S. Nitzan, “More on More Efficient Rent Seeking and Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment,” Public Choice, Vol. 79, Nos. 3-4, 1994, pp. 355-356. doi:10.1007/BF01047778
has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions
AUTHORS: Kyung Hwan Baik
KEYWORDS: Contest; Rent Seeking; Timing Assumptions; Underdog; Favorite
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.5B, August 30, 2013
ABSTRACT: I study contests in which two asymmetric players compete with each other by expending irreversible efforts to win a prize. I consider three types of games, which are distinguished by their different timing assumptions: the simultaneous-move game, the sequential-move game, and the game with endogenous timing. I compare the outcomes obtained under the different timing assumptions.