<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v3.0 20080202//EN" "http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/3.0/journalpublishing3.dtd">
<article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" dtd-version="3.0" xml:lang="en" article-type="research article">
 <front>
  <journal-meta>
   <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">
    psych
   </journal-id>
   <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title>
     Psychology
    </journal-title>
   </journal-title-group>
   <issn pub-type="epub">
    2152-7180
   </issn>
   <issn publication-format="print">
    2152-7199
   </issn>
   <publisher>
    <publisher-name>
     Scientific Research Publishing
    </publisher-name>
   </publisher>
  </journal-meta>
  <article-meta>
   <article-id pub-id-type="doi">
    10.4236/psych.2020.119090
   </article-id>
   <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">
    psych-103223
   </article-id>
   <article-categories>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
     <subject>
      Articles
     </subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="Discipline-v2">
     <subject>
      Social Sciences 
     </subject>
     <subject>
       Humanities
     </subject>
    </subj-group>
   </article-categories>
   <title-group>
    Understanding Reporting and Problem-Solving Behaviors in a High Reliability Organization: A Case Study in a Spanish Nuclear Company
   </title-group>
   <contrib-group>
    <contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple">
     <name name-style="western">
      <surname>
       Joaquín
      </surname>
      <given-names>
       Navajas
      </given-names>
     </name>
    </contrib>
    <contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple">
     <name name-style="western">
      <surname>
       Eulàlia
      </surname>
      <given-names>
       Badia
      </given-names>
     </name>
    </contrib>
   </contrib-group> 
   <aff id="affnull">
    <addr-line>
     aSociotechnical Resear Centre of Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (CIEMAT), Madrid, Spain
    </addr-line> 
   </aff> 
   <pub-date pub-type="epub">
    <day>
     16
    </day> 
    <month>
     09
    </month>
    <year>
     2020
    </year>
   </pub-date> 
   <volume>
    11
   </volume> 
   <issue>
    09
   </issue>
   <fpage>
    1401
   </fpage>
   <lpage>
    1419
   </lpage>
   <history>
    <date date-type="received">
     <day>
      4,
     </day>
     <month>
      August
     </month>
     <year>
      2020
     </year>
    </date>
    <date date-type="published">
     <day>
      26,
     </day>
     <month>
      August
     </month>
     <year>
      2020
     </year> 
    </date> 
    <date date-type="accepted">
     <day>
      26,
     </day>
     <month>
      September
     </month>
     <year>
      2020
     </year> 
    </date>
   </history>
   <permissions>
    <copyright-statement>
     © Copyright 2014 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. 
    </copyright-statement>
    <copyright-year>
     2014
    </copyright-year>
    <license>
     <license-p>
      This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
     </license-p>
    </license>
   </permissions>
   <abstract>
    The safety of high-reliability organizations is a factor resulting from the interaction between technology and organizational factors. The existence of a system to openly report incidents and without being afraid is paramount for safety. Previous research has identified organizational factors that foster or inhibit employees’ participation in reporting as well as several organizational dilemmas. From this theoretical approach, this research presents a case study in a Spanish nuclear organization to understand how the event reporting system is perceived by its workers. Researchers carried out focus groups, which were designed to generate discourse around the organization’s reporting system. Participants’ discourse was analyzed to identify key interpretative repertoires. Results obtained show two main aspects related with the notifying and problem-solution behaviors: 1) the ineludible cultural nature of the reporting system and 2) the misleading relationship between reporting and problem-solving. These findings should be considered in order to manage the safety in risky industry.
   </abstract>
   <kwd-group> 
    <kwd>
     Reporting Culture
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Organizational Culture
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Safety Culture
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Nuclear Industry
    </kwd> 
    <kwd>
      Interpretative Repertoires
    </kwd>
   </kwd-group>
  </article-meta>
 </front>
 <body>
  <sec id="s1">
   <title>1. Introduction</title>
   <p>This paper aims to understand how the event reporting system is perceived in a Spanish nuclear industry organization and intends to enhance knowledge on factors related to reporting system perception and problem resolution approaches. The purpose is to identify factors determining participation in the organization’s reporting system. To do that, the “interpretative repertoires” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-43">
     (Potter &amp; Wetherell, 1987)
    </xref> of focus group participants regarding the performance of their organizational reporting system were analyzed from a qualitative approach.</p>
   <p>Prior to sharing study results, the significance of reporting systems in high reliability organizations and their inherent relationship to safety is discussed. The approach taken by the nuclear industry and on recent scientific literature data, will be assessed in detail. The common ground of all approaches is the assumption that having a participative reporting system opened to all employees contributes to increased organizational safety.</p>
   <sec id="s1_1">
    <title>1.1. Reporting System in High Reliability Organizations</title>
    <p>The safety of high reliability organizations (hereinafter, HRO), such as nuclear power plants, chemical processing facilities, or health systems, is conceived as a factor resulting from the interaction of technology and organizational components, especially considering technical and human subsystems are tightly interrelated <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-42">
      (Perrow, 1984;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-45">
      Rasmussen, 1997)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>From a sociotechnical approach, the analysis of risk and safety prevents simplistic assumptions based on a merely technological concept of safety <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-19">
      (Hopkins, 2006;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-29">
      Le Coze, 2008;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-30">
      Le Coze, 2019)
     </xref>. Thus, organizational culture became a relevant factor to better understand safety in high reliability organizations <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-55">
      (Vaughan, 1996)
     </xref>. Therefore, aspects related to the promotion of employee commitment or their participation in safety programs, become important.</p>
