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R. Amir and I. Grilo, “Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilib-rium,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1999, pp. 1-21. doi:10.1006/game.1998.0650

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Profit-Sharing and the Endogenous Order of Moves in Oligopoly

  AUTHORS: Hiroyuki Takami, Tamotsu Nakamura

  KEYWORDS: Profit-Sharing; Endogenous Timing; Observable Delay Game

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.2, May 23, 2012

  ABSTRACT: Whether firms move sequentially or simultaneously is one of the most important questions in the oligopoly theory. Forms of firms and/or their remuneration systems influence the decisions. This paper analyzes the effect of profit-sharing on the endogenous order of moves in a wage-setting stage of a unionized duopoly where one adopts profit-sharing while the other does not. It is shown that the two firms do not move simultaneously. In addition, if a fraction of profits going to the union is large, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the profit sharing firm moving first emerges endogenously.