TITLE:
Optometry Associations and the Free Rider Problem Revisited
AUTHORS:
Matthew Mullis, Joshua Hall, Edgar Orozco
KEYWORDS:
Free Rider Problem, Professional Associations, Optometry, Public Choice
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.16 No.2,
March
23,
2026
ABSTRACT: Members of professional associations pay dues to professional associations for a variety of reasons, including lobbying. This can lead to a free-rider problem if non-members enjoy the benefits without paying. Using 2023 data from 30 states, we revisit earlier work on the free-riding problem by analyzing how continuing education requirements, number of optometrists, benefit salience, and legal services affect membership rates. We find no significant relationship between continuing education hours or total optometrists and membership percentages. We introduce two variables measuring selective incentives: salience of advertised benefits and availability of legal services. Legal services exhibit a negative association with membership in certain specifications. While we find no evidence of free-riding, differences in sample size and measurement challenges mean that further research is needed.