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J. Hamilton and S. Slutsky, “Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games: Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1990, pp. 29-46. doi:10.1016/0899-8256(90)90012-J

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Strategic Interaction and Charitable Fundraising

  AUTHORS: Amornrat Amornrat Apinunmahakul, Vicky Barham

  KEYWORDS: Non-profit; Charities; Strategic Interaction

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.3 No.3, May 22, 2012

  ABSTRACT: This paper studies strategic interaction between rival charities providing multiple public goods, highlighting the role of fundraising campaigns in influencing donor decision-making. The analysis suggests that, even when charities honor donor designation, social welfare may be higher in equilibrium when charities solicit donors sequentially, rather than simultaneously or through a United Fund.