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G. Codognato, “Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Limit Exchange Economies with Complete Markets: A Comparison between Two Models,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2000, pp. 136-146. doi:10.1006/game.1999.0735

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Mixed Markets: A Comparison

  AUTHORS: Ludovic A. Julien

  KEYWORDS: Stackelberg Competition; Exchange Economies; Preferences

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.2 No.1, February 23, 2012

  ABSTRACT: In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Stackel-berg-Walras and the Cournot-Walras equilibria can coincide only if 1) the endowments and preferences of atoms are identical and 2) the elasticity of the followers’ best response functions are equal to zero in equilibrium.