M. Maschler and G. Owen, “The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments,” In: R. Selten, Ed., Rational Interaction, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992, pp. 5-12.
has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Weakly Stable Sets of NTU Game
AUTHORS: Han Qiao, Hong-Wei Gao
KEYWORDS: NTU Game; Weak Dominance; Core; Weakly Stable Set
JOURNAL NAME: American Journal of Operations Research, Vol.2 No.1, March 14, 2012
ABSTRACT: In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.