TITLE:
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Behavior Strategies of Participants in the Supply Chain Financial Credit Market under Government Subsidies
AUTHORS:
Shu Fang, Bao Feng
KEYWORDS:
Government Subsidies, Supply Chain Finance, Credit Market, Evolutionary Game, Numerical Simulation
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Business and Management,
Vol.10 No.6,
November
16,
2022
ABSTRACT: On the basis of clarifying the participants in the
supply chain financial credit market and their credit behaviors, we use the
evolutionary game theory to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of
credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), core enterprises and
financial institutions in the government subsidy environment, and analyze the
equilibrium point. We also use numerical simulation to analyze the influence of
changes in government subsidies and other factors and different initial
conditions on the evolutionary results. The results show that: 1) The initial proportion of the active credit strategy selected by the
game player has a significant impact on the evolution of the system; 2) Government subsidies have a great positive effect on the convergence of
the credit system to the best stable state, but the function itself is not universal. Therefore, the
government needs to rationally coordinate the subsidy quotas of
participating entities in accordance with the actual situation, and provide
targeted support and subsidies; 3) The higher the
independent repayment rate of SMEs, the more the credit market converges to the
best stable state.