    <p>From this point of view, the existence of a system to report incidents is paramount for safety. The safest organizations have implemented efficient strategies to report, identify and manage the consequences of error <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-57">
      K. Weick &amp; Sutcliffe, 2007)
     </xref>. It is highly recommended to establish an open reporting system for near misses and accidents without fear of punishment <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-17">
      (Health and Safety Executive, 2013)
     </xref>. From an error management approach, it is considered that “Errors are ubiquitous. Errors cannot be completely prevented” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-9">
      (Frese &amp; Keith, 2015: p. 7)
     </xref>. Thus, it is necessary to have systems allowing all organization members to communicate safety concerns.</p>
    <p>According to <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-46">
      Reason, 1990)
     </xref> the reporting culture is a key aspect determining the safety of complex systems. Reason considers that the reporting culture should involve “voluntary” employee participation in safety information systems. It is important to emphasize the idea of participative willfulness, which is directly linked to how the organization manages guilt and penalizes error. It is worth mentioning that according to Reason “a no-blame culture is neither feasible nor desirable” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997: p. 295)
     </xref>. Instead, establishing an environment of trust compatible with clear accountability, marking a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior is really important <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997)
     </xref>.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s1_2">
    <title>1.2. Reporting Systems within the Nuclear Industry</title>
    <p>Within the scope of the nuclear industry <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-24">
      (IAEA, 2002a)
     </xref>, the following problem reporting aspects are considered: 1) employees should have an attitude driving them to participate actively in incident reporting; 2) the lack of reporting would be a sign of weak safety culture and; 3) fostering the participation of employees entails ensuring those who report are not penalized by the organization.</p>
    <p>With regards to active participation by all employees, a favorable attitude is shown by workforce’s usage of “mechanisms for reporting on safety shortcomings and suggesting improvements” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-23">
      (IAEA, 1991: p. 28)
     </xref>. To do that, the organization should foster an organizational culture favoring problem identification and resolution through participation of all employees.</p>
    <p>Lack of reporting or personnel participation is, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a symptom of “weak” safety culture. It would also reveal a lack of organizational awareness on the valuable knowledge that can be obtained from problematic events <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-24">
      (IAEA, 2002a)
     </xref>. To strengthen safety culture, it would be necessary to develop a reporting culture in which “all employees need to be encouraged to report even minor concerns” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-24">
      (IAEA, 2002a: p. 8)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>Reporting failures and near-misses provide lessons that could prevent more severe events. In that sense, ensuring individuals are not afraid of reporting problems is quite important. The organizational culture should ensure that problem reporting is not retaliated. In other words, “(the employees) must believe that these reports are valued and that they and their colleagues will not be penalized or disciplined as a result of coming forward to make them.” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-24">
      (IAEA, 2002a: p. 8)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>Similarly, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-39">
      (NRC, 2004)
     </xref> links problem identification to an organizational culture in which employees do not fear retaliation in case they err. This idea is explicitly defined in the concept of Safety Conscious Work Environment (hereinafter, SCWE). SCWE is defined as an environment in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both to the management and to the NRC without fear of retaliation. The SCWE is a specific safety culture attribute that allows individuals to look for deficiencies and to ensure concerns are addressed. It is essential for the organization to ensure retaliation is not tolerated. In that sense, “an adverse action is deemed retaliatory if it is taken, in whole or in part, because the individual was engaged in a protected activity” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-39">
      (NRC, 2004: p. 5)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>According to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a SCWE is a healthy safety culture “component” that should include the implementation of a corrective action program accessible to all employees. The need for a culture allowing people to report openly and without being afraid is highlighted, so that “individuals feel free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retribution, with confidence that their concerns will be addressed” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-27">
      (INPO, 2013: p. 27)
     </xref>.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s1_3">
    <title>1.3. Reporting Culture Determinants</title>
    <p>Recent research on reporting culture and their determinants, cover a large variety of high reliability industries, including the nuclear, petrochemical and health sectors. An important number of studies focus on quantifying the relationship between problem reporting and operational performance, the latter measured by quantitative and safety indicators <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-22">
      (Hutchinson et al., 2009;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-35">
      Morrow et al., 2014)
     </xref>. Generally speaking, there seems to be a clear consensus that the level of reporting is a key indicator of “health” in a high reliability organization <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-57">
      (K. Weick &amp; Sutcliffe, 2007)
     </xref>. Similarly, a lack of reporting would anticipate future operational problems. In this regard, a study reviewing twelve significant events into depth shows that organizational unreported precursors existed for many of such events <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-52">
      (R. Taylor et al., 2017)
     </xref>. The extent to which these reporting systems are used seems to indicate the level of organizational attention to safety. According to <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-22">
      Hutchinson et al. (2009)
     </xref> there is a clear correlation between reporting culture and safety indicators within the hospital environment. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-50">
      Simons et al. (2015)
