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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Stackelberg-Cournot and Cournot Equilibria in a Mixed Markets Exchange Economy
AUTHORS: Ludovic A. Julien
KEYWORDS: Stackelberg-Cournot Equilibrium; Conjectural Variations; Preferences
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.3, August 2, 2012
ABSTRACT: In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers’ best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.