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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining
AUTHORS: Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Bryan C. McCannon
KEYWORDS: Plea Bargaining; Re-Election; Prosecutor
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.5B, September 30, 2013
ABSTRACT: In this note, we provide a new explanation for the “failure” of plea bargaining. We show in a model of asymmetric information that a public prosecutor facing re-election takes cases to the courtroom to signal quality even when her welfare (absent retention motivation) is always higher from plea bargaining.