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Block, N. (1997). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness (pp. 375-416). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sensorimotor Approach. A Critical Account

  AUTHORS: Alessandro Dell’Anna, Alfredo Paternoster

  KEYWORDS: Sensorimotor Approach; Enaction; Phenomenal Consciousness; Externalism; Explanatory Gap

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.3 No.4, October 9, 2013

  ABSTRACT: The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.