     </xref> consider that the reporting culture not only should be measured positively according to the global number of entries, because the implementation of many improvement programs could lead to decreased reporting even if safety culture improved.</p>
    <p>Many studies identify leadership as a determining factor when it comes to organizational reporting. Visible commitment by management and leaders seems to be necessary conditions to ensuring employees make use of notifying systems. A leadership style based on management commitment and on a culture not penalizing error, has a clear influence on work processes <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-21">
      (Hsu et al., 2010)
     </xref>. Managers who in addition to their managerial skills, are perceived as approachable, seem to determine the frequency of reporting <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-40">
      (Oltedal &amp; McArthur, 2011)
     </xref>. Similarly, error feedback perception seems to be an organizational factor which significantly predicts the level of reporting <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-48">
      (Richter et al., 2014)
     </xref>. This feedback should be dynamic and understandable <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (J. Reason, 1997)
     </xref>. A study with senior managers shows that safety culture refers mainly to the terms “just culture” and “reporting culture” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-10">
      (Fruhen et al., 2014)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>Other studies also concluded that there are many hampering factors inhibiting reporting, aspects such as “extra work, skepticism, perhaps a natural desire to forget that the incident happened, (...) lack of trust and, the fear of reprisals” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997: p. 296)
     </xref> are highlighted. Within the healthcare context, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-13">
      Gifford &amp; Anderson (2010)
     </xref> consider that the lack of support from leaders and insufficient clarity of report results are some organizational barriers that hamper reporting.. A critical element is how employees perceive report undesirability by managers, which would entail “apparent concerns from staff that their reports would not be part of a just response, that bad news would not be welcome at more senior levels” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-52">
      (Taylor et al., 2017: p. 9)
     </xref>. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-16">
      Håvold (2005)
     </xref> breaks down the reporting culture in aspects relating to the will to report (near misses or accidents) and the belief that reporting is important to safety.</p>
    <p>Leadership perceived as unwillingness to accept responsibility or employees that are blamed, are two aspects with a negative impact <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-6">
      (Behari, 2019;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-15">
      Halperin &amp; Bronshtein, 2019)
     </xref>. The perception that reports will be censored before they reach system managers appears as a potential inhibiting barrier <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-41">
      (Oswald et al., 2018)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>According to <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-13">
      (Gifford &amp; Anderson, 2010)
     </xref>, the main individual factors that would hamper reporting are temporary pressure, lack of feedback and individual fear of retaliation as a result of reporting. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-38">
      (Nordlöf et al., 2015)
     </xref> point out that the main causes for omission are the time needed to write and describe an event and the shame of admitting an error or reckless act.</p>
    <p>Accepting the importance of reporting problems does not necessarily imply that employees actually report <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-34">
      (Mjadu &amp; Jarvis, 2018;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-58">
      Yang et al., 2020)
     </xref>. A comparative study of sea transport organizations in Norway and Greece revealed that labor conditions and safety culture are the two main predictors of non-reporting within the industry <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-36">
      (Nævestad et al., 2018)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>A discretionary or volunteer aspect of reporting seems to be an underlying, relevant element that supports such reporting. In a qualitative study by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-31">
      Lekka &amp; Sugden (2011)
     </xref> which combined in-depth interviews with focus groups, it became evident that even if the reporting system was consistently used to report safety incidents, it was not always used for “minor” events. When it came to minor issues, personnel granted themselves the power to decide if reporting was necessary or not, so “staff would exercise their own judgment on whether such incidents should be reported” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-31">
      (Lekka &amp; Sugden, 2011: p. 448)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>Some studies mention the difficulty of the actual act of reporting, that is, the challenge of writing down organizational aspects, some of which are complex. In this sense, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-3">
      Anderson et al. (2013)
     </xref> refer to the difficulty of laying out organizationally complex processes onto the report. The approach to problem resolution is also perceived as antagonist to the act of reporting <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-49">
      (Sandberg &amp; Albrechtsen, 2018)
     </xref>.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s1_4">
    <title>1.4. Reporting and Organizational Dilemmas</title>
    <p>The reporting process has a socially-built dimension that closely ties reporting to its social context <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-54">
      (van der Westhuizen &amp; Stanz, 2017)
     </xref>. From this angle, it is important to consider the concept of “organizational dilemma” as a useful term to determine the meaning of reporting within organizations.</p>
    <p>Organizational dilemmas are a dichotomy by which selecting an alternative seems to imply neglecting another. According to <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-51">
      (Steiner, 1998)
     </xref>, there is an organizational dilemma in situations when people are confronted with the need to make a decision (and to act) without having an alternative that seems clearly better than the rest. This type of situations tends to lead to organizational inefficiency when individuals are forced to act or, on the contrary, not to act when the action is needed. Furthermore, organizational dilemmas require some type of organizational learning <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-51">
      (Steiner, 1998)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>Some crucial dilemmas that may occur in organizations are: 1) the dilemma of productivity <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-1">
      (Abernathy, 1979)
