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K. H. Baik and J. H. Lee, “Endogenous Timing in Contests with Delegation,” Economic Inquiry. In press. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00487.x

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions

  AUTHORS: Kyung Hwan Baik

  KEYWORDS: Contest; Rent Seeking; Timing Assumptions; Underdog; Favorite

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.5B, August 30, 2013

  ABSTRACT: I study contests in which two asymmetric players compete with each other by expending irreversible efforts to win a prize. I consider three types of games, which are distinguished by their different timing assumptions: the simultaneous-move game, the sequential-move game, and the game with endogenous timing. I compare the outcomes obtained under the different timing assumptions.