>39</sup>. As shown ( <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>KS1), S Korean shipbuilding started with 0.46 m GT (1962) and reached 1.23 m (1986), out of ~17 m worldwide (7.3%).</p><p>The new orders were 19.4 m GT worldwide (1983), where S Korea obtained ~19%, while Japan got ~46% ( <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>KS2). By 1995, the new orders were ~26 m GT, and S Korea got ~30% vis-&#224;-vis Japan ~35%.</p></sec><sec id="s10_6"><title>10.6. The East European Shipbuilding (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>5)</title><p>There was a small activity of 1.3 m GT p.a. worldwide (1960), with Poland to increase its production, and Ukraine to face the impact of the rising wages and of an unhelpful parity.</p><p>Poland and Yugoslavia dominated in shipbuilding (1960) with a ~4.5% share within the group; by 2021, the share fell to ~2.1%. Poland maintained its share followed by Croatia and Romania.</p></sec><sec id="s10_7"><title>10.7. The Japanese Shipbuilding, 1950-2021 (July): A Case-Study</title><p>Japan lost almost its entire fleet during the 2<sup>nd</sup> WW. The 12 (survived) shipyards<sup>41</sup>, which by 1952 increased to 14, could produce 1/2 of their pre-war GRT (1948). Their prices were low due to low wages: a 15,000 GRT tanker, deliverable within 18 months, priced at $3m. Japan had to import steel mainly from USA! USA<sup>42</sup> an occupier, helped Japan with a loan of 7b Yen to build tankers etc., to become self-sufficient!</p><p>Japan invested substantial amounts in equipment suitable for modern shipbuilding works, and methods, which were adopted by its heavy industry already, coupled with high degrees of planning and automation. These saved time and caused fewer labor accidents! The ship bridge installed back for the 1<sup>st</sup> time (the “transom” type). The Japanese yards adopted the standardization of ships in the “Freedoms” (1965). The Japanese yards shared the problems of ship-owners having to face the increased costs of loading/unloading and the rise in the price of oil (1975)!</p><sec id="s10_7_1"><title>10.7.1. Japan’s Fleet/Shipbuilding (1950-1970)—As a Free Country</title><p>The country’s new shipbuilding effort was well organized by involving Ship-builders, Ship-owners, and the Government as sponsor! The Government selected shipping and shipbuilding for an intensive state attention, (Ministry of Transport-MOT), in 1947, quite justifiably, aided by finance directed to shipping at &gt;33%. Its steel mills soon provided the steel plates required (1948)!</p><p><xref ref-type="table" rid="table2">Table 2</xref> summarizes the main shipping/shipbuilding policies in 1950-1960.</p><table-wrap id="table2" ><label><xref ref-type="table" rid="table2">Table 2</xref></label><caption><title> The Japanese shipping/shipbuilding, 1950-1960</title></caption><table><tbody><thead><tr><th align="center" valign="middle" >Policy (1940-1946): Not to favor orders for exports; Policy (1947): to attract orders for exports; 1950-51: 2 banks established</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Target 1 (1952): to serve 1/2 of country’s trade; Japan thus created an antagonistic<sup>43</sup> fleet; 1955: the 1<sup>st</sup> ship export boom</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >1949-1953: Greek orders were 41% of Japan’s exports (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>6); 1956: 325 ships launched in Japan (about 1.8 m GT)</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Policy (1954-end-1956): accepting foreign orders under<sup>44</sup> attractive finance terms</th></tr></thead><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >1954-56; Japan employed 200,000 shipyard workers</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1954-60: Greeks ordered 296 ships<sup>45</sup>; 1952-63: Greeks ordered 209 ships priced at more than $800m!</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1953-56: After the Korean War the demand for new ships intensified, again, especially for export &amp; foreign exchange poured-in</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1956: The increased demand caused increased costs &amp; certain delays in deliveries</td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Source: data from Naftika Chronica, 2022.</p><p>The 3 main successful objectives of the Japanese yards in 1956 were (Graph 2).</p><p>The Greeks who never missed the good opportunities, ordered massively ships in Japan (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>6).</p><p>As shown, 74% of Japan’s exports (1955) were for Greeks, which fell to 40% by 1963-64 (April-Feb.). The Cuban crisis took place (1962). Apropos, the 2<sup>nd</sup> closure<sup>46</sup> of the Suez Canal in 1967, demanded tankers &gt; 200,000 dwt. Greeks built such tankers, and OBOs, sized 150,000 dwt. This is an area of extreme economies of scale (1964-1967).