     </xref> which considers that “short-term efficiency and long-term adaptability are inherently incompatible” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-2">
      (Adler et al., 2009: p. 99)
     </xref> or 2) the innovator’s dilemma <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-7">
      (Christensen, 1997)
     </xref> which states that organizations tend to avoid radical innovations in order to satisfy its existing clientele. Multiple studies advocate the existence of different dilemmas within organizations from a variety of methodological and qualitative perspectives. In this way, <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-28">
      Jonsson &amp; Zakrisson (2005)
     </xref> highlight the dilemmas that face leaders of non-governmental organizations.</p>
    <p>Studies on reporting show there are a number of dilemmas associated to the problem reporting act. According to <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-20">
      Hor et al. (2010)
     </xref>, the justification for the act of informing will depend on the meaning given to the act of reporting within a particular local context. After an ethnographic research, they pointed out that the reporting system and incident management system are highly linked to the local perception of accountability. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-18">
      Henriqson et al. (2014)
     </xref> refer to the “fear of vilification, social reprimand and work conflicts” as an organizational dilemma when it is understood that reporting is necessary (in the name of organization safety) but, on the other hand, it might be conflicting if it affects other colleagues.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s1_5">
    <title>1.5. Subject of Study</title>
    <p>This research takes on a discursive, qualitative perspective to the study of organizations <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-56">
      (Weick et al., 2005)
     </xref>. From this standpoint, the aim of the study is to understand the nuclear sector workers’ perception about reporting system and its link to problem-solving. To do that, the “interpretative repertoires” <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-43">
      (Potter &amp; Wetherell, 1987)
     </xref> generated by focus group participants were qualitatively analyzed in order to understand the reasons why participants use (or did not use) the reporting system. And also to identify which factors, according to the organization’s workers, would contribute to enhancing reporting system performance.</p>
    <sec id="s1">
     <title>2. Methodology</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="s2_6">
     <title>2.1. Case Study Organization and Context</title>
     <p>This research initiative is developed within the framework of the Consortium Agreement CIEMAT-IAEA (2016-19), Coordinated research Project on Organizational Cultural Basis for Successful Performance in NPPs IAEA-I22004 which is focused on analyzing reporting culture foundations in nuclear organizations.</p>
     <p>The research is a case study of a Spanish nuclear industry. The organization, a public utility, of with 345 members, authorized this case study. Part of their staff is based at the headquarters and the other is distributed between two nuclear sites. To ensure the organization remains anonymous, in this paper it is referred to as NPC (Nuclear Public Company).</p>
     <p>To provide context of the study, this organization underwent a safety culture self-assessment in 2017, with a special focus on strengthening its Reporting and Improvement System (hereinafter RIS), which had been designed and implemented by the quality department without full acceptance or usage by the workforce. The organization allowed researchers to carry out 6 focus groups (2 per site) as part of the Coordinated Research Project (CIEMAT-IAEA), with the aim of collecting accurate information on their reporting system.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="s2_7">
     <title>2.2. Method and Sample</title>
     <p>The qualitative measurement method used for this study was focus group. Groups were designed and led by the authors of this study for the purpose of learning more about RIS perception by organization employees. Two thematic areas guided focus group moderation:</p>
     <p>1) Assessment of reporting system usage by the organization (both individually and organizationally).</p>
     <p>2) Changes needed for RIS improvement as a problem-solving tool.</p>
     <p>A total of 8 people participated in each group, all with a similar hierarchical position.</p>
     <p>The employee sample was comprised of 48 workers selected by the organization.</p>
     <p>Study sample selection considered Mintzberg’s components <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-33">
       (Mintzberg, 1979)
      </xref> different sites and the alignment of job categories. As a result, focus groups were formed as follows:</p>
     <p>Participants in every focus group had a similar job category (level C and level D employees) to ensure no hierarchical differences between them. Although the sample included all functional units, it excluded the participation of managers, executive positions and contractor personnel.</p>
     <p>All group participants were asked for permission to record, transcribe and analyze the sessions. The anonymity and confidentiality of participants was ensured.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="s2_8">
     <title>2.3. Qualitative Analysis</title>
     <p>This study takes the analytical perspective of the Grounded Theory <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-14">
       (Glaser &amp; Strauss, 1967)
      </xref>, as well as a social constructionist concept by which language is considered a reality-building social practice <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-11">
       (Garay et al., 2005)
      </xref>. It is important to mention that the Grounded Theory pays special attention to the socially-built nature of reality <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-8">
       (Edwards &amp; Potter, 2017;
      </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-12">
       Gergen, 1985)
      </xref>, with the aim of producing interpretations of study subjects <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-4">
       (Annells, 1996;
      </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-14">
       Glaser &amp; Strauss, 1967)
      </xref>.</p>
     <p>Within the scope of this paper, discourses were analyzed so as to identify key interpretive repertoires <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-43">
       (J. Potter &amp; Wetherell, 1987)
      </xref>. The social reality was approached inductively, meaning textual data immersion favored the understanding of cultural and social order aspects <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-26">
       (Íñiguez, 2006)
      </xref>. The qualitative analysis of interpretative repertoires provides recurrent patterns of specific, accurate meaning formulations around the NPC reporting system, showing how employees “build” the RIS within their daily activities.</p>
     <p>The analysis process followed the guidelines mentioned by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-53">
       (Taylor &amp; Bogdan, 2000)
