K. H. Baik, “Effort Levels in Contests with Two Asymmetric Players,” Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1994, pp. 367-378. doi:10.2307/1059984
has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions
AUTHORS: Kyung Hwan Baik
KEYWORDS: Contest; Rent Seeking; Timing Assumptions; Underdog; Favorite
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.5B, August 30, 2013
ABSTRACT: I study contests in which two asymmetric players compete with each other by expending irreversible efforts to win a prize. I consider three types of games, which are distinguished by their different timing assumptions: the simultaneous-move game, the sequential-move game, and the game with endogenous timing. I compare the outcomes obtained under the different timing assumptions.