TITLE:
Quantum States, Reality, and Knowledge—Revisiting the Dispute between Metaphysics and Epistemology in Light of the PBR Theorem
AUTHORS:
Jun’an Lin
KEYWORDS:
Scientific Realism, Quantum State, PBR Theorem, Relational Quantum Mechanics, Structural Realism, Epistemology
JOURNAL NAME:
Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics,
Vol.14 No.11,
November
18,
2026
ABSTRACT: The debate concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics does not merely concern how to understand a successful mathematical formalism and once more raises an old question: does scientific knowledge pertain to a reality that exists independently of the observer, or does it simply organize experience, predict the outcomes of experiments, and record information? This article focuses on the ontological status of the quantum state. It first distinguishes the traditional epistemological notions of truth, belief, and justification from the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic commitments of scientific realism, and then examines the shift in research paradigms from classical to quantum mechanics. It subsequently reconstructs the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem and makes clear its philosophical implications. Within the framework of ontological models and on the assumption of preparation independence, the ontic-state distributions associated with different pure quantum states cannot overlap. Yet this result does not demonstrate that the quantum state is a complete physical ontology nor does it prove that the wave function is an absolute, intrinsic entity that is concretely located in spacetime. On this basis, the paper advances a view called moderate relational realism. Interactions, correlations, and quantum events are real in a way that is independent of the mind; the systems remain as relata; and the quantum state is regarded as an objective representation of the preparation history, of the relations between systems, and of the physical dispositions which these relations preserve. This position accepts the restriction that the PBR theorem places on ψ-epistemic ontological models while at the same time rejecting the inference from ψ-onticity to the reification of the wave function. When addressing the objections relating to relations without relata, the objectivity of relative facts, and interpretive underdetermination, the paper states that quantum mechanics has not overcome scientific realism; on the contrary, it has moved realism away from a full commitment, an object-centered ontology, and absolute representation towards selectivity, relationality, and fallible perspectival objectivity.