TITLE:
Assessing the Economic Viability of France’s Pension Reforms Using AJ-LF Models
AUTHORS:
Anton Samokish, Georgii Kiselev, Ivan Minyaev, Kuzma Meleshin, Platon Ustinov, Ruslan Kerimov
KEYWORDS:
Pension Reform, France, Labor Market, Game Theory, Trade Unions
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.14 No.1,
February
29,
2024
ABSTRACT: The article is dedicated to the analysis of the Pension reform of 2023 in
France. At the time of April 2023 this topic was hotly debated; many
politicians, sociologists, economists, and common citizens expressed their
opinions about Emmanuel Macron’s politics. The article examines the underlying
reasons, background, and public response to the reform, as well as its
immediate and long-term effects, through an unbiased investigation by
developing a macroeconomic model for goods and labor markets. But what makes
the study unique in its essence is a non-standard usage of game theory
techniques: dominant and dominating strategies, Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. This approach provides readers with a unique and unconventional
perspective on the situation, enabling them to gain insight into the
motivations behind the actions of various stakeholders and improve their
overall understanding of the consequences following the reform. At the end of
the work authors provide a critical assessment of President Macron’s actions
and answers to the most intriguing questions: “Was the introduced reform
inevitable?”; “Perhaps it would be best to repeal the legislation and halt
everything right here and now?” “Should Mr. President and the Government take
public opinion into account, or it would be better to purely trust the view of
professionals and proceed with the current political vector?”