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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Credit Constraints and Decisions in Exports: Theory under Asymmetric Information
AUTHORS: Xin Zhang
KEYWORDS: Credit Constraints; Asymmetric Information; Heterogeneous Productivity
JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Mathematical Finance, Vol.2 No.3, August 31, 2012
ABSTRACT: This paper examines why credit constraints for domestic and exporting firms arise in a setting where banks do not observe firms’ productivities. To maintain incentive-compatibility, banks lend below the amount needed for first-best production. The longer time needed for export shipments induces a tighter credit constraint on exporters than on purely domestic firms, even in the exporters’ home market. Greater risk faced by exporters also affects the credit extended by banks. Extra fixed costs reduce exports on the extensive margin, but can be offset by collateral held by exporting firms.