      </xref>, referred to as “analysis in progress”: data discovery, coding and relativization. It is important to know that both paper researchers participated in the coding phase, first assigning a code individually and then negotiating such code with the aim to establish end categories. Final interpretation of analysis-collected findings was also negotiated. It software MAXQDA (version 12) was used as a support tool to assign the codes <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-44">
       (Rädiker &amp; Kuckartz, 2020)
      </xref>.</p>
    </sec>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s3">
    <title>3. Results</title>
    <p>The results of the analysis give information about the two areas used to design the participative process (Assessment of RIS and proposed changes).</p>
    <sec id="s3_1">
     <title>3.1. Perception of the Reporting System</title>
     <p>The qualitative analysis reveals that there are three aspects determining employees’ perception of the reporting system.</p>
     <p>1) Unawareness of the system and its processes</p>
     <p>Most participants acknowledge they have never used the RIS. The reason why individuals do not use this application is supported by two main ideas:</p>
     <p>Participants repeatedly refer to the lack of knowledge to justify insufficient usage by the organization. The analysis shows there are differences between the sites. For example, whereas personnel at the headquarters referred to a generic lack of project implementation, station workers talked about aspects relating to management hierarchy. The main findings that justify the lack of use are shown in <xref ref-type="table" rid="table1">
       Table 1
      </xref>.</p>
     <p>2) RIS and problem resolution</p>
     <p>
      <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-"></xref>Three argumentative ideas structure the perception of RIS as a problem-resolution tool:</p>
     <p>Cons:</p>
     <table-wrap id="table1">
      <label>
       <xref ref-type="table" rid="table1">
        Table 1
       </xref></label>
      <caption>
       <title>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-"></xref>Table 1. Summary of main arguments used to explain the scarse organizational use of RIS.</title>
      </caption>
      <table class="MsoTableGrid custom-table" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="100.00%" colspan="2"><p style="text-align:left">Unawareness of the system and its processes</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="34.54%"><p style="text-align:left">Argumentative Ideas</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="65.46%"><p style="text-align:left">Fragments</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="34.54%"><p style="text-align:left">Lack of information</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="65.46%"><p style="text-align:left">“I have little information on the tool”</p><p style="text-align:left">“This thing is a bit confusing (…) because I did notattend the course”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td acenter" width="34.54%"><p style="text-align:center">IT application</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="65.46%"><p style="text-align:left">“I have never used it. I have no computer and they won’tlet me have one”</p><p style="text-align:left">“An IT system (…) does not encourage people toreport the incidences”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td acenter" width="34.54%"><p style="text-align:center">Lack of projectimplementation (Headquarters)</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="65.46%"><p style="text-align:left">“P1: Nothing has been implemented/P2: Yes,it is not sufficiently implemented”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td acenter" width="34.54%"><p style="text-align:center">Influence of mid-levelmanagers (Facility 1)</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="65.46%"><p style="text-align:left">“Sometimes you would like to enter something on RISbut it does not suit your boss’ agenda”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-top-td acenter" width="34.54%"><p style="text-align:center">Lack of authorization torecord incidences (Facility 2)</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="65.46%"><p style="text-align:left">“There is a filter: Not everyone can enter an RIS action”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
      </table>
     </table-wrap>
     <p>“It is best to talk amongst us, to discuss the issue, to approach your boss directly and not to lose our shared dialog and understanding. RIS should be the very last option.”</p>
     <p>Pros:</p>
     <p>“Formalizing certain aspects (…) to make them public and take a more formal approach, ensuring everyone knows the path to follow, making the acceptance and scheduling of your improvement proposal public, and forcing other stakeholders to respond somehow.”</p>
     <p>There are also different visions depending on the location. At the headquarters, it is linked to problem resolution but only when the issue is considered solvable (“I only enter it when something happened and I already have the solution”; “We know some things cannot be solved, so we do not enter them on RIS”). On the contrary, station personnel think solutions are not linked to the reporting system (“The RIS is talking the talk rather than walking the walk”; “It is a show to let others know how good we are, not to solve issues”).</p>
     <p>Main argumentative ideas relating to the RIS and its problem-resolution capabilities are shown in <xref ref-type="table" rid="table2">
       Table 2
      </xref>.</p>
     <table-wrap id="table2">
      <label>
       <xref ref-type="table" rid="table2">
        Table 2
       </xref></label>
      <caption>
       <title>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-"></xref>Table 2. RIS and its problem-resolution.</title>
      </caption>
      <table class="MsoTableGrid custom-table" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="100.00%" colspan="2"><p style="text-align:left">RIS and problem resolution</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="30.71%"><p style="text-align:left">Argumentative Ideas</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="69.29%"><p style="text-align:left">Fragments</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="30.71%"><p style="text-align:left">It adds no benefit</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="69.29%"><p style="text-align:left">“It is not effective”</p><p style="text-align:left">“It is not an operational tool”</p><p style="text-align:left">“It’s more theoretical than practical”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="30.71%"><p style="text-align:left">RIS vs. otherorganizational mechanisms</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="69.29%"><p style="text-align:left">“Most problems can be solved without entering them onto RIS”</p><p style="text-align:left">“RIS is used when the issue could not be solved”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="30.71%"><p style="text-align:left">Problem institutionalization</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="69.29%"><p style="text-align:left">“It formalizes certain aspects from our perspective (…)”</p><p style="text-align:left">“RIS can be linked to a corrective action (…) andthat is the appeal of this application”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
