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U. Faigle and W. Kern, “The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1992, pp. 249- 266. doi:10.1007/BF01258278

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Weakly Stable Sets of NTU Game

  AUTHORS: Han Qiao, Hong-Wei Gao

  KEYWORDS: NTU Game; Weak Dominance; Core; Weakly Stable Set

  JOURNAL NAME: American Journal of Operations Research, Vol.2 No.1, March 14, 2012

  ABSTRACT: In this paper, the definition of weak dominance is proposed for a NTU game and two new solution concepts of NTU games are introduced: the refined core and weakly stable set. The relationship is explored among the core, the weakly stable set and the refined core.