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Lang, L. H. P., Stulz, R., & Walkling, R. A. (1989). Managerial Performance, Tobin’s Q, and the Gains from Successful Tender Offers. Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 137-154.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(89)90075-5

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Impacts of Corporate Social Responsibility on the Corporate Optimum Risk: Evidence of Mergers and Acquisitions

  AUTHORS: John Rugira

  KEYWORDS: ESG, Excessive Risk-Avoidance, Excessive Risk-Taking, M&A

  JOURNAL NAME: American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, Vol.14 No.9, September 26, 2024

  ABSTRACT: This paper investigates whether corporate social responsibility reduces deviations from the firm’s optimal risk-taking within the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) framework. Using two risk-taking measures and a sample of 10,647 transactions between 1991 and 2020 in public firms worldwide, we find that pre-M&A Environment Social and Governance (ESG) acts as a control mechanism to reduce deviations from optimal risk-taking. ESG reduces post-M&A excessive risk-taking but also limits excessive risk avoidance. A more robust ESG performance is associated with smaller deviations from optimal risk-taking levels, although integration complexity and managerial opportunism nurture deviations from the optimum risk-taking. These findings are consistent with the “stakeholder” view of ESG activities.