TITLE:
Should We Overlook All Altruistic Behavior by Politicians?
AUTHORS:
Shunsuke Sekiguchi
KEYWORDS:
Altruism; Liability; Caveat Emptor; Caveat Venditor
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.3 No.3,
June
7,
2013
ABSTRACT: Not all policies benefit their intended
targets even though they are motivated by political altruism. This paper analyzes how
the frequency of altruistic behavior changes depending on whether consumers (i.e., the electorate) or producers (i.e., politicians) bear the responsibility.
It compares the strict liability rule, which means the altruist must bear all damages,
with the no liability rule, which means the recipient must bear all damages. It finds
that under the no liability rule, if politicians are altruist, the frequency of
altruistic behavior is less than under the strict liability rule. Therefore,
the paper shows that if politicians were altruists, they would prefer the
strict liability rule.