      </table>
     </table-wrap>
     <p>3) RIS inhibitors</p>
     <p>The analysis shows five types of arguments justifying the system’s limiting nature.</p>
     <p>Person 1: “The feeling that non-important things are registered and that important things are not.”</p>
     <p>Person 2: “That’s not a feeling. There is actually no criterion, meaning you enter an action in good faith because you think it is relevant enough, but there is no criterion.”</p>
     <p>“It is either too much work or something so specific that it cannot benefit the entire organization”</p>
     <p>It is considered irrelevant to report non-important aspects.</p>
     <p>“If you enter it, you are making it more important than it actually is.”</p>
     <p>“They tell you: why did you enter that? And this? If you report: Water is cold, then Mr. X comes and says: Listen, why did you enter that? Are you aware of the mess you have caused?”</p>
     <p>“People feel it is going to lead to problems, so you prefer to take shortcuts.”</p>
     <p>“It is used as a weapon, as something coercive: “I am going to enter an RIS action so you do this!”</p>
     <p>“This sometimes turns into more work, into an overload.”</p>
     <p>“It leads to a work turmoil which eventually causes obstacles and hampers daily activities.”</p>
     <p>“We know the RIS is looked at by external parties. When a Regulator inspection comes, they say: Show me the RIS, and if there are 8 or 9 actions… the Regulator loves to see open actions. I love for them to see those actions because they are not mine, but I need to be empathetic because I don’t want them to see 6 actions assigned to someone.”</p>
     <p>Main argumentative ideas relating to the RIS inhibitors are shown in <xref ref-type="table" rid="table3">
       Table 3
      </xref>.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="s3_2">
     <title>3.2. Improvements for a More Efficient System</title>
     <p>The analysis shows that employees perceive the need to improve technical and organizational RIS elements before it can become an optimal reporting system.</p>
     <table-wrap id="table3">
      <label>
       <xref ref-type="table" rid="table3">
        Table 3
       </xref></label>
      <caption>
       <title>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-"></xref>Table 3. RIS inhibitors.</title>
      </caption>
      <table class="MsoTableGrid custom-table" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="100.00%" colspan="2"><p style="text-align:left">RIS inhibitors</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="35.61%"><p style="text-align:left">Argumentative Ideas</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="64.39%"><p style="text-align:left">Fragments</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="35.61%"><p style="text-align:left">No criterion</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="64.39%"><p style="text-align:left">“It is not a tool that clearly defines what is an incidence,a problem or the means to solve them”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="35.61%"><p style="text-align:left">No relevance</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="64.39%"><p style="text-align:left">“Sometimes silly things get entered onto RIS, a tool thatshould only be used for serious stuff”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="35.61%"><p style="text-align:left">Repercussions of reporting</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="64.39%"><p style="text-align:left">“It seems to create more problems than it solves”</p><p style="text-align:left">“People feel it is going to lead to problems, so theyprefer to take shortcuts”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
      </table>
     </table-wrap>
     <p>1) Technical conditions</p>
     <p>Three types of arguments relating to technical tool aspects are mentioned.</p>
     <p>“I think it is important to explain what it should be used for (…), not only entering issues and incidences but also solutions”</p>
     <p>“It should be more focused on work safety, on overall site improvement.”</p>
     <p>“RIS should not be an instrument by which you accuse yourself of administrative non-compliance, but rather a development element ensuring safe project implementation, with a more preventive approach, instead of a tool to admit guilt.”</p>
     <p>It seems evident, especially at the stations, that it is necessary to clarify RIS usage in relation to daily-used processes (such as work orders).</p>
     <p>“Sometimes we enter RIS actions when it should actually be a work order.”</p>
     <p>Main argumentative ideas relating to the RIS technical conditions are shown in <xref ref-type="table" rid="table4">
       Table 4
      </xref>.</p>
     <p>2) Organizational conditions</p>
     <p>Three types of arguments relating to organizational aspects were mentioned as conditions to make the RIS tool more efficient:</p>
     <p>“Management is the secret of success.”</p>
     <p>“If each one of our managers called us at the end of the month and said: some amber traffic lights should be red or green, then we would be more awareness”.</p>
     <table-wrap id="table4">
      <label>
       <xref ref-type="table" rid="table4">
        Table 4
       </xref></label>
      <caption>
       <title>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-"></xref>Table 4. RIS technical conditions.</title>
      </caption>
      <table class="MsoTableGrid custom-table" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="100.00%" colspan="2"><p style="text-align:left">RIS technical conditions</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="35.82%"><p style="text-align:left">Argumentative Ideas</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="64.18%"><p style="text-align:left">Fragments</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="35.82%"><p style="text-align:left">Clarifying the purpose</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="64.18%"><p style="text-align:left">“It is important to explain what it should be used for”</p><p style="text-align:left">“The RIS should not be used for everything. It issomething specific for nuclear aspects.”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
       <tr> 
        <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="35.82%"><p style="text-align:left">Usage procedure and criteria</p></td> 
        <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="64.18%"><p style="text-align:left">“There should be a document containing the criteria”</p><p style="text-align:left">“RIS? From now on, use it for everything!” And I said“but we have a work order here.”</p></td> 
       </tr> 
      </table>
     </table-wrap>
     <p>“I think the best option would be that once you talk to your boss, he or she would right away enter the issue onto the computer. That would be the best option.”</p>
     <p>“Having the freedom to do it without thinking you might make enemies.”</p>
     <p>“More effective and not focused on looking for someone to blame.”</p>
     <p>Main argumentative ideas relating to the RIS organizational conditions are shown in <xref ref-type="table" rid="table5">
       Table 5
      </xref>.</p>
    </sec>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s4">