</p><p>This is also the time when the “mini bulk carriers” of 3000 GRT were built for the trade in USA lakes etc. for a Greek ship-owner, and the time of “Freedoms”, destined to replace Liberties (1968-69). In 1967 (August) the first automatic<sup>47</sup> vessel delivered from Japanese yards to her Greek owner!</p><p>The shipyard policy of Japan during 1960-1970 was as follows (<xref ref-type="table" rid="table3">Table 3</xref>).</p></sec><sec id="s10_7_2"><title>10.7.2. Japan’s Fleet/Shipbuilding (1971-1989) (<xref ref-type="table" rid="table4">Table 4</xref>)</title><p>The above period is characterized by the oil crisis in 1973. Before that the Suez Canal closed in 1967, and a boom in the freight markets took place, in 1969-1970. In 1971 an agreement achieved between major oil companies and OPEC and a recession emerged. A major change in the shipbuilding policy of Japan decided! We showed below Graph 2, that the adaptation to the ship-owners specifications was respected and satisfied by Japanese yards, and this was a competitive advantage.</p><p>In 1970, the Japanese decided to adopt the “mass production” through standardization, expecting to build ships of quality and of low price, something not liked by Greeks! The Japanese insisted, by majority, arguing in addition that the standardized ships were easier to maintain. They were right, but they did not expect the 1981-1987 shipping depression!</p><table-wrap id="table3" ><label><xref ref-type="table" rid="table3">Table 3</xref></label><caption><title> The shipyard policy of Japan, 1960-1970</title></caption><table><tbody><thead><tr><th align="center" valign="middle" >Peace between labor &amp; management<sup>48</sup> (ownership)</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Increased productivity by automation, pre-fabrication, “learning by doing”; no rivets (1969); attracting export ship orders (especially between 1961 &amp; 1971)</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Bank finance (*); subsidies (1964); 1961: 70% to be paid in 7 years; 1966: 80% in 8 years</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Improved quality</th></tr></thead><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Large sizes could be built; adaptive ability to the new technological advances &amp; automation</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >The cost of building did not increase; yards produced in three 8-hours shifts of 24 hours</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >(*) Special treatment had the tankers to be built under long time charters from oil companies (1966)</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1960-67: Large yards bought the smaller ones; &amp; one large one merged with other large one; a consolidation era</td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >1961-64: Greeks ordered 72 ships (~2.3 m GRT); their 246 ships priced at $1b (1961)</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1949-64: Japan built 13.5 m GRT for exports; 42% was for Greeks 5.7 m (65% tankers)</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1963: the 2<sup>nd</sup> ship export boom; 1965: the 3<sup>rd</sup> ship export boom</td><td align="center" valign="middle" ></td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Source: as in previous table.</p><p>Decisive was also the revaluation of Yen, making shipbuilding prices higher, coupled with increases in the wages etc. of Japanese workers, and an increase in the price of steel (1971), at a time when Japanese shipyards worked at their full</p><table-wrap id="table4" ><label><xref ref-type="table" rid="table4">Table 4</xref></label><caption><title> The history of the Japanese shipbuilding, 1971-1989</title></caption><table><tbody><thead><tr><th align="center" valign="middle" >1971: ~8 m GT built for Japan; 05/03/71: the 1<sup>st</sup> “Fortune” bulk carrier lunched, 21,500 dwt, 15k speed; 1972: 82% of the Japan’s fleet aged &lt; 10 years</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >1973 Sock 1: the revaluation of Yen; high losses run by shipbuilders; 1973 Sock 2: the 1<sup>st</sup> oil crisis (Japan had 34 m GT of orders, a peak); 1974: a drastic reduction of tanker orders</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >1975: 300,000 workers employed in shipyards; 1976 Decision: Japan had to cut shipbuilding capacity; 1977: Greeks ordered 167 ships</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >1977: the order backlog &lt; 10 m GT; smaller yards closed; 1978: a Price War started; 1978: only 3.2 m GT of