TITLE:
An Examination of the Evolutionary Game of Enterprise Quality Supervision under Credit Linkage
AUTHORS:
Xingwang Yu, Yifan Wei
KEYWORDS:
Credit Linkage, Enterprise Quality Supervision, Evolutionary Game, Time-Lag Effect, Incentive Compatibility
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Business and Management,
Vol.14 No.3,
May
8,
2026
ABSTRACT: This paper addresses resource misallocation and systemic risks caused by enterprises’ passive compliance in China’s enterprise quality supervision. To tackle these issues, an evolutionary game model is developed between enterprises and supervision authorities, incorporating dynamic credit adjustment. The model avoids distortion of supervisory motivation by designing a linkage between credit and supervision and ensuring incentive compatibility. Equilibrium stability is analyzed using the Jacobian matrix, and the evolutionary dynamics between government and enterprise behaviors are explored through PyCharm multi-agent simulation. Results indicate that system equilibrium depends on the profit differential between the two parties. The dynamic punishment mechanism can raise the supervisory efficiency threshold, thus promoting enterprise compliance. The simulation rigorously verifies the existence of the sunk cost effect, and the cooperative equilibrium exhibits a compound adjective evolutionary path: “policy initiation-market relay-cooperative stability”, providing a robust theoretical basis for addressing resource misallocation in quality supervision across various industries.