    <title>4. Discussion</title>
    <p>The commitment and participation in reporting systems of employees’ at all organizational levels are key elements for the safety of HROs <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997)
     </xref>. From this perspective, the aim of this study is to understand which main factors contribute to the perception and usage of reporting systems by workers in a Spanish nuclear industry organization. Some organizational logics behind reporting processes are revealed when the reasons that drive personnel to report (or not to report, as it happens in the organization of study) are adequately understood.</p>
    <p>Results obtained in this study show two key aspects that need further discussion: 1) the ineludible cultural nature of the reporting system and 2) the misleading relationship between reporting and problem-solving.</p>
    <p>1) The ineludible cultural nature of the reporting system</p>
    <p>Safety culture is one of the safety pillars of HROs. Reference agencies within the nuclear industry inevitably link the existence of a strong, healthy safety culture to a solid reporting system <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-27">
      (INPO, 2013;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-39">
      NRC, 2004)
     </xref>. Participation in reporting systems by all organization employees becomes paramount <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-24">
      (IAEA, 2002a)
     </xref>. Scientific literature has identified organizational factors fostering orhampering the level of participation by employees. Numerous studies agree on the fact that leadership, of both executives and managers, is the crucial element determining the system’s operational performance success <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997)
     </xref>. In turn, leadership influences the existence of a “blame-free” organizational culture that promotes reporting <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-6">
      (Behari, 2019;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-52">
      R. Taylor et al., 2017)
     </xref>.</p>
    <table-wrap id="table5">
     <label>
      <xref ref-type="table" rid="table5">
       Table 5
      </xref></label>
     <caption>
      <title>
       <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-"></xref>Table 5. RIS organizational conditions.</title>
     </caption>
     <table class="MsoTableGrid custom-table" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td aleft" width="100.00%" colspan="2"><p style="text-align:left">RIS organizational conditions</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="37.10%"><p style="text-align:left">Argumentative Ideas</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="62.90%"><p style="text-align:left">Fragments</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="37.10%"><p style="text-align:left">Engagement of management andthe rest of the organization</p><p style="text-align:left">[Headquarters]</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="62.90%"><p style="text-align:left">“Management is the secret of success”</p><p style="text-align:left">“If this is a tool for improvement, it should be availablefor everyone”</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="37.10%"><p style="text-align:left">RIS and the line of command</p><p style="text-align:left">[Facility 2]</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-bottom-td custom-top-td aleft" width="62.90%"><p style="text-align:left">“If you ask your bosses, whatever they respondmay condition you”</p><p style="text-align:left">“Managers have no interest”</p></td> 
      </tr> 
      <tr> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="37.10%"><p style="text-align:left">RIS and a blame-freeenvironment</p></td> 
       <td class="custom-top-td aleft" width="62.90%"><p style="text-align:left">“Having the freedom to do it without thinking youmight make enemies”</p><p style="text-align:left">“It should be more effective and not focused onlooking for someone to blame”</p></td> 
      </tr> 
     </table>
    </table-wrap>
    <p>In the case of NPC, the reporting system is, a priori, open to all organizational levels. The quality department has designed a system according to common nuclear industry standards and requirements. Despite its design, incidence reporting on the system is limited and far from meeting the expectations of organizational managers. Is it because the tool is poorly designed? Is it because of inherent IT tool difficulties? This study coincides with others focusing on the relevance of cultural aspects associated to reporting <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-54">
      (van der Westhuizen &amp; Stanz, 2017)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>Firstly, the need to clarify the act of reporting becomes clear. Results show the need to accurately determine what should be reported. Individuals doubt on “what to report”, “what is an incidence” or where RIS stands in relation to other mechanisms. It is worth mentioning that the definition of what should be reported is determined by the organization, applying criteria which do not depend on employees.</p>
    <p>Secondly, the analysis shows that the act of reporting does not occur in an aseptic environment, but within a specific organizational context that eventually determines if reporting will take place or not. As shown by the analysis of groups, reporting in NPC takes place when the potential consequences of such reporting have been forecast. That means certain elements such as work overload, possible negative repercussions or how reporting may affect managers, seem to largely determine incidence reporting within the organization. Furthermore, it is revealed that reporting is conditioned by the fact that reported incidences are visible to the regulator.</p>
    <p>The case study of NPC also shows that the organizational culture should be considered to understand the reporting behavior. Reporting is the result of the organizational value given by employees to the act of reporting. In other words, efficient system performance does not depend so much on the user-friendliness of the software or forms to complete, but rather on a set of organizational culture logics which determine the perception of what is suitable or not. The analysis of interpretative repertoires of employees reveals that the reporting system is not an objective procedure or aseptic instrument allowing workers to communicate incidences to higher hierarchical levels. Reporting is part of a blueprint of organizational meanings forming the organizational culture.</p>
    <p>Eventually, the analysis of organizational reporting programs is inevitably linked to the organizational culture to ensure a more effective operational performance. Thus, understanding the organizational culture helps to understand the very act of reporting (and vice versa).</p>
    <p>2) The misleading relationship between reporting and problem-solving</p>
    <p>The reporting behavior is a key aspect determining the safety of complex systems <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997)
     </xref>. Behaving indifferently to deficiencies is a sign that a weak safety culture exists <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-57">
