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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Scheduling Jobs with a Common Due Date via Cooperative Game Theory
AUTHORS: Irinel Dragan
KEYWORDS: Schedule; Efficient Value; Egalitarian Value; Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution; Shapley Value; Cost Excesses; Lexicographic Ordering; Cost Least Square Prenucleolus
JOURNAL NAME: American Journal of Operations Research, Vol.3 No.5, September 18, 2013
ABSTRACT: Efficient values from Game Theory are used, in order to find out a fair allocation for a scheduling game associated with the problem of scheduling jobs with a common due date. A four person game illustrates the basic ideas and the computational difficulties.