TITLE:
Secure Implementation in Queueing Problems
AUTHORS:
Katsuhiko Nishizaki
KEYWORDS:
Secure Implementation; Dominant Strategy Implementation; Nash Implementation; Strategy-Proofness; Queueing Problems
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.2 No.5,
December
28,
2012
ABSTRACT: This paper studies secure implementability (T. Saijo, T. Sjostrom and T. Yamato, “Secure Implementation,” Theoretical Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2007, pp. 203-229) in queueing problems. Our main result shows that the social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness and strong non-bossiness (Z. Ritz, “Restricted Domains, Arrow-Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Non-Manipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private Alternatives,” Mathematical Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 155-179), both of which are necessary for secure imple- mentation, if and only if it is constant on the domains that satisfy weak indifference introduced in this paper. Weak in- difference is weaker than minimal richness (Y. Fujinaka and T. Wakayama, “Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money,” Economics Letters, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2008, pp. 91-95). Our main result illustrates that secure implementation is too difficult in queueing problems since many reasonable domains satisfy weak indifference, for example, convex domains.