TITLE:
Prisoners' Dilemma Supergame on Rectangle Lattice
AUTHORS:
Zhongxing Ye, Jingshu Chen
KEYWORDS:
Prisoners' Dilemma; Supergame; Planar Rectangle Lattice; Markov Process; Invariant Measure; Equilibrium
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Applied Sciences,
Vol.3 No.1B1,
July
11,
2013
ABSTRACT: In this paper a class of large supergames, i.e., infinitely
repeated games played by many players are studied. The players located on the
vertex set of planar rectangle lattice play several basic games with his
neighbors. The basic game is two-person prisoners’ dilemma game with asymmetric
payoffs. Under the conditions of the pre-specified updating rules and the transition
probabilities, the relevant stochastic process of strategy evolution forms a
Markovian process. The simulation results about the long-run behavior are
provided.