TITLE:
How Much Time Will Be Needed for the Appointment Process to Move from a Discretionary System to Merit-Based Selection of Representatives in Publicly Traded Companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
AUTHORS:
Mutabunga Rugina Placide, Bahiga Bashangwa Jocky, Eligbelol Begakoma Felix, Alfred Akonkwa Amisi
KEYWORDS:
Meritocracy, Clientelism, Public Governance, Public Enterprises
JOURNAL NAME:
American Journal of Industrial and Business Management,
Vol.16 No.9,
September
21,
2026
ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the challenges of recruiting executives for public enterprises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by examining the contrast between a meritocratic system, based on skills, qualifications, experience, integrity, and suitability for the position, and a clientelist system structured by political, familial, community, and relational networks. The study demonstrates that the existence of formal procedures, such as calls for applications and the digitization of selection processes, does not necessarily guarantee the objectivity of appointments, as a gap can persist between officially established rules and actual decision-making practices. Drawing particularly on agency theory, the institutional approach, and analyses of neopatrimonialism, the article emphasizes that the politicization of appointments can undermine the accountability of executives, the autonomy of governance bodies, and potentially, the performance of public enterprises. Methodologically, the research adopts a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative analysis of 254 observations, document analysis, and a qualitative component based on purposive sampling comprising 12 interviews conducted in 17 public companies across various sectors. Three hypotheses structure the investigation: the first concerns the influence of relational capital and political factors on recruitment practices; the second examines the role of transparency, oversight, and effective rule enforcement in promoting meritocracy; and the third analyzes the relationships between meritocratic selection, governance, and organizational performance. Descriptive analyses suggest the importance of relational and political dimensions in appointment processes, while statistical tests do not consistently confirm a direct and significant relationship between recruitment methods and key organizational indicators. Conversely, certain relationships involving relational capital appear more significant, confirming the need to examine the social and institutional mechanisms surrounding appointments. This article thus advocates an integrated approach in which qualitative analysis can explain mechanisms that cannot be fully captured by statistical data alone. It concludes that reform of the appointment system must be based on professionalization, transparency, independence, and accountability, in order to transform the discretionary power of appointment into a legally regulated, traceable power grounded in verifiable professional criteria.