Article citationsMore>>

Buller, A. M., Peterman, A., Ranganathan, M., Bleile, A., Hidrobo, M., & Heise, L. (2018). A Mixed-Method Review of Cash Transfers and Intimate Partner Violence in Low-and Middle-Income Countries. The World Bank Research Observer, 33, 218-258.
https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lky002

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: When Children Lose Bargaining Power: An Economic Model of Domestic Violence against Children

  AUTHORS: Zhixing Ni

  KEYWORDS: Noncooperative Family Game Model, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.14 No.5, October 24, 2024

  ABSTRACT: This paper develops a noncooperative family game-theoretic model to analyze domestic violence against children, focusing on how children’s bargaining power affects the equilibrium outcomes between them and their parents in violent games. I present two scenarios: one in which children retain some negotiating leverage through external support services and another in which children lose bargaining power entirely. In the first scenario, parents use violence up to the point where children’s utility matches their threat point, which is based on the support provided by external services. In contrast, parents in the second scenario maximize their violent behavior while staying below the threshold that would trigger external interventions. My analysis extends existing economic models of domestic violence by specifically addressing violence against children, who often lack the economic resources or by negotiating the leverage that adult victims may possess.