TITLE:
Effects of CSR on Fresh E-Commerce Supply Chain and CSR Sharing Strategy under Demand Uncertainty
AUTHORS:
Qichao Shi, Jinxin Huang, Lin Feng
KEYWORDS:
Freshness-Keeping Effort, Corporate Social Responsibility, Fresh Produce, Wholesale Price Contract, Revenue-Sharing Contract
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.14 No.6,
December
24,
2024
ABSTRACT: We examine a two-stage fresh e-commerce supply chain comprising a supplier and an e-tailer. It remains unclear how corporate social responsibility (CSR) levels affect supply chain performance or how the e-tailer’s freshness-preserving effort is linked to CSR levels. This study investigates the impacts of a supplier’s and an e-tailer’s CSR levels on optimal pricing and freshness-preserving effort and how supply chain members should share CSR. A Stackelberg game is used to model four scenarios: 1) the supplier practices CSR under a wholesale price contract (WSN), 2) both the supplier and the e-tailer practice CSR under a wholesale price contract (WSO), 3) the supplier practices CSR under a revenue-sharing contract (RSN), and 4) both the supplier and the e-tailer practice CSR under a revenue-sharing contract (RSO). The results show that as CSR levels rise, freshness-preserving efforts increase, and retail prices fall. When the supplier and the e-tailer jointly practice CSR, the freshness-preserving effort level, order quantity, and consumer surplus are higher, and the retail price is lower than when only the supplier practices CSR. In Model WSN, the supply chain’s profit grows as the supplier’s CSR level increases. In Models WSO, RSN, and RSO, profits rise when the supplier’s CSR level is low but fall when it is high. If the supplier’s CSR level is low, the e-tailer should practice CSR but not excessively. However, if the supplier’s CSR level is high, the e-tailer should refrain from engaging in CSR.