orders for Japan</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Decision: capacity had to be cut by 35% by 1980 1978-end: employment at 247,000</th></tr></thead><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >1980: S Korea appeared: a threat since 1978</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1980: Japanese attracted the 60% of the global orders</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1981: Japanese yards completed 8.4 GT m, about 1/2 of the world total</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1981-1987: the bulk carriers crisis</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1982 (Jul.) Decision: to dispose shipbuilding surplus production facilities in 61 companies by various %</td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >1983 Decision: to increase subsidies to yards</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1986: the 5 larger yards lost 48b Y; 1988-end: Japan suffered still from the revaluation of the Yen</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >1989: the 7 major yards planned to cut employment by 22,650 persons</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Source: data from MOT report on Japanese Shipbuilding, 1986</td><td align="center" valign="middle" ></td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Sources: data from  Stopford (1989) ; &amp; data from Naftika Chronica, 2022.</p><p>capacity. An agreement achieved between the Greek ship-owners union and Japan for the shipbuilding contracts affected by the revaluation (1977).</p><p>We have already mentioned the detrimental period of 1980-1990 for both shipping and shipbuilding when many orders were reduced and cancelled. Worth mentioning is the building of the 1<sup>st</sup> VLCC (very large crude carrier) 291,391 dwt, double hulled (in 01/02/1993) for Greeks, a “product” of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act. Between 2000 and 2010 Japan does not favor exports. Despite this, Greeks, in 2008, placed orders in Japan for “Aframax” tankers. In 2013, under the pressure for the decarbonization of shipping, Japan marketed the 33,000 dwt new bulk-carrier “IS” Tri Star capable to save energy, and the “eco-design”.</p><p>The Asian etc. shipbuilding performed as follows (1960-2021) (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>7).</p><p>As shown, Japan had the top position (1960). S Korea “obtained” almost 1/2 of Japan’s share (2000). In the meantime the cost of S Korean shipbuilding increased (1960-1970). Also, the cost of Japanese ships increased, and much shipping business lost away to Hong Kong and Greek ship-owners.</p><p>Despite the above the 3 major shipbuilding countries in 2005 had the 80% share in the 230 m dwt world orders (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>8)!</p><p>As shown, S Korea attracted the top world share in orders with 81.3 m in dwt and 1160 ships, of which 660 tankers and 430 containerships; Japan got 510 bulk carriers and 350 tankers (&amp; 100 RORO); China got 320 tankers and 264 containerships.</p></sec></sec><sec id="s10_8"><title>10.8. Other Shipbuilding Countries</title><p>Once upon a time, USA held lion’s shipbuilding share with ~39% (1960). Brazil (1980) with 47% took over. Other countries obtained 84% (2000). In 2021 (July), Turkey held 49%; others 30%, and USA 20% in the group, with 541,000 CGT or</p><p>0.71% globally! Historically, USA was a leading shipbuilder (1800s). This ended during the Civil War (1861-65). In 1914-1919, USA produced up to 4 m GRT, using standard ship/production methods! There were more than 50 building berths, needing 275 days to produce 1 vessel. USA, however, is well known for the mass construction of 2600 Liberty ships<sup>50</sup>, (plus 563 T2 tankers), of 10,902 (16,543) dwt each, using welding for the first time (1941-46). USA failed to compete, however, the other world shipbuilding nations, despite its generous subsidies from 30% to 50%...</p></sec></sec><sec id="s11"><title>11. Part VIII: The Main Characteristics of Shipbuilding</title><p>Shipbuilding is a heavy engineering industry  (Stopford, 2009: 613) , and only industrialized nations<sup>51</sup> could do it. Shipbuilding requires an expertise also in the design of ships. A great competitive advantage is to manufacture locally the steel plates, the main engine and the design plans.</p><sec id="s11_1"><title>11.1. The Production of Completed Ships, 1948-2020</title><p>The production of completed ships, from 1948 to 2020, in the 3 main ship-building areas: Japan, S Korea &amp; China, was as follows (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>9).