TITLE:
On the Non-Observational Character of Practical Knowledge
AUTHORS:
Guxing Chen
KEYWORDS:
Intentional Action, Practical Knowledge, Non-Observational Knowledge, Formal Cause, Process, Event
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Social Sciences,
Vol.12 No.3,
March
7,
2024
ABSTRACT: Anscombe’s practical knowledge remains a hotly
debated topic in the philosophy of action. Anscombe herself posits that when an
agent performs an action intentionally, they are aware of doing so without the
need for observation, underscoring the
non-observational essence of practical knowledge. However, skepticism
challenges this view, questioning whether practical knowledge persists
in instances of action failure. Anscombe affirms it does, a stance that puzzles
many scholars. This paper defends the non-observational nature of practical
knowledge from two angles: Firstly, it distinguishes between practical and
speculative knowledge by highlighting that practical knowledge catalyzes
intentional action, making it the formal cause. This implies that practical
knowledge’s validity is independent of the action’s outcome, thus rendering
action failure irrelevant to its existence. Secondly, intentional action is
characterized more as a continuum than a discrete
event. Therefore, interruptions or
failures do not denote the end but a continuation of the action process,
allowing the notion of failure to be reconsidered within the broader framework
of ongoing action.