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Pinto, Y., Neville, D. A., Otten, M., Corballis, P. M., Lamme, V. A. F., de Haan, E. H. F. et al. (2017). Split Brain: Divided Perception but Undivided Consciousness. Brain, 140, aww358.
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/aww358

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Embodying Consciousness in Brains and Machines II: Portals

  AUTHORS: Peter B. Lloyd

  KEYWORDS: Hard Problem, Consciousness, Mental Monism, Idealism, Artificial Consciousness, Conscious AI

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.16 No.3, July 29, 2026

  ABSTRACT: This paper adopts the philosophical theory of mental monism and examines the constraints on models of embodiment within that framework. It proposes a biologically plausible model of embodiment in brains and suggests an extension to embodiment in machines. The conscious mind is characterized as a nonphysical and nonlocal system comprised only of volitions and phenomenal experiences, subject to scientifically discoverable natural laws, and capable of processing information independently of the linked brain tissue.