      (Weick &amp; Sutcliffe, 2007)
     </xref>.</p>
    <p>With regards to this case study, the high level of RIS dissociation from problem-solving processes, points to the artificiality and lack of operational life of the reporting system. The assessment of RIS as in-house marketing or a mere image proves that in certain operational levels within the organization, the system has no strong practical link to safety. In the face of problems, employees tend to talk amongst themselves or to go directly to a member of management. Based on this study it is possible to extrapolate that a reporting system on its own does not contribute positively to safety. To put it more bluntly, the mere organizational existence of reporting channels does not seem to provide sufficient guarantee that they will be used to solve operational problems and, in turn, to improve safety.</p>
    <p>It is paradoxical that many NPC employees point to a fake use of the system to report problems for which the solution is known, and also to failure to use the system to address relevant issues for which there is no known solution. How can that deceptive balance be broken? How to boost a practical use of reporting systems? Study results suggest that strengthening the formal nature of the reporting system could be useful. In that regard, analysis results show that the notarized nature and capacity to institutionalize problems of this instrument are considered a strength.</p>
    <p>On the other hand, results also reveal the existence of an underlying organizational dilemma <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-51">
      (Steiner, 1998)
     </xref> in RIS usage. Such dilemma can be generically described as follows: “Global problems” vs. “Specific or silly problems”. In a practical sense, the dilemma confronts ideal, desirable reporting based on “relevant” problems, against non-desirable, empty reporting of superfluous things. In terms of linguistic pragmatism <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-32">
      (Levinson, 1989)
     </xref>, the dilemma would be used to justify non-use of RIS to deal with daily, frequent issues. This characteristic of labor problems as minor or non-relevant, would justify the exclusion of formal reporting. Practical resolution of this dilemma at NPC implies justifying that it is not necessary to register minor incidences (categorized as “nonsense”) so that the generation of false problems can be prevented.</p>
    <p>In short, this study shows that even when people report on the system, the organizational value of such reporting should not be considered natural, nor linked to safety or to the identification of the most pressing problems faced by the organization. In fact, this case study reveals the paradox that it is possible to avoid registering complex problems (by simply reporting easily solvable issues), while justifying the need to report “relevant” problems in order to avoid the communication of daily incidences.</p>
    <p>Practical implications</p>
    <p>The results of this study have practical implications on the safety of high reliability organizations. On the one hand, they reveal that the act of reporting depends on a set of normative values. Thus, an increase in reporting levels would inevitably lead to questioning organizational culture aspects related to beliefs and values. On the other hand, it is also necessary to consider that the mere act of communicating events on the reporting system does not ensure the registration of essential organizational issues with the aim to address them. Care should be taken so that the resolution of potential reporting-related organizational dilemmas is commensurate with the safety significance of reported events.</p>
    <p>Study limitations</p>
    <p>This case study contains findings obtained solely from one organization. It would be interesting to compare these results to those of other organizations within this industry. In terms of design, it would also have been important to hold focus groups with middle managers and executives. This RIS system vision is confined to executing levels within the organization. It is important to emphasize that participants were selected by the organization, excluding executive positions and contractor personnel. This sampling characteristic should be considered since from a critical reflective perspective it is considered that methodological decisions are never neutral <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-37">
      (Navajas et al., 2013)
     </xref>.</p>
   </sec>
   <sec id="s5">
    <title>5. Conclusion</title>
    <p>The existence of an incident reporting system is a fundamental aspect in high reliability organizations <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-47">
      (Reason, 1997;
     </xref> <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-56">
      Weick et al., 2005)
     </xref>. Such systems must allow the reporting by employees at all organizational levels. Therefore, it is crucial that the organizational culture encourages an attitude that leads to an active participation <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-25">
      (IAEA, 2002b)
     </xref>. From this theoretical approach, the aim of this study is to contribute to the knowledge of factors impacting on reporting behavior. Thus, a case study has been undertaken in an organization of the Spanish nuclear sector. Through the development of focus groups, the research has attempted to clarify what factors promote and hamper the use of the organization’s reporting system. For so, a qualitative analysis of the “interpretative repertoires” of the focus group participants has been carried out.</p>
    <p>The case study reveals that there are two aspects determining employees utilization of the reporting system. First, the inescapable influence of organizational culture on the reporting system, which determines what to report depending on people’s forecast of the consequences. The qualitative analysis shows that reporting is the result of the organizational value given by employees to the act of reporting. In fact, the organizational cultural logics determine the perception of what is acceptable to report. Second, there is a paradoxical relationship between the reporting system and problem-solving. In this respect, the existence of reporting channels does not ensure that the main operational problems are recorded and addressed. This study shows the existence of an organizational dilemma that confronts desirable reporting with not valuable reporting. The resolution of this dilemma would be used to justify the lack of use of the reporting system to notify minor incidents or the fake use of the system to report problems for which the solution is already known.</p>
    <p>Future research regarding reporting behaviors should include all the organizational levels, such as strategic apex and middle line <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-33">
      (Mintzberg, 1979)
     </xref> which, as prior studies have shown <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="scirp.103223-5">
      (Badia et al., 2020)
     </xref>, may be determining diverse organizational subcultures in the Spanish nuclear industry.</p>
   </sec>
  </sec>
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