</p><p>As shown, the global shipbuilding started from a low level of GRTs (2.4 m) (1948), but soon reached 36 m GT (1<sup>st</sup> peak; 1975) and eventually 104 m GT (2<sup>nd</sup> peak) (2011), due to the exceptional high freight rates in 2003-2008 (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>10)!</p><p>As shown, the Baltic dry cargo index from round 2000 units in 1985 Jan. reached the 11,000 units mark in end-2008.</p><p>In addition, the impact of the orders, placed during 2003-2008, echoed till 2020<sup>52</sup>! The Shipbuilding industry is not only cyclical, but the cycles are very long! A shipbuilding cycle lasted from 1948 to 1988 (40 years) with a peak (1975)! A 2<sup>nd</sup> cycle started in 1989, and continues in 2022, with a peak of 156 m dwt (2011)!</p></sec><sec id="s11_2"><title>11.2. The Impact of the Depression Periods, 1975-1987</title><p>The shipbuilding industry depressed by the tanker crises (1975, 1979), and the bulk carriers’ one: 1981-1987 (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>11 &amp; <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>12 for 1972-1985).</p><p>As shown, (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>11), in 1973, the orders peaked-up at 72 m GT, with a zero laid-up tonnage (1972-1974)! The “ships completed”, after 1975, (almost 1/2 of</p><p>those ordered), followed the orders placed 2 - 4 years ago<sup>53</sup>! In 1978, the orders placed, of a low 6 m GT-regressed thereafter between a low of 10 m and 18 m GT (1985). The ~6 m GT orders placed (1978) were below the scrapping level of 11 m GT, meaning that they were only for a partial renewal! Scrapping reached (1985) the 20 m GT, almost twice the orders placed!</p></sec><sec id="s11_3"><title>11.3. A Survey on Shipbuilding of Greek Ship-Owners, 2004 (<xref ref-type="table" rid="table5">Table 5</xref>)</title><table-wrap id="table5" ><label><xref ref-type="table" rid="table5">Table 5</xref></label><caption><title> The results of a survey, carried-out among 50 Greek-owned shipping companies, 2004</title></caption><table><tbody><thead><tr><th align="center" valign="middle" >Question</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Answer 1:</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Answer 2</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Answer 3</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Answer 4</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Answer 5</th></tr></thead><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Under what circumstances your company would order a vessel?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >price, 33%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >experience, 30%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >technological level, 26%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >specialization, 9%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Class opinion, 2%</td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >What are the prospects of the EU shipbuilding?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Very low, 62% → Not so low: 38%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >EU needs a different pricing policy, 47%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >a more specialized &amp; advanced technology, 29%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >a new labor legal framework, 18%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >subsidies, 6%</td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Where would you order vessels?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >S Korea, 43%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Japan, 33%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >China<sup>54</sup>, 21%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >E Europe, 2%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >SE Asia, 1%; elsewhere 2%</td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Do you believe that China will get more orders in future?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Yes, 87%;</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >No, 13%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" ></td><td align="center" valign="middle" ></td><td align="center" valign="middle" ></td></tr><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >What duration do you want to have the guarantees given by Asian yards?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >More than 2 years: 55%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >More than 3 years: 35%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >More than 4 years: 10%</td><td align="center" valign="middle" ></td><td align="center" valign="middle" ></td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Source: “Naftika Chronica”, 2022.</p></sec></sec><sec id="s12"><title>12. Part IX: The Economics of Shipbuilding</title><sec id="s12_1"><title>12.1. A Diagrammatic Model</title><p>The shipbuilding price is determined by the interaction of the Supply (of newly-built ships), carried-out by the shipbuilders, with their Demand, created-out by the ship-owners (Graph 3).</p><p>As shown, the current freight rate is the moving power behind the demand for ship buildings! If the existing fleet is large (0T<sub>3</sub>), and the freight rate is low (0F<sub>3</sub>), the demand for building ships is also low (0NB1). In addition, the new-building price (0P<sub>3</sub>) is low. As the new-building price increases, supply increases, (up to 0NB<sub>3</sub> = full capacity). To increase the total supply beyond 0NB<sub>3</sub>, in the short-run, this is impossible according to theory.</p><p>The yards of equal technical ability and with the lower cost “catch the worm”. If there is an excess demand in the short-run, the yards prolong the delivery. It is very probable, however, to lose business in the 2<sup>nd</sup> hand market. Also, yards with a total cost above 0P1 will accept orders only if there is a subsidy (equal to 0P1-Subsidy).</p><p>In the long-run, (meaning after the time that it takes for a new berth to be built), the supply curve has to shift to the right (shown by the arrow). Apparently, the construction of new berths is not to the interest of the yards, if the shift reduces their future ship-building prices!</p></sec><sec id="s12_2"><title>12.2. A Mathematical Model</title><p>Let a yard’s (maximum) production be determined by its production function: Q<sub>y</sub> = f(K<sub>y</sub>, L<sub>y</sub>) [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref1">1</xref>], where K<sub>y</sub> = X<sub>y</sub> + M<sub>y</sub> [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref2">2</xref>] = capital plus materials, and L<sub>y</sub> = labor [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref3">3</xref>]. To produce Q<sub>y</sub> depends on ship-owners’ demand: D<sub>y</sub> = g(Q<sub>y</sub>) [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref4">4</xref>], given ship-building price, P<sub>y</sub> [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref5">5</xref>]. The yard’s profits are: Π<sub>y</sub> = P<sub>y</sub>Q<sub>y</sub> − rK<sub>y</sub> − wL<sub>y</sub> [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref6">6</xref>], where r is the capital cost and w is the average wage. Now, Π<sub>y</sub> = g(Q<sub>y</sub>)Q<sub>y</sub> − rK<sub>y</sub> − wL<sub>y</sub> [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref7">7</xref>] and Π<sub>y</sub> = g(f(K<sub>y</sub>, L<sub>y</sub>) − rK<sub>y</sub> − wL<sub>y</sub> [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref8">8</xref>]. Π<sub>y</sub> is a function of K<sub>y</sub> &amp; L<sub>y</sub>: Π<sub>y</sub> = h(K<sub>y</sub>, L<sub>y</sub>) [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.123457-ref9">9</xref>] and can be drawn as follows (Graph 4).</p><p>When a yard starts, its production is low (A), and enjoys zero profits (a yard has high set-up cost in buying and preparing the land, buying machinery, carrying-out staff’s training, paying property taxes, carrying maintenance, advertisement, etc.). The S Korean shipyards e.g., for 8 years, had a capacity (in GT) higher than the “ships completed” from 76% (1969) to 89% (1962)!</p><p>After sometime, production increases, and profits finally are obtained (B)! If, however, the yard cannot raise its price due to a price war or due to competition, so that to get the maximum profit (at M), then the profits obtained will be lower (at C). Worth noting is that, at C, inputs have to increase.</p></sec><sec id="s12_3"><title>12.3. The Demand for Renewal &amp; Expansion</title><p>The Demand for newly-built ships is expansionary. The demand for replacing a number of ships<sup>55</sup> is to maintain the status quo (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>13).</p><p>As shown, the demand for newly-built ships-NBS, is more volatile than that for replacement<sup>56</sup>, from year to year, as expected. At times, the demand for NBS is larger by as much as 40 m dwt (1995) something reasonable. Peaks in the expansionary tonnage noted in 1997, 2000, 2003-04 and 2006, i.e., during the boom years in freight rates, as expected.</p></sec><sec id="s12_4"><title>12.4. The Demand for Newly-Built Ships</title><p>The factors that determine the demand for a newly-built ship can be (Graph 5 &amp; <xref ref-type="table" rid="table6">Table 6</xref>).</p><table-wrap id="table6" ><label><xref ref-type="table" rid="table6">Table 6</xref></label><caption><title> The number of questions that a shipping company has to answer before deciding to order a newly-built ship</title></caption><table><tbody><thead><tr><th align="center" valign="middle" >Question 1</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Question 2</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Question 3</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Question 4</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Question 5</th></tr></thead><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >What is, and what will be mainly, the freight rate upon delivery<sup>57</sup>?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >What is the final amount that has to be paid in $, to the yard (taking into account subsidies &amp;/or finance)? (*)</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >What are the guarantees to be given by the yard?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >What is class opinion on yard’s technical ability?</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >How long is ship’s delivery, vis-&#224;-vis buying a sister 2<sup>nd</sup> hand one (**)?</td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Source: author. (*) The parity is important: in 1978, e.g., 195 Yen bought 1$; in 1984, 250 Yen could do that, and in 1987 145; in 2023 Jan. 140 Y buy 1$. (**) One factor that plays a substantial role is the price prevailing in the 2<sup>nd</sup> hand market for, say, a 5 - 10 years of age sister ship! This is so because during a boom, the 2<sup>nd</sup> hand ships are ready to “catch the worm like the early bird”.</p><p>The estimation of the condition of the market upon delivery, perhaps after 2 - 8 years, is indeed difficult! The motive, however, to order a ship is always the current freight rate, being the most decisive immediate influence on ship-owners. The selection of the yard(s) from which offers will be asked, takes into account also the opinion of company’s engineers (technical department<sup>58</sup>). They also judge yard’s experience, its level of technology and its specialization! After 1, or 2, yards are selected, specific specifications are sent, and offers are invited. The building price is the key, however, to which we turn.</p></sec></sec><sec id="s13"><title>13. Part X: The New-Building Price</title><p>The low new-building price is most essential, provided that ship’s order is placed in perfect timing  (Goulielmos, 2021a) . In end 1996, the order book for tankers had its lowest point at about 7% on the existing fleet. Earnings, in $ per day, of a VLCC, had also its lowest point, but with a two-year delay. This means that “orders follow earnings”.</p><sec id="s13_1"><title>13.1. The Volatility of the New-Building Price</title><p>The new-building price has a wide margin of variation depending on demand, but not only, and this is why timing is important (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>14)! The degree to which such a price can be reduced is determined by the cost of the materials (e.g., the main engine covers 16% of the total cost; the steel 13%).  Stopford (2009)  estimated that the materials cover 56% of the total building cost (p. 639)! The labor cost<sup>59</sup>, which covers 17%, as well profits, will be reduced during a shipbuilding crisis…</p><p>As shown, the prices of 2 new-buildings changed violently, over 44 years, from below or at $8.5m to $72m! The effects of the post 1973 oil depression<sup>60</sup>, as well as the post 1979 one, are apparent.</p></sec><sec id="s13_2"><title>13.2. The Role of the Fixed Cost</title><p>A yard’s overhead cost (27% of the total) is indeed high, and it has to be managed! Yards are capital-intensive industries! Worth noting is that an increased fixed cost from 0FC1 to 0FC2 reduces profits by 1/2 (Graph 6)!</p></sec><sec id="s13_3"><title>13.3. The International Differences in Ship-Building Prices</title><p>There are differences in prices among shipbuilding nations (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>15) and this is competition! In 1987, ship-owners gained perhaps up to $250m from the lower prices charged by the S Korean yards!</p><p>As shown, a ship-owner who placed an order in Korea S<sup>61</sup> in 1988 Oct., he/she would save $23m vis-&#224;-vis placing it in W Europe!</p></sec><sec id="s13_4"><title>13.4. Can a Price War Take Place?</title><p>This occurred<sup>62</sup>, and also turned into a credit one (Graph 7)!</p><p>Prices in Far East “were” below the Japanese cost for a VLCC, in 1976-1979, 1983-1985 (by 40%), 1987-1988 (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>16). Worth mentioning is that up to 1987, the Far East shipbuilding policy was to fill-up the existing capacity! As this accumulated losses, the policy changed to the one getting rid of the surplus capacity, of course at the expense of employment!</p><p>As shown, certain yards priced a VLCC $38m less than her cost (1987)! We come now to another dilemma, where China took Solomon’s decision!</p></sec></sec><sec id="s14"><title>14. Part XI: To Build or Not to Build for Exports?</title><p>What is the strategy of the majority of shipbuilders in 2021 (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>17)?</p><p>As shown, 27 shipbuilding countries (out of 36 = 75%), built ships, by as much as 60%, for exports, (in cgt; ships &gt; 300 GT), in 2021 (out of a total of ~76 m GT). <xref ref-type="table" rid="table7">Table 7</xref> presents the situation of each shipbuilding country.</p><table-wrap id="table7" ><label><xref ref-type="table" rid="table7">Table 7</xref></label><caption><title> The shipbuilding countries worldwide and their %, in cgt, of building ships for exports, 2021 (01/07)</title></caption><table><tbody><thead><tr><th align="center" valign="middle" >Countries from 80% to 100% for exports</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Countries from 60% to 79%</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Countries from 40% to 59%</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Countries from 20% to 39%</th><th align="center" valign="middle" >Countries from 0% to 19%</th></tr></thead><tr><td align="center" valign="middle" >Italy, Germany, France, Finland, Philippines, Norway, Croatia, Australia, Romania, Sri Lanka, Ukraine &amp; Singapore</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Korea S, Turkey &amp; Spain</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >China PR, Viet Nam, Netherlands &amp; Poland</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >India<sup>63</sup> &amp; Bangladesh</td><td align="center" valign="middle" >Japan, Russia, Portugal, USA, Indonesia &amp; Malaysia</td></tr></tbody></table></table-wrap><p>Source: data from ISL (2021).</p><p>As shown, 12 countries (44%), had export orders by majority (&gt;50%). Among the 3 top ones: S Korea<sup>64</sup> had ~71%, China PR ~54% and Japan ~19%!</p></sec><sec id="s15"><title>15. Part XII: What Are the Benefits from Having Shipyards?</title><p>The main benefits from establishing a shipbuilding industry can be (Graph 8).</p><p>As shown, one reason for establishing a shipyard industry is to manufacture an export product, and to obtain revenue, and foreign exchange. In Greece sea transport imported 23b euro (est.) (2022). A 2<sup>nd</sup> reason is to provide employment, especially in poor coastal regions (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>18). In Greece the sea transport employs about 200,000 people and contributes about 7% to GDP.</p><p>As shown, the worldwide employment in shipbuilding varied from 515,000 in 1975 to 224,000 in 1987, taking into account only 3 main shipbuilding areas! Japan held the lion’s share in 1975, with 300,000 employees (<xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>19).</p><p>Worth noting is that in Japan, the employment provided by the sub-contractors and related industries stayed almost intact at 105,000 employees an additional benefit! Another benefit accrues from the relationship between shipbuilding and ship-repairing, ship-modifications and dry-docking, as well constructions required for defense and other needs beyond shipping (metal bridges, trains etc.)! Shipyards nowadays may obtain a competitive advantage by building ships friendly to sea environment (adding e.g., scrubbers) conforming to IMO’s regulations vis-&#224;-vis the new fuel.</p></sec><sec id="s16"><title>16. Further Research</title><p>• How much port costs increase CIF price? Should ports charge depreciation for docks, wharves, piers, quays, etc., based on a “cost recovery theory”?</p><p>• Do immigrants contribute<sup>65</sup> to their host-country?</p><p>• Is it true that “the larger the fleet owned by nationals, the larger it has to be the national shipbuilding industry”<sup>66</sup>?</p><p>• Will the new trade routes, in 2022-23, due to sanctions on Russia favor Mediterranean shipyards?</p><p>• Why shipbuilding cycle is much longer 40 years on average than the shipping one (~10 years or so on average)?</p><p>• What is really the minimum efficient scale of a shipyard? Micro-economists determined theoretically the minimum (efficient) scale  (Besanko et al., 2017: p. 57, 237) ! They argued that if a firm, and thus a shipyard, wishes to exhaust economies of scale, it has to produce there.</p><p>• What is the shape of the average cost curve of a Shipyard? Is it like number 1 ( <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>FR1), as often depicted by economists, or like number 2 or 3?</p><p>• Is globalization a solution for a mature shipyard, meaning to transfer all portable machinery etc. to a cheaper country (in labor and power) and produce there?</p><p>• Why UK did not “copy” the fellows Americans, who, by 1946, built 2710 Liberty ships, of which one<sup>67</sup> built in ~5 days (4 days, 15 hours and 26 minutes from the time of keel-laying) ( <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>FR2, <xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>FR3)?</p><p>• Is it true that shipyards can re-obtain their lost competitive advantage by building ships, which now respect sea environment complying with IMO’s regulations, &amp; adding scrubbers on ships e.g., in a rather efficient and cheaper way?</p><disp-formula id="scirp.123457-formula3"><graphic  xlink:href="//html.scirp.org/file/11-7203268x60.png?20230303161208339"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>FR1. Two different average cost curves. Sources: inspired by  Martin (2010: p. 132)  and  Besanko et al. (2017) . The MES of a shipyard in CGT equals √F/d, where F stands for the fixed cost and d is the parameter of any diseconomies of scale (proof in Martin, op. cit., p. 300-2).</p><disp-formula id="scirp.123457-formula4"><graphic  xlink:href="//html.scirp.org/file/11-7203268x62.png?20230303161208339"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>FR2. The construction of each liberty had to be done within a certain time<sup>68</sup>.</p><disp-formula id="scirp.123457-formula5"><graphic  xlink:href="//html.scirp.org/file/11-7203268x63.png?20230303161208339"  xlink:type="simple"/></disp-formula><p><xref ref-type="fig" rid="fig">Figure </xref>FR3. Various constructions commissioned to 11, at least, yards at the same time! Source: author’s archive.</p></sec><sec id="s17"><title>17. Conclusion</title><p>The “gifts of Nature” gave Adam Smith the idea for nations to specialize in what they were efficient. Mercantilists wanted to create a favorable Balance of Trade, so that the silver/the gold to pour into UK! This meant a strong merchant marine to connect the very distant colonies with Metropolis! The British killed 3 birds with one stone: exporting industrial products “made in G Britain”; importing raw materials from colonies and expanding their liner shipping!</p><p> Stopford (2009)  (Chap. 15) persistently correlated the destiny of the UK shipbuilding to the destiny of the UK fleet! For this there is only one explanation: “all UK ship-owners ordered ships exclusively in UK shipyards, by trust or tradition!” As they used to do!</p><p>The resort to sea economy, in a more fair, legal and organized way, was inevitable to happen, given the steady increase of global population, arriving soon at 8b mouths! Colonies one day, would claim their liberalization, as they did, becoming also UN members! The law of the Sea in 1982 opened to the citizens of the sea (the coastal people), the sea economy.</p><p>Shipyards have to see who orders ships worldwide, and from them of course the dearer ones, and try to attract him/her, no matter his/her nationality. Greeks ordered 17.3 m dwt in 2022. Matters of foreign currency are secondary, as well the intention to support domestic ship-owners, if they are not competitive!</p><p>Ship-owners, as a rule, during a boom, order ships, do not lay-them-up or scrap-them-up! In a depression, they lay ships-up and scrap them-out and refrain from orders, except for careful and conservative replacements! This scenario proves that the level of the freight rate determines the level of ships on order!</p><p>Most important of all is to control the shipbuilding cost and avoid revaluation! This is the most difficult operation as labor will always claim wage rises. It is more profitable if the main engines, steel plates, etc. are not imported.</p></sec><sec id="s18"><title>Conflicts of Interest</title><p>The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.</p></sec><sec id="s19"><title>Cite this paper</title><p>Goulielmos, A. M. (2023). Shipbuilding: The Neglected Industry among Those of Shipping, Maritime &amp; Marine: The Case-Studies of UK, Japan &amp; S Korea. Modern Economy, 14, 196-229. https://doi.org/10.4236/me.2023.142013</p></sec><sec id="s20"><title>NOTES</title></sec></body><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="scirp.123457-ref1"><label>1</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Alderton, P. M. (1999). Port Management and Operations. Lloyd’s of London Press.</mixed-citation></ref><ref id="scirp.123457-ref2"><label>2</label><mixed-citation publication-type="other" xlink:type="simple">Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., &amp; Schaefer